Document obtained from the "CIA computer" on the third floor of the National Archives in College Park, MD, on January 11th, 2002. Author and publication date unknown. From the bibliography one could infer it was written some time in the early 1970s. - Paul

Images of pages online at http://www.derechos.net/paulwolf/colombia/counterterror.htm

Approved For Release 1999/09/24: CIA-RDP85-00671ROO0200250001-4

COUNTERTERRORIST PROGRAM PRIMER

I. SUMMARY

II. TERRORIST METHODS

III. COUNTERTERRORIST TOOLS

IV. THREAT ANALYSIS

V. DEFENSIVE MEASURES

VI. INCIDENT PROCEDURES

VII. TERRORIST EXEMPLARS

VIII. BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. SUMMARY

OFFENSIVE TERROR

Threats, violence and coercion form the basis of offensive terror. Terrorism

is used to reduce effectively resistance to the aims of its proponents. It is

the means to (1) demoralize governmental authority; (2) separate a people from

their leaders; (3) paralyze opposition forces; (4) shock the indifferent; (5)

agitate and influence; (6) build terrorist morale; (7) enforce conformity or

compliance; (8) eliminate an enemy; (9) advertise and initiate a revolutionary

movement; (10) destroy group or population solidarity; (11) disorient a mass;

and provoke repressive government countermeasures which will antagonize the

population concerned.

Terror ruthlessly applied is a powerful and effective weapon so long as it

is not employed clumsily or to excesses which stimulate general population

alienation against the terrorists. Further, it can only be applied for short

durations or its effectiveness will be diminished as the population becomes

accustomed to living under these conditions. It is, therefore, imperative

that terrorist actions be planned to evoke a high but short-term state of

fear, dread, or anxiety among its target population. If terror is not measured

to accomplish these conditions, it cannot hope to attain favorable results for

the terrorists or their sponsors.

Given the above considerations, terrorism may not be effective unless it is

climactic and successful in its initial stages. All preparatory action must

therefore be clandestine and premature acts of violence cannot be permitted.

The preparatory phase of terrorism represents the most important and crucial

period. Dedicated covert leadership is needed to begin the process of

clandestine organization. Motivated manpower with ideology must be spotted,

recruited, trained and secretly formulated into small compartmented action

"cells." Financial and material resources, plus related supporting mechanisms

are essential if terrorist action is to be undertaken with sufficient impact.

Agents or informants must be recruited and trained to provide target

intelligence required for discriminate or indiscriminate acts of violence.

Technical skills and specialized equipment will need to be acquired for

bombing operations or unique approaches to assassination. Tactics must be

rehearsed generally without secure use of any geographic area or facility.

And last but not least, the means must be achieved to provide communication,

dispersion of assets, command and control plus tactical mobility.

Having completed all preparatory action secretly among an infinitesimal

portion of the population, a well-planned terrorist campaign is launched

suddenly by the conduct of massive acts of violence that occur simultaneously

over a wide area. The resultant shock effect may be expected to create highly

desirable psychological responses, and perhaps temporarily neutralize

opposition security forces. Taking advantage of this situation, the effective

terrorist organization can rapidly expand the level of violence until a

balance of power is achieved favoring the originators. Acts of terrorism can

then be dramatically decreased or curtailed until future needs demand a

resurgence.

During the conduct of the terror campaign, discriminate terrorism targets

selected leaders or individuals whose loss will severely handicap the "cause"

they represent. This selective violence is also used to disrupt government

machinery or impress specific groups by elimination of key personnel.

Indiscriminate terror is utilized to spread panic among the general population,

with the aim of eroding trust, authority and security. The general technique

includes bombing of restaurants, movies, hospitals, religious centers, and

transportation services, or assassination of people in the street. As a

general rule, this type of terror is most effective when it appears to have

no specific targets even though particular acts of violence may be highly

selective.

2. DEFENSIVE TERROR

If governments or independent groups become frustrated over their inability

to negate, offensive terror by legal means, they may resort to the employment

of violence to counter violence. The targets of such defensive terror include

opposition cadre, terrorists, and their supporting mechanisms. Since regimes

or individuals do not normally wish to become overtly involved in any

terrorist action, most defensive terror campaigns are conducted on a covert

basis.

Primary tactics of defensive terror include selective assassination and

bombing. Ancillary efforts may involve raids, ambush, kidnapping, torture

and harsh punishment without "due process." Normally, defensive acts of

violence are discriminate unless an easily identifiable population group

is directly responsible for offensive terror. Under such circumstances,

indiscriminate action against such groups may be thought justifiable, but

the government concerned would probably reap a harvest of accusations

charging brutal repression -- regardless of where the guilt may lie.

The fundamental problem with defensive terror is that violence begets more

violence and the general population usually becomes antagonistic toward

government because of this consequence. Even if government is not the actual

sponsor of defensive terror, suspicion and accusation will eventually lead

to an official image of brutal repression which does not enhance the legal

government's chances for survival. This reason, plus ethical and moral

considerations, will usually preclude any regimes consideration of this

technique.

3. COUNTERTERROR

First and most importantly, counterterror has no relationship to defensive

terror. Counterterror usually involves a combination of social, economic,

psychological, political, propaganda, intelligence, and internal security

actions designed to neutralize a terrorist force. Further, these actions

must be individually and/or collectively structured to erode the terrorists

basis of popular support.

Essential counterterrorist actions should include (1) development of

programs designed to meet "felt needs" and resolve conditions perceived

as being intolerable by various population elements; (2) upgrading of

security force capabilities to provide population protection and freedom

from fear; (3) effective utilization of "law and due process" to convince

the populace that government will defeat the subversives without utilizing

repressive measures; and (4) creation of institutional and governmental

mechanisms that provide the means for effective "change" without violence.

The developmental or modernization approach usually requires human,

technological and capital inputs at a rate which will provide substantial

agricultural and/or industrial growth. This is a long-term and complex

solution which cannot be achieved easily without adequate savings, trade,

aid or credit. In addition to the above inputs, markets must be developed;

producer incentives created; income and employment levels increased;

educational programs expanded; birth rates reduced to something less than

Gross National Product increases; and skilled manpower, energy sources,

raw materials, machinery or other capital items must be assembled at the

production point. Apart from these overall development efforts, dissident

and impoverished population elements should be provided with basic minimal

subsistence plus the opportunity for socio-economic self-advancement.

Security improvement programs should be based upon legislative actions

which provide the police and other internal defense forces with appropriate

increases in leadership, manpower, training, finance, communications,

mobility, weapons, equipment and material. Essential tactical innovations

will be discussed under the following section. The fundamental basis for

improving security operations is via better intelligence collection and

collation. Human/technical penetrations, agent or informant operations,

prisoner interrogation, communications intercept, and investigative

techniques all provide essential information inputs. Effective collation

of this data should result eventually in the identification of subversive

leadership, cadre, action and support elements, ideology, modus operandi,

organizational patterns, strength, capability, plans or intentions,

facilities, mechanisms, and other details.

In turn, the finished intelligence produced is used to provide targets

or operational leads and as legal evidence for judicial processing of

subversives.

