An American Trojan Horse? Eisenhower, Latin America, and the Development of US Internal Security Policy 1954-1960

By Dennis M. Rempe, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Spring 1999

Perceptions of Third World nations as susceptible to communist subversion and revolutionary warfare led the Eisenhower administration to formulate a coordinated internal security strategy known simply as '1290d'. Later renamed the Overseas Internal Security Program (OISP), this policy initiative sought to strengthen host nation security forces, judicial systems, and public information media in an effort to combat indirect communist intervention strategies. Implementing OISP policy in Latin America proved difficult. In Congress, the administration was criticised for colluding with dictatorial regimes. while Latin Americans feared that the new program would be used as a 'Trojan Horse' to penetrate their security structures. After the Cuban Revolution, however, OISP policies developed under Eisenhower came to dominate US-Latin American security relations for the remainder of the Cold War.

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Throughout the Cold War, US policy makers saw less developed countries as a major source of weakness to the free world's position against communism. They believed that political instability, economic backwardness, extreme nationalism, and colonial issues dramatically increased the likelihood of direct communist pressure, intervention, and subversion. 1 To counter this, substantial policy initiatives in the field of internal security were undertaken, on a global scale by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his administration consequent to National Security Council (NSC) Action No. 1290d in December 1954. Overall they sought to achieve a co-ordinated US internal security assistance strategy which would (1) assess the nature and degree of communist threat in target countries; (2) increase the capability of internal security forces to counter subversion and paramilitary operations; (3) revise legislation and reorganise judicial systems in order to permit more effective anticommunist action; (4) exchange information on subversive methodologies; and (5) assist in the development of public information programmes to clarify the nature of the communist threat. 2

This article focuses on the development of internal security policy within the US national security structure in response to the threat of communist subversion and revolutionary warfare in the Third World. Specific initiatives and problems associated with the implementation of 1290d policy in Latin America - collusion with dictatorial regimes, concerns over human rights violations, and fears that internal security programmes would be used as political weapons against legitimate opposition groups - are also analysed as US policy under Eisenhower shifted away from hemisphere defence and internal security ultimately comes to dominate defence relationships between the United States and the other American republics after the Cuban Revolution. 3

Background - Military Assistance and Hemisphere Defence

Military assistance and hemisphere defence preoccupied US policy plans for Latin America even prior to the beginning of the Cold War. In 1938 the United States established military missions which offered training and instruction in order to counter the threat of Fascist and Nazi subversion. After the outbreak of World War II, 16 Latin American nations granted the US air and naval base privileges as well as transit rights, while the US entered into Lend-Lease agreements with every Latin American republic except Argentina, and Panama. To facilitate US-Latin American military interaction, joint defence commissions with Mexico and Brazil were established, as was the Inter-American Defence Board (IADB).

In the post-war world, arrangements for the common. defence of the hemisphere played an integral part in the development of a world-wide anticommunist security system. 4 Shortly after taking office in January 1953, President Eisenhower defined and approved Latin American policy for his new administration. Eisenhower, recognising the need for support from the other American republics in the Cold War, provided military and economic assistance in order to strengthen hemispheric solidarity. 5 Both NSC 144/1 (18 March 1953) and NSC 543211 (3 September 1954), 'United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America', framed a variety of economic, political, and military objectives which the US sought to advance. These included support of US policies both in the UN and other international organisations; orderly political and economic progress; standardisation in organisation, training, doctrine, and equipment of military forces along US lines; and the reduction and elimination of internal communist or other anti-US subversion. 6

In the aftermath of the overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz in June 1954, the need for sustained action in countries threatened by internal subversion gained urgency. Adoption of the anticommunist resolution (Resolution 93) at the Caracas Conference (March 1954) meant that the United States could, as Secretary of State Foster Dulles declared, operate more effectively to meet Communist subversion in the American Republics'. 7 For Latin America, internal security programmes became the practical implementation of the administration's anticommunist policies.

Action No.1290d - Establishing the Structures

Wide-ranging policy initiatives in the field of internal security originated in the latter half of Eisenhower's first term. On 21 December 1954 the NSC, with the President's approval, requested that the Operations Co-ordinating Board (OCB) present a report, 'on the status and adequacy of the current programme to develop constabulary forces to maintain internal security and to destroy the effectiveness of the Communist apparatus in free world countries vulnerable to Communist subversion'. 8 Consequent to NSC Action No. 1290d, concepts and programmes for US assistance to aid in the development of foreign internal security forces were formally initiated. 9

Prior to this point, the US had offered piecemeal help on an emergency basis in Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Iran, and Guatemala, with agencies tasked to internal security activities as circumstances warranted. 10 When requested, the United States provided technical co-operation programmes in other nations to improve training, organisation, equipment, and functioning of civil police elements. As early as the Truman administration, US personnel with police experience were utilised as part of the public administration work associated with the US Mission. 11 This 'fire-fighting' approach to policy changed in 1954. Eisenhower expressed the view that, 'in certain kinds of countries. inhabited by certain kinds of people, it might be militarily sound and less costly for the US to provide them with light armament rather than standard heavy equipment. That is, a constabulary or a Philippine scout-type force might do the trick.' 12 As a result, he urged the formulation of internal security policy, recognising that it was in the US interest to aid nations vulnerable to communist subversion. 'Remaining fires' needed to be extinguished and new ones prevented from occurring. 13

Through OCB, a 1290d Working Group with representatives from the Departments of State and Defense (DOD), the International Cooperation Administration (ICA - established 30 June 1955 from Foreign Operations Administration), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was formed. As interpreted and developed by the Group, a concept for proceeding on the problem was formulated by 9 March 1955 which focused on influencing judicial and legislative systems, public information media, and police and military forces sufficient for internal defence. 14 Specific Country Team reports were sent to sub-regional drafting committees, along with currently available Washington-level information. Formed by the Working Group and chaired by State Department members, the drafting committees, composed of area specialists, prepared the initial 1290d Country Reports. These, in turn, were submitted to Working Group deputies for review and final forwarding to the Working Group and OCB. The fully completed series of reports were subsequently sent to the NSC and President Eisenhower. Ultimately, the Working Group reviewed 44 countries selecting 22 for initial analysis including

Western Hemisphere Bolivia, Costa Rica, Brazil, Guatemala, Chile, Venezuela

Southeast Asia Philippines, Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia

Far East Japan, Korea

South Asia Burma, Pakistan, Afghanistan

Near East Iceland, Greece

Europe Iran, Iraq, Syria

The threat of communist subversion was evaluated to be

Critical Laos, Vietnam

Dangerous Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Syria

Potentially Dangerous Brazil, Chile, Greece, Iran, Pakistan (East)

Contained But Needs Watching Guatemala, Iraq, Korea, Pakistan (West), Philippines, Thailand.

Analysis for Japan, Costa Rica, Iceland, and Venezuela was postponed, as no immediate threat was evident. On 1 June 1955, OCB began its review process with Guatemala. 15

Internal Security in Latin America - Early Initiatives

As early as 1947, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), precursor to CIA, offered an assessment of Latin America's Cold War geostrategic position. As a whole, its intelligence reports concluded, Latin America was within striking distance of US naval and air power and could be shut off by naval blockade consequently, nations within the region were of little use to the Russians either as military allies or as sources of supply. The Soviets then had nothing to gain by integrating their economy with that of Latin America since any large-scale trade arrangements involving strategic materials would elicit an 'immediate and effective' response from the United States. Economic dependency upon an area that could be cut off during war was 'unlikely to commend itself to the security-conscious USSR'. 16

These special conditions forced the Soviets to undertake operations in Latin America in a more clandestine fashion. Trade unions, especially those that extracted, processed, and transported materials the US needed from Latin America in any future war, were major targets for penetration. Other Soviet activities included dissemination of carefully-selected propaganda themes, and the creation and maintenance of intelligence networks. 17 Early CIA assessments of the communist threat viewed these developments with alarm it was believed that the USSR, by merely giving the necessary orders, could withhold from the United States its normal peacetime flow of strategic raw materials from key Latin American nations and precipitate economic crises in several others. 18

In Latin America, poverty, illiteracy, and repressive governments provided communists with a supportive environment within which to develop a base. Effective countermeasures depended in part upon an increasingly rapid growth of middle classes, greater organisation of and co-operation with anticommunist labour and political groups of the left both liberal and socialist - and increased co-operation between police, military, information, and intelligence agencies. 19 In Latin America, 1290d policy initially focused on preventive, police-type activity with limited application of force. This included detecting components of the communist apparatus such as agents, fellow-travellers, and front organisations, and detaining communist personalities or groups and undertaking judicial action against them. In this instance, US assistance centred on developing honest and competent administration by eliminating unqualified personnel and increasing pay and training; providing appropriate arms, equipment, transport and communications facilities; revising legislation and reorganising judicial systems in order to permit more effective action; exchanging information on the methodology of subversion; and assisting in the development of public information programmes to clarify the nature of the threat. 20

In countries where actual. or potential large-scale communist insurrection existed, US assistance followed a twofold strategy. First, police forces received aid in order to suppress minor civil disturbances stemming from banditry and low-level guerrilla actions. Jointly, indigenous military and paramilitary forces were trained, equipped, and deployed to provide counter-intelligence, and to suppress large-scale riots, demonstrations, and guerrilla activities. 21 Surveys on a country-by-country basis provided analysis and recommendations, allowing US internal security assistance to be individually designed to meet the specific requirements of each nation. 22

Latin America and 1290d - Summary Assessments 1955-56

OCB Working Group (1290d) for Latin America undertook summary assessments of the early efficacy of US internal security policy in target countries. The group included Spencer King (Chairman-State), Colonel William T. Bennett (Defense), Walter Bauer (ICA), Albert E. Carter (USIA), Colonel R. P. Crenshaw (Staff Representative-OCB), and an unnamed CIA representative. 1290d summary reports for Latin America were based on individual country assessments, beginning with 'Analysis of the Internal Security Situation in Guatemala', dated 1 June 1955. Assessments for Chile and Brazil. (16 November 1955), Bolivia (21 December 1955), Venezuela (13 June 1956), and Costa Rica (15 August 1956) followed and all reports subsequently underwent yearly progress reviews and reassessments as needed. New countries were added for analysis and action as the programme developed.

