Obadele v. Kelley, 1988 WL 40282 (D.D.C.,1988)
Milele Archibald, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.
John D. Bates, Assistant United States Attorney, Washington, D.C., for defendants.
MEMORANDUM
GASCH, Senior District Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
*1 This matter is before the Court upon defendants' motion for partial dismissal of the second amended complaint and plaintiff's motion for default judgment against defendant George Moore. At oral argument, the Court granted leave to amend the complaint for purposes of the defendants' motion for partial dismissal. Also at that time, plaintiffs dismissed three defendants from the second amended complaint: James B. Adams, Norman Carlson, and Robert Hauberg. Although the claims against those individuals were dismissed, plaintiff's counsel stated that the allegations concerning them were to remain in the complaint. [n. 1]
On June 7, 1984, on several grounds, the Court dismissed the complaint in this case, brought by Imari Abubakari Obadele, who claims to be the President of the Republic of New Afrika ("RNA"), against various government officials. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on June 11, 1986, affirmed in part and reversed in part the dismissal of this case. The key portion of the order states:
Specifically, this Court reverses the District Court's dismissal on statute of limitations grounds of Obadele's claims concerning Federal Bureau of Investigation counterintelligence program activities unrelated to Obadele's arrest, conviction and incarceration and remands to the District Court for further proceedings on these claims.
Obadele v. Smith, No. 84-5529 (Judgment June 11, 1986). This memorandum will address the remaining claims based upon counterintelligence activities unrelated to the arrest, conviction and incarceration of plaintiff which were previously dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. Also discussed below are plaintiff's reinstated actions against Messrs. Spells, Lindberg, Moore and Hefner which previously were dismissed by this Court on want of prosecution grounds at a time when plaintiff had moved this Court to require the defense to supply the addresses of these defendants. [n. 2] The Memorandum-Order of this Court dated June 7, 1984, was otherwise affirmed. It dismissed the defendants former United States Attorneys General Griffin Bell, William French Smith, Edward Levi, and William Saxbe, William Webster, former Director of the FBI, and Joel Knowles, former caseworker at the United States Penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia. As pointed out in the previous opinion of the Court, only general, vague, conclusory allegations concerning these defendants were alleged and for that reason, the case was dismissed as to them.
To supplement the jumble of claims and parties already familiar to the Court, plaintiff seeks to add an additional party-plaintiff, the Republic of New Afrika, and to add the Department of Justice and the FBI as additional parties- defendant. Also relatively new to the case is plaintiff's motion for default judgment against defendant Moore.
In the years since plaintiff first sought redress in this Court, his financial aspirations apparently have been tempered. He and the RNA currently seek only $2.2 million in compensatory and punitive damages, less than one-fiftieth of the former demand of $114 million. The complaint also demands injunctive and declaratory relief from the Department of Justice, FBI and the remaining individuals.
For the reasons set forth in this memorandum, the Court dismisses the claims put forth by the RNA as time-barred; dismisses the claims against the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice as already dismissed by this Court and the Court of Appeals; dismisses the claims against the remaining defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim; dismisses the claims relating to plaintiff's arrest, conviction and incarceration on grounds of collateral estoppel; and dismisses the claims against defendant Robert Hefner and Spells, the informant, because they relate to plaintiff's arrest and conviction. Accordingly, the Court denies plaintiff's motion for default judgment against defendant Moore. As previously noted, plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed claims against James B. Adams, Norman Carlson, and Richard Hauberg.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
*2 A brief reference to the underlying facts of the original incident which gave rise to this case may be helpful. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal the convictions in United States of America v. James, 528 F.2d 999, cert. denied sub nom. Henry v. United States, 429 U.S. 959 (1976). One of the defendants in that case, Richard Bullock Henry, a/k/a Imari Abubakari Obadele, is the plaintiff in this case. The facts are set forth in considerable detail in the Fifth Circuit opinion and will not be repeated here. They may be summarized, however, as follows.
Defendant Henry, a/k/a Obadele, was president of an organization purporting to be an independent nation claiming sovereignty over the lands now comprising Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina. Henry was convicted of conspiring to commit offenses against the United States and of assaulting federal officers with, and possessing unregistered firearms. The charges arose from a shoot-out incident following the attempted service of an arrest warrant. During the shoot-out, a local police officer was shot and killed. Another local police officer and an FBI agent were seriously wounded. A substantial collection of automatic and other weapons, together with a large quantity of ammunition, a bomb, and ingredients from which molotov cocktails could be manufactured were found in the two buildings occupied by "citizens of the Republic of New Afrika." Further and of significance is the following passage from the Fifth Circuit's opinion:
A poster on the wall in the "capitol" at the time of and for some time prior to the shoot-out stated: "Our most important gratuity is an intelligent underground army which, if the Republic is attacked will burn white America to the ground as mercilessly as a missile attack."
Id. at 1010.
The attempted arrest followed receipt in the FBI office in Jackson, Mississippi, of a teletype message from the Detroit, Michigan, FBI office that a complaint had been filed, charging one Jerry R. Steiner, a/k/a Sylee Lagondele Omos I, with unlawful flight to avoid prosecution for first degree murder. Having information from a reliable source that Steiner was present at the Lewis or Lynch Street addresses of plaintiff and RNA, the FBI and the local police proceeded to execute the arrest warrant for Steiner and three others, for whom they had misdemeanor warrants. The shoot-out ensued.
III. MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL
Plaintiff Obadele has submitted a proposed second amended complaint adding the Republic of New Afrika as a plaintiff, and the Department of Justice and the FBI as defendants. [n. 3] In response to this submission, defendants filed a motion for partial dismissal, which, they state, is in accordance with the Court's order of December 22, 1986, instructing defendants to "submit their alternative to an amended complaint to narrow and clarify the issues on remand." Defendants emphasize that plaintiff should be prevented from pressing claims that the Court of Appeals affirmed as properly dismissed. Defendants also argue that the second amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to certain defendants. Further, the defendants seek dismissal on grounds of insufficiency of service of process, lack of personal jurisdiction or want of prosecution as to certain defendants.
