Escuela Santa Isabella, San Vicente, March 13, 2002

2001

The "Sixth Division": Military-Paramilitary Ties and U.S. Policy in Colombia (HRW)

Even as President Pastrana publicly deplores successive atrocities, each seemingly more gruesome than the last, the high-ranking officers he commands fail to take the critical steps necessary to prevent future killings by suspending security force members suspected of abuses, ensuring that their cases go before civilian judicial authorities, and pursuing and arresting paramilitaries.

With one signature, the White House sent a direct message to Colombia's military leaders that overshadowed any other related to human rights. Put simply, the message was that as long as the Colombian military cooperated with the U.S. antidrug strategy, American officials would waive human rights conditions and skirt their own human rights laws.

Judged by the Colombian military's behavior in the field - not by rhetoric or public relations pamphlets - its leaders understood this message clearly. Even as Colombia's high command has agreed to scrub some units for human rights problems, the rest of the military appears to have a virtual carte blanche for continued, active coordination with the paramilitary groups responsible for most human rights violations in Colombia.

2000

The Ties That Bind: Colombia and Military-Paramilitary Links (HRW)

Together, evidence collected so far by Human Rights Watch links half of Colombia's eighteen brigade-level army units to paramilitary activity.

In 1997, 1998, and 1999, a thorough Colombian government investigation collected compelling evidence that Army officers worked intimately with paramilitaries under the command of Carlos Castaño. They shared intelligence, planned and carried out joint operations, provided weapons and munitions, supported with helicopters and medical aid, and coordinated on a day to day basis.

There is credible evidence, obtained through Colombian government investigations and Human Rights Watch interviews, that in 1998 and 1999, Army intelligence agents gathered information on Colombians associated with human rights protection, government investigative agencies, and peace talks, who were then subjected to threats, harassment, and attacks by the army, at times with the assistance of paramilitary groups and hired killers.

There is credible evidence that this alliance between military intelligence, paramilitary groups, and hired killers is national in scope and is able to threaten key investigators in the Attorney General's office and the Procuraduría.

Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Office in Colombia February 8, 2001 Informe del Alto Comisionado sobre la situacion de Derechos Humanos en Colombia Mary Robinson and Anders Kompass of the United Nations April 14, 2000 -- "As the High Commissioner has already stated in previous reports, the Colombian State bears undeniable historical responsibility for the origin and development of paramilitarism, which was protected by law from 1965 to 1989. Although the so-called "self-defence groups" were then declared unconstitutional, 10 years have passed and they have not been dismantled." ... continued

1999

Barrancabermeja: A City Under Seige (AI)

On the evening of 16 May 1998 a large heavily-armed paramilitary force drove unhindered through a number of poorer districts of the city of Barrancabermeja, department of Santander. On route the gunmen rounded up residents, killing several on the spot and forcing many others on to trucks. By the next day the bodies of seven victims of the paramilitary attack had been discovered. The whereabouts of the remaining 25 people who were forcibly abducted is still unknown.

Despite the fact that the Colombian armed forces maintain a heavy presence in close proximity to the districts where the attack took place and that these units had only recently received intelligence reports indicating that paramilitary forces were planning a massacre in the city; despite the sound of gunfire and the reported cries for help of the victims and the appeals made to the security forces to pursue the paramilitary attackers, no action was taken by the security forces either to confront the paramilitary force during the attack or to track them down as they made their exit from the city. Furthermore, there is evidence that a security force check-point which had been established on the orders of a local military commander to control the route into the area for a period of 24 hours from the afternoon of 16 May 1998, inexplicably withdrew to barracks shortly before the arrival of the paramilitary group.

This incursion heralded the beginning of a paramilitary onslaught in the south of Bolívar department which resulted in over 6000 peasant farmers and miners from the municipalities San Pablo, Simití, Santa Rosa and Cantagallo fleeing their homes and seeking refuge in Barrancabermeja. The city's traditional solidarity was stretched to the limits as the displaced took over libraries, schools and other public buildings. The demands of the displaced included that the government provide them with humanitarian assistance and take effective steps to guarantee their safe return to lands they had been forced to abandon.