Regarding "law and due process," it is essential that judicial procedures

be established to assure that violence control measures are politically,

legally and morally justifiable. This is particularly true of methods used

to arrest, detain, interrogate, convict and imprison or execute individual

members of a subversive movement. If repressive, brutal, or illegal tactics

are used by the government to attack subversive forces, popular sentiment

may favor success of the latter.

Creation of adaptive and responsible institutions provide government with

its most effective psychological weapon against violence. Assuming such

organizations provide the basis for peaceful constructive change, the

perpetrators of violence cannot justify their methods to a target populace.

In fact, history has proven that the urban guerrilla cannot long survive

in an environment where popular political, economic, or social aspirations

can be achieved by non-violent methods. Social unrest thrives on the

inability of a nation to modernize existing private or governmental

institutions in a manner which will facilitate the effective, peaceful

resolution of intolerable conditions. It is therefore essential that

government assure that there is an adaptive organizational basis for

reform, modernization and progressive change. This process must include

government bureaucracy, political parties, unions, cooperatives, youth

groups, and other private institutions.

II. TERRORIST METHODS

The following sub-sections provide a general synopsis of terrorist

methodology.

1. PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION

In order to be successful, most subversive movements must convince a

majority of a target population that the conditions under which they exist

are intolerable. This attitude will then provide the motivation and "cause"

needed to stimulate the popular dissidence essential to ruining or

overthrowing any government.

Propaganda comes in many and varied forms to include (1) leaflets; (2)

letter campaigns; (3) wall slogans; (4) rumors; (5) oratory; and (6) radio,

newspapers or other media. However, the latter forum exists only where free

speech is guaranteed or for low-level efforts which might not be suppressed.

Agitation is usually accomplished by agents of influence who seize upon

controversial issues to "inflame" specific audiences for the purpose of

stimulating the development of particular attitudes, actions or reactions.

These individuals usually focus their attention on labor, student or other

population organizations that have banded together because of common

interests they wish to protect or promote. By identifying with their cause,

the agitator can thus seek to exploit any known grievance.

2. ASSASSINATION AND KIDNAPPING

The urban guerrillas may employ assassination and/or kidnapping operations

to eliminate "key" leaders within government or the private sector.

Liquidation of existing leadership is the oldest method of revolution and

affords a relatively simple means to dislocate or disorganize political-

social-economic institutions.

Targets many be limited to "heads" of state, representatives of government,

local leaders, or other individuals who act to support the status quo. The

primary aim of a systematic campaign of assassination is to alienate a

populace from their government by establishing the omnipotent power of the

guerrillas. Kidnapping operations may also be designed to accomplish this

same objective, and to extract concessions, capture publicity, provoke

controversy or free political prisoners. Targets for kidnapping may also

include foreign diplomats or business executives and various personalities

who might be useful for propaganda purposes. In some cases, the kidnap

victim may be executed after his usefulness has ended, so that net effect

is that of a combined kidnapping and assassination.

Individuals or select three to five-man guerrilla teams are usually

employed to conduct the above types of operations. Normally, such

individuals are selected on the basis of their proven courage,

dedication, resourcefulness and cunning. Preferably, they are not

persons wanted by the authorities, but ordinary citizens capable of

moving about freely. Assassinations or kidnappings are planned in

detail and special surveillance parties first check on the movements

of prospective victims. The target is shadowed to learn his habits,

hours, movement patterns and usual security procedures. When a pattern

is established, the guerrillas then develop and rehearse their specific

modus operandi.

3. INFILTRATION*

*As used in this case, the word infiltration is synonymous with

penetration.

The security and operational potential of an urban guerrilla force is

usually predicated on the quantity of intelligence obtained by successful

infiltration. If police and internal security organizations can be

penetrated, the guerrillas may thus be forewarned of actions planned

against them. The infiltration of security forces was seen by Lenin as

one of the essential preconditions for a successful urban uprising.

Lenin's theory being that urban guerrillas would always be outgunned

unless they neutralize the police and other security elements by

infiltrating their own agents at all levels.

In addition, the subversive movement cannot be expected to succeed unless

it attacks and erodes any official programs designed to establish or

sustain population confidence in government. To help accomplish this goal,

the urban guerrillas will attempt to infiltrate all elements of the target

regime. The net objective is to obtain information which can be used to

plan disruptive or destructive attacks against socio-economic development

projects or other programs designed to alleviate popular grievances.

Select infiltration operations may be used to obtain specific target

intelligence, particularly as regards procurement of funds, weapons, or

other supplies. Penetration agents can also provide information on

potential targets for terrorist, sabotage, assassination and kidnap

operations.

Classic clandestine "tradecraft" techniques are used as the basis for

organizing and accomplishing infiltration operations.

We are first concerned with human penetrations and to a lesser degree,

theft, bribery, technical penetrations and other ancillary types of

espionage. However, the primary danger is that guerrillas may obtain a

popular following from among elements of the population having existing

intelligence access. This situation will then create a more spontaneous

flow of information which the urban guerrillas can use for protection or

advantage.

4. BOMBING & SABOTAGE

The essential purpose of bombing or sabotage is effective disruption of

the economic-political-security activities within a state whose government

is targeted for ruin or overthrow. It is a tactic that may be employed by

urban guerrillas and terrorists, or by specialized "cells." Fundamental

objectives include: (1) reduction of agricultural and industrial production;

(2) impeding the effective functioning of essential services such as

communication, transportation and utilities; (3) limiting the conduct of

various government activities with emphasis on internal security services

and political machinery; and/or (4) "cowing" of a target population.

Most of the above is based upon covert destructive attack using explosives,

combustibles, abrasives or subtle disruptive action. Methods include: (1)

descriminate or indescriminate bombing; (2) mechanical breakage; (3) use

of damaging chemicals; (4) arson; (5) electronic interruptions; (6)

pilferage of vital components; (7) dissemination of incorrect information,

falsification of data, misfiling and records manipulation; (8) tampering;

(9) fatal "flawing" of materials or equipment; (10) work slowdown; (11)

interruption of command or control procedures, and (12) use of laws,

courts, and parliamentary rules to impede the effective functioning of

government.

The extensive employment of various bombing and sabotage techniques

affords the revolutionary with a relatively secure and inexpensive weapon

that can have disastrous consequences on the economy and security of a

state. Further, the systematic employment of same erodes public morale

and confidence in government while advertising the success and apparent

invincibility of subversive forces.

5. ARMED ATTACKS

Terrorist groups may employ snipers or "firing groups" of four or five men

which may undertake limited hit and run attacks to erode popular confidence

in government security forces and to force the initiation of repressive

acts antagonistic to a target populace. Weapons include rifles, shotguns,

pistols, grenades, Molotov cocktails, explosives and other lightweight,

easily concealable items. Targets may be discriminately or indiscriminately

selected. Police, firemen, government officials, foreign diplomats or

businessmen and leaders of moderating forces are high on the discriminate

list. Indiscriminate targets are usually selected to incite population

fear. These armed action groups may also be used to undertake robbery,

kidnapping, assassination or other select activity in support of overall

subversive objectives.

In the urban environrnent, such guerrilla action is at close quarters

for extremely short duration. Specific tactics will depend on the target,

the metropolitan terrain, attack options, movement alternatives, type of

weapons, accepted modus operandi and the potential for surprise/retreat.