Guatemala

With the overthrow of Arbenz, US policy makers believed the situation in Guatemala to be generally under control. Procommunist, forces might conduct espionage activities but were incapable of seizing power, causing disruption, or undertaking concerted paramilitary operations. However, political instability, economic stagnation, and the possibility of defection among Army officers loyal to Arbenz continued to be of immediate threat. 23 The National Police and the army's military intelligence section, both of which were responsible for the suppression of subversives, had serious deficiencies in organisation, training, equipment, and investigative capabilities. The Committee for National Defense Against Communism, an executive agency tasked with uncovering clandestine communist organisations and directly responsible to the new president, was deemed ineffective. 24

The new Guatemalan government under Castillo Armas 'enthusiastically accepted' the survey of its internal security forces, undertaken by private consultants under ICA contract, and completed on 25 March 1956. US technicians were sent and training for Guatemalan police and military personnel began in both the United States and the Canal Zone. Fearing the resurgence of underground communist activity, US reorientation of Guatemalan military personnel toward their internal security role accelerated, liaison officers established an exchange of information on communist activities, and ICA programmed $300,000 for civil police functions the following year. 25 By the end of 1956, the annual 1290d report concluded, US training and support had succeeded in strengthening the capabilities of Guatemala's primary internal security forces. 26

Chile

In Chile, communist opportunities arose from conditions common to Latin America political and economic instability aggravated by high levels of inflation. Chilean communists, while outlawed as a political party, maintained a well-established organisation of some 30,000-35,000 with particular influence in organised labour, student movements, and intellectual circles. 27 Internal security forces consisted of the Carabinero Corps (21,000 men) and the Directorate General of Investigation (Investigaciones - a group similar to the US Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]) - both organised under the Ministry of Interior. The Chilean armed forces had a combined strength of 51,300 that could be deployed effectively in a supporting role to the Carabineros in order to suppress riots or insurrection. Indeed, US personnel considered the Carabinero Corps 'one of the most effective police forces in Latin America' with capabilities that could be used in other South American police forces where politically it was desirable to utilise non-US personnel. 28

In order to promote the US-Chilean security relationship, substantial initiatives were undertaken throughout 1956. General Ardiles (Director of the Carabineros) and his aide were invited to the US for internal security orientation and an invitation was extended for a Carabinero officer to undertake training in the Police Administration Specialist project. In both instances, Ardiles expressed 'delight and appreciation' for the offer. 29 Information exchanges between the Chilean Investigation Directorate and other Latin American internal security organisations were instituted and assistance reoriented toward internal security in order to realise economies that could be diverted to other Latin American Military Assistance Programmes (MAP). As well, US Embassy personnel approached officials of private American mines in the country to aid in developing anti-sabotage programmes for key installations in the copper and steel industries. 30 Finally, the United States Information Agency (USIA) maintained active anticommunist programming, ICA budgeted $100,000 (FY1957) primarily for training police officials and, on a more general level, technical assistance for hemisphere defence continued as a means of achieving overall stability and collective security for the area during this period. 31

Brazil

US 1290d specialists believed that while the Brazilian Communist Party was not in a position to seize power, it did constitute a potentially dangerous threat to internal security by virtue of its size (fourth or fifth largest outside the Soviet orbit), and the Brazilian government's tolerance of communist activities. including large-scale propaganda actions. Communists had achieved a platform from which to exploit popular discontent and anti-US nationalism by infiltrating into government positions at both the federal and local levels, as well as labour and information media organisations. By 1956, Brazil's Communist Party - the largest and wealthiest in Latin America - provided a model for other communist parties in the hemisphere, openly advocating armed struggle. 32

Efforts to improve effectiveness and co-ordination between state and federal police services were hampered by provincial autonomy and interservice rivalries. Separate civil and militarised police forces existed for each of the 20 states and the Federal District and fundamental problems existed at all levels due to lack of Proper communications equipment, motor transport, and training. Although a section of Brazil's National Security Council (BNSC) already undertook collection of intelligence against communists at a national level, US policy makers believed that a National Intelligence Agency which could co-ordinate anticommunist activity was integral to the development of a successful 1290d policy for Brazil. 33 Overall, the Army appeared well equipped for internal security purposes, and could rely on both the Navy and Air Force for transport support. Army officers were predominantly anticommunist, a sentiment to which the US gave 'discreet and informal' encouragement. 34 Still, efforts by the US to establish a National Police Academy failed, and although ICA did set aside $500,000 to support and train Brazil's police forces for the following year, little overall progress was made in bringing 1290d policies to that country in 1956. 35

Bolivia

Bolivia's governing National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) seized power in 1952. Composed primarily of moderate leftists, it was considered to be one of the most popular, broadly based governments in Bolivian history. In fact, the 1290d Working Group for Latin America regarded it as one of the 'best hopes for stability and friendliness towards the US', though its power was largely maintained through American economic support. 36 A potentially serious internal security situation existed due to the country's widespread poverty, the uncertainty surrounding a politically unstable and armed workers' militia, as well as low morale and disorganisation within the armed forces. Broad Marxist influences in education and labour circles, and public indifference to any communist threat further exacerbated the situation. Indeed, MNR leadership regarded communists merely as political rivals, though initially both the Communist Party of Bolivia (PCB) and the Trotskyite Workers Revolutionary Party (POR) were declared illegal. 37 The US, concerned by the potential threat of penetration to Bolivian government and paramilitary organisations, urged the elimination of communists and other subversives from positions of power and influence. Toward this end, the US Embassy in La Paz compiled information lists on the identities and activities of subversive elements, discussing specific cases through liaison channels with the Bolivian government. 38 USIA programmed anticommunist themes in an attempt to segregate police actions against communists from those against other political groups, while the local Bolivian press also offered some support in disseminating anticommunist information. 39

A survey conducted by two US police specialists of the Bolivian Carabinero and other security forces found them inadequate to cope with the internal security threat. These forces, armed primarily with obsolete European small arms, were handicapped by overlapping jurisdictions and lack of co-ordination. Political schisms between moderate and extreme leftists as well as the rightist opposition were also reflected within these groups, particularly the untrained, but armed, 14,000 member workers' militia, which appeared highly vulnerable to communist penetration. The Army, purged and reduced in strength, suffered from poor discipline, lack of funding, and internal political dissension. In the US, 1290d specialists were concerned that any political conflict might result in internecine warfare between Bolivia's internal security forces. 40 To stabilise the situation, they recommended continued training of the Bolivian military, particularly in riot control, counter-intelligence, and anti-guerrilla operations as well as the development of a programme to neutralise or minimise dangerous features of the workers' militia. General Ardiles of the Chilean Carabineros also informally offered training facilities for Bolivian police. Overall, the 1290d Working Group concluded, considerable effort would be required before any discernible effect was realised. 41

By the end of 1956, there appeared to be little danger of either an overt communist attack on Latin America or prospects for their general electoral success. The Soviets had increased trade and cultural relations with the region which, in the opinion of US policy makers, was intended to disrupt, 'friendly [US] relations with Latin America, to subvert the countries in the area, and to destroy the inter-American system'. 42 A variety of US political, economic, and military responses were initiated against this development including ongoing training of Latin American military personnel in US armed forces schools and training centres, and their use in a 'constructive role in economic development projects', later termed civic action. As well, vigorous efforts were undertaken to implement programmes designed to strengthen police and paramilitary forces in order to promote effective internal security operations. 43 New 1290d programmes had been initiated in both Costa Rica, where internal security questions were deemed 'particularly sensitive' and objectives still in the negotiation stage, and in Venezuela, where the government appeared to be stable and in control of the situation. For the new year, preparations to bring 1290d policies to more than eight Latin American and Caribbean countries including Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, El Salvador, Peru, and Haiti were underway. 44

Bureaucracy, Human Rights, and the Trojan Horse

Examining the internal security structures of the original 22 countries revealed large disparities in concept, organisation, and effectiveness. Militarily, all of the countries studied except Bolivia and Afghanistan had forces sufficient or in excess of internal security requirements. Many maintained heavy weapons, armour, warships and jets, but lacked the special training and equipment required for counter-insurgency or counterguerrilla operations. 45 Extensive layering of police forces - national, provincial, and metropolitan Carabineros, constabulary, civil guards and border/frontier troops - further exacerbated the problem. In several nations (Vietnam, Iran, and the Philippines), the military undertook. police-type internal, security functions while in others (Thailand), certain police units maintained military tasking and capabilities. The influence of European police systems was the solitary factor that all systems appeared to have in common.

