Political Dissidents and Rural Unrest

from Bandits Peasants and Politics: The Case of "La Violencia" in Colombia, by Gonzalo Sánchez and Donny Meertens, pp. 160-166 (1983, English translation 2001 by Alan Hynds)

[T]he 1960 Congress was in no way homogeneous; rather, it was extremely splintered, as were the parties both nationally and regionally. Within these multiple forces, the MRL, which appears to have been the most cohesive of the forces opposed to the National Front, had to carry the burden of presenting structural diagnoses and solutions, thereby neutralizing the purely repressive responses. The MRL, as its leader, Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, would later state, was like a "red [leftist] flag" stretched out alongside dissent. At that time, no one asked if Lopez was a simple channel for that dissent or when he would negotiate it away. He claimed and appeared to be a simple spokesman for a certain democratic tradition within the Liberal Party that tolerated an alliance with other expressions of the opposition, including the Communist Party.

With a straightforward program, summed up in the slogan Health, Education, Housing, Land (Salud, Educacion, Techo, Tierra; SETT), and by questioning the National Front's democratic credentials because it had barred open party competition, the MRL was able to unite disparate stakeholders who had come together for merely short-term needs. The view that only structural transformations could effectively solve La Violencia; the belief that a democratic agrarian reform was a necessary response to peasant insurgency; and the conviction that relentlessly broadening the executive's special powers tended to harm the majority of the populace to the benefit of a voracious minority -- all these positions were formidable obstacles to official policy, which can be summarized by Minister of the Interior Lleras Camargo's statement that the dilemma regarding bandolerismo came down to either "capturing or shooting" the bandoleros (Anales del Congreso, May 10, 1961, 1611).

Under these circumstances, bandolerismo found a tacit ally in the MRL, which was willing to milk that support for any and all electoral gains, and this alliance led to the highly controversial issuance of MRL identification cards in numerous rural areas. However, a sizable majority of the National Front's gamonales began to distance themselves from their former bandolero allies, relying instead on the electoral advantages afforded by the institutional, economic, and military power of the ruling-coalition factions.

By 1962, most of the bandolero-controlled areas supported the MRL, with minimal Conservative exceptions (Efrain Gonzalez) or Liberal ones (Dumar Aljure, in the Llanos). The expansion of both groups, as well as their demise, would largely occur simultaneously: they both reached their peak in 1962, and in 1967 they were both definitely liquidated and disbanded.

In 1960, the MRL obtained 341,521 votes and seventeen seats in Congress; in 1962, it more than doubled its congressional representation (twelve seats in the Senate, thirty-three in the Chamber of Representatives) with 625,630 votes, or 23 percent of the total. In 1964, its support fell to 381,847 votes and it was divided into "hard" and "soft" factions. At the same time, ANAPO tripled its strength. In coming years this contrast would reflect a characteristic gap between urban opposition movements and fundamentally rural ones.

In any event, bandolerismo and the MRL both existed within the opposition-integration dialectic, although they were moving in opposite directions: bandolerismo was becoming relatively more radicalized, or was at least proclaiming its autonomy, while the MRL was clearly becoming institutionalized.

Outright charges of MRL complicity increased noticeably. The accusations were based on cases such as that raised by Interior Minister Fernando Londono y Londono regarding a speech by an MRL cadre at the burial in Cartago (Valle) of a bandolero for whose capture a reward had been offered and on whose body the national flag had been placed (Anales del Congreso, April 12, 1962, 418). Although the MRL's political leaders censured the identification-card campaigns carried out in its name in the provinces, accusations such as these were very costly for the opposition in human lives, especially before and after the 1962 elections.

However, the results of those elections, that is, the 625,000 MRL votes, forced the new president, Guillermo Valencia, to adopt a new tack regarding the opposition: negotiation. Valencia offered Juan Jose Turbay, a prominent MRL member of Congress, a post as minister of mines. Turbay accepted, and his fellow MRL members welcomed the step as a fundamental correction of National Front policies.

The premise now being proposed was that the MRL had not been formed to oppose the National Front, per se, but to counteract the distorted interpretation of it. This was a remarkable political victory for the new president and would lead to the immediate splintering of the MRL and to its break with the Communist Party and all independent leftist forces represented in Congress by Gerardo Molina.