The net effect being a great diversification of tactical approach from

one situation to another.

6. MOB VIOLENCE

Street tactics of the terrorist or urban guerrillas include the

instigation and/or manipulation of demonstrations, mobs, and strikes.

The objective is to create a situation wherein peaceful protect groups

can be agitated to participate in acts of civil disobedience or riot.

Agents of influence and subversive agitators may seize upon any popular

grievance to stimulate the formation of protest groups. The next objective

is for agitators to encourage the type of public demonstration that could

easily "flare" into a confrontation with police.

Having created a proper environment, various guerrilla elements can

infiltrate the street mobs to incite a riot or undertake acts of violence

using the protestors for cover.

Tactics are simple. Bottles, bricks, and stones can be hurled at police.

Hasty barricades may be used to block streets. Business establishments,

factories and/or government buildings can be looted or burned. Snipers

can be deployed to fire at police, hoping they in turn will retaliate by

killing innocent members of the mob. When the police attempt to arrest

an agitator, a larger group of urban guerrillas may attempt to aid his

escape. If internal security forces effectively contain the riot, the

guerrillas will retreat along pre-planned avenues of escape.

The primary objective of such group agitation is to force the government

to take strong repressive measures, thereby further alienating the

population. Promoting general disorder also helps to disrupt the economy

and undermine the government. Last but not least, by organizing social

discontent, the urban guerrillas induce the population to accept their

leadership, while demonstrating the regime's lack of authority.

Basic ingredients for group agitation include: (1) leadership trained

in mob psychology and tactics; (2) an executive committee responsible

for overall planning and execution; (3) propaganda efforts to rally

public sympathy for a cause; (4) compilation and continuous review of

exploitable grievances; (5) registration of potential dissidents; (6)

study of overall environment; (7) profiling of radical organizations;

(8) enlistment of financial and moral support; (9) tactical training

for agitators; (10) development of community support; (11) recruitment

of "crowd-moving" orators; (12) preparation of music, chants and

slogans; (13) creation of demands and ultimatums; (14) planning for

pivotal events designed to precipitate conflicts; (15) public

announcement of time and place for planned demonstration; (16)

stimulation of actions to incite media coverage; and (17) encouraging

demonstators to participate in dramatic mass arrests.

By effective manipulation of mob psychology, the urban guerrilla thus

plans to push the aggrieved citizen into outright breaches of law that

will lead to heightened outbursts of violence. In addition, all-out

revolution must be rapidly precipitated or mob participants will lose

stamina in the face of prolonged adversity. To succeed, group agitation

must be carefully timed to coincide and "peak" with other guerrilla

actions.

III. COUNTERTERRORIST TOOLS

An effective counterterrorist program must incorporate most if not all

of the working tools described herein.

Terrorist Profiles - can be used to provide security personnel with a

classic thumbnail description of individuals who warrant close scrutiny

as potential participants in acts of violence. This approach facilitatess

narrowing the focus of investigative and intelligence operations designed

to identify members of terrorist organizations. Further, the profile

improves routine observation by police and other authorities responsible

for internal security.

An example profile of a potential terrorist might indicate basic

characteristics to include: (1) male or female age 16 to 58; (2) member

of potentially dissident group; (3) person with emotional or fanatical

tendency; (4) individual who has evidenced violent behavior or emotional

instability; (5) citizens who are isolated from the national

socioeconomic or political "mainstream"; (6) radicals who have engaged

in demands for revolutionary change; and (7) individuals who obviously

have nothing to lose by engaging in terrorism.

Potential terrorist traits should be adjusted to fit each particular

local or national environment. The main objective being to create a

system that is easily developed and readily applied by all security or

intelligence personnel.

Documentation Controls - facilitate security forces in their efforts

to identify suspect terrorists and their supporters. Population

identification papers should be designed to allow the police to spot-

check any individual's name, date and place of birth, residence,

family status, employment, race, religion, and physical description.

Photographs and fingerprints can also be added to documents. In cases

of emergency, citizens may be required to obtain special documentation

for travel and resource control permits for the purchase of any item

that might be used to aid a terrorist act.

The intended objective of detailed documentation is to aid the screening

of dissident population elements. When used in conjunction with terrorist

profiles and when properly focused on areas where violence has occurred

the system can be effective in providing investigative leads.

Biographic Registry - involves the establishment of a central security

reference containing biographic card files or computer data on all

known criminals, subversives, terrorists, dissidents and suspicious

personalities. Each security and intelligence service would provide

appropriate biographic inputs, and have controlled access to the

complete registry. Sources and information would be protected by

appropriate compartmentation and security clearance procedures.

In effect, a national biographic reference is created to facilitate

collation of all source intelligence on confirmed or suspect terrorists.

If the quality and quantity of information inputs are adequate, all

security personnel can use existing files as the basis for rapidly

determining any persons possible association with terrorist or

subversive activity. By establishing secure radio procedures for

sending queries to the biographic registry, any policemen with

appropriate communication can immediately validate the suspect status

of individuals, stopped for spot-checks.

The biographic registry does not negate the need to investigate or

collect intelligence on potential terrorists having or not having files,

but it does preclude suspect persons from easily going unnoticed.

Personnel & Physical Security - must necessarily be provided for

the indigenous leaders and government personnel who will likely be

targeted for terrorist violence. This requirement includes protection

of individuals from threats, coercion, assassination and bombing; the

latter action prompting the need for physical security of offices,

homes, meeting places and transportation facilities.

General defensive procedures include: (1) personnel security clearances;

(2) entry and exit control for offices; (3) protective fences for fixed

facilities; (4) guards for personnel and buildings; (5) screening of

communications, mail and cargo; (6) use of metal detectors for routine

weapons search; (7) utilization of bomb squads with dogs trained to

smell out plastic explosives; (8) travel control procedures emphasizing

alternate routes and various methods of transportation; (9) street

patrols in the area of offices and individual homes; and (10) other

techniques appropriate to environmental situations.

The primary objective of such elaborate precautions is to frustrate

the effective conduct of terrorist actions and thereby prevent those

spectacular successes which encourage expanded future violence.

To better focus defensive efforts and conserve resource allocation, it

is essential that hard intelligence be obtained on terrorist intentions

and modus operandi. This intelligence effort also provides the basis

for offensive actions designed to negate terrorist violence before it

can be employed. Personnel and physical security is thus achieved by a

combination of defensive and offensive programs, the latter of which

can be the most effective. The offensive methods will be discussed

further in subsequent sections.

Intelligence Collection - is essential to the conduct of effective

counterterror operations. Neutralization of violence is dependent upon

government having some knowledge of terrorist personalities, organization,

plans, intentions, ideology, modus operandi, and support mechanisms.

Without such knowledge, security forces will be unable to properly focus

defensive or offensive actions. Unfocused countermeasures are usually

doomed to failure since the terrorists will be largely unaffected.

Detailed information on terrorists can best be obtained by clandestine

human or technical penetration operations. Failing this, intelligence

must be gathered by alternate means to include: (1) recruitment of

informants; (2) suspect surveillance; (3) police investigation of

potential terrorists; (4) search for weapons, explosives, or other

incriminating evidence; (5) prisoner interrogation: (6) monitoring of

possible targets and suspected terrorist supply sources; and (7) mass

population education in observation and reporting techniques related to

terrorist activity.