Among Latin American security forces, as elsewhere in the developing world, deficiencies centred on poor administration, obsolete equipment, a lack of modern scientific techniques and procedures to counter covert communist activities, and a dearth of programmes to develop public support. 46 Indeed, developing public support was of particular importance given that these forces - often illiterate and poorly paid - existed through bribery, corruption, and extortion. 47 In the United States, problems of this nature were viewed as representative of the region as a whole. Colonel Crenshaw, OCB Staff Representative of the Latin American 1290d Working Group believed, for instance, that US policy papers towards the other American republics should forthrightly reflect obstacles inherent to development of that area including, 'instability, corruption, lack of social consciousness, lack of initiative and enterprise, [and] the rabidly anti-US attitude of some non-communist groups'. Crenshaw believed this would never occur as it was, 'to delicate to put down'. 48

But within the Eisenhower administration itself, bureaucratic problems also interfered with the development of 1290d programmes. No single, identifiable programme existed but rather a variety of plans which encompassed economic assistance, anticommunist information programmes, and training of security forces. Every major US government agency overseas attempted to promote, directly or indirectly, internal stability in target countries. 49 As a consequence, co-ordination of 1290d policy at this early stage proved erratic. State Department responsibilities arose from control over foreign relations but were ill defined with regards to 1290d. USIA often had overlapping anticommunist information activities associated both with 1290d and standard Country Outline Plans of Operations, but placed little emphasis on developing programmes which could bolster public support for indigenous security elements. ICA and Defense shared authority and responsibility for surveying, training, and equipping internal security forces, while Defense also maintained responsibility for developing foreign armed forces for more general Mutual Security missions. No US agency actively took responsibility for influencing legislative reform in the developing world. 50

Further difficulties arose from needlessly high levels of security and lack of bureaucratic initiative. Officials requiring internal security information were often left uninformed because the status or problems of ongoing 1290d operations was neither centralised nor consolidated from the field. 51 Meeting infrequently, performance levels varied considerably between groups. Surprisingly for such a specialised and sensitive policy, people at relatively low personnel levels, some not even technically competent in matters concerning internal security, often conducted 1290d initiatives. 52 Inadequate inter-agency co-ordination of internal security programme planning, evaluation, and reporting existed, and the overall leadership needed to resolve conflicts and provide guidance was handled on an ad hoc basis. 53 These problems were particularly acute within the Latin American Group given the region's size, diversity, and low level of priority within US strategic planning. As regards secrecy, not even the State Department's Bolivia desk, in drafting the regular Outline Plan of Operations for Bolivia, was completely informed on 1290d plans for that country. 54

Personnel and funding were also key problem areas in the development of 1290d policy. A limited number of US specialists had the appropriate experience, personal qualifications, and language capabilities to conduct countersubversive training. As a result, use of foreign specialists increased, as did continental US (CONUS) training of selected personnel, though facilities were often inadequate. 55 Moreover, funding requirements, while modest in scope (FY1957 projections called for approximately $25 million, $35 million in FY1958) often proved difficult to obtain under existing Mutual Security legislation given that neither ICA nor Defense had complete flexibility to utilise foreign aid funds for internal security assistance purposes. 56

In general, US economic, military, and technical assistance to developing nations rarely took country-specific internal security requirements into account. Developing nations, struggling within the context of poverty and explosive population growth, political immaturity and corruption, illiteracy, racial and colonial conflict, and proximity to countries controlled by communist governments required 'special contributions' for specific internal security needs. Those needs were never fully considered when planning large-scale assistance programmes. 57

But the Eisenhower administration faced far greater problems than bureaucratic inefficiencies in its efforts to develop and expand 1290d programmes in the developing world. Latin American and US perceptions differed markedly over both the actual threat posed by communism and the ability of the Soviets to orchestrate its proponents. Confusing 'revolutionary nationalism and indigenous discontent with externally supported Communist movements', the United States often found itself aligned with repressive regimes and 'discredited elites' whose importance as bulwarks against communism was out of all proportion to their nations' actual Cold War strategic value. As a result, American support often enforced the status quo rather than meeting the rising need for progressive change demanded in the developing world. 58

In fact, critics excoriated the administration for abetting the development of police states and aiding dictatorships that violated human rights. 59 In response, Albert R. Haney, Deputy Assistant to the Director for Security Affairs (ICA) claimed that the administration did not have the 'moral luxury' of helping only those countries with democratic ideals similar to the United States. 'Eliminate all the absolute monarchies, dictatorships and juntas from the free world', Haney declared, 'and count those that are left and it should be readily apparent that the US would be well on its way to isolation - the fortress America illusion'. Indeed, Haney continued, 'properly understood as a democratic, unselfish, often unconditional approach to helping other countries to help themselves to strengthen and improve the very sinews of government, [1290d programmes were] a very worthy and honourable form of foreign aid.' 60 Although perhaps too lofty an endorsement of a policy known even within the US government as the 'police programme', Haney was nonetheless adamant that US law enforcement and military officers leave 'no brutality, repression or violation of human rights ... unchallenged'. 61 This did not mollify critics, particularly in Congress, who continued to attack security policies that aided governments in suppressing legitimate internal opposition. 62

Latin Americans also worried about greater US intervention in their internal affairs, questioning whether 1290d programmes were little more than a 'Trojan Horse' intended to penetrate their security services. 63 Indeed, US internal security initiatives

[Had] not generally gained the interest and support of the Latin American governments which, with the exception of Bolivia, did not feel sufficiently threatened by Communism to overcome local political problems inherent in establishing new security organs. There were, for example, indications that some of the legally constituted law enforcement and military bodies, as well as the non-Communist opposition, resented and feared the introduction of new security agencies designed to combat Communist subversion, fearing they would be used (as they [were] in some cases) as political weapons under the control of the existing governments primarily directed at the political opposition as such, and function to the detriment of existing security organs. 64

Clearly, the original intent of the administration's 1290d policy was not the development of 'assets' within Latin America's security structures. Still, it was not an unexpected bi-product given the degree of collaboration that developed between US police, military, and intelligence organisations and their counterparts in the region and Latin Americans had cause to be concerned. 65

A New Look - The Overseas Internal Security Programme

In an attempt to alleviate the problems associated with 1290d policies, special procedures and mechanisms and greater centralised direction and control were introduced in order to revise and refine operations. 66 High level appointments were made from ICA and a Senior Advisory Group in order to plan and expedite internal security operations. Drawn from departments and agencies with primary responsibility for the implementation of internal security policy, these appointments included Arthur Richards (State), William Leffingwell (Defense), Edward Roberts (US Information Agency), James Angleton (CIA), and T. E. Naughten (Senior Official, 1290d). 67 This group remained operational during the initial phase of restructuring, with the Senior Official given access to covert aspects of 1290d programmes, 'on a need-to-know basis consistent with the operational security considerations involved'. 68

On 13 March 1957, policies associated with NSC Action 1290d were redesignated as the Overseas Internal Security Programme (OISP). While the newly named policy maintained the previous mandate of developing the capabilities of security forces and agencies to counter internal communist subversion, policy makers acknowledged that attempts to eliminate all possible economic, social, and political causes of subversion were beyond the programme's capabilities. 69 Still, they believed that a focused OISP policy, properly co-ordinated and run in conjunction with appropriate technical, political, and economic actions could form an 'internal security system' that would ensure a significant measure of stability to the developing world. OIS programmes were envisioned as a 'major element of US foreign operations', forming an integral part of all operational plans for underdeveloped nations. Their purpose to act as a 'vaccine' against communist subversion, thereby "allowing for orderly progress and development. 70

Roles and responsibilities for the various departments and agencies tasked with implementing OISP policy were also newly defined. ICA assumed 'an affirmative responsibility in initiating, directing and supervising' OISP actions. 71 It undertook assistance to civil police forces and agencies, providing training, equipment, technical assistance, and personnel through the Technical Co-operation programme. This assistance focused both on training foreign personnel for operations against communist infiltration and subversion as well as aiding host governments to mobilise public support for internal security. initiatives. The State Department now provided political and policy guidance in the field, negotiated programme acceptance, and attempted to influence host country laws and judicial systems in favour of anticommunist legislation. CIA, presumably, continued to provide intelligence/counterintelligence support, liase with foreign intelligence services, and undertake covert action as required in support of OISP objectives. 72

Defense Department training of foreign military forces both in the United States and abroad continued as well, focusing on riot control, counter-intelligence, and counter-guerrilla operations funded through military assistance programmes. Other DOD roles now included 'courtesy' training in US facilities of 'neutral' country personnel; assistance to select paramilitary and police forces jurisdictionally linked to host-country military forces; and logistical support to US field elements operating directly or indirectly with counter-subversive forces. 73 To achieve military assistance economies and reduce direct US involvement, regional training centres and third-country instruction Vietnamese by Filipinos, Laotians and Cambodians by Thais, Bolivians by Chileans - received even greater emphasis. This was both a political consideration and a practical necessity given the lack of qualified US personnel available for internal security purposes. 74 Finally, in an attempt to reorganise the bureaucracy associated with the programme, OISP reports were integrated into regular OCB procedures and Country Papers, the special OCB (1290d) Working Group was abolished, vice-chairmanship for OISP changed hands from State to the Special Assistant to the President, and OCB itself, while maintaining its broad functions and responsibilities, was organisationally placed within the structure of the NSC. 75

OISP and Latin America - Progress and New Initiatives

Measures undertaken by the Eisenhower administration to refine the OISP concept insured that policy would be implemented more expeditiously. Within the Latin American Group, concerns over leadership responsibilities, the preparation of OISP courses of action and progress reports, as well as security classification, were clarified. 76 A regional fund of $2,000,000 for OISP activities, including more than $500,000 each for Bolivia and Brazil, $300,000 for Guatemala, and $100,000 each for Chile and Costa Rica was planned. Internal security funds for countries not yet approved for OISPs, including $300,000 for Colombia and $100,000 each for Ecuador and Uruguay, were also set aside. 77