*3 A. Adding the RNA as a Plaintiff
Defendants oppose joining the RNA as an additional plaintiff in this case because it has never been named as a plaintiff in this action since its inception in July 1980 or in the amended complaint filed May 8, 1981. The second amended complaint seeks to add RNA as a plaintiff, and demands $1.5 million on its behalf. Defendants argue that none of them had notice of any claims to be asserted by the RNA against them, and that these claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff's opposition to this statute of limitations defense rests on the arguments made in his motion to amend the complaint filed on November 12, 1986. Plaintiff argues that the previous complaint contained numerous allegations of damage to the provisional government, Republic of New Afrika. He stated that the RNA must be added so that the Court may afford it "complete relief." Plaintiff argues that Rule 19(a) provides authority for adding the RNA as a plaintiff, as long as its joining will not deprive the court of jurisdiction and in its absence complete relief cannot be granted. Plaintiff insists that the RNA has distinct interests that should be adjudicated individually.
Rule 19(a) provides, in part:
Persons to be Joined if Feasible.
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded to those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest....
Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a). The United States Supreme Court has stated that a party should be joined to an action if it has "an interest in the controversy, and ... ought to be made [a party], in order that the court may act on that rule which requires it to decide on, and finally determine the entire controversy, and do complete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in it." Shields v. Barrows, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1855); see Bakia v. Los Angeles County, 687 F.2d 298, 301 (9th Cir.1982). There is no precise formula for applying this rule; the facts and circumstances of each case weigh heavily in the court's determinations pursuant to Rule 19(a). 7 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1604 (2d ed. 1986).
In their supplemental memorandum regarding the statute of limitations, defendants argue that the timeliness of plaintiff's proposed joinder turns on whether the second amended complaint adding the RNA as a plaintiff "relates back" to the original complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 15(c) provides that whenever a claim in the amended pleadings arises out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
*4 Plaintiff rejoins that the claims asserted for the provisional government of the Republic of New Afrika in the second amended complaint satisfy this requirement. Plaintiff also argues that the RNA is an indispensable or a necessary party to this action. According to plaintiff, the RNA has interests separate from his which may be impaired if the RNA is excluded from this case.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has addressed the issue of the addition of plaintiffs and relation back of amendments. Leachman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 694 F.2d 1301 (D.C.Cir.1982). In Leachman, the Court of Appeals acknowledged "the need to limit relation back of claims asserted by new plaintiffs in some way beyond the 'conduct, transaction, or occurrence' test that applies to relation back of amendments generally." Id. at 1309 (citing Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 238-39 (5th Cir.1968)). Recognizing that the policy underlying Rule 15(c) is notice to the party opposing the amendment, the Court stated that "[a]t some point, defendants should know who their adversaries are." Id.
In Leachman, the addition of a corporation wholly-owned by the existing plaintiff was at issue. [n. 4] The Court of Appeals affirmed the conclusion of the lower court that the statute of limitations barred the adding of the proposed plaintiff. Id. at 1310. The court based its ruling on the existing plaintiff's failure to show that the defendant knew or should have known of the potential involvement of the proposed plaintiff. Finding no relation between the plaintiff's claim and her ownership of the proposed plaintiff's stock, and noting that her claims would not have been affected if her husband had willed the stock to someone else, the court found no identity of interest between the plaintiff and proposed plaintiff. Without this identity of interest, the court concluded that the "nature of Mrs. Leachman's action ... gave no notice of the existence of Northern Counties". [n. 5] Id. at 1309. The court noted that plaintiff provided no explanation for the failure to include the proposed plaintiff in the original complaint. Id. at 1310 n. 7.
In the case at bar, the original complaint filed in 1980 asserted claims on behalf of Mr. Obadele that stand apart from the claims the RNA would seek to bring. The events alleged to have an impact on plaintiff Obadele do not provide the basis for a claim by the RNA. Instead, the RNA seeks to bring a new cause of action arising out of some of the same occurrences.
As in Leachman, the original complaint did not put defendants on notice of the separate damage claims to be asserted by the proposed plaintiff. Defendants note, as did the Court in Leachman, that plaintiffs offer no explanation for the failure to join the RNA in the original complaint or the first amended complaint. For these reasons, the Court holds that the statute of limitations bars Mr. Obadele from joining the RNA as a plaintiff in this case.
*5 The Court also notes a more fundamental objection. The complaint fails to set forth any Rule 17(b) qualifications of RNA to sue and be sued. It appears from the complaint that RNA is or may be an unincorporated association, but its domicile is not alleged. Regarding such associations, Rule 17(b) provides that the capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held, except (1) that a partnership or other unincorporated association, which has no such capacity than by the law of such state, may sue or be sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States....
In Provisional Government of the Republic of New Afrika, et al. v. ABC, et al., No. 85-6000 (D.C.Cir. June 30, 1987), RNA sought redress primarily on theories of common law defamation and conspiracy to deny civil rights. Affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that such claims by RNA were not cognizable because unincorporated associations have no capacity to sue in the courts of the District of Columbia. Slip op. at 2 (citing Day v. Avery, 548 F.2d 1018, 1022 (D.C.Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977)). Further, the proposed amendments to the complaint regarding RNA do not allege that any constitutional or statutory right is involved in its mission to win political independence for the five states allegedly comprising its domain. Consequently, the caveat in Rule 17 regarding substantive constitutional rights does not open the doors of this Court to RNA.