To narrow the focus of the above collection operations, demographic

data and terrorist profiles can be used, to fix specific geographic

areas where terrorists could reside and organize with some degree of

relative safety. Although terrorists may operate anywhere, they

normally maintain their residence and meeting places among dissident

population elements who evidence negative or hostile reaction to

government security forces. This fact, therefore, allows selective

elimination of those urban and rural areas which would not provide a

hospitable terrorist environment.

Physical data on roads, communication facilities, residential

patterns, buildings, and isolated areas can also be used to help

determine likely patterns of terrorist organizational activity within

suspect geographic areas. Trash collectors, building inspectors,

electricians and other personnel with natural access can be recruited

to aid collection of this physical information. Again, this effort

further serves to pinpoint where intelligence operations should be

targeted.

Counterintelligence/counterespionage operations will also be needed

to supplement the above efforts. The objective of these operations

includes: (1) penetrating and manipulating terrorist cells; (2)

stopping, disrupting, misorienting or negating terrorist intelligence

collection activities; and (3) developing passive or specialized

defenses against planned terrorist acts of violence.

In summary, intelligence and counterintelligence operations form the

foundation for counterterror campaigns. Those security services or

personnel not familiar with essential clandestine tradecraft should

seek appropriate guidance and assistance.

Intelligence Collation - provides the detailed compilation and

analysis of information needed to help identify, arrest and convict

the perpetrators of violence. It also facilitates the location and

elimination of terrorist support mechanisms and other hard targets.

To function effectively, any collation center must have access to all

sources of information. This implies cooperation with all security and

intelligence services using appropriate clearances, "source" protection

and compartmentation. In addition, the centers must have the legal

right to pinpoint specific targets and assign collection or action

requirements to individual government components. Without such

follow-on authority, the collation centers become little more than

repositories of unexploited intelligence.

All source information inputs should include: (1) biographic data;

(2) pertinent socioeconomic, demographic and geographic publications;

(3) details on transportation, communications, and material resources;

(4) target assessments; (5) analysis of terrorist organizations and

modus operandi; and (6) all reporting on criminals, dissidents, radicals,

subversives or terrorists. After collecting every scrap of available

information, trained analysts then collate data with the objective of

developing investigative and target leads.

The primary advantage to central collation is simply that all available

pieces of an investigative puzzle are laid before personnel experienced

in the art of formulating a composite intelligence picture which

provides the sharpest available detail on any terrorist organization.

If this collation process is absent or fragmented, any intelligence

produce cannot be properly exploited and subsequent counterterror

activities may be expected to be largely ineffective. It is, therefore,

imperative that any government targeted by terrorists seek to establish

the best possible intelligence collation system.

Security Force Requirements - generally include: (1) defense of

official personnel and physical facilities; (2) riot control, bomb

disposal and population protection from acts of violence; (3)

enforcement of law and order; (4) preparation for national defense

against internal or external acts of aggression; (5) investigation

leading to location, arrest, and conviction of criminals, dissidents,

subversives or terrorists; and (6) other actions required to resist

lawlessness, violence, subversion and warfare originating within or

outside the state.

The conduct of counterterror operations primarily burdens police forces

with the requirement to provide population fredom from fear and violence,

while undertaking legal investigation which will ultimately result in

conviction and punishment of terrorists after "due process." As

previously stated, the foundation for this effort is based upon adequate

intelligence collection which may be a primary or secondary function of

various security services.

Once intelligence leads are provided, the lengthy and arduous process

begins to obtain sufficient evidence for a court trial which will

prove the suspect terrorist guilty of accomplished or planned crimes of

violence. This requirement demands the skills and extensive application

of modern criminal investigation. It is, therefore, suggested that

appropriate actions be undertaken to provide police or other security

forces with adequate authority, leadership, manpower, funds, training

and equipment needed to accomplish the task.

Under most circumstances, it is recommended that target governments

seek whatever resources deemed necessary to upgrade security forces

and give them the capability to deal with terrorists by action within

existing legal parameters. Even though this is often the most difficult

course of action, it has proven to be the most successful.

Population Mobilization - is initiated by advising the target nation's

citizenry of the nature of any terrorist threat and motivating mass

popular participation in negating acts of violence. To accomplish this

objective, the populace should be organized and instructed in the

techniques of aiding security forces in the identification of possible

terrorists.

The latter may be accomplished by launching an aggressive educational

program designed to establish citizen procedures for reporting suspicious

activities or personalities that are observed by local inhabitants.

Carried to its ultimate conclusion, each village and city block would

have resident protection committees with direct communications to local

police forces. Possible investigative leads would thus be immediately

relayed for exploitation by security forces.

The unique advantage of such citizen participation is based on the fact

that local residents are most keenly aware of unusual events or the

appearance of strangers in their neighborhoods. Another obvious benefit

is the increase in numbers of eyes and ears that terrorists will be

forced to avoid.

Actual techniques of population mobilization will vary according to

environmental situations and citizen receptivity or motivation.

Procedural approaches are the same as for so-called "block warning

systems." As stated in the introductory note, implementation should

not be attempted prior to consultation with appropriate specialists.

Judicial Base - is created by formulating those laws which fully support

security forces in their conduct of counterterror operations. In addition,

such laws should insure that all efforts are politically, legally and

morally justifiable. This is particularly true of methods used to arrest,

detain, interrogate, convict and imprison or execute individual members

of a terrorist movement.

IV. THREAT ANALYSIS

1. TERRORIST FACT SHEET

1. Who are they, how many, how organized, what is their motivation, and

what are their basic objectives?

2. What are their linguistic, technical and communications capabilities?

3. Where located, how armed, how equipped, current status, and degree of

mobility?

4. What are their psychological and/or physical vulnerabilities?

5. How its command and control exercised?

6. What are the terrorists' probable courses of action under any given

set of circumstances?

7. When, where and how might essential and/or minimal outside support be

provided?

8. What are the minimum concessions the terrorists will accept in exchange

for hostage release?

2. POSSIBLE TERRORIST OBJECTIVES

1. Publicity; propaganda, and/or influence.

2. Political concessions.

3. Finance by ransom of hostages and/or aircraft, etc.

4. Release of fellow terrorists.

S. Expanded control via induced fear.

6. World-wide attention to grievances they have been unable to resolve

by legal means.

7. Elimination of principal opponents.

8 Consternation among all the groups, factions, and/or nations who

oppose their "cause".

9. Expanded use. of target government repressive measures which tend

to create sympathy for the terrorists.

3. TERRORIST POTENTIAL

1. What dissident, subversive, terrorist or other elements reside

within the country?

2. Do international or third-country terrorist organizations have

support and/or action components assigned to the ccountry?

3. What is the record and modus operandi or post terrorist operations,

and what is the frequency of incidents?

4. If specific persons were targeted as potential victims, where would

terrorists probably initiate the kidnapping or seizure? For a hostage,

where would they probably be held?

6. What factors regarding activities and/or movement patterns

unnecessarily expose potential victims to a possible kidnapping?