Throughout 1957 the administration contended with ongoing. Sino-Soviet bloc efforts to establish and expand diplomatic, cultural, and economic ties throughout the other American republics, aided and supported by local communist parties and groups. 78 It responded by actively implementing, with varying success, OISPs in several Latin American nations. In Chile, no immediate need for a police programme appeared necessary, as the internal situation remained stable. Carabineros Director General Ardiles did pay a 'highly successful visit.' to the United States and efforts were also undertaken to restrict communist leadership in trade unions. However, attempts by US officials to have the Chilean government retain anticommunist legislation failed. In Brazil, no substantial progress was made in establishing a national intelligence agency until 1958, but in Venezuela, a survey of the oil-producing facilities was completed and DOD conducted 'anticommunist intelligence training' for the military. 79

In Bolivia, OISP specialists concluded that subversive elements still posed a serious threat to stability. ICA, with two police advisors in-country and two more on the way, provided emergency riot control equipment, vehicles, and firearms in an effort to equip and train the Bolivian Carabineros, National, and Transit police units. But reluctance by the Bolivian government to accept further internal security initiatives delayed new OISP actions until 1958, when DOD provided training and equipment for a 550-man Presidential Guard Battalion and established camps for the Bolivian Army to undergo retraining by three US Army mobile training teams (MTTs) in an attempt to rebuild morale and capabilities. 80

For Guatemala, the assassination of President Castillo Armas in July 1957 increased the potential for political instability. Three ICA police technicians provided training to the National Police, Border Patrol, Judicial Police Department, and the Seccion de Defensa Contra Comunismo - the executive anticommunist agency, while two others conducted 'specialised survey and training' of the border patrol and the new President's personal security force in an attempt to avert another assassination. However, loyalty within the Army to individuals rather than to the national constitution continued to fuel uncertainty, while political instability, 'prevented the development in the police forces of an esprit de corps and a democratic orientation'. As a result, questions over the ability of military and police units to maintain internal security remained, though the election early in 1958 of a conservative candidate willing to co-operate with US objectives alleviated some political concerns. 81

New OISP-related initiatives were also undertaken in various Latin American nations where fully established programmes did not yet exist. Civil police surveys for El Salvador and Peru were completed, but the Costa Rican OISP was suspended after the US Embassy declared the political situation too sensitive. US personnel also considered a police survey for Honduras, but 'serious questions' over the suitability of either an OISP or civil police programme were raised due to the Honduran government's repressive measures against non-communist opposition. Similar US concerns over repressive government measures existed in regard to El Salvador where an ICA police advisor was already assisting in training and reorganising the National Police. Finally, approximately 24 personnel from Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, and Paraguay received internal security orientation 82 and, in what would become the most serious internal security issue between the United States and the Andean region in the decades ahead, plans for training Ecuadorian security officers in the 'detection of illicit narcotics traffic' began. 83

By the end of 1957, US internal security activities in Latin America were proceeding, albeit at a moderate pace. For the Eisenhower administration, however, it was the last full year in which they could initiate OISP policy in the other American republics without substantial legislative restrictions. Still, while events throughout 1958 proved to be the low point of the administration's Latin American policies, revolutionary changes in the region ultimately elevated its OIS programmes to a dominant position within US-Latin American security relationships.

OISP Policy Under Siege

On 27 April 1958, US Vice President Richard M. Nixon departed for a tour of eight Latin American nations with his wife and various US officials. Dramatic and widely publicised anti-American demonstrations greeted Nixon in Lima, Peru, and in Caracas, a mob of some 4000 Venezuelans attacked his motorcade. Troops with. drawn bayonets were needed to clear a way for the cars through the angry crowd. In the United States, Marine units were placed on standby at Cherry Point, North Carolina, in order to assure the protection of the American delegation. 84 Nixon's disastrous trip highlighted the failure of the administration's Latin American policies that the attack on the Vice President occurred in Venezuela was particularly embarrassing given that OISP reports for several years had declared that nation 'stable'. 85

US officials claimed that the outbreaks of violence were communist inspired and directed though they admitted that the majority of rioters were non-communists, angry with US policies towards the region. Ultranationalism, particularly among politically active students and intellectuals, appeared to be the most serious current problem facing US interests in the area. As well, many democratic elements were resentful over US support of dictatorial regimes and the administration's general neglect of Latin America in comparison to Europe, Asia, and Africa. All of these factors, US analysts concluded, allowed communists to increase their political, cultural, and propaganda activities, and place the United States in a negative position. 86 In fact, intelligence officials feared that the overall strength of Latin American communist parties appeared to be growing, particularly in Colombia, Venezuela, and Guatemala. 87 These reports not withstanding, even CIA director Allen Dulles admitted that problems would exist in the region were communists not present. 88 Indeed, the situation in Venezuela for instance, punctuated an important US misperception that Latin Americans might well be ultranationalist and even, in some instances, violently anti- American but that did not necessarily make them procommunist.

Nonetheless, in an effort to offset these adverse factors, the administration began to place greater emphasis on both its economic and security policy in the region. But attempts to counter suspected communist influence through increased military assistance funding met with stiff congressional opposition. 89 Among other issues, concerns were raised about the validity of implementing, public safety programmes in countries where political, economic, or even ultranationalist factors caused instability, 'in the absence of any immediate threat from communist subversion'.90 Many congressional critics, including Hubert Humphrey, John F. Kennedy, William Fulbright, and Wayne Morse opposed increased military assistance to regimes that lacked popular, democratic support within their own nations at the excuse of being anticommunist. 91

In June 1958, Senator Morse dealt another blow to the administration's OISP policy when the Mutual Security Act passed with an amendment he had sponsored, prohibiting the use of MAP funds in Latin America for internal security purposes. 92 This placed the administration, 'in the absurd position of working on an expanding number of civil OIS Programmes and, at the same time, being under specific Congressional injunction not to use MAP funds for internal security purposes except in "exceptional" cases'. 93

To further complicate matters, the administration's ICA Director, James Smith, reacting to the mounting congressional pressure, decided unilaterally to limit equipment provided to developing nations under its Public Safety Programme to only that amount needed for instruction or demonstration purposes. Concerns were raised that ICA's entrance into the field of internal security had constituted 'a wide departure from established concepts of "technical assistance" and "economic development"'. Public safety administration in OISP-scheduled countries often included 'activities not normally associated with police operations in the United States' such as the operation of national communications networks, maintenance of national personal registration and identification systems, and domestic counter-intelligence and control of subversive activities. Moreover, supporting forces 'deemed repressive or militaristic often [appeared] incompatible with other ICA objectives'. A reassessment of OISP and ICA Public Safety policies was recommended. 94 By February 1959, Smith was replaced as ICA Director by James W. Riddleberger, but his attempt to limit ICA's internal security role proved a factor in the eventual militarisation of OISP policy.

Revolution in Cuba The Future of OISP in Latin America

In an effort to address congressional criticism over MAP funding in underdeveloped regions, Eisenhower established the President's Committee to Study the US Military Assistance Programme in November 1958. General William H. Draper was appointed chairman of the committee, which held its first meeting in December. But the committee's inception and the congressional criticism it was meant to defuse were overshadowed by events some 90 miles off the coast of Florida. On I January 1959, the collapse of the Fulgencio Batista government in Cuba and the emergence of Fidel Castro's revolutionary regime presented a model for insurgency to all Latin American guerrilla movements. For the first time, guerrillas who openly identified their political beliefs as radical-leftist brought down and replaced a proAmerican government. 95 For the Eisenhower administration, this represented a final, major blow in an ongoing series of setbacks to its policies in Latin America, made all the more embarrassing by the fact that no OISP initiatives were considered for Cuba in the years prior to Castro's revolutionary success. The Cuban Revolution radically altered the US military's geostrategic concepts of security for Latin America, forcing the administration to deal with not only social reform, but also the prospect of Cuban-style insurgency spreading throughout the hemisphere. 96 Previously, the overriding US military consideration for the region was hemisphere defence, although OISPs did attempt to promote training of paramilitary, civil police, and intelligence organisations for the maintenance of internal security. Military assistance had placed the US in a favourable position of influence in the Latin American military sphere, contributed indirectly to the national economies by sharing defence costs, and impacted on the psychological conditioning of officers and men trained in the United States. But now, Brigadier General James W. Coutts declared in a letter to the Draper Committee, 'the greatest aid Latin America can furnish us militarily is in preserving their internal stability'. 97

Colonel Edward G. Lansdale in DOD's Office of Special Operations (OSO) echoed this belief:

Perhaps the outstanding Defense need with the OCB is a more realistic look at the Overseas Internal Security Programme (OISP). What the originators of OISP intended and what the OISP is today are too far apart. Defense has gradually defaulted its very real stake in OISP to ICA and a civilian police program. This is falling short of internal security goals. Bolivia furnishes an example. Under OISP the US trained Bolivian police ... provided fine protection to American officials in the recent demonstrations. But, the internal security of Bolivia is in a highly unstable state. Wouldn't the judicious expenditure of some OISP funds in a programme with the Bolivian Army ... start constructing the fundamentals needed for internal security in Bolivia? 98

Another OSO member, J. T. French, believed that OISP policy needed to be 'vitalised' through NSC level reaffirmation of its importance; centralised direction and leadership from Washington; 'full-time attention' to assessment, implementation, and progress -reports; and utilisation of personnel knowledgeable in internal security activity, including those from other countries, who would bring flexible and imaginative concepts and ideas to the program. According to French, DOD's abrogation of responsibilities in implementing OISP policy meant that it often offered limited, 'standardised' type support which proved to be 'meaningless' to the local situation or, worse still, failed to develop any programs at all, 'due to confusion or lack of knowledge on the part of people in the field as to what OISP [was] all about'. Many sections of the US government not currently involved could contribute to the program, French concluded, particularly within Defense where intelligence, special warfare, civil affairs, and military government specialists were under-utilised. 99