B. Adding the DOJ and the FBI as Defendants
Defendants oppose adding the DOJ and the FBI as defendants. Neither entity was named in the complaint dated May 8, 1981, nor has plaintiff asserted a distinct cause of action against either of them, except for the injunctive relief sought against continuing Cointelpro activities. [n. 6] The Court of Appeals affirmed this Court's dismissal of the claim for injunctive relief on the ground that the complaint lacked sufficiently specific allegations of a continuing conspiracy to support a claim for injunctive relief. Defendants argue that the DOJ and the FBI cannot be added as defendants in order to resurrect the claim for injunctive relief.
Plaintiff Obadele again rests on arguments made in his motion to amend the complaint, filed November 12, 1986. In that motion, plaintiff argued that the prior complaint contains allegations of wrongful activities of the DOJ and the FBI. Further, plaintiff asserted that he needed to add the organizations as defendants in order for the Court to provide complete relief to him. Plaintiff argued that the organizations would not be prejudiced because the interests of the United States have been represented by the U.S. Attorney and because the heads of those organizations were served with summonses and complaints in this matter.
In his supplemental memorandum, plaintiff asserts that the statute of limitations would not bar the addition of the DOJ and FBI as defendants because, in accordance with Rule 15(c), there was timely service of the original complaint upon the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia on July 25, 1980, and on the United States Attorney General on July 31, 1980. [n. 7] Plaintiff further argues that the proposed defendants are indispensable parties to this action. Without their joinder, plaintiff maintains that the Court will be precluded from conducting a full litigation of plaintiff's claims as a proper predicate to any equitable relief. Plaintiff seeks injunctions which may "decide on, and finally determine the entire controversy, and do complete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in it." Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139 (1854).
*6 The Court denies plaintiff's motion to join the FBI and the Department of Justice as defendants. Defendants have correctly characterized plaintiff's attempt to join the new defendants as an attempt to revive the injunctive relief claim by adding two new defendants. As noted above, the Court of Appeals deemed proper this Court's dismissal of that claim against the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI. Because these defendants were sued in their official capacities, plaintiff had effectively brought suit against the FBI and the DOJ. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (stating that an official capacity suit is to be treated as a suit against the entity). The proposed joinder of the FBI and DOJ, therefore, is little more than plaintiff's attempt to overrule the Court of Appeals and reinstate properly dismissed claims.
Plaintiff's attempt to join the FBI and DOJ is precluded for a second reason. Without an injunctive remedy available against these agencies, plaintiff is left with his demand for substantial money damages--$1.5 million for RNA and $700,000 for himself. Sovereign immunity bars money damages against the United States, its agencies or officials while acting in their official capacities unless there is a specific waiver by the federal government. United States v. Testan, 392 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 103, 104 (D.C.Cir.1984). Plaintiff has not alleged any waiver of sovereign immunity nor has he even sought to bring himself within the scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
C. Motion to Compel Addresses
The power of compulsion possessed by this Court is exercised with reluctance and only in unusual circumstances. Cf. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (injunctive relief is extraordinary remedy). Action may be compelled only when the balance of equities favor the party seeking relief. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193 (1978). Thus, the Court will compel production of the addresses of Lindberg and Holder only if plaintiff has demonstrated that the weight of equity is with him.
Plaintiff can make no such showing. To the contrary, he seeks to have this Court foist upon the defendants' shoulders his burden of reasonable diligence in prosecuting his case. The record is devoid of any indication that plaintiff has made a minimal attempt to serve Lindberg and Holder. After eight years of litigation, such indolence is inexcusable and precludes the exercise of this Court's compulsory processes. [n. 8] Additionally, without service upon defendants Lindberg and Holder, this action may not proceed against them; the claims against them are dismissed with prejudice.
*7 D. Personal Jurisdiction: Individual Defendants
Defendants have moved for dismissal of the case against defendants Levi, Miller, Brennan and others for lack of personal jurisdiction over them. [n. 9] The government contends that because the complaint does not allege that these nonresident defendants caused injury to Mr. Obadele in the District of Columbia, plaintiff has failed to allege any personal jurisdiction as to all the individual nonresident defendants.
It is plaintiff's burden to establish that this Court has jurisdiction. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182 (1936); Tavoulareas v. Comnas, 720 F.2d 192, 195 (D.C.Cir.1983). A review of the cases on this subject demonstrates that plaintiff's reliance upon the District of Columbia long-arm statute fails to support his assertion of personal jurisdiction. [n. 10] Plaintiff relies on the proposition that officials in the Department of Justice and the FBI conceived and put into operation the Cointel program in the District of Columbia. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir.1984). Additionally, plaintiff's complaint extensively reviews the alleged adverse effect of that program upon him. Without exception, these allegations of harm focus on activities of plaintiff principally in Mississippi, but also in Detroit and New York.
Upon a liberal reading of the complaint, the Court might assert personal jurisdiction over Messrs. Levi, Miller and Brennan because these defendants transacted business in the District of Columbia, D.C.Code Ann. § 13- 423(a)(1), or because plaintiff suffered injury in this jurisdiction. D.C.Code Ann. §§ 13-423(a)(3) & (4). [n. 11] The latter of these theories is easily resolved against the plaintiff. Although absent from his complaint, plaintiff argues in his supporting papers that the Cointelpro impaired his ability to obtain support for his project of severing five southern states from the domain of the United States and installing as the sovereign the RNA. Plaintiff contends that the Cointelpro successfully damaged his reputation and dissuaded federal officials from offering support to plaintiff's project.