1998

War Without Quarter: Colombia and International Humanitarian Law (HRW)

Violations of international humanitarian law -- the laws of war -- are not abstract concepts in Colombia, but the grim material of everyday life. War bursts into the daily activities of a farm, a village, a public bus, or a school with the speed of armed fighters arriving down a path or in four-wheel drive vehicles. Sometimes, armed men carefully choose their victims from lists. Other times, they simply kill those nearby, to spread fear. Indeed, a willingness to commit atrocities is among the most striking features of Colombia’s war.

1997

Mapiripan: A Shortcut To Hell Cambio 16

Fear runs so rampant in this little village that even the special Prosecutors sent to investigate the massacre have felt its sting, as evidenced by their managing to take testimony in a record five (5) hours without once venturing forth from the Mayor's Offices. According to a military source, the Army received information on the presence of paramilitary groups in the region on July 14, the very same day that 120 or 150 armed men marched into the town of Mapiripan. The town's penal municipal judge, Leonardo Iván Cortés-Novoa, called the Army battalion commander in charge of the area eight (8) times to ask for assistance. Nevertheless, the army waited until July 21 to send in troops, after 25 of the townspeople had been torn limb from limb while still alive, according to Cortés and other residents who saw the victims forced into the town's slaughterhouse. Those present claim that members of the paramilitary groups savagely dismembered their friends with knives and machetes, throwing the severed arms and legs into the turbulent waters of the Guaviare River, which borders the town.

1996

Colombia's Killer Networks: The Military-Paramilitary Partnership and the United States (HRW)

Human Rights Watch has obtained evidence, including the heretofore secret Colombian military intelligence reorganization plan called Order 200-05/91 and eyewitness testimony, that shows that in 1991, the military made civilians a key part of its intelligence-gathering apparatus. Working under the direct orders of the military high command, paramilitary forces incorporated into intelligence networks conducted surveillance of legal opposition political figures and groups, operated with military units, then executed attacks against targets chosen by their military commanders.

Human Rights Watch has also documented the disturbing role played by the United States in support of the Colombian military. Despite Colombia's disastrous human rights record, a U.S. Defense Department and Central Intelligence Agency team worked with Colombian military officers on the 1991 intelligence reorganization that resulted in the creation of killer networks that identified and killed civilians suspected of supporting guerrillas.

Colombian Armed Forces Directive No. 200-05/91

The Genocidal Democracy by Javier Giraldo S. J.

This book, published by Common Courage Press in 1996, is no longer in print. However, in view of continuing violence in Colombia and recent proposals by the US Government to increase military aid, we are making it freely available online.

This proposed military aid -- cash, weapons, training, and US troops -- continues a history of US support for a system that, according to Father Giraldo's Inter-congregational Commission of Peace and Justice, produced over 67,000 victims of political violence between 1988 and 1995. Under the guise of drug interdiction, this action will no doubt fuel the existing violence and do little to stop the production of narcotics. The history exposed in this book will make clear the folly of this approach to narcotics production in Colombia and make you wonder to what end US involvement is really intended. Please read this information, use it, and spread it around.

1993

State of War: Political Violence and Counterinsurgency in Colombia (HRW)

Colombia is Latin America's leading recipient of U.S. military aid, ostensibly provided for counternarcotics measures, but the armed forces' priorities remain counterinsurgency tactics. The centerpiece of army strategy has been the creation of three Mobile Brigades, elite units of professional soldiers that receive special training and operate in areas of greatest insurgent activity. The units have been implicated in a shocking number of abuses, including extra-judicial executions, disappearances, rapes, torture, the wanton burning of houses, crops, and food, indiscriminate bombings and aerial strafing, beatings, and death threats.

1980-1990

Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia (OAS 1993)

The 1968 enactment of Law 48 created the self-defense groups. As a result, groups of individuals with ties to economic or political sectors in the country's various regions emerged in the 1970's and became entrenched in the 1980's. With the sponsorship or acquiescence of sectors of the armed forces, these groups used violence to protect partisan or group interests. Originally, the relationship between the self-defense groups and State national defense organizations was occasional and informal in nature. However, these legal self-defense groups started to grow stronger and to coalesce precisely when the Army was finding it increasingly difficult to perform its function of defending public law and order in the country.