7. In cases of seizures, airline skyjackings, or other mass hostage

operations, why might particular individuals be singled out?

8. What unusual events normally proceed a terrorist kidnapping or

seizure -- either within or outside the country?

9. What disposition is usually made of the hostages of those terrorist

groups with which you are familiar and what time factors are involved?

10. In cases of negotiated release, what individuals or groups might be

used as a go-between?

11. What are the usual communication channels or systems used by

terrorists for command control and/or negotiations?

12. What is the ethnic and psychological profile of those terrorist

leaders with whom you might come in contact, and what are their

grievances or political objectives?

13. Have terrorists tended to panic, upon learning they are threatened

or that governments will not bargain for release of hostages?

14. Under what conditions have most hostages been held, and what

circumstances have led to their release or execution?

V. DEFENSIVE MEASURES

1. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF SUPPORT.

1. Judicial: Laws must be established which facilitate the effective

functioning of those intelligence and security operations essential

to the conduct of counterterror programs without the creation of a

repressive police state which will antagonize the populations concerned.

2. Legislative: Governing bodies must enact and sustain the above

process of law, while creating the financial and other resources needed

to accomplish same.

3. Social: Institutional process should be created to provide

opportunities for personal social advancement and the peaceful

resolution of individual grievances regardless of sex, religion,

creed, language, ethnic origin, status, or other differences.

4. Economic: Each individual should be afforded the means of

subsistance, and the opportunity to attain basic felt needs, e.g.

housing, clothing, and essential material goods.

5. Psychological: Popular attitudes must be created which discredit

the terrorist "cause" and the violent methods used to attain their

objective -- and at the same time the population must be convinced

that the government should, can, and will prevail without resorting to

violence to counter violence.

6. Political: Governments should create and/or sponsor a political

system which fosters the means for peaceful changes of leadership, the

need or justification for violent overthrow of any regime.

7. Media: Newspaper, radio, and television should be encouraged to

avoid giving terrorists free publicity of the type which would engender

sympathy or support from the general population.

8. Security: Intelligence and internal security services must provide

the population with freedom from fear while identifying, apprehending,

convicting, and imprisoning terrorists via due process of law.

9. Population: Various elements of the populace should be organized

into "block" or village security committees to provide advance alert

of any terrorist activity -- assuming all the above actions have first

been implemented and have motivated the population to become so

involved.

10. Leadership: All government and institutional leaders administrators

should fully support and underwrite the counterterror campaign. They

must provide the management, direction, coordination, and resource

inputs which assures the development and continuation of an effective

program.

NOTE: It is imperative that advance determination be made regarding

establishment of priorities and division of labor regarding what

private and/or governmental institutions have responsibility for the

above actions.

[NEXT TWO PAGES IN DOCUMENT REDACTED]

25XIC10C

4. PERSONAL/PHYSICAL FACTORS

1. Instruct all potential targeted personnel to periodically alter

modes, times and routes of movement.

Z. Where possible, they should avoid making advance appointments or

establishing routine schedules.

3. Limit regular travel by personal vehicle unless plans are made for

en route protection, e.g., armed escort, scout vehicles, car armoring,

street patrols, defensive driving, car pool, car swapping, random

routes or other techniques.

4. Fence private residences and utilize dogs, geese, ducks and/or guinea

fowl to provide exterior alarm while installing adequate hardware to

preclude a hasty forced entry. (If the situation warrants, guards should

also be considered.)

5. Armed guards, alarms, fences, control zones, hardware and other

protective procedures should be used to deter all possible types of

hostiles against office.

6. Periodic security investigations should be conducted on all employees

having access to residences, vehicles and/or place of work of potential

targets.

7. Initiate or accelerate efforts focused on terrorist organizations

and their sponsors or supporters.

8. Assist security forces in screening, all internal and external

travelers for suspect terrorists or persons having similar profile.

9. Surveil the movements of all foreign diplomats or other persons who

might offer communications or other support for terrorists.

10. Photograph and surveil all strangers moving in or out of foreign

embassies sympathetic to the terrorist cause.

11. Establish "block warning systems" whereby local residents can

immediately alert security forces if suspect persons or activity is

observed.

12. Train all potential targets in countersurveillance techniques and

specific security precautions that may be used for personal defense.

13. Qualify selected individuals in the use of small arras and provide

them with appropriate weapons.

14. Retain maps of all potential target areas to include floor plans

and defense plan for key buildings.

15. Check airline passenger lists and hotel registrations on a daily

basis against known terrorist list by true names and aliases.

16. Stimulate security forces to maintain port of entry surveillance

and tighten passport/visa control.

17. When appropriate, utilize technical penetration and/or wire taps

to monitor points of terrorist contact or support.

18. Watch for thefts of automobiles, or weapons and relate stolen

items to plausible terrorist operational concepts.

19. Restrict movement and set curfews as needed.

5. COMMUNICATION RELATED DEFENSE

1. Establish periodic radio or telephone check-in procedures whereby all

personnel advise their location and status to an alert center having the

authority and capability to immediately react to determine why an officer

has failed to make his safety report on time and to initiate appropriate

action as needed.

2. Equip potential target personnel with beacons or other emergency

devices that can be used to relay immediate alert when an attack occurs.

3. Organize and periodically test various lines of expedient communication

with internal security services who will be called upon to react in the

event of any hostile action against personnel.

4. Provide for alternate means of communication with all higher

headquarters in the event primary facilities are seized or otherwise

rendered inoperative.

5. Prepare and advise all personnel of word, phrase, gestures or other

codes which may be used by hostages to relay information by phone,

letter or via intermediaries.

6. Develop necessary contingency plans to control, monitor, block, jam

or cut all communications which might be used by any terrorist group.

7. Pre-position equipment and technicians to facilitate immediate

employment of remote listening devices, direction finding systems and

other specialized communication related items.

8. Pre-determine probable conditions under which media coverage may

be granted in exchange for concessions from terrorists. In any event,

arrange to prevent, guide, limit and/or control media coverage of any

terrorist incident until it has reached conclusion.

9. Equip potential targets with push-button activated sirens, flares,

floodlights and other systems should be considered for aiding emergency

alert and/or as a means to "foil" an attack.

10. Create a command control center with constant 24-hour communications,

and the established capability to coordinate all resources that might be

used to deter, negate or react to a terrorist attack. (Therein, establish

the focal [sic] for intelligence collation and analysis to provide

potential advance alert to all hostile actions.)

11. Be prepared to record all conversations during any terrorist

incident to facilitate on-going and/or after-action analysis.

12. Maintain an open communication or dialogue with all security

services and/or potential intermediaries.

6. TERRORIST ACTIVITY GAMING

Experience has generally proven that various terrorist groups eventually

evolve stereotyped operational procedures that develop as a result of:

(1) standardized organization, doctrine and training; (2) limited quantity

or quality of available men, money and material; (3) target area social,

economic, political, psychological and security strengths or weaknesses:

(4) communication, transportation, support and intelligence limitations;

(5) climate, weather, demography and geography; and (6) types of

countermeasures which must be overcome. Systematic analysis of these

influencing factors thus facilitates the development of hostile activity

signal patterns which may be used as an aid in terrorist strength,

location, deployment, modus operandi, and planned or intended actions.