The glaring flaw in plaintiff's theory is the absence of any constitutionally authorized mechanism by which federal officials could foster the acquisition of sovereignty by the RNA over five southern states. Plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to meet with federal officials and plead for assistance. The failure of his plea does not evince damage to his reputation; it is simply consistent with the frivolity of his project. The properly pleaded allegations of injury focus on events in Mississippi, Louisiana, New York, and Michigan. Consequently, sections 13-423(a)(3) and 13-423(a)(4) of the long-arm statute provide no basis for personal jurisdiction over Messrs. Levi, Miller, Brennan or any other nonresident defendants in this case. See Moncrief v. Lexington Herald-Leader Co., 807 F.2d 217, 221 (D.C.Cir.1986) (plain language of subsection (a)(3) requires showing that injury occurred in District of Columbia); Traeger v. Wallace Berrie & Co., 593 F.Supp. 223, 225 (D.D.C.1984) (subsection (a)(4) confers personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant if tortious injury occurred in District of Columbia).
A similar defect undermines any claim that personal jurisdiction lies in the District of Columbia under the transacting business concept of section 13- 423(a)(1). [n. 12] Under that section, both the business transaction and its consequences must occur in the District of Columbia. See Traeger, 593 F.Supp. at 225; Cockrell v. Cumberland Corp., 458 A.2d 716, 717 (D.C.1983). As the Court noted above, the effects, if any, of Cointelpro activity were felt elsewhere than the District of Columbia.
*8 Further analysis of the transacting business concept reveals a second factual deficiency that precludes assertion of personal jurisdiction by this Court. "It is now well-settled that the 'transacting business' provision embraces those contractual activities of a nonresident defendant which cause consequence here." Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988, 992 (D.C.1981) (emphasis added) (citing Rose v. Silver, 394 A.2d 1368 (D.C.1978); Cohane v. Arpeja-California, Inc., 385 A.2d 153 (D.C.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978)). As plaintiff tacitly admits throughout his complaint, the actions of defendants Levi, Miller and Brennan in the District of Columbia were supervisory, political or policy-oriented. In no instance did any of these defendants engage in contractual or commercial activities in the District of Columbia that impinged on plaintiff's reputation with federal officials.
For the various reasons set forth above, the Court perceives no basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over any of the identified individual defendants. Because plaintiff has been denied leave to join the FBI and DOJ and has had abundant opportunity to discover any individual defendants not already identified, his complaint must be dismissed in its entirety. In order to elucidate the factual basis for dismissing the individual defendants, the Court will briefly examine the role of these defendants as alleged by plaintiff. Where appropriate, other defenses fatal to the complaint are discussed.
1. Lindberg and Holder
As the Court has made clear, it cannot properly exercise jurisdiction under the long-arm statute over these nonresident defendants whose actions allegedly affected plaintiff in Mississippi, Louisiana, New York, Michigan, or elsewhere than in the District of Columbia. The defendants Lindberg and Holder, according to allegations in the complaint, were FBI agents stationed in Mississippi. No allegations concern any activities in the District of Columbia. For that reason, the complaint against Lindberg and Holder must be dismissed.
2. Levi
Defendant Levi, former Attorney General of the United States, is sued because he failed to disclose to the Church Committee all the details of the Cointelpro program as it related to plaintiff. [n. 13] Consistent with his pattern of incomplete and ambiguous pleading, plaintiff only intimates that jurisdiction over Mr. Levi is based on the act of testifying before this Committee. This allegation is inferred for plaintiff's benefit because the Court has already explained that plaintiff cannot rely solely upon Mr. Levi's employment with the federal government to establish a nexus with the District of Columbia. Despite indulgence of plaintiff's inadequate pleading, Mr. Levi's testimony cannot be the basis for personal jurisdiction over him. Certainly, testimony is not a commercial or contractual activity. Moreover, appearance before the Committee under its subpoena is not voluntary and, therefore, not an act within the purview of sections 13-423(a)(3) or 13-423(a)(4). [n. 14] See Tavoulareas v. Comnas, 720 F.2d 192, 194 (D.C.Cir.1983).
The Court also notes that Mr. Levi's tenure as Attorney General does not coincide with operation of the Cointel program. He joined the Justice Department in this role on February 6, 1975. The Cointel program, however, was terminated in the early 1970's. Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 9-10 & n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1984) (citing Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, S.Rep. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.1976)). Additionally, to the extent that Mr. Levi's testimony was anticipated by plaintiff to vindicate a defense asserted by him, but rejected, at his trial, the claim against Mr. Levi relates to the trial, conviction and incarceration of plaintiff. All such claims were dismissed by this Court under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Obadele v. Smith, No. 80-1844, slip op. at 8 (June 7, 1984). After reviewing the so-called vindication evidence, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Obadele v. Smith, No. 84-5529 (Judgment June 11, 1986). [n. 15]
*9 3. Spells and Hefner
The activities alleged concerning Messrs. Spells and Hefner took place mostly in Mississippi but also in other locales far removed from the District of Columbia. Mr. Spells is alleged to be an FBI informant and Mr. Hefner is the FBI agent who supervised Mr. Spells' activities. Since these activities did not take place in the District of Columbia, the jurisdictional doctrine set forth in this memorandum applies to them.
Again, plaintiff's ignorance of the Judgment of the Court of Appeals affords a separate basis for dismissing his claims. The allegations against defendant Hefner are either patently general or concern the use of defendant Spells as an undercover informant under Mr. Hefner's supervision. Particularly, plaintiff alleges that defendant Spells infiltrated and disrupted plaintiff's defense of his criminal prosecution. Plaintiff also alleges the use of a fugitive arrest warrant for Jerry Steiner as a ruse for the raid on RNA properties. Both of those alleged events were central to plaintiff's arrest and conviction and provided the basis for his defense and later collateral attacks on his prosecution and conviction. Defendants correctly maintain that even if the alleged events were part of the Cointelpro activities against plaintiff, they are not actionable in light of the Court of Appeals' ruling affirming the dismissal of all claims related to plaintiff's arrest, conviction and incarceration. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the claims against defendants Spells and Hefner. [n. 16]
4. Kelley
While the jurisdictional flaws in plaintiff's complaint preclude personal jurisdiction over defendant Kelley, the Court finds it appropriate to elucidate the full panoply of flaws in plaintiff's claims against this defendant. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Kelley, as head of the FBI, had a duty personally to ensure that the Church Committee was fully advised of all the facts and circumstances concerning the FBI's Cointelpro activities respecting the RNA. In addition, plaintiff contends that Mr. Kelley was obligated personally to provide FOIA material to the plaintiff and to refrain from notifying the Inspector General of HUD, from which organization plaintiff was seeking to borrow funds to finance a housing project in Detroit, of the activities in which plaintiff's organization was engaged.