As the paramilitary groups became stronger, some of them began to be absorbed and then run by drug cartels. The cartels originally used them as a means to protect the lawful businesses that they had acquired with their ill-gotten gains. Later, however, they began to use them as actual armies, to eliminate political opponents and to deal with and resolve problems between drug cartels, especially between the groups in the Medellín cartel and those in the Cali cartel. The paramilitary groups also started to carry more sophisticated weaponry and were given highly specialized training, for which Israeli, British and mercenaries of other nationalities were recruited. These mercenaries established training camps and actual schools to train the paramilitary and hired gunmen that drug traffickers used in their gang wars and on their suicide missions to assassinate prominent people and Colombian politicians.

Under President Betancur [1982-1986], while peace efforts got underway through negotiations with the guerrilla forces, the paramilitary movement escalated, at least partly because of the sense of frustration that the peace negotiations caused in some sectors of the military, the curb on anti-guerrilla activities, the restrictions that the Government imposed as to the type of activity that could be used to combat the guerrilla movement and the increased effort to prevent lawlessness on the part of the military.

Also during this period, the Asociación Campesina de Agricultores y Ganaderos del Magdalena Medio (ACDEGAM) was created on July 24, 1984. This group and other regional associations of farmers, businessmen and entrepreneurs took advantage of Law 48, from 1968, to play a major role in promoting and consolidating paramilitary groups, aided by the armed forces. In May 1984, a truce known as the Uribe Agreements was declared with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Out of that came a new political force in Colombia, the Unión Patriótica (UP), the first leftist political group, consisting of former members of the guerrilla movement and of other leftist political groups.

[M]embers of the newly-created Unión Patriótica started to be assassinated. The extermination campaign may have been motivated by the fact that former FARC members who had become members of the Unión Patriótica seemed to be benefitting by their re-incorporation into the legal political system, even though some either maintained or seemed to maintain ties with the guerrilla movement that continued to engage in military activities. Another possible motive for the extermination campaign may have been a fear that the UP would win control of local government with the armed support of the guerrilla movement.

In 1989 the administration of President Barco enacted a series of laws calculated to dismantle the paramilitary groups, making it unlawful to form any new, private self-defense groups. During this same administration, measures were also taken to strengthen controls to ensure that the military were operating within the law, such as the appointment of a civilian Prosecutor for the Military and Police Forces and the creation of an Office of the Attorney Delegate for Human Rights with the authority to investigate and punish cases of genocide, disappearances and torture. These measures, however, did not seem to have much of an effect.

There was an explosion of violence during this period, one of the worst in Colombia's history. Three presidential candidates were assassinated Luis Carlos Galán of the Partido Liberal on August 16, 1989; Bernardo Jaramillo of the Unión Patriótica on March 22, 1990, and Carlos Pizarro of the Alianza Democrática M-19, on April 26, 1990. Also assassinated was the Attorney General, Carlos Mauro Hoyos, on February 25, 1988. The drug cartels started to practice their own brand of terrorism to force the government to change its policy of suppressing drug trafficking and in the process created an unprecedented climate of fear and intimidation. This new brand of almost uncontrollable aggression, called "narcoterrorism", raged on in Colombia from 1988 and 1990 virtually unchecked. In many rural areas, members of the UP continued to be exterminated, partly as a result of differences between the FARC and the drug traffickers.