This wavering of both the government and the opposition paved the way for the key member of the new administration, Minister of War General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, to design the military strategy for the coming years. In a speech before the Senate on August 22, 1962 -- the most complete treatise ever heard there on La Violencia -- he listed the causes and solutions of the conflict, in the following order:

1. Political causes that, although considered by top congressional leaders to have been surpassed at the national level, still had to be dealt with head on in other areas of influence. He outlined the specific method to be used:

I would like to request a concrete declaration, expressly identifying [the culprits], by the departmental and municipal directorates condemning Sangrenegra, Almanegra, Desquite, or Efrain Gonzalez, Carlos Bernal or Chiapas, or Tirofijo, El Diablo, El Mico, and Raya. And any others [whose] names [would be] quaint if they weren't tragic and who signify the permanent scourge of Colombian territory. (Anales del Congreso, September 4, 1962, 979)

2. Economic causes stemming from the permanent "usufruct" of fincas over which the owners had no control. The extremely unequal and widely known distribution agreed upon between administrators and cuadrillas in Quindio was: 50 percent for the cuadrilla, 30 percent for the administrator, and 20 percent for the landowner. And this was the best option. Ruiz Novoa also noted the link between paid cuadrillas and persons who ordered the killing of the legitimate owners and occupants of a piece of land so as to appropriate it, purchase it at a low price from the heirs or widows, or keep the harvests. To curb this practice, the minister of war proposed regulations on real estate transactions.

3. Social causes, most notably unemployment in regions such as northern Cauca, northern Valle, and Quindio (seasonal unemployment of coffee pickers in the latter two), which had created an "authentic market for crime" or, perhaps, in the case of women, encouraged prostitution. Educating and rehabilitating young people, the "offspring of La Violencia," and creating employment were among the measures proposed by Novoa to deal with the social causes.

4. The state's weakness and its dearth of resources, which translated into low salaries for everyone employed by the "repressive machinery" (judges, police, the military). This was, in turn, a main cause of impunity. The state's inability to respond to demands for social-welfare programs, schools, and roads in many rural areas created an authority vacuum for the peasants that was often filled by bandoleros. To solve the state's budgetary shortfall and its inability to resolve problems, Ruiz Novoa proposed a special tax to pay for the fight against La Violencia.

5. Colombian society's acquiescence to La Violencia; that is, its complacency regarding the deaths of 300,000 persons during this period, whose bodies, if "placed side by side, would cover the road from the Plaza de Bolivar to the Puente de Boyaca, 150 kilometers of bodies that would join the two most significant landmarks of Colombian freedom and democracy"; its indifference to the deaths of 35 army officers, 129 noncommissioned officers, and 1, 135 soldiers, as well as 9 police officers, 73 noncommissioned police officers, and 779 agents in the last years of the fight against La Violencia, and the 17,000 deaths between 1957 and 1962; and its indifference to the 256 Colombians "sentenced to death each month." Ruiz Novoa added: "Because of this we can understand the answer given by that peasant who, when asked what he thought of the death penalty, hastened to answer: 'I think they should do away with it"' (Anales del Congreso, September 4, 1962, 980). The minister of war saw additional evidence of the internalization and chronic nature of La Violencia projected through cultural expressions such as literature or the awarding of the first national painting prize to Alejandro Obregon's stark La Violencia.

6. Ruiz Novoa also pointed to "pure" bandolerismo, made up of children or adolescents who had no alternative for survival but to join the cuadrilla, as a specific cause of La Violencia, for which he proposed a definitive solution: "end[ing] it with public force."

7. Finally, of all the causes and difficulties he listed, the principal and most intractable was collective complicity, that is, campesinos' solidarity with the bandoleros: "Despite the permanent repudiations by the directorates and the most distinguished political leaders, this solidarity continues like a deep sea in campesino regions where the bandolero, as noted by the minister of justice, is considered a sort of hero" (Anales del Congreso, September 4, 1962, 981). Removing this obstacle was the precise intent of the civil and psychological efforts. In Ruiz Novoa's words:

[T]his psychological type of action is intended to destroy the guerrilla-warfare phenomenon valued by Mao Tse Tung, perhaps the leading exponent on the topic, as an indispensable [element] for the success of this type of campaign when he says that guerrillas should move "between the people and the region where they operate like fish in water." This psychological action tries to remove the water and destroy the fish. (Ibid.)