Like Mr. Levi, Mr. Kelley is beyond the reach of the D.C. long-arm statute because he did not transact business in the District of Columbia. With respect to testimony before the Church Committee, the similarity between these defendants persists. As with all the defendants, no action by Mr. Kelley is alleged to have caused plaintiff any injury in the District of Columbia. Finally, because the FOIA-related allegations against Mr. Kelley fail to state a claim, they cannot be the basis for personal jurisdiction.
*10 Symptomatic of the inadequacy of plaintiff's pleading is the FOIA- related claim against Mr. Kelley. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Kelley obstructed the FOIA request and the inquiries of the Church Committee. Essentially, plaintiff contends that FBI employees failed to unearth every remnant and artifact of the Cointelpro activities regarding plaintiff. In a treacherous leap up the FBI organizational chart, plaintiff concludes that Mr. Kelley, as Director of the FBI, is responsible for these alleged omissions in the agency's FOIA response. The fatal deficiency of this claim, however, is the inapplicability of respondeat superior to Mr. Kelley in his individual capacity. See Lojuk v. Quandt, 706 F.2d 1456, 1468 (7th Cir.1983). [n. 17] However reluctant he may be, plaintiff must realize that FOIA responses were not prepared by Mr. Kelley. Thus, plaintiff fails to state a claim for which this Court may grant relief.
The final blow is dealt to the claims against Mr. Kelley by plaintiff's failure to allege with sufficient specificity the involvement of Mr. Kelley in a constitutional violation. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982). In communicating with the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Mr. Kelley acted squarely within the scope of his discretion to notify other federal agencies of information pertinent to those agencies' activities. In the course of such discretionary action within his duties, Mr. Kelley enjoys qualified immunity from damages suits to redress alleged constitutional torts. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507-08 (1978); Martin v. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, 812 F.2d 1425, 1431 (D.C.Cir.1987). Because plaintiff's claim regarding the letter to HUD states no "compensable claim for relief under the Federal Constitution, it [can]not survive a motion to dismiss." Butz, 438 U.S. at 507-08; see Chagnon v. Bell, 642 F.2d 1248, 1261 (D.C.Cir.1980) (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 507).
5. Moore
Urging dismissal of the complaint against defendant Moore, [n. 18] the government presses an argument unusually appropriate to this case. The contention simply is that plaintiff's belated service upon Moore on December 11, 1986--more than six years after the complaint was filed and six months after the Court of Appeals' judgment--clearly failed to comply with Rule 4(j) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In its Order in June 1984, this Court dismissed Moore on precisely this basis. The Court of Appeals, however, considered this action premature because there was pending plaintiff's motion to compel production of defendant Moore's address.
The motion to compel is now moot because plaintiff has served Moore at his address in Northern Virginia. [n. 19] Plaintiff's belated achievement of this task without intervention of the Court or assistance of the government belies his claim of diligence. Additionally, plaintiff did not argue on appeal that his efforts to serve Mr. Moore were frustrated by the government's refusal to supply his address. For these reasons, the Court believes that plaintiff inexcusably failed to serve Mr. Moore in a timely manner as required by Rule 4(j). This neglect is one basis for dismissal of the complaint against Mr. Moore.
*11 Plaintiff's procedural lack of diligence is accompanied by a more compelling substantive inadequacy in the complaint against Mr. Moore. The various paragraphs concerning Mr. Moore either relate to plaintiff's arrest, conviction and incarceration or fail to allege with the requisite factual specificity a compensable constitutional tort. Mr. Moore's identification of plaintiff as a "black power advocate" and threat to the nation's security was entirely accurate as evidenced by plaintiff's avowed purpose as president of the RNA and his conviction in 1973. See Second Amended Complaint ¶ 64f (admitting that violent characterization of RNA not "inaccurate"). The remaining allegations are prefaced by an acknowledgment that Mr. Moore's actions implemented FBI policy. Id. ¶ 60. In none of these duplicative and vague allegations does plaintiff contend that Mr. Moore discharged his duty "in a way known to [him] to violate the United States Constitution, or in a manner that [he] should know transgresses a clearly established constitutional rule." Butz, 438 U.S. at 507; see Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. The barrage of conclusory claims in the counts of the complaint do not satisfy this obligation. At most, plaintiff states a claim for common law defamation--a tort that does not rest on a constitutional foundation. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 698 (1976).
In Paul, the Court considered precisely whether a charge of defamation states a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the fourteenth amendment. Paul was the Chief of Police in Louisville, Kentucky. During the 1972 Christmas season, he compiled a list of persons recently arrested for shoplifting. The name and picture of each person was included in a flyer distributed to merchants in the city. Davis appeared in the flyer. [n. 20] Id. at 695-96. Among the adverse consequences for which plaintiff sought redress was a reprimand by his employer. Though plaintiff was not fired, he was warned to avoid " 'a similar situation' in the future." Id. at 696. Upon these facts, Davis alleged a violation of his constitutional rights and sought damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. On Paul's motion, the complaint was dismissed for failing to allege deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution. Id.