A basic problem in developing such patterns is that most intelligence

analysts are unwilling or unable to postulate plausible theories relating

to suspected terrorist activity. A natural tendency is to avoid theoretical

hypothesis and relay solely on indicators substantiated by multiple source

intelligence. The lack of a theoretical framework thus deters sequential

logic development and deduction [until?] plausible operational approaches

can be proven or disproven by available data and known events. To further

complicate the analytical process, it is also recognized that sufficient

intelligence is seldom available with the quantity or quality needed to

forecast operational stereotypes. It is therefore essential that "gaps"

be filled by developing and testing all possible action options expressed

as theoretical operational alternatives. Probable terrorist actions should

be advanced by personnel experienced in operating with or against the

types of militant organizations with which any analysis is concerned. If

such expertise is not available, it is suggested that indigenous personnel

be employed in a role casting exercise. Ideally, groups of prisoners or

defectors can also be used to "game" particular problem situations

confronting those terrorist groups which they previously represented.

Initial operational theory should disregard available intelligence data.

Once all probable action alternatives are postulated, training analysts

may then be used to prove or disprove theoretical concepts. However,

actual events may be more useful in determining the validity of

particular theories. This, of course, assumes a careful analysis of

causal factors contributing to the timing and accomplishment of any

particular terrorist action.

Application and usefulness of any gaming model is thus dependent upon

proper development of a logic sequence predicted on theoretical concept

evaluated against intelligence data and known events.

The logic sequence itself is nothing more than the studied formulation

of operational hypothesis which are then supported or challenged by

all evidence and the process of deductive reasoning. As theoretical

concepts are proven valid, this then facilitates advance prediction

of intended terrorist action in situations where "hard" intelligence

is lacking.

Those persons attempting to use initial TAG models should not expect

100 percent accuracy. Basic pitfalls include: (1) failure to properly

read indicators; (2) signal patterns can be read out of context; (3)

terrorists may cancel or postpone intended actions; and (4) the

absence of partial reading of indicators may lead to false conclusions.

In addition to the above pitfalls, the system will probably not be

effective unless it is managed by an officer with some previous

operational experience against the general type of opposition force

being evaluated.

The officer must also have: (1) courage of conviction; (2) a

willingness to develop and express "gut" feeling; (3) basic tactical

aptitude; (4) an ability to explore theorhetical hypotheses; and (5)

skill in developing indicators without substantial multiple source

intelligence.

Assuming the above conditions are met, the TAG systems should have

reasonable chance of success. Further, it is assumed that a carefully

tructured TAG system would produce effective results against any type

of terrorist force operating in a rural or urban environment. The

basic is that evaluative criteria must be adjusted to fit each unique

set of circumstances. Additionally, the TAG system must be employed by

operatives with relevant tactical experience, basic analytical ability,

arid a large measure of common sense. Prior to developing a TAG model,

the following questions must be carefully answered for each specific

terrorist group considered:

a. What ideological, organizational and tactical patterns are clearly

evidenced?

b. How do known doctrinal or training concepts compare with specific

operational approaches?

c. What tactics would be feasible given probable limitations of men,

money and material?

d. How do various subversive elements overcome the social, economic,

political, psychological and security strengths of the target area?

e. What types of activities are being directed against the target and

how do these relate to known vulnerabilities?

f. What are the probable limits of available communication,

transportation, support and intelligence?

g. How do terrorists adapt themselves to limit handicaps caused by

adverse climate, weather, demography or geography?

h. What types of countermeasures must be overcome and how will these

efffect operational concepts?

i. What is the best estimate of probable modus operandi given known

limitations?

In short, the effective development of a workable TAG system is

predicated on minimal all-source intelligence and a studied evaluation

of specific subversive forces, in the local, national or international

environment in which they exist. Each scrap of information is thus

evaluated to determine the validity of activity patterns which are

initially presented as plausible theories. A logic sequence is then

developed to relate theories to available data, terrorist operational

options, and probable events.

7. ITC SYSTEM

The Intelligence-Targeting Collation or ITC System has been effectively

used to provide a visual system for displaying, locating, and dating

large quantities of information on a terrorist or guerrilla force. It is

basically a plot-board technique that makes data easier to interpret

when compared with most map and/or record systems.

In the course of daily plotting, an analyst uses the ITC Plot Board to

closely observe developing patterns of activity. He contemplates the

purpose of any single action as it relates to potential target proximity

and sequential relationship to all other intelligence data. After a

brief period, trends will begin to emerge, thus allowing the analyst to

make accurate projections on terrorist or guerrilla strength, location,

deployment, modus operandi and/or intentions.

The ITC System clearly reveals activity signatures that generally hold

true for all opposition forces operating in a particular area. This

allows an analyst to assume the role of a master chess player who can

view the board and determine various logical moves of an opponent.

Obviously, these signatures will vary according to environment, types

of conflict and standard methodology of the hostile force. As an

example, urban terrorist signatures might be revealed by the following

types of information input:

a. Police report increasing theft of explosive or incendiary materials.

b. Informant observes suspect dissidents conducting a "casual meeting."

c. Intelligence asset discovers a terrorist operation against a likely

target for violence.

d. A technical penetration operation reveals intentions for future

terrorist actions.

e. Surveillance team follows suspect terrorist during his recon of

local airport.

Although certain specific intelligence reports may clearly indicate

intended hostile actions, the ITC System can provide a much broader

and deeper insight regarding the total threat. It also facilitates the

expedient collation of intelligence that might otherwise be handled on

a fragmented or delayed basis which precludes effective overall analysis

and counteraction within a limited time frame. An ITC System may be

established for a rural or urban environment, using the following

procedural approach:

a. Obtain a roll of lined graph paper with grids on an approximate

map scale of 1:25,000 for rural areas, or 1:10,000 for urban areas.

b. Bind the graph paper to chartboards or cardboard squares roughly

3 x 4 feet in size.

c. Number graph lines on bottom and right side of chartboard to

correspond with Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid numbers for

selected target areas.

d. Match and bind corresponding map sections to reverse side of each

board or on a feasible alternate location.

e. Establish secure work area where analyst may handle and plot

sensitive intelligence data on boards.

f. Develop symbol code to identify plotted sources of information,

e.g.:

SOURCE SYMBOL

(1) Agent X

(2) Informant O

(3) Penetration *

(4) Incident @

(5) Photography #

(6) Historical ^

(7) Prisoners <

(9) Research >

(10) Rumors &

[ed. note - symbols in report substituted by above alphanumerics.]

a. Establish color codes for various time periods of information

acquisition, and plot source symbols in appropriate time color. (NOTE:

Color normally should indicate specific 10 - 30 day time periods.)

h. If sourcing of data and dates must be exacting, develop sequential

number codes for intelligence reports and place same numeric code

beside plotted symbol, e.g., 3 - 84 for the 84th report during March

of that year. (Use card box to maintain record, of codes and reference

to source reporting related to same.)

i. In conjunction with source codes, utilize two-letter alphabetic

vocabulary code to identify and plot critical information reported,

e.g.:

ACTIVITY CODE

Action AC

Agent AG

Assassination AS

Base BA

Bombing BM

Cache CH

Cadre CA

Clandestine Meeting CM

Communication CN

Demonstration DM

Enemy Agent EA

Espionage ES

Explosives EX

Facility FA

Guerrilla GU

Headquarters HQ

Homicide HC

Hospital HS

Hostage HT

Incendiary Device ID

Kidnapping KN

Killed KL

Prison PR

Raid RD

Route RU

Signal SG

Supplies SU

Supply Cache SC

Terrorist TR

Traffic TF

Unknown Activity UA

Vehicle VH

Weapons (Small Arms) WP

(NOTE: Vocabulary code symbols given are exemplary only and may be

reduced or expanded as the situation dictates, These codes may also be

used on combination as appropriate, e.g., SQ/AB for squad sized ambush.)

j. Supplementary symbols can be added as needed, e.g., small arrows

attached to source code symbols to indicate direction of movement.