1952-1965

Request for an Intelligence Mission for Colombia October 8, 1953 Dr. Chaves said the Colombian Government would like to contract the services of three U.S. experts who would go to Colombia and set up the machinery for an intelligence service there. ... He said Colombia would be glad to contract these men either as private individuals or as representatives of a U.S. government agency, and Colombia would pay their salaries. He asked whether it would be improper to go direct to Mr. Allan Dulles or Mr. J. Edgar Hoover with this request, and was told it would be advisable to keep it within Department channels. Colombian Intelligence Service Formed November 25, 1953 The new Intelligence Service is essentially designed to make the Rojas Regime more secure. Placing it directly under the Presidency presumably eliminates the possibility of its serving the personal ambitions of subordinates; combining the two existing groups ought to make for efficiency, and the importation of modern (FBI) methods tends toward this same end. Government Efforts to Cope with Civil Disorders March 24, 1955 An analysis of the public order situation as of January 1955 in the Department of Tolima, the center of the majority of guerrilla activity reported in recent months, has been made by the Public Order Brigade of the Colombian Army stationed in Tolima. A controlled American source report of March 17 transmitted a translation of this analysis. The analysis reflects the desire of the military authorities to blame the outbreaks on Communist provocateurs, and at the same time reveals their realization that the problems involved are much more complex than the relatively facile explanation of Communist agitation would indicate. The analysis states that "the Brigade command has reached the conclusion that the terrorist plan, in its widest program, is completely of Communist origin". Later in the report, however, the conclusion is reached "that all the rural inhabitants of the area are potential bandits". Military planes furnished to Colombia March 30, 1955 Attached is a statement from the Pentagon, which shows that 14 fighters and 7 light bombers were delivered to the Colombians as promised. It adds that they will receive 7 more bombers in Fiscal 1955. Colombian Use of U.S. Military Assistance May 18, 1955 1. The bilateral agreement states that Colombia will not, without the prior agreement of the U.S., devote MDAP or reimbursable assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished. Defense believes that the primary purpose of furnishing assistance is to provide assistance for the performance of collective hemisphere defense missions, but that our assistance has a secondary purpose, namely, the maintenance of Colombia's internal security, if the need should arise. In support of this position, Defense points to the secret bilateral plan with Colombia, in which Colombia is assigned the task of discharging responsibilities assigned to Colombia in the Inter-American Defense Board general military plan for the defense of the hemisphere. One of the responsibilities assigned to Colombia in the general plan is the maintenance of its own security. ... 3. With regard to the Colombian request to our Air Mission chief that he provide assistance in preparing napalm, Defense indicates that standing Defense instructions preclude Air Mission personnel becoming directly involved in hostile activities. However, Defense considers that the provision of the type of technical assistance requested by Colombia would not constitute direct involvement. Memorandum from John Foster Dulles to Henry Cabot Lodge June 3, 1955 Following the UN and OAS Resolutions on collective measures, the United States proposed and offered to sign bilateral military assistance agreements with a number of Latin American governments, and to provide grant military assistance thereto. Such a bilateral agrement was entered into with Colombia on April 17, 1952. The secret United States - Colombian military plans call for United States assistance for one anti-aircraft battalion, one infantry battalion, one fighter squadron, one squadron of light bombers and a naval modernization program. Proposed Modification of Article I, Paragraph 2, of the Military Assistance Agreement of April 17, 1952. March 6, 1956 "With respect to equipment and materials furnished under terms requiring reimbursement, the utilization thereof for purposes different from those mentioned in this paragraph will require the prior agreement of both Governments." This has been interpreted as restricting the use for internal security purposes of equipment and of troops provided therewith where such equipment was designed primarily for hemispheric defense. It is ironic that this particular sentence was inserted in the Military Assistance Agreement at the request of Colombia. So far as the Embassy knows, it appears in no other Military Assistance Agreement signed with any of the other American Republics. The reason for its insertion was said to have been that the Colombian Armed Forces, then subject to the Laureano GOMEZ - Roberto Urdaneta Conservative Government, were desirous of placing a check upon the Government's use of equipment, which check is seemingly now to their present disadvantage. Formation of Battle Group Type Unit June 23, 1959 [President Lleras] said that guerrilla forces were