Davis contended in his complaint that the unfounded label "active shoplifter" would deter him from entering retail stores for fear of being suspected of shoplifting. He also anticipated impairment of future employment opportunities. Id. at 697. The Supreme Court, reviewing the Sixth Circuit's reinstatement of the complaint, 505 F.2d 1180 (1974), acknowledged that Davis stated a claim of defamation [n. 21] under state law. Id. The difficulty, however, was that Davis declined to press this claim, substituting allegations of constitutional dimension. [n. 22]
Setting the context for Davis' proposed expansion of the liability of federal officials, the Court began:
*12 If respondent's view is to prevail, a person arrested by law enforcement officers who announce that they believe such person to be responsible for a particular crime in order to calm the fears of an aroused populace, presumably obtains a claim against such officers under § 1983. And since it is surely far more clear from the language of the Fourteenth Amendment that "life" is protected against state deprivation than it is that reputation is protected against state injury, it would be difficult to see why the survivors of an innocent bystander mistakenly shot by a policeman or negligently killed by a sheriff driving a government vehicle, would not have claims equally cognizable under § 1983.
It is hard to perceive any logical stopping place to such a line of reasoning. Respondent's construction would seem almost necessarily to result in every legally cognizable injury which may have been inflicted by a state official acting under "color of law" establishing a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. We think it would come as a great surprise to those who drafted and shepherded the adoption of that Amendment to learn that it worked such a result, and a study of our decisions convinces us they do not support the construction urged by respondent.
Paul, 424 U.S. at 698-99. As a first step in rejecting the position urged by Davis, the Court declined to accept that traditional state law claims are actionable under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and section 1983. Id. at 699. A tort attains constitutional status only if the plaintiff can point to the "specific constitutional guarantee safeguarding the interest he asserts has been invaded." Id. at 700; see Baker v. McCollam, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979); Butz, 438 U.S. at 507-08. In the Court's view, Davis could not enumerate a specific constitutional protection against reputational injury. Paul, 424 U.S. at 701.
The Court then addressed the implied premise of Davis' argument that stigmatization of his reputation was a unique kind of injury. The Court was not persuaded, however, that the distinction was tenable. "The words 'liberty' and 'property' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment do not in terms single out reputation as a candidate for special protection over and above other interests that may be protected by state law." Id. Expanding this conclusion to state and federal officials, the Court determined "that the weight of our decisions establishes no constitutional doctrine converting every defamation by a public official into a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 702 (footnote omitted); see id. at 702 n. 3.
Particularly pertinent to the case with which this Court is now concerned is the extensive discussion in Paul of the constitutional distinction between defamation standing alone and defamation accompanied by deprivation of a right previously held under state law. [n. 23] In the course of that discussion, Chief Justice (then Justice) Rehnquist persuasively explained that a claim for denial of Due Process had been recognized in defamation cases only when the plaintiff's legal status under state law was affected. Compare Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972) with Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952). The upshot of the cases, as stated by the Chief Justice, is applicable to the case at bar with remarkable precision:
In each of these cases, as a result of the state action complained of, a right of status previously recognized by state law was distinctly altered or extinguished. It was this alteration, officially removing the interest from the recognition and protection previously afforded by the State, which we found sufficient to invoke the procedural guarantees contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the interest in reputation alone which respondent seeks to vindicate in this action in federal court is quite different from the "liberty" or "property" recognized in those decisions....
*13 Respondent in this case cannot assert denial of any right vouchsafed to him by the State and thereby protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. That being the case, petitioners' defamatory publications, however seriously they may have harmed respondent's reputation, did not deprive him of any "liberty" or "property" interests protected by the Due Process Clause.
Paul, 424 U.S. at 711-12.
Like Davis, plaintiff Obadele asserts merely that his growing fame became infamy; he states no denial of a right--for example, the right to an untarnished reputation--guaranteed to him by the law of any state or the federal government.
To the extent that plaintiff might distinguish Paul as inapposite to his allegations of conspiracy, which along with defamation comprise the whole of the complaint, Martin v. District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, 812 F.2d 1425 (D.C.Cir.1987), reveals the distinction as irrelevant. In Martin, the plaintiff complained that the United States Capitol Police conspired to deter him from redressing injuries arising from a prior allegedly unlawful arrest. Id. at 1427. In the District Court, Martin's complaint survived a motion to dismiss because in the opinion of Judge Joyce Hens Green, Martin had stated a theory that put the defendants' conduct beyond the "outer perimeter" of their authority. As a consequence, Judge Green ruled that the officers might not enjoy absolute immunity. Id. at 1428.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed. Before reaching Martin's conspiracy allegations, the Court concluded that "[t]he only overt acts in which the defendants are alleged to have engaged are squarely within both the statutory authority conferred on the U.S. Capitol Police ... and the general ambit of law enforcement duties." Id. at 1429. Given this characterization of Martin's allegations, the Court considered whether conspiracy allegations could breathe life into Martin's complaint. Immediately dismissed was the possibility that the defendants' improper motive, if any, could have rejuvenative powers. That possibility is precluded by Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), and its progeny. Equally impotent was Martin's argument that an agreement to perform absolutely immunized acts, though improperly motivated, is not within the scope of the immunity that shields the acts themselves. Martin, 812 F.2d at 1429 & n. 15. Upon this reasoning, the court concluded that the officers enjoyed absolute immunity to Martin's common law claims.
The remaining issue of the defendants' qualified immunity against constitutional torts implicated the Butz and Paul line of cases. Because Martin alleged that the defendants sought to impede his access to the courts, he successfully stated a claim of constitutional proportion. At this point, the Court of Appeals encountered the intractable task of explicating the analytical framework for claims of qualified immunity. Id. at 1431-32. Plaintiff Obadele apparently would have this Court travel the same obscure path. This Court's journey, however, need go no further than the premise from which the Court of Appeals launched its voyage.