Example ITC Plot Board

[diagram omitted]

NOTE: Use fine-line ink pens to record symbols on plot board. Make

symbols and alpha-numeric lettering as small as possible without being

unreadable.

[about 5 pages deleted]

25X1C10c

11. PRE- CRISES POINTERS

1. Plan imaginative delaying tactics that can be used to "stall"

negotiations with terrorists and gain time needed to fully explore

various options for attaining hostage release.

2. contingency plans to avoid premature and unplanned direct

confrontation with terrorists.

3. Develop themes for humanitarian appeals designed to persuade

terrorists that they are losing support for their "cause."

4. Game probable negotiated release situations to determine advance

guarantees needed to assure that hostages will be returned unharmed

simultaneous with the granting of any concessions to terrorists.

S. Determine transportation and security options assuming terrorists

will probably demand aircraft for flight to a safe haven.

6. Establish various contingency reaction plans among and between all

governments that might possibly be concerned with any anticipated

terrorist action.

7. Take necessary steps to be prepared to control terrorist

communications and movement to prevent guidance direction or

assistance from outside sources.

8. Game all possible future actions with various government security

elements to preclude uncoordinated panic reaction during any terrorist

incident.

VI. INCIDENT PROCEDURES

1. PROTECTIVE REACTION CHART

TERRORIST ACTION EXAMPLE REACTION

1. Assault Escape, evade, initiate emergency commo and/or

attempt delaying action until security reaction

force can break attack.

2. Kidnapping If possible and advisable, attempt to escape and

evade. Activate emergency or other warning device.

If captured, cooperate with your captors without

divulging sensitive intelligence or compromising

information. In response to kidnapping, pre-planned

rescue and/or negotiated release to be attempted.

3. Ambush Move away from fields of fire, seek protective

cover, and if armed, immediately return fire.

Initiate emergency commo and take evasive action

avoiding exposed or open areas.

4. Bombing Dive for protective cover and lie flat with feet

toward explosion. Activate bomb squads and fire

teams to attempt to limit further damage. Be alert

for second bomb.

5. Hijacking Do not attempt to overpower hijackers unless given

a very reasonable chance for success. Avoid

attracting attention to yourself. If kidnapped as

a result of hijacking, follow above para 2. guidance.

6. Seizure Encirclement or entrapment of terrorists accompanied

by no-bargaining position with demand that terrorists

surrender. Armed surreptitious entry team should be

prepared to attempt release of any captives.

7. Sabotage Attempt to rapidly identify exact type and source

of sabotage. Use search and security teams to

locate follow-on sabotage actions. Screen personnel

with access to target and implennent protective

security procedures.

8. Assassination Immediate reaction must be spontaneous defensive

maneuver to escape particular type of attack. Then

initiate emergency procedures and take evasive

action until security forces arrive. Practice

countersurveillance and good security to avoid

future assassination attempts.

9. Deception Take immediate defensive action until such time as

and threats proven false, particularly in situations where

deception or threats are a prelude to actual attack.

[paragraphs deleted]

25X1C8a

Communication

8. What types of communication are believed or known to be available

to terrorists, and how might these be employed for command control?

9. Has action been taken to disrupt terrorist communications, and if

not, why not?

10. What types of communication systems are being used by security

services, and how are these employed?

11. What capability exists for immediate communication between various

services, command elements within government, and/or the responsible

leadership?

12. What is the status of critical communication, and is there a

possibility that such communications might be delayed or disrupted?

13. In the case of a hostage, is the victim equipped with any

clandestine communication system?

Physical

14. Where, how, and under what conditions are terrorists deployed?

15. What routes of entry and/or escape might be used to gain access

to, or exit from the terrorist's present location?

16. If terrorists use hostages to demand safe passage, what routes

might be used?

17. What physical attributes of the terrorist's present location,

or probable movement routes, would facilitate an ambushand/or other

surprise action?

18. Have detailed maps, building blueprints, utility layouts, and

other physical data been used in answering questions 14 through 17

above?

19. In cases of skyjacking or use of aircraft for escape, what

physical attributes of airports and/or aircraft might be used to

negate on-going or indicated terrorist action?

20. What are the physical advantages and disadvantages of the

terrorist's current location and/or disposition?

Logistics

21. What items of equipment are immediately available to support

operations against terrorists? (Consider weapons, ammo, explosives,

starlight scopes, remote listening devices, cameras, helicopters,

vehicles and other appropriate items.)

22. What equipment is now in use by security services?

23. What equipment is known to be available to terrorists?

24. How might available equipment be employed to negate present

and/or intended terrorist action(s)?

Negotiations

25. Have the terrorists been told that their demands will be met in

order to gain time to develop the best possible response?

26. Has every effort been made to conceal the fact that terrorist

demands might not be met?

27. What preparations have been made to meet terrorist demands in

the event no other alternative is possible?

28. If inaction or a no bargaining position is to be taken, have all

the consequences been fully evaluated?

29. How can any bargaining best be conducted to facilitate release of

any hostages while increasing chances that terrorists will be captured?

Expertise

30. What special skills are available from internal security services?

(Consider bomb disposal squads, snipers, radio direction finding units,

teletap teams, camera crews, technical personnel, communicators, and

others that might be appropriate to the situation.)

31. What special skills are available from the foreign community?

32. What special skills have been evidenced by the terrorists, and

what others might they probably have?

3. IMMEDIATE RESPONSE

[deletion]

25X1C8a

4. HOSTAGE LOCATION

1. If foot movement involved, consider use of trackers and/or tracking dogs.

2. Screen and question. local residents near kidnap scene to attempt to

determine routes of travel.

3. Be prepared to trace telephone calls and/or surveil couriers as one

means to locate general area where hostage is being held.

4. Game possible locations where a specific terrorist group might hold

the hostage in question assuming you have determined who is responsible.

5. Post rewards for information leading to the hostages safe recovery.

6. Organize a systematic search procedure using several small teams

composed of local residents to avoid giving terrorists any advance alert.

7. Utilize intelligence/informant networks to attain leads on terrorist

safehouses or known locations where hostages might be hold.

8. Attempt to monitor all telephone calls and other communications going

to or from suspect area(s).

9. Consider selective use of remote listening devices to help pinpoint

hostage location. (Hopefully, the victim may already be -equipp-od with

a self-activated "bug" so that he and/or the terrorist$ may reveal their

location.)

5. POTENTIAL HOSTAGE NOTES

1. Maintain your dignity and avoid taking any action which might provoke

the terrorists.

2. Start thinking about escape the minute, you are captured. Your best

chance to escape will usually occur during the confusion of the attack.

3. Do not volunteer information about yourself or any other subject.

4. Attempt to convince terrorists that the only hope of accomplishing

their objectives is to assure your safety.

5. Make careful observations regarding the terrorists and the situation

so you can provide vital intelligence to your potential rescuers --

assuming a means of communication has been or will be provided.

6. As one possible means of communication, remember "key" words, phrases,

and gestures you will need to signal a friendly intermediary and/or other

contact.

7. Assess the determination of the terrorists with regard to the

accomplishment of their mission.

8. In appropriate situations, sympathize with the terrorist "cause" and

attempt to convince them of your desire to cooperate, within limits,

which would not embarrass you with your government.

9. Avoid any outward expression of fear, panic, or hatred which might

stimulate an automatic hostile reaction from the terrorist.

10. Convince the terrorists that patience will gain them at least some

of the objectives they seek, that delays or negative responses, are

inevitable but that the local govermment will eventually meet part of

their demands.

11. Attempt to buy time with the above techniques and any others you

can improvise, as you must give your potential rescuers a chance to

fully prepare their response.

TERRORIST OPERATIONAL EXAMPLAR CHART

[Chart adopted for email format. - ed.]

1. Organization

International: Patriotic front, e.g., Palestinian Fedayeen, Communist

or other radical organization. Fanatic individuals.

Local/national: Subversive or extremists. Fanatics and nuts. Armed

guerrillas and/or revolutionaries. Action arm and/or legal apparat

of international terrorists. Third country groups or individuals.

2. Sponsorship and Leadership

International: External to target area. Communist bloc, patriotic

front, dissident elements and/or governments sympathetic to terrorist

"cause".

Local/national: Internal or external to target nation. Subversives

or revolutionaries acting alone or in conjunction with third country

governments or movements.

3. Planning

International: Detailed and specific with emphasis on high impact

operations having maximum propaganda potential and/or means to extract

concessions. Plans are also designed to directly or indirectly

undermine the strength of a particular target, e.g., Israel.

Local/national: General and non-specific with emphasis on operations

designed to force a target regime to undertake repressive acts which

will alienate a government from their national population.

4. Target Analysis and Intelligence

International: Vulnerable to classic or improvised terrorist attack.

Target meeting above planning criteria. Objective with known and fixed

pattern of activity, or one exposed to detailed targetting assessment

by informants, intelligence agents, or other methods.

Local/national: Exposed to type of attack normally employed by local

terrorist groups. Discriminate or indiscriminate with primary objective

being to "cow" a target population. Intelligence only required for

discriminate targets and this usually provided by existing network of

agents and/or informants.

5. Targets

International: Subject to element of surprise. Unprepared for hostile

action. Limited physical defense if fixed, or exposed and undefended if

mobile. Known to lack effective intelligence and/or counterintelligence

capabilities. Meets criteria in 3. and 4., above.

Local/national: Random target of opportunity hit because of immediate

undefended exposure to terrorists, or discriminate and specific target

relatively undefended and/or subject to element of surprise. Selection

primarily based on probable impact as regards objective to "cow"

population or force target regume to initiate repressive acts.

6. Communications

International: Courriers, deaddrops, cutouts, radiom CW, microdot and

diplomatic pouch of governments sympathetic to terrorist cause.

Usually no direct communication between leadership and operatives.

Local/national: Local mail, bamboo telegraph [?], couriers or runners,

deaddrops, cutouts, radio, and direct passage between terrorist cells

or from leadership down.

7. Coordination

International: Decentralized, compartmented and specifically geared to

particular operations. All coordination begins at planning stage and

is designed to provide direction for independent support, intelligence

and action cells.

Local/national: Centralized with limited compartmentation and minimal

directional control. Designed to provide overall guidance on

psychological, political, operational and other objectives for a

subversive movement in which the terrorists may play a major or minor

role.

8. Funding and Logistics

International: Governments sympathetic to terrorist cause provide

clandestine funding and act as a conduit for explosives, weapons,

equipment, or other items. Considerable quantities of logistics

originate from Communist Bloc countries, but seldom pass directly to

terrorists.

Local/national: Robbery, theft, extortion and kidnap operations used

to raise all or portion of needed funds. [?] items are stolen,

purchased on black market or clandestinely provided by external

sponsors.

9. Personnel Selection and Training

International: Any fanatic organization may provide sources of

personnel. Actual selection depends on individual motivation, skills,

and potential cover for access and/or action. General and specific

target training generally accomplished within countries sympathetic

to terrorist cause.

Local/national: Recruits are primarily drawn from dissident elements

of population who are aggravated with their personal situation and

the target regime. Training of cadre usually takes place in Communist

or other revolution exporting third countries. However, many

terrorists receive clandestine training within target nation.

10. Transportation

International: International airlines, stolen vehicles, boats, and/or

any other method compatible with cover and movement requirements

related to covert preparation to hit a particular target.

Local/national: Primarily by foot, local transporation facilities,

and/or stolen vehicles. Sustained rate of high mobility.

11. Support Groups

International: World-wide network of small clandestine cells

designed to provide intelligence and operational support for specific

and isolated acts of terrorism. In some cases AL FATAH and possibly

other terrorist groups also have legal representation in a number of

countries. Individual terrorists may or may not be associated with

local revolutionary and/or subversive organizations.

Local/national: Support cells are usually an integral part of any

terrorist or subversive organization. They may or may not have

independent functional and/or geographic responsibilities, but are

generally located within the immediate area(s) targetted by

terrorists.

12. Documentation

International: Stolen and altered. Obtained under false pretense.

Provided by sympathetic governments. Fabricated and/or obtained

in name of unwitting or deceased subject.

Local/national: Rural based guerrillas seldom use documentation,

whereas urban oriented terrorists or subversives tend to rely on

their cover rather than false documentation. If papers needed,

they are ususally bought or obtained under false pretenses.

13. Basing and Staging

International: Generally non-specific and located as required to

facilitate attack against a specific target. However, governments

sympathetic to terrorist cause will usually provide training bases

and temporary staging areas as needed.

Local/national: Safe areas and houses are normally used to provide

fixed facilities where operations may be planned, prepared, and

rehearsed. Since target options limited to confined geographic

area, basing must be relatively static.

14. Attack Methods

International: Hijacking, kidnapping, bombing, assassination,

seizure, threats and deception. Isolated attacks covering wide

geographic area.

Local/national: Assault, ambush, sabotage, and other methods as

indicated in international profile. Repetitive attacks usually

limited to single national environment.

15. Operational Execution

International: Compartmented, specific, exacting, with attack

group(s) usually isolated from planning or support elements.

Terrorist action may be unwitting individual, composite groups or

dedicated team.

Local/national: Discriminate, indiscriminate, random, or targets of

opportunity usually hit by compartmented terrorist cell. Local

terrorist elements often engage in their own planning and support

activities. Action may be undertaken by unwitting individual,

composite group or dedicated team, as in the case of international

terrorists.

[unreadable paragraph follows]

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