A comparable view was shared by Robert Komer at CIA who was adamant that no other program offered 'as much overall security' for such relatively small cost as OISP, and. that the program was 'under fire largely because of ICA's reluctance to be in the police business'. Komer believed that, 'for what it's worth, my own personal opinion is that OISP ought to be increased, and offered to each new underdeveloped country. And if anyone had the guts to do so, OISP could be used to reduce the demand for military aid, especially in countries where internal security is the primary mission'. 100

Ironically then, it was the Cuban Revolution that breathed new life into Eisenhower's struggling internal security policy in Latin America, muting congressional critics. In fact, the administration, offered a final detailed policy review by a group composed of personnel from Defense, State, CIA and OCB in a last attempt to clarify and promote the policy before the end of the Eisenhower mandate. OIS programs, the group's report concluded, did not and could not reduce military expenditures in countries with combined internal and external missions. In fact, internal security programmes proved to be a net addition to US assistance costs, offering the possibility of savings only in areas where regular military forces did not exist or were not desired, such as Africa. 101 They did, however, meet a ,separate and distinct counter subversive need', and highlighted a gap in national security policy internal security programs were a valuable means of countering low-intensity threats to US interests in areas not in immediate danger of communist subversion. The group made a specific request to the NSC to review this gap in policy guidance. 102

The group also offered a guarded response to criticisms over the dangers of association with repressive or militaristic forces. Its conclusion that the identification of the United States with these kinds of forces would always remain a question of degree. Police functions in underdeveloped nations, the group noted, went beyond 'protection of life and property' or simple prevention of crime. They often needed to control 'armed dissidence, tribal warfare and militant subversive activities' while concurrently establishing 'law and order in remote areas among primitive peoples.' Clearly the level of power wielded by internal security forces opened the door to abuse and repression, particularly in the absence of judicial safeguards. To counterbalance this situation the US needed to eliminate unnecessary use of force, while attempting to improve police administration, training, and operational standards. Modem investigative techniques, effective supervision through improved mobility and communications systems, and the application of legal and judicial safeguards were all seen as means of increasing public support while concurrently diminishing the threat of abuse of power. 103 'Influence' was to be exerted on foreign security forces to maintain operational focus and political neutrality while close interaction with US advisors would enhance 'pro-Western orientation'. 104

In August 1959, policy makers, through US Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906/1), called for continued support of civil police and other 'overt and covert' programs to fight against communist ubversion, while concomitantly encouraging and assisting allied nations to develop their own covert programs in co-ordination with the United States. NSC 5906/1 also recommended similar actions against 'subversive or rebellious' noncommunist elements deemed 'hostile to US interests'. 105 In Latin America, Public Safety Programs were to proceed 'as feasible', with the caveat that consideration be given to the dangers of associating with internal security forces which utilised repressive or extra-legal methods of enforcement. 106 By October, a high-powered US special survey team comprised jointly, perhaps for the first time in that region, of military and civilian counterinsurgency specialists with experience in Asia, went to Colombia at the request of that nation's government to survey its internal security problems. 107 For the other American republics, as elsewhere in the developing world, these kinds of teams increasingly composed of special warfare experts - became the norm.

Conclusion

As Cold War attentions shifted to the 'contested areas' of the periphery,108 the Eisenhower administration grew increasingly concerned by the rising threat of communist subversion and revolutionary warfare throughout the Third World, including Latin America. 109 In response, the administration instituted 1290d (OISP) policy, seeking to build effective internal security systems within allied developing nations. Coupled to broader US assistance efforts that sought to alleviate social., economic, and political problems that often fuelled violence in these nations, OISP was a policy designed to promote order and progress by first securing internal stability. By linking internal security initiatives to aid programs, US policy makers were able to bring enormous influence to bear upon all facts of the internal affairs of host nations, especially in the development of their force structures, judicial systems, and information media.

Clearly there were problems associated with this new policy initiative. Authority and responsibility for OIS programs were initially ill-defined, jurisdictions overlapped and excessive secrecy and inter-agency rivalry slowed progress. As a result, co-ordination between the various US departments involved in policy implementation was erratic. Personnel and funding were key problem areas too, as limited numbers of qualified US specialists existed to conduct countersubversion training, while thoseoperating in the field were often hampered by lack of centralised direction and leadership. Nonetheless, the significance of Eisenhower's Overseas Internal Security Program was that did offer the first coherent, integrated US strategy for countering low-intensity threats, communist or otherwise.

In Latin America, political objections to 1290d policy made efforts to initiate and expand programs more difficult. 110 Differences over estimates of Soviet ability to influence and direct communist movements in the region and periodic revelations of US intelligence assets embedded within the security structures of various Latin American nations further exacerbated the problem. Most importantly, failure to systematically institutionalise human rights training as an integral part of internal security programs for the region exposed US administrations throughout the Cold War to criticisms of colluding with authoritarian regimes.

In spite of these problems, Latin America's unique geostrategic position and its regional vulnerabilities ensured the eventual predominance of internal security force structures in nations throughout that area. After the Cuban Revolution, the Eisenhower administration's fear that Castro's government would actively promote and covertly assist communist revolutionary movements throughout the hemisphere propelled OISP policy to primacy. 111 Legislative restrictions not withstanding, the Eisenhower administration continued to affirm OIS programs for the region to the end of its second term, side-stepping the More Amendment, as needed, through special presidential determinations.

Indeed, some of the administration's last policy actions sought to promote internal security as a priority objective in Latin America, calling jointly for effective US counter-guerrilla doctrine as well as assistance programs to deal with the social, political, and economic causes of discontent in the region. 112 As a result, internal security policies developed under Eisenhower came to dominate US-Latin American security relations, ultimately evolving into counterinsurgency doctrine under President John F. Kennedy.

NOTES

A version of this article was first presented at the annual Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) Conference, Georgetown University, 21 June 1997.

1. NSC 5501 - Basic National Security Policy - 6 Jan. 1955, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs - Records, 1952-61 (OSANSA), NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 14, NSC 5501Basic National Security Policy (Abilene, KS Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (Hereafter DDEL]), p.3. I am extremely grateful to Archivist David J. Haight and the staff of the Eisenhower Library for facilitating my research in Abilene.

2. Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d - 23 Nov. 1955, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 13, NSC 5434/1 Military Assistance Program, Procedure for Review-Annex A (DDEL), pp.20-1. Initial 1290d policy was drafted out of the so-called 'MacArthur Concept'-apparently a reference to Douglas MacArthur II, Counsellor of the Dept. of State until 24 Nov. 1956.

3. For US foreign policy initiatives vis-a-vis Latin America during this period see Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism (Chapel Hill UNC Press 1988). Blanche Wiesen Cook. The Declassified Eisenhower A Divided Legacy (Garden City, NY. Doubleday 1981). See also Benjamin R. Beede, Intervention and Counter-insurgency An Annotated Bibliography of the Small Wars of the United States, 1898-1984 (NY. Garland 1985) and Anthony James Joes, Guerrilla Warfare A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical Sourcebook (Westport, CT. Greenwood Press 1996) for an overview of guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency historiography.

Two works that continue to remain useful are Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power.- Counter-insurgency and Civic Action in Latin America (Columbus Ohio State UP 1966), which focuses on US internal security initiatives in Latin America under the Kennedy administration, and Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counter-insurgency Era US Doctrine and Performance 1950 to the Present (NY. Free Press, a Division of Macmillan 1977).

For a wide-ranging collection of articles on US-Latin American military issues see Russell W. Ramsey, Guardians of the Other Americas Essays on the Military Forces of Latin America (Lanham. MDUP of America 1997).

An excellent critical review of US counter-insurgency policy is offered in D. Michael Shafter. Deadly Paradigms The Failure of U.S. Counter-insurgency Policy (Princeton UP 1988). For more vociferous critics see Alexander George (ed.) Western State Terrorism (NY Routledge, Chapman & Hall 1991); Noam Chomsky, Timing the Tide The US and Latin America (NY Black Rose Books 1987); and Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft US Guerrilla Warfare, Counter-insurgency, and Counterterrorism 1940-1990 (NY. Pantheon Books 1992).

On the issue of human rights see Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America (Princeton UP 1981).

For the changing nature of US-Latin American security relations see Jonathan Hartlyn et al. (eds.), The United States and Latin America in the 1990s Beyond the Cold War (Chapel Hill UNC Press 1992) and Richard L. Millet and Michael Gold-Bliss (eds.), Beyond Praetorianism The Latin American Military in Transition (Coral Gables NorthSouth Centre Press. U. of Miami 1996).

4. James F. Schnabel. The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. 1 1945-1947 (Washington DC Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff 1979) pp.347-49. From National Archives, Record Group 218.

5. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America (note 3) p.26.

6. NSC 144/1 - United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America - 18 March 1953, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 4, NSC 144-Latin America (2) (DDEL), pp. 1-7, NSC 5432/1 - United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America - 3 Sept. 1954, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 13, NSC 5432/1-Policy Toward Latin America (DDEL). pp. 1-8.

7. Discussion at the 189th Meeting of the NSC, Thursday, 18 March 1954, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), NSC Series, Box 5, 189th Meeting (DDEL), p.3.

8. NSC Record of Actions 229th Meeting. 21 Dec. 1954 - Action Number 1290d, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 1, Records of Actions by NSC 1954(4) Action Nos. 1259-1292 (DDEL). p.2.