*14 Unlike Martin, plaintiff Obadele fails to state an injury for which the Constitution affords redress. As discussed extensively above, his claims in all their unsightly forms are all versions of common law defamation. Without more, there is no constitutional tort, and the question of qualified immunity need not be addressed. Further, Martin leaves no doubt that the individual defendants in this case are absolutely immune to suit for common law defamation or for conspiracy to commit that tort.
Finally, the Court reiterates that plaintiff has entirely failed to justify the extension of the District of Columbia's long-arm jurisdiction to any defendants in this case. Plaintiff makes no colorable claim that he suffered any injury in this jurisdiction as a result of Mr. Moore's activities. [n. 24]
6. Brennan and Miller
Plaintiff has also sued two supervisory FBI officials, Charles D. Brennan and Edward S. Miller. It is alleged that these officials participated in the preparation of the Cointel program and that they had knowledge of its operation and approved of it. At the outset, the Court is confronted with the same problem addressed previously in this negative effect upon plaintiff's ability to carry his project forward. Although specific places are alleged where such tactics were carried out, there is no allegation that such tactics took place in the District of Columbia. It is also alleged that, acting under the direction of these supervisory officials, FBI agents in Mississippi, defendants Lindberg and Holder, persuaded a Hines County farmer who had agreed to sell 20 acres of land to plaintiff, not to do so. This was to have been an important extension of plaintiff's project.
Like the other specific allegations of the complaint, these acts bear no relation to the District of Columbia. Consequently, these acts may not be the basis for personal jurisdiction over these defendants. Equally destructive of the claims against Miller and Brennan is plaintiff's familiar failure to identify a compensable constitutional tort. As discussed with respect to defendant Kelley, plaintiff's allegations state a claim for defamation against which these former federal officials are immune. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 701; see Martin, 812 F.2d at 1428.
IV. MOTION FOR DEFAULT
Earlier in this memorandum, the claims against defendant Moore were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, failure to prosecute and failure to state a claim. Technically, disposition of the claims against Mr. Moore was premature because there remains pending plaintiff's entry of default and motion for default judgment against Mr. Moore. Of course, Mr. Moore opposes the motion and asks that the entry of default be vacated. As suggested by the dismissal of all claims against Mr. Moore, plaintiff's motion will be denied and Mr. Moore's motion to vacate will be granted.
Under modern procedure, default judgments are not favored. Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 805 (D.C.Cir.1980). This predilection for resolving disputes on their merits, rather than upon procedural miscues, explains the sound discretion of the district courts to set aside an entry of default. See Keegel v. Key West & Caribbean Trading Co., 627 F.2d 372, 374 (D.C.Cir.1980). Under Rule 55(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an entry of default may be set aside for good cause shown. Evaluation of a motion under Rule 55(c) is guided by the primary object of default judgments--the totally unresponsive party. Jackson, 636 F.2d at 836.
*15 Defendant Moore can hardly be labelled "totally unresponsive," particularly in the context of this case. While plaintiff filed this action in 1980, he did not serve Mr. Moore until December 11, 1986. Thirty-three days later, upon plaintiff's application, default was entered by the Clerk against Mr. Moore. On the same day, the United States opposed the entry of default, purporting to represent all defendants. At least since January 13, 1987, Moore has been represented, along with all the other individual defendants, by the government. This procedural dueling was complicated by a petition for certiorari pending before the Supreme Court from November 12, 1986, when plaintiff made the application, until January 12, 1987, when the application was denied. Obadele v. Smith sub. nom. Obadele v. Meese, 107 S.Ct. 904 (1987).
Under these circumstances, Mr. Moore cannot be characterized as a totally unresponsive defendant. In reaching this conclusion, the Court notes particularly that Mr. Moore's failure to answer or otherwise plead was a consequence of the complicated procedural posture of the case and the inadvertence of government counsel. Finally, the Court perceives no possible prejudice to plaintiff as a consequence of vacating the default. See Jackson, 636 F.2d at 836. On January 12, 1987, plaintiff had not even filed the second amended complaint which he so fervently urged the Court to accept. On these facts, the Court finds good cause to set aside the default entered against Mr. Moore.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Court has granted the government's motion for partial dismissal of the second amended complaint and, additionally, has dismissed the rest of the defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. The claims put forth by the RNA are dismissed. The claims against defendants DOJ, FBI, Messrs. Levi, Miller, Brennan, Moore, Hefner, Holder, Spells and Kelley are dismissed. The claims surrounding Mr. Obadele's arrest, conviction and incarceration are dismissed. The entry of default against Moore is set aside.
ORDER
Upon defendants' Motion for Partial Dismissal and plaintiff's Motions for Default Judgment, to Compel Addresses, and to join the Republic of New Afrika as a plaintiff and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice as defendants, the oppositions thereto, and the record herein, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum, it is by the Court this 25th day of April, 1988
ORDERED that defendants' Motion for Partial Dismissal be, and hereby is, granted; and it is further
*16 ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment be, and hereby is, denied; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion to Compel Addresses be, and hereby is, denied; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion to join the Republic of New Afrika, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Justice be, and hereby is, denied; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff's complaint be, and hereby is, dismissed in its entirety.
n. 1. Allegations concerning defendants dismissed from the complaint are stricken in accordance with Rule 8(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
n. 2. The motion to compel the disclosure of the addresses of defendants Spells, Lindberg, Moore and Hefner remains. Also pending are plaintiff's motions to amend the complaint and to compel answers to interrogatories.
n. 3. Although the Court granted leave to amend the Complaint for purposes of this motion, the Court will refer to a singular plaintiff throughout this memorandum. As will be seen in section III. A. of this memorandum, the Court dismisses as time-barred the claims asserted by the RNA.