recently becoming more difficult to suppress, and that he had definite knowledge that in many sections of the country, these units were being infiltrated by Communist party members. He went to some length to explain how the Communist Party was successful in defeating a well-equipped Army in Cuba, and that he was somewhat worried that such might also be the case with other Latin American countries in the future. Formation of Battle Group June 23, 1959 The suppression of guerrilla activities in Colombia has been in the past, as it is now, a very serious and difficult problem for the government. According to Colombian military sources, there is increasing evidence that much of the bandit activity is led by and participated in by Communists. Colombia Seeks Aid in Suppressing Bandit Groups July 17, 1959 President Lleras has made a strong plea to our Ambassador in Bogota for the granting of four helicopters which he considers vital to Colombian plans for suppression of Communist-infiltrated bandit groups. President Lleras' appeal for aid in suppressing Colombian guerrilla warfare activities July 21, 1959 I believe, therefore, that we should develop a program of positive assistance with the Colombian Government, short of providing grant military assistance at this time, which program, pending further study, could include the following: b) An offer to send to Colombia a team of experts on guerrilla warfare problems, to survey the situation and make recommendations to President Lleras with respect to an overall program to eliminate the problem. Such a team, comprised of experts from CIA and the military would also serve to fill in our own knowledge of the nature and scope of the problem, particularly the Communist aspect, which information might later justify a change in the present recommendation against providing grant military assistance. c) An offer to assign to our military mission in Colombia, two or three additional officers with proper qualifications to give anti-guerrilla Ranger-type training, on the spot and with cooperation of Canal Zone and continental U.S. schools as required. The Special Forces School at Ft. Bragg, N.C., might not only be a source of suitable officers, but might interest itself in the Colombian case as a model for the development of their special type of operations. El Tratado Secreto Militar con los EE. UU. November 19, 1959 OBLIGACIONES Y DERECHOS DE COLOMBIA a) MILITARES. Colombia se compromete a utilizar las armas suministradas por los Estados Unidos solo en misiones especiales y que sean juzgadas convenientes para la defensa del hemisferio y del mundo libre, por planes estratégicos. Colombia se obliga a no usar las armas suministradas por los Estados Unidos para defender su seguridad interna o para defenderse contra la agresión de un pais vecino, sin previa anuencia de los Estados Unidos. Colombia se obliga a devolver a Estados Unidos las armas que esta Nación le suministre, cuando haya desaparecido su necesidad. Colombia se obliga a participar en misiones militares conjuntas con los Estados Unidos. Colombia se obliga a permitir que oficiales norteamericanos obrando bajo la supervisión y control directo del Departamento de Defensa de los Estados Unidos, observen el uso de las armas suministradas a titulo de préstamo. Fuera de Colombia el Servicio de Espionaje Norteamericano! November 19, 1959 El profesor Gerardo Molina, ex-director de la Universidad Nacional y de la Universidad Libre, nos expresó: "Me parece sumamente grave porque afecta la soberanía nacional. En los momentos en que la guerra fría disminuye, aquí se agudiza en la forma de una persecución contra las corrientes democráticas valiéndose de la colaboración de la policia norteamericana". Quién es Quién en el F.B.I. para Colombia November 20, 1959 Silenciosamente, como corresponde a un agente secreto, el coronel Hans Tofte, danés de nacionalidad pero en misión especial entre los americanos, entró en su automóvil y se dirigió hacia el Hotel Tequendama. Press Speculation About Military Pact November 20, 1959 URDANETA called on the Ambassador unannounced in connection with the La Gaceta headlined story of an alleged secret military pact between Colombia and the United States and the presence of an alleged FBI mission -- both of which were echoed in La Calle and the Communist news organ Voz de la Democracia. The La Gaceta article accused Urdaneta of signing the said "secret" military pact and carried a contemporary picture of him with Rojas PINILLA and Pabón NUÑEZ (then Minister of Government). Press Speculation on Guerrilla Warfare Team November 30, 1959 In a further conversation November 24 with Col. Parker and Mr. Hans Tofte of the US team, General Rueda stated that the Minister of War had held a conference with a reporter from the "international press" (the General could not identify the newsman) and had stated that the team was not an FBI mission but was here in regard to technical matters pertaining to the MDA Agreement. None of the articles featured in La Calle or La Voz de la Democracia was repeated in the responsible press, and hence no repetitive circulation was given to these stories. These papers themselves did not return to the attack the following week. Considering these facts together with the small circulation of the weeklies in question and the sensationalist reputation which is usually attached