9. Report in Connection with the Overseas Internal Security Program - I April 1959 OSANSA, NSC Series, Subject Subseries, Box 6, Overseas Internal Security Program (April 1958-May 1959) (DDEL), p.1. The 1290d program was renamed as the Overseas Internal Security Programme (OISP) in March 1957.

10. Observations and Suggestions Concerning the 'Overseas Internal Security Program (OISP)' - 14 June 1957, Albert R. Haney - Deputy Assistant to the Director for Security Affairs, International Co-operation Administration (ICA), White House Office, NSC StaffPapers, 1948-61, OCB Central Files, Box 18, OCB 014.12 File #5(2) NSC 1290d Internal Security (DDEL), pp. 11-12. (Hereafter Haney Report).

11. Memo for the Record - Second Meeting Called by ICA to Discuss 1290d Procedure (Draft Attachment) - 6 Feb. 1956, NSC Staff- Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 17, OCB 0 14.12 - File #3(1) NSC 1290d - Internal Security (DDEL), no page number.

12. OCB Progress Report - 19 March 1957 Overseas Internal Security Program, OSANSA, Special Assistant Series, Chronological Subscries, Box 4, April 1957(2) (DDEL), I page.

13. Haney Report (note 10) p. 12. In Nov. of 1954, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) in Washington DC agreed to a three-year contract with the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) to provide training for 75 overseas police officers. As a result, IACP and FOA assumed primary responsibility for the training of foreign police officials.

14. Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d - 23 Nov. 1955, pp. 1-2; Annex A, pp.20-21.

15. Ibid. p.4 and Annex A, pp.21-2. Preparation of Washington-based information was assigned as follows Nature of the Threat - CIA; Description of Internal Security Forces Defense; Inventory of Current US Programmes- FOA (ICA); Political Factors Bearing on Internal Security - State.

16, Soviet Objectives in Latin America. Central Intelligence Group Document ORE 16, 10 April 1947 in CIA Research Reports, Latin America, 1946-1976, Reel #2 (Frederick, MD UP of America, 1982) p. 1.

17. Ibid. pp.4-5.

18. Soviet Objectives in Latin America - Summary, Central Intelligence Agency Document ORE 16/1, 1 Nov. 1947 in CIA Research Reports, Latin America, 1946- 1976. Reel #2, no page numbers.

19, A Report of the National Security Council by the Department of State on US Policy Regarding Anti-Communist Measures which could be Planned and Carried out within the Inter-American System, NSC 16-28 June 1948 in Declassified Document Quarterly Series, Vol.2 (1976), Microform 42(F) (Washington DC Carrollton Press 1977) pp.4-10. (Hereafter DDQS).

20. Report of NSC 1290d Working Group - 16 Feb. 1955, NSC Staff Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 16, OCB 014.12 File #1(2) NSC 1290d - Internal Security (DDEL), pp.2,4. See also NSC 1290d Working Group (Internal Security Force), Draft Model Telegram - 10 March 1955, File #1(4), pp.1-2 from the same Box.

21. Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d - 23 Nov. 1955, pp.4-5; NSC 1290d Working Group (Internal Security Force), Draft Model Telegram - 10 March 1955, pp.2-3; Draft Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff - Implementation and Co-ordination of NSC Action 1290d - nd, NSC StaffPapers, OCB Central Files, Box 18, OCB 014.12 File #3(1) NSC 1290d - Internal Security (DDEL), p. 1.

22. Report of NSC 1290d Working Group - 16 Feb. 1955, p.7.

23. 1290d Project - Summaries - Guatemala - 5 Oct. 1955, NSC Staff- Papers, OCB Central Files. Box 17, OCB 014.12 File #2(1) NSC 1290d - Internal Security (DDEL), no page numbers; Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d - Summary of 1290d Report on Guatemala - 23 Nov. 1955, p.33.

24. Ibid.

25. Attachments to ICA Report on 1290d - Guatemala - 22 June 1956. NSC Staff Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 17, OCB 014.12 File #3(4) NSC 1290d - Internal Security (DDEL), p. 13; Annual Status Report on Operations Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d Dec. 1955 through Nov. 1956 - Guatemala - 15 Feb. 1957 (Amended), NSC Staff. Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 18, OCB 014.12, File #4(6) NSC 1290d - Internal Security (DDEL). pp.31-2 (Hereafter Annual 1290d Report - 15 Feb. 1957); 1290d Project - Summaries Guatemala - 5 Oct. 1955, no page numbers; Implementation of 1290d Programs Guatemala - 16 Aug. 1956, NSC Staff. Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 17, OCB 014.12 File #3(6) NSC 1290d Internal Security (DDEL), p.4.

26. Annual 1290d Report - 15 Feb. 1957 (note 25) p.7.

27. 1290d Project - Summaries - Chile - 5 Oct. 1953, no page numbers-, Report to the NSC, Synopses of Individual Country Analyses (Annex B) - Chile - 12 Sept. 1955, NSC Staff Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 17, OCB 014.12 File #1(9) NSC 1290d - Internal Security (DDEL), p.29. The 1948 Chilean 'Law for the Permanent Defence of Democracy' was also a tool used initially by the Ibanez Government to isolate and remove communists from positions of influence. By 1958 this law had been repealed, re-legalising communist activities.

28. Ibid.

29. Implementation of 1290d Programs - Chile - 16 Aug. 1956, pp.3-4. Some opposition appears to have been voiced by Ardiles in extending a similar invitation to the Director General of Investigations.

30. 1290d Project - Summaries - Chile - 5 Oct. 1955, no page numbers.

31. Report to the NSC, Synopses of Individual Country Analyses (Annex B) - Chile - 12 Sept. 1955, p.29, Annual 1290d Report - Chile - 15 Feb. 1957, p.26.

32. Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d - Summary of 1290d Report on Brazil - 23 Nov. 1955, p.27; Annual 1290d Report - Brazil - 15 Feb. 1957, p. 19.

33. Ibid. Also - Attachments to ICA Report on 1290d - Brazil - 22 June 1956, p.5;

34. Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 12904 - Summary of 1290d Report on Brazil - 23 Nov. 1955, p.27.

35. Annual 1290d Report - Brazil - 15 Feb. 1957, p. 19.

36. Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d - Summary of 1290d Report on Bolivia - 23 Nov. 1955, p.26; Report to the NSC, Synopses of Individual Country Analyses (Annex B) - Bolivia - 12 Sept. 1955, p.28.

37. Ibid.

38. Implementation of 1290d Projects - Bolivia - 16 Aug. 1956, p. 1; Annual 1290d Report Bolivia - 15 Feb. 1957, p. 17.

39. Attachments to ICA Report on 1290d - Bolivia - 22 June 1956, p.3. 'Considerable opposition' was later voiced by the State Department's Latin American section to a plan which would have involved USIA in a makeover of the Bolivian Army's image - see Implementation of 1290d Programme - Bolivia - 16 Aug. 1956, p. 1.

40. Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d - Summary of 1290d Report on Bolivia - 23 Nov. 1955, p.26; Report to the NSC, Synopses of Individual Country Analyses (Annex B) - Bolivia - 12 Sept. 1955, p.28; Attachments to ICA Report on 1290d - Bolivia - 22 June 1956, pp.3-4; Implementation of 1290d Projects - Bolivia - 16 Aug. 1956, p.1; Annual 1290d Report - Bolivia - 15 Feb. 1957, pp. 17-18.

41. Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d - Summary 1290d Report on Bolivia 23 Nov. 1955. p.26; Annual 1290d Report - Bolivia - 15 Feb. 1957, p. 18.

42. NSC 5613/1 - US Policy Toward Latin America - 25 Sept. 1956, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 18, NSC 5613/1 - Policy Toward Latin America (2) (DDEL), p.2.

43. Ibid. pp. 10- 11.

44. Annual 1290d Report - Costa Rica, Venezuela - 15 Feb. 1957, pp.27, 57; Summary of 1290d Activities Attachment Status of 1290d Programs - 15 Aug. 1956 and 1290d Project - Priorities on New Countries - 23 Aug. 1956 both in NSC Staff. Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 17, OCB 014.12 File #3(6) NSC 1290d - Internal Security (DDEL). no page numbers. Globally, 1290d papers for all 22 of the original countries selected for analysis were completed by the end of 1956, including Japan and Iceland. New 1290d priorities were also being determined for a variety of nations outside the Western Hemisphere including Austria, Ceylon, Finland, India, Egypt, Turkey, Taiwan, Ethiopia, Morocco, and Lebanon.

45. Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d - Working Draft - 7 Sept. 1955, NSC Staff. Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 17, OCB 0 14.12 File # 1(8) NSC 1290d - Internal Security (DDEL), pp.3-4,7.

46. [bid.. pp.3-4.

47. Haney Report. p.8. The FBI, Scotland Yard, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are given as examples of forces which enjoyed broad public support for their internal security missions.

48. New LA Policy Paper Planning Board Meeting 26 July - 27 July 1956, NSC Staff. Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 75. OCB 091.4 File #7(6) Latin America (DDEL), I page.

49. Supplemental Progress Report on Actions Taken Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d - 6 Sept. 1956. NSC Staff. Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 17, OCB 014.12 File #3(7) NSC 1290d - Internal Security (DDEL), pp. 1-2.

50. Report to NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d - Working Draft - 7 Sept. 1955, pp.6-7.

51. Annual 1290d Report - 15 Feb. 1957, p.4.

52. Memo for the Record - Second Meeting Called by ICA to Discuss 1290d Procedure - 6 Feb. 1956, no page number.

53. Supplemental Progress Report on Actions Taken Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d - 6 Sept. 1956. p.3.

54. Memo re Request for NSC 1290d File as Affects Latin America and Priority to be Given Latin America - 18 Nov. 1955, NSC Staff. Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 73, OCB 091.4 File #4(9) Latin America (DDEL), pp. 1-2.

55. NSC Action 1486c. 13 Dec. 1955 as quoted in Memo to the OCB from John B. Hollister, Director, ICA re Need for Clarification of the 'Overall Leadership' Function in the Implementation of the NSC Action 1290d Programs, 6 Sept. 1956, NSC Staff. Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 17, OCB 014.12 File #3(7) NSC 1290d - Internal Security (DDEL). p. 10; Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d - 23 Nov. 1955, p.9. Prior to NSC Action 1290d, ICA had established a Civil Police Branch in its Public Administration Division. This was elevated to Divisional status after 1290d was approved. Its three most senior members were Byron Engle (GS-15, Chief of Division), a graduate of the FBI National Academy with nine years of service in the Middle and Far East including Chief, Police Administration, Far East Command responsible for Japanese training under Gen. MacArthur; Charles C. Oldham (GS-14, Deputy Chief of Division) a former Chief of a large state police organisation; and Arthur E. Kimberling (GS14, Chief, Far East Branch) a former Chief of the Louisville Police Dept. who had also been engaged in Japanese police reorganisation. (See Supplemental Progress Report on Actions Taken Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d - 6 Sept. 1956, p.7).

56. Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d - 23 Nov. 1955, p.10. In fact, the Byzantine nature of the funding process was often quite remarkable. In Bolivia, for example, delays in implementing the military portion of the 1290d programme were primarily due to the differences between US government agencies over means of funding. State officials, after consulting with those at Defense, suggested to ICA that grant economic assistance be increase to cover military 1290d activities through a diversion of MDAP funds under section 501 (Transferability of Funds) of the Mutual Security Act (Title V-Miscellaneous Provisions, Chapter 1. General Provisions). This was to be done with the understanding that the Bolivian government would purchase 'an agreed list of military equipment' from Defense under section 106 (Sale of Military Equipment, Materials, and Services) of the MSA (Tide I-Mutual Defense Assistance, Chapter 1. Military Assistance), by diverting the money required from its regular budget. All of this after State rejected the possibility of funding the programme under sections 105(b)(4) (Conditions Applicable to Military Assistance (hemisphere defence]) and 401 (Special Fund) due to the effect this might have on requests for assistance by other South American nations. In the end, ICA continued to hold out for section 401 funding, while State - still open to alternate suggestions - believed this method to be untenable due to 'overriding foreign policy considerations'. (See Implementation of 1290d program - Bolivia - 16 Aug. 1956, p.2). For a detailed description of the legislation involved see the Mutual Security Act for this period.

57. [bid. pp.4,8.

58. All quotes from Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power.- National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford UP 1992) pp. 508-11. See also Blaufarb. The Counter-insurgency Era (note 3) p.8.

59. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America (note 3) pp.38-41.

60. Haney Report (note 10) pp.7-10.

61. Ibid.

62. Shafer, Deadly Paradigms (note 3) p.88.

63. Haney Report (note 10) p.7.

64. Special Report on Latin America (NSC 5613/1) -Annex B Major Operating Problems and Difficulties Facing the United States - 26 Nov. 1958, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 18, NSC 5613/1 - Policy Toward Latin America (1) (DDEL), p.24. Even in 'sufficiently threatened' Bolivia, both the Communist Party of Bolivia and the Trotskyite Workers Revolutionary Party, when permitted to participate in the June 1956 elections, polled only some 1.5 per cent of the national vote, achieving no Congressional representation. Sensitive political considerations in nations such as Burma, Tunisia, Morocco, Iceland, Ethiopia and the Sudan also militated against open 1290d support to those governments. See Haney Report (note 10) p.8.

65. For an example of US perceptions towards the development of Latin American intelligence assets see Dennis M. Rempe, 'Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics US Counter-insurgency Efforts in Colombia, 1959-1965', Small Wars & Insurgencies 3/6 (Winter 1995) pp.311 and 326 (note 6 1).

66. Supplemental Progress Report on Actions Taken Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d - 6 Sept. 1956, p.3.

67. Haney Report (note 10) p. 11. ICA Annual Status Report on Operations Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d Working Draft - 29 Dec. 1956, NSC Staff Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 18, OCB 0 14.12 File #4(1) NSC 1290d Internal Security (DDEL), covering letter. For an overview of the positions and liaison-area responsibilities of Hollister, Naughten, Haney. and other full-time staff associated with 1290d policy co-ordination see Summary Report of US Assistance in Strengthening the Internal Security of Countries Vulnerable to Communist Subversion - not dated, NSC Staff. Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 17, OCB 014.12 File #3(8) NSC 1290d - Internal Security (DDEL), no page numbers. This senior staff was drawn from ICA, Defence, and CIA.

68. Operational and Co-ordinating Arrangements for the NSC Action No. 1290d Programme - Attachment - 19 Sept. 1956, NSC Staff- Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 17, OCB 0 14.12 File #3(8) NSC 1290d - Internal Security (DDEL), p.2. Problems in presenting 1290d programmes to Congress were solved by offering a designated Top Secret presentation section. As well, for some OCB; scheduled meetings, CIA representatives were offered the opportunity to present oral briefings of covert information if desired.

69. Annual Report of Operations of the Overseas Internal Security Program to the OCB for the NSC Dec. 1956 through Nov. 1957 - 11 March 1958 (Revised), OSANSA, NSC Series, Subject Subseries, Box 6, Overseas Internal Security Program (April 1958-May 1959) (DDEL), p. 1. (Hereafter Annual OISP Report - I I March 1958).

70. Haney Report (note 10) pp.2-7.

71. Memo to the OCB from John B. Hollister, Director, ICA re Need for Clarification of the 'Overall Leadership' Function in the Implementation of the NSC Action 1290d Programs - 6 Sept. 1956, pp. 1-4. Hollister was Director of ICA from July 1955 to July 1957. James H. Smith who directed ICA from July 1957 to Jan. 1959 followed Hollister James W. Riddleberger replaced Smith in Feb. 1959.

72. Annual OISP Report - I I March 1958, p.1; Statement of Co-ordination Arrangements for the Overseas Internal Security Program - I April 1957, Annex A - Illustrative Roles of Participating Agencies - 13 March 1957, pp. 1-3. CIA's role is completely sanitised from this document and therefore remains speculative.

73. Ibid., Memo from Gordon Gray, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, Chairman-ICS, and Defense Representatives-OCB Working Groups re Implementation and Co-ordination of NSC Action 1290d. 14 March 1956, NSC Staff- Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 17, OCB 0 14.12 File #3(3) NSC 1290d - Internal Security (DDEL), pp. 1-2.

74. Haney Report, (note 10) p.22. Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d Working Draft - 7 Sept. 1955, p.3.

75. Statement of Co-ordination Arrangements for the Overseas Internal Security Program - 1 April 1957. pp.2-3. Haney Report (note 10) pp. 11- 12; Functions and Organisation of the OCB - Feb. 1958. US President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee) Records, 1959-61, Box 16, OCB - Operations Co-ordination Board(1) (DDEL), no page numbers.

76. Memo for Members - OCB Working Group on Latin America - from R.P. Crenshaw re Progress Report on Latin America (NSC 5613/1) - 23 May 1957, NSC Staff. Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 76, OCB 091.4 Latin America File #11(3) (DDEL), p.7. As for concerns over excessive secrecy, after OISP plans were integrated into OCB Outline Plans of Operations. security classification was downgraded to Secret.

77. Annual 1290d Report - 15 Feb. 1957, pp.9-10.

78. Annual OISP Report - I I March 1958, p.9.

79. Memo to R.P. Crenshaw from King re Progress Report - 21 May 1957, NSC Staff- Papers, OCB Central Files. Box 76, OCB 091.4 Latin America File # 11(3) (DDEL), p.9; Annual OISP Report - Chile, Brazil - 11 March 1958, pp.42, 44; OCB Special Report on US Policy Toward Latin America (NSC 5613/1), Annex A - Major Developments 26 Nov. 1958, OSANSA. NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 18, NSC 5613/1 - Policy Toward Latin America(1) (DDEL), p. 13.

80, Annual OISP Report - Bolivia - 11 March 1958, pp.40-41. In June 1957, a memo circulated among the internal security sub-committee of the OCB; Latin American Working Group called for the use of engineering battalions within OISP projects to construct roads and schools as part of the Bolivian 'stabilisation' program. Seen as a means of enhancing the military's reputation while concurrently promoting development, these types of military projects would form an integral part of all internal security civic action programmes in the future. See Memo to Members of the Internal Security Sub-Committee of the Latin American Working Group of the OCB from the Chairman (King) re Bolivia - 7 June 1957, NSC Staff Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 77, OCB 091.4 Latin America # 11(5) (DDEL), one page. For an overview of civic action programmes undertaken by various Latin American military forces see Mutual Support Between Economic and Military Programs (Ch.VIII - Current Activities of Local Military Agencies in Civil Undertakings Abroad - Latin America) - 10 June 1959, Draper Committee, Box 17, Mutual Support Between Economic and Military Programmes (DDEL), pp. 1-7.

81. Annual OISP Report Guatemala - I I March 1958. p.43.

82. NSC 5613/1 - US Policy Toward Latin America Progress Report - 11 Sept. 1957, OSANSA. NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries. Box 18, NSC 561311 - Policy Toward Latin America(1) (DDEL), p.9; Memo for Members - OCB Working Group on Latin America - from R.P. Crenshaw re Progress Report on Latin America (NSC 5613/1) - 23 May 1957, pp.7-8; Memo for Dearborn from Crenshaw re US Internal Security Activities in Honduras and El Salvador - 29 July 1957, OSANSA, OCB Series, Subject Subseries, Box 3, Latin America (DDEL), pp. 1-2.

83. Annual OISP Report - Ecuador - I I March 1958, p.44.

84. Letter from the Secretary of State to the Vice President - 6 March 1958, pp.222-3; Memo from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to the Secretary of State, 9 May 1958, p.224; Memo of a Telephone Conversation - 13 May 1958, pp.228-9 all in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Vol.V, 1958-1960 (Washington DC US Government Printing Office 1991).

85. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America (note 3) pp. 100-2.

86. Background of Recent Latin American Demonstrations Against Vice President Nixon and Initiative For High-Level Western Hemisphere Meeting Summary - nd, in DDQS. Vol.3 (1977). Microform 64(A), pp. 1-4.

87. OCB Report on US Policy Toward Latin America (NSC 561311), Annex B CIA Intelligence Annex - Sino-Soviet Bloc Activity in Latin America - 15 April 1958 in DDQS. Vol. 7 (198 1). Microform 335(A). pp. 1-4.

88. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America (note 3) p. 1022.

89. Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower (note 3) pp.330-32. See also Letter to the President from Senators Green, Fulbright, Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Kennedy, and Langer re Mutual Security Appropriations Bill for 1959 - 25 Aug. 1958, President's Committee to Study the US Military Assistance Programme (Draper Committee) Records. 1958759, Box 17, Category V-Central Files (Military Assistance) Jan. 1959(2) (DDEL), 5 pp. For the CIA review and rebuttal of the charges that US MAP assistance had encouraged a trend towards military regimes in the underdeveloped world see Letter and Attached Study from Robert Amory Jr (CIAOffice of the Deputy Director [Intelligence]) to Gen. Draper re Certain Problems Created by the US Military Assistance Programme 30 Jan. 1959, Draper Committee, Box 8, U. Letter to Allen Dulles, CIA, 15 Dec. 1958; Replies of 14 and 30 Jan. 1959 (DDEL), pp. 1-20.

90. OCB Report on US Policy Toward Latin America (NSC 5613/1) - 21 May 1958, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 18, NSC 5613/1 - Policy Toward Latin America(1) (DDEL), p.6. As regards the name change to 'Public Safety Programs', in his report of 14 June 1957, Albert Haney recommended renaming ICA's civil police program 'to a title more expansive and palatable abroad' such as 'Public Safety' - clearly this recommendation was adopted. (See Haney Report (note 3) pp.20, 28).

91. Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower (note 3) pp.330-31.

92. The Mutual Security Act of 1960 - Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate on S. 3058 - 22 April 1960, Reports to the President on Pending Legislation Prepared by the White House Records Office (Bill File), Box 166, Appr. 5/14/60 To Amend Further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as Amended, and for Other Purposes. H.R. 115 10 (DDEL), p.36. Morse had good reason to be recalcitrant about internal security policy by this point. In a summary of the legislative history of OISP it was noted that, 'a deliberate effort was made to keep legislative presentations subtle with respect to this type of activity and blend the activity into overall presentation in such a way as not to call undue public attention to the programme because of obvious security connotations, and yet at the same time make clear to Congress the ripe of activity in which ICA was undertaking'. As well, by the end of 1958 Eisenhower, 'advised all concerned that when they went to Congress to get appropriations for military assistance for political purposes or to get economic assistance, they should simply describe all such assistance as national security assistance.' See Edwin H. Arnold to J.H. Smith Jr re Worldwide Review of Public Safety Programs (FY59-60) - 12 Nov. 1958, Annex A Legislative History of OISP - 24 Oct. 1958, Draper Committee, Box 17, Category V-Central Files (Military Assistance) April 1959(2) (DDEL), p.1 and Memo re Discussion at the 388th Meeting of the NSC - 3 Dec. 1958, p.3.

93. Memo from the Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs (Hill) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) re US Military Policy Towards Latin America 29 July 1958 in FRUS Vol. V, 1958-1960, p.150. Concern was also voiced by Hill that ongoing attempts by the administration to offer justifications for every 'exceptional' circumstance involving internal security in Latin America would 'some day cause ... acute embarrassment if there is a searching inquiry by the press or the Congress'.

94. Edwin H. Arnold to J.H. Smith Jr re World-wide Review of Public Safety Programs (FY59-60) - 12 Nov. 1958, pp.2, 9-11. It was recognised that historical support, ongoing national security interests, and the interests of other agencies involved in the development of internal security programs would mitigate against immediate application of ICA's new policy. In 1958, co-ordination of Mutual Security Programme activities was transferred to the State Department and with it, leadership functions concerning OISP.

95. Andrew Hoehn and Carlos Weiss, 'Overview of Latin American Insurgencies', in G. Fauriol (ed.) Latin American Insurgencies (Washington DC Georgetown Univ. Centre for Strat. and Int. Studies and NDUP 1985) pp. 13-14.

96. Federico G. Gil, Latin American-United States Relations (NY Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1971) p.227 Thomas C. Wright, Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution (NY. Praeger 199 1) p.61.

97. Letter to William H. Draper, Chairman - US President's Committee to Study the US Military Assistance Programme - from James W. Coutts, US Army Chief of Staff - 13 Jan. 1959 in DDQS, Vol. 10 (1984). Microform 00 1577, pp. 1-3. Although the study focuses on East and Southeast Asian military performance estimates, an interesting overview of DOD's evolving global perception concerning the role of indigenous military forces can be found in a document prepared by The Institute for Defense Analysis for the Draper Committee. See A Brief of Weapon's Systems Evaluation Group's Study of the Utilisation of Indigenous Forces of Underdeveloped Countries - 12 Feb. 1959, Draper Committee, Box I I (DDEL).

98. Memo by Col. E.G. Lansdale, Office of Special Operations (OSO)/Office of the Secretary of Defence (ODO) to Defense Collateral Activities Co-ordinating Group re Military Assistance - 27 April 1959, Draper Committee, Box 17, Category V-Central Files (Military Assistance) April 1959(2) (DDEL), p.7.

99. Memo for Col. Bussey, Draper Committee Staff from J.T. French, Office of Special Operations re Overseas Internal Security Program - 7 April 1959, Draper Committee, Box 17, Category V-Central Files (Military Assistance) April 1959(2) (DDEL), pp. 1-3. Albert Haney had earlier envisioned greater use of Special Forces in both a counterguerrilla warfare role and as a guerrilla exploitation force.

100. Memo from R.W. Komer to Col. G.A. Lincoln, Study Co-ordinator, Draper Committee re OISP Program - 29 Jan. 1959. Draper Committee, Box 20, Overseas Internal Security Program (DDEL). I page. (Underlined in original).

101. Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group in Connection with the Overseas Internal Security Program (OISP) - 25 March 1959. Draper Committee, Box 17, Category V-Central Files (Military Assistance) March-April 1959(2) (DDEL), pp.2-3, 22. Actual amounts spent on OISPs were less than one per cent of total MSP costs.

102. Report in Connection with the Overseas Internal Security Program - 1 April 1959, p.3.

103. Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group in Connection with the Overseas Internal Security Program (OISP)-25 March 1959, pp. 14-17.

104. Ibid. pp. 16-18.

105. NSC 5906/1 - Basic National Security Policy - 5 Aug. 1959, OSANSA. NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 27. NSC 5906-Basic National Security Policy [Strategic Stockpile; Space Policy] (1) (DDEL), p.16. This policy remained valid throughout the remainder of the Eisenhower mandate.

106. NSC 5902/1 - US Policy Toward Latin America - 16 Feb. 1959, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 26. NSC 5902 - Latin America(1) (DDEL), pp. 16-17. Maintenance of internal security was also seen as a contribution to hemisphere defence in so far as a breakdown in this security during time of general war would cause the diversion of US troops from other missions. See Annex B to above, p.67.

107. Rempe, 'Guerrillas' (note 5) p.305. Given the sensitivity of the Eisenhower administration to charges of 'colluding with dictators'. it is likely that internal security support for Colombia would have been a much more prominent feature of US foreign policy initiatives in that country were it not for the military dictatorship of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla that extended from 1953 to 1957. %Jthough arms were supplied under the auspices of hemispheric defence agreements and the first Ranger-style (Lanceros) counter-guerrilla units were formed by US military personnel, extensive internal security support did not begin until Rojas was removed from power and the new National Front government of Alberto Lleras Camargo was elected to office in 1958.

108. Letter from Gen. Graves B. Erskine, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) to Mansfield D. Sprague. The President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad, Sprague Committee. Box 8. Military #28(13) (DDEL), p. 1.

109. Memo for Waldemar A. Nielsen, Executive Director, The President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad from Edward G. Lansdale, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) re Latin America, Sprague Committee, Box 3, Latin America # 12(4) (DDEL). p. 1. For the final report of the Sprague Committee vis-a-vis Latin America see The President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad (PCIAA No. 12) - Latin America - 23 May 1960, NSC Staff Papers, NSC Registry Series, 1947-62, Box 13, PCIAA Studies Nos. I I and 12 (Sprague Committee) (DDEL), pp. 1-15.

110. Annual 1290d Report - 15 Feb. 1957, p. 1.

111. Bureau of Intelligence and Research - Intelligence Report No.8385 'Me Situation in Cuba - 27 Dec. 1960 in DDQS, Vol.5 (1979), Microform 71 (C), p.5.

112. Letter from the Activing Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mallory) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Irwin) in FRUS WIN, 1958-1960, pp.214-15. See also documents 22, 33, 37, 38, and 40 in above for an overview of some final policy questions and statements by Eisenhower administration officials concerning Latin America and internal security.