n. 4. Northern Counties Lumber Co. was wholly owned by plaintiff's decedent and was the owner of the airplane in which the decedent was killed. The essence of the suit was a products liability claim for manufacturing and design defects. Shortly after litigation began, the parties jointly dismissed the case with the condition that defendants would not attempt to invoke in a possible revived suit the statute of limitations. Only the decedent's survivor, not the corporation, was a party to this first action.
n. 5. In Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.1968), cited by the Leachman court, the amended complaint reflected merely a change in capacity of the proposed plaintiff. The mother of a boy injured by an Army firecracker had sued as next friend of her injured son, and was allowed to amend the complaint to claim as a plaintiff in her own right. Id. at 234. The Court reasoned that the mother's participation from the outset of the case as a party gave the defendant adequate notice that the mother's claims were involved.
n. 6. In Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C.Cir.1984), the Court described Cointelpro as an FBI program begun in 1967 and discontinued in the early 1970's.
n. 7. In their supplemental memorandum, defendants assert, and the Court agrees, that the statute of limitations is immaterial to the determination whether the proposed defendants may be joined.
n. 8. Plaintiff's indifference to his obligation of reasonable diligence is evident from the facility with which defendant Moore was served upon the exertion of some effort by plaintiff. Mr. Moore is a long-time resident of Northern Virginia whose name and address have been listed in the telephone book for longer than the life of this case.
n. 9. Originally, this motion also applied to defendant James B. Adams. At oral argument on September 17, 1987, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Mr. Adams from the second amended complaint.
Defendant Levi is a former United States Attorney General and defendants Miller and Brennan are former Assistant Directors of the FBI.
By implication, the defendants question this Court's personal jurisdiction over all the nonresident defendants. Only plaintiff's horrendous pleading has prevented a clearer statement of that position. Consequently, the Court accepts the implication as though expressly stated.
n. 10. Relevant portions of the statute provide:
(a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person's--
(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;
...
(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District of Columbia;
(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits
business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia....
D.C.Code Ann. § 13-423 (1981).
n. 11. The ensuing discussion accepts plaintiff's allegation that these three defendants were employed by the FBI and DOJ in the District of Columbia. Regarding the other individual defendants, plaintiff does not identify a single contact with the District. Regardless of this discussion, therefore, personal jurisdiction over these strangers to the District is impossible under the long-arm statute, which requires at a minimum one such contact.
n. 12. This jurisdictional premise could apply only to the three individual defendants who allegedly furthered Cointelpro by actions in the District of Columbia: Messrs. Levi, Miller, and Brennan.
n. 13. The Church Committee was a Select Committee of the United States Senate charged with investigating counterintelligence programs devised and implemented by the FBI in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
n. 14. Members of the Executive Department, such as the Attorney General or the Director of the FBI, as a matter of comity accede to the request of congressional committees to appear without the issuance of a subpoena. Failure to appear would in no case insulate that official from testimony. Either a subpoena or an order to the Sergeant-at-Arms would compel appearance.
n. 15. "Thus, we conclude, as the Fifth Circuit concluded before us in Obadele v. Civiletti, that:
[e]ven if we concede arguendo that the now-available evidence ... might have clearly supported the trial-rejected defense of a pretextual arrest warrant, this would not have justified the use of armed force by the RNA members in the house to deter the entry of the ... officers.... Nor--even though the post-shooting entry in the house was warrantless--would it now justify a suppression of the evidence in plain view seized by the police officers following their entry under exigent circumstances."
Obadele v. Smith, No. 84-5529 (D.C.Cir. June 11, 1986), mem. at 2 (quoting Obadele v. Civiletti, No. 79-3827 (5th Cir. Sept. 23, 1980).
n. 16. The motion to compel the address of Mr. Hefner has been rendered moot by the dismissal of the claims against him. For that reason, the Court denies that motion.
n. 17. In Lojuk, a former patient of a Veterans Administration hospital sued a doctor and the hospital's Director for subjecting him to electro-convulsive therapy. 706 F.2d at 1458. The claim against the Director was founded on her supervisory role at the hospital, though she was not personally involved in plaintiff's case. Affirming dismissal of the claim against the Director, the Seventh Circuit concluded that "[p]laintiff cannot maintain a Bivens-type action against federal officials on the basis of the doctrine of respondeat superior." Id. at 1468 (citing Beard v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 485, 497-98 (7th Cir.1979)).
n. 18. George C. Moore, former unit chief of the FBI, is alleged to have worked closely with defendants Miller and Brennan in the formulation of the Cointel program, especially that portion of it which concerned Black Nationalist groups. In Hobson v. Wilson, the Court of Appeals described this objective as follows:
The purpose of this new counterintelligence endeavor is to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership, and supporters, and to counter their propensity for violence and civil disorder.
737 F.2d at 10.
n. 19. Moore has resided at this address since long before this action began.
n. 20. Davis pleaded not guilty to the charge but was never tried. Shortly after the flyer was distributed, the Louisville Police Court dismissed the charge. 424 U.S. at 695-96.
n. 21. Defamation is the "[h]olding up of a person to ridicule, scorn or contempt in a respectable and considerable part of the community." Black's Law Dictionary 375 (5th ed. 1979).
n. 22. Plaintiff, in the case sub judice, has made the same tactical decision. Though he sues the individual defendants in their unofficial capacity, he bases his demand for redress on a panoply of constitutional provisions. The essence of his complaint, to the extent that one is discernible, is that the Cointel program impaired his reputation and diminished his influence with federal officials and members of his community.
n. 23. Familiar examples of such rights are employment or tax exempt status. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 703.
n. 24. See infra Part III (regarding plaintiff's motion for default judgment against Mr. Moore).