to them by the reading public, the Embassy believes that the President's decision was a good one. To have issued an official statement would have only forced the responsible press to take cognizance of the charges. La Gaceta Charges Secret US-Colombia Military Pact December 1, 1959 The November 19 issue of the leftist Liberal weekly paper La Gaceta features an article charging that a secret military pact exists between the United States and Colombia. The article states that the agreement signed in 1952 by President Roberto URDANETA was never submitted to Congress for ratification and contains secret provisions. The article also relates this alleged secret treaty to the paper's previous story concerning an FBI mission in Colombia, stating that the latter is a direct result of the secret treaty. La Gaceta Repeats Charge of US-Colombia Military Pact December 10, 1959 This story, highlighted "Urdaneta Confirms the Existence of an Arms Agreement with the US," states that the letter from the former President confirmed the existence of an agreement that violates Colombia's sovereignty. It charges that the procedure of exchanging notes was illegal, and that the agreement by Representative Alvaro GARCIA Herrera last year when he charged that it violated Colombia's sovereignty, and called upon Congress to ask the Government to submit the agreement to it for ratification. Position Paper: U.S. Assistance to Colombia in Combatting Guerrillas circa March/April, 1960 The United States should seek to encourage President Lleras in his desire to liquidate the guerrilla problem... Since 1948, some 250,000 people have been killed and 1,500,000 displaced in Colombia by guerrilla warfare which started as part of the traditional conflict between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Since politically motivated guerrilla activities ended a situation has developed characterized more by lawlessness, murder and banditry than politically-motivated guerrilla warfare. Five of Colombia's richest provinces are affected. Although the remaining guerrilla bands cannot be said as a whole to be Communist-controlled, the Communists do have a few guerrilla bands of their own and have infiltrated others, while the general situation is dangerously exploitable by the Communists should they decide to revert to tactics of violence. Memo from E. P. Eurand to General Goodpaster April 7, 1960 During the conversation at Camp David, President Lleras made the remark that our mission was not training the Colombian Army in what they really needed. This was not said in a complaining voice but in fact he stressed that they were getting what the Colombian Army Generals thought they needed. He stated that there was little prospect of war between the Latin American States or of any deployment of the Colombian Army overseas. He said that what they should be ready for is guerrilla-type warfare since he believed that if the President and Mr. Khrushchev are able to maintain peace, the Communists will use third parties to stir up trouble, including guerrilla activity in all the weak areas of the world. President Lleras also remarked tha tit would be very difficult for him to persuade the very powerful Army group in his country to do anything but emulate the American Army, but that he had hopes that if, as President Alessandri of Chile had suggested, the Latin American nations have a disarmament conference, then at this time not only the Colombian Army but perhaps others can be convinced that what they need is anti-guerrilla forces. Memo from Major John Eisenhower to Under Secretary of State April 14, 1960 During the conversations at Camp David, President Lleras made the remark that the Colombian army is stressing the wrong type of tactics in their training. By this, of course, he meant that they are putting undue emphasis on conventional tactics rather than anti-guerrilla warfare. ... The President agreed with President Lleras that the stress of military activity in South America should be placed in anti-guerrilla operations, but he pointed out that our missions should not attempt to influence basic governmental policy, but rather should teach what the Colombians want. Memo from Major John Eisenhower to Asst. Secretary of Defense April 14, 1960 This is to serve as a followup to our telephone conversation several days ago in which I told you of a conversation of the President with President Lleras of Colombia. President Lleras stated the need for more anti-guerrilla training in the Colombian army. After the meeting, the President directed that you be requested to furnish a report as to what kind of army Colombia needs, to include such matters as equipment, training, organization, force levels, and budget. By separate memorandum, a copy of which is enclosed, I have notified Secretary Dillon of the State Department that the President has requested you to do this. Guerrilla Bandit Leaders Eliminated July 7, 1961 The Colombian army has continued in recent months an intensified and considerably successful campaign to eliminate leaders of the rural violence plaguing Colombia. The Army has seemed to accent the death, rather than the often useless capture of violence leaders. By ensuring that the bandit is killed in the encounter with soldiers, the possibility of his later escape, legal release, or bribery from jail is thereby removed. ...In