Significantly, it was the MRL, through Senators Jaime Isaza Cadavid and Alvaro Uribe Rueda, that took the initiative in responding to the minister of war's views of the political protection still received by bandoleros. The next day it submitted to the upper house a proposal exactly in accordance with the minister's request:

The Senate of the Republic, heeding the request of the minister of war in his speech yesterday, most energetically condemns the bandolero activity that has been conducted in the country. And especially the conduct of antisociales who appear, according to the minister's statement, as leaders of cuadrillas of miscreants: Sangrenegra, El Diablo (Agustin Bonilla), Tres Espadas, Tirofijo, El Mico, Chispas, Efrain Gonzalez, and others, and exhorts the directorates of the various sectors of Colombian society to make similar pronouncements. Consequently, we summon the ministers of the interior, justice, and war to join the debate that will be held in response to this proposal. (Anales del Congreso, August 28, 876; September 6, 1011; September 19, 1168; September 25, 1255; September 28; October 2, 1962)

The recommendation led to discussions of little import -- for example, whether the Senate hierarchy was qualified to name the perpetrators of La Violencia; if the simple addition of Christian names to the lists of aliases protected the Senate's dignity and prestige; whether a specific listing such as the one being debated might give those in question the publicity they sought and lead the press and the Senate to "increase their prominence." The following week, the MRL's directorate for Antioquia disseminated its condemnation in line with the war minister's exhortation to municipal directorates. Although the first item on the war minister's list had been formally fulfilled, in practice the events of the early days of the National Front would be repeated: while the national directorates issued condemnations, many regional leaders were obliged to give some support or tacit protection to bandoleros, who had the real political control of some areas. Nonetheless, even this simple, formal condemnation legitimized the impending genocide.

However, to return to the war minister's plan and, in general, to the new government, once the executive branch had achieved the relative political isolation of the bandoleros, it proceeded to the plan's other points and requested special powers to issue unrestricted laws covering La Violencia, turning Congress into a mere political club. These authorizations covered topics as diverse as modifying criminal legislation and revamping the entire judicial branch; reorganizing the military and police structure (the army, police, DAS, prison system); placing municipalities belonging to one or more departments in critical areas under a single political authority; creating, organizing, or extending educational and health-care services for the victims of La Violencia, as Well as carrying out road and public-works projects to prepare for "pacification"; and financing all these measures by creating a "national peace quota" (under the perennial guise of "peace"!). The peace quota was to take the form of a 20 percent tax on income, supplementary revenue, and absenteeism, and a possible 250-million peso loan from the central bank (Anales del Congreso, September 12, 1092, and October 16, 1962).

At this time the effectiveness of this new, multifaceted offensive was difficult to predict, but there was a general sense of distrust and despair. The bandoleros responded to each official communique of victory, to each governors' meeting announcing the final battle, with massacres that neutralized the government's triumphalism. A clear indication of the bewilderment was the heated debate on the use of military uniforms. As noted in Chapter 3, bandoleros' systematic use of military garb had created such confusion that one representative said that in Quindio a "uniform is the same as fear." The war minister was particularly annoyed when a congressman questioned him in the following terms:

I would like to ask General Ruiz Novoa whether the street account of the formula suggested by the foreign relations minister, Doctor Montalvo, is true -- that the only logical formula for ending La Violencia is the following: that the police and army dress up as civilians and kill anyone they find in uniform. [He then repeated:] This is a street account. (Anales del Congreso, November 9, 1924-1926, and December 14, 1962)

In sum, at the end of 1962, the large bandas continued intact; as late as May 1963, there was talk in Congress of two republics existing in Valle -- in one, only Conservatives could enter, and the other, lopista (for supporters of Lopez Michelsen and the MRL), where neither Conservatives nor pro-government Liberals could enter. However, the MRL's change of course had fundamentally reformulated the problem. The struggle could now be described as a conflict not between parties but between the bandoleros and the government.