conclusion, it must be said that whatever the long term effect these bandit deaths will have on the Colombian violence situation, certainly these deaths have boosted the morale of the army, encouraging soldiers to new effective anti-guerrilla action. Further, the Government has been able to show the local persecuted populace of violence regions that although the guerrilla outlaws may operate for some time, the forces of public order are able to catch up with them eventually. The Case of Colombia August 2, 1961 In June 1959 President Lleras formally requested U.S. equipment under the MAP program for the purpose of combatting and reducing guerrilla and bandit activities in the interior of Colombia. President Lleras did this in the full realization that compliance with his request would necessitate an exception to current restrictions on the use of MAP assistance for internal security purposes. In response to his request, a team of guerrilla warfare experts was dispatched to Colombia to make an on-the-spot survey of the violence situation. This team concluded its field survey in December 1959 and submitted its report in June 1960. This report was an exhaustive undertaking and filled 3 large volumes and recommended rather grandiose proposals, including the establishment of a covert network of advisers and engagement in broad fields of internal activities. ... At the Department of State's request, on January 5, 1961, the President made the required Determination permitting the furnishing of this assistance for internal security purposes without regard to Western Hemisphere defense missions. Our two Governments exchanged notes for the enabling Agreement on April 3, 1961 and the program is now in the process of implementation. The Violence Problem: Case Histories September 10, 1962 During the month of August, three significant episodes of violence occurred which are interesting because they illustrate three different facets of the complex phenomenon known as the "violence problem"; 1) On August 15 bandits ambushed a bus near Saboyá in Boyacá killing 25 persons in an incident which has all the earmarks of localized political motivation and the caudillo "war-lord" pattern. The reaction to this incident is also suggestive of the local Liberal-Conservative rivalry that so complicates the violence situation. 2) On August 26, bandits murdered 29 persons near Toro, Valle in an incident that seems to manifest criminal terrorism with possible intimidation motives. 3) On August 27, an Army-police effort to capture a bandit leader resulted in a skirmish near Guacarí, Valle which killed 12 persons and resulted in the capture of 56 other persons as well as some subversive propaganda. The circumstances of this incident suggest that some relation existed between leftist elements and the bandit leader in question. Review of Plan LAZO 1963 In Colombia, the Minister of War, General Ruis-Novoa, in the recent past, announced to the Congress that the bandit problem was no longer merely a political inspiration having domestic interest alone. Although it began as a result of politcal party rivalry, today bandit activity is influenced and directed from without the country, with directoral centers situated in urban areas being used as the principal means of directing and controlling subversive activities within the country. This is subversion in its most refined form. Subversion, sabotage, riot and rebellion are not new techniques. Never before, however, have democratic nations been faced with a subversive movement composed of professed "citizens" whose orders come from abroad (such as Desquite's Band). This is precisely what is occurring in Colombia today and this is why Directive 001, which provides for adequate internal security, is so important. It unifies the armed forces in putting forth their efforts toward a common goal and in addition, it employs other agencies of the national government (DAS, Aduana and the National Police) in roles which, if followed, will create a cohesiveness of national counterinsurgency resources never before experienced in the country. 9th Psychological Warfare Company -- Program of Instruction Lancero School -- Hunter Killer Program of Instruction Helicopters for Colombia May 14, 1964 In Tolima State (rugged mountainous region mid-way between Bogotá and Cali in the Cauca Valley) there have been two trouble spots -- a bandit (criminal) area in the north, and a communist-bandit "enclave" in the south (an area known as Marquetalia). The latter is the most active and strongest communist "enclave" of 4 or 5 scattered through Colombia. Because criminal bandits have been responsible for more deaths and greater brutality in recent years than have been the communist-led outlaw groups (which have killed largely for political reasons), the GOC has been moving more energetically in trying to wipe out the bandit groups than in fighting the communist bands. Within the past 3 months the Colombian Army has killed the two leading bandit chiefs in northern Tolima ("Desquite" and "Sangre Negra"), and the GOC has announced the "pacification" of that area. (Actually, the bandit groups, while seriously hurt, are still moderately active, and army units, plus helicopters, must remain in northern Tolima to finish the job.) With the recent successes against the bandits in northern Tolima, the army's enthusiasm and morale is high, and its plans to move against the communist-led bandit "enclave" in southern Tolima have been speeded up. The GOC has announced an immediate clean-up operation against the "enclave" and its prestige, as well as that of the army, is now committed to an early and effective campaign. Moreover, the communist groups, made up in part by escaped criminals and political prisoners, well-armed and firmly entrenched in the area, has become more active in terrorizing the region in an attempt to discourage the GOC from moving against it. Our National Policy Paper on Colombia (presently in final draft) sets forth one of our principal objectives as the elimination of the potential for subversive insurgency inherent in the continued existence of active bandit groups, guerrilla bands, and communist-dominated "enclaves". History of Colombian Request for Helicopters circa May 14, 1964 On 1 May 1964, the Embassy emphasized its previous position stating that the campaign against the communist enclaves was prompted by increased activity and fear that communists would be successful in uniting the enclaves. The campaign was an integral part of the Internal Defense Plan approved by the Special Group (CI) and urged on the Colombian Government by the United States. Telegram from Bogota Embassy to Secretary of State April 1, 1964 In letter, Valencia stated above equipment would be used against communist centers in southern Tolima (dominated by Marulanda or "Tiro Fijo"); the central and eastern cordilleras of Huila; and Rio Chiquito, Cauca. Valencia emphasized in letter that communists these areas are genuine and not crypto-communists. Also claimed they oriented toward Cuba whence they receive direction and financing. This loan request did not come as surprise, since we given advance information on GOC military plans move against Marulanda in Huila-Tolima some time ago. ... Troops already being moved into position southern Tolima, northern Huila and should be deployed on or about April 20 for operations. Telegram from Bogota Embassy to Secretary of State April 10, 1964 We strongly believe we must provide all possible assistance to foster success operations against communists. For political reasons, do not see how we can fail give maximum support GOC in project which so clearly in our mutual interest and which represents voluntary GOC effort reduce communist danger this country. Operations against communist areas represent logical extension internal defense plan to support of which we committed. Our judgement is we must accede President Valencia's request to fullest measure possible. There no question but that requirement exists and that objective deserves strongest US support. Telegram from Bogota Embassy to Secretary of State April 25, 1964 No doubt at all Marulanda and his followers genuine communists. Are currently receiving propaganda support Bogota other parts country from Communist Party, Fedepetrol Union, Communist Youth and other extremists. GOC and its military forces firmly committed to campaign against Marulanda with troops and aircraft already deployed. They intend carry plan to successful conclusion. We wish emphasize here that prestige of government from President on down is at stake in anti-commie campaign. Possibility cannot be excluded, in view increasing commie propaganda support Marquetalia, that other zones (El Pato, Riochiquito, Sumapaz) may begin diversionary operations when situation begins tighten on Marulanda. In such event, contingency planning requires mobility provided by additional helicopters which could be tactically diverted to provide temporary punitive reaction of sort employed with success in northern Tolima anti-bandit campaign. In order provide best chance of GOC success we firmly convinced additional helicopters needed now. Telegram from State/DOD to Bogota Embassy May 1, 1964 All Washington agencies share Embassy's desire provide continued support Colombian anti-bandit campaign in most vigorous possible way and agree that Colombian effort against small Communist affiliated enclaves represents next logical stage this campaign. Telegram from Bogota Embassy to Secretary of State May 8, 1964 Military units already in position Marquetalia and adjoining regions and have begun civic action and psychological operations. Communists and other extremists have campaign underway to "defend Marquetalia". There even reports of as yet undetermined veracity of Cuban arms shipment intended for Marquetalia. Colombian papers also reporting Soviet endorsement "violent revolution" those parts LA where such measures justified. Thus, we have situation in which GOC prestige absolutely committed to reduction "Tiro Fijo" influence Marquetalia and communists increasingly committed prevent this. As Dept aware, GOC action against communist areas was made integral part of Internal Defense Plan approved by Special Group (CI) in 1962 and urged by US on Colombian Government. Letter from Asst. Sec. of State to Deputy Asst. Sec. of Defense May 11, 1964 In the past year the Colombian armed forces and police have been remarkably successful in reducing banditry in the northern Tolima region. To a significant degree this success has resulted from the provision of medium helicopters under the Military Assistance Program. The President of Colombia has now requested extraordinary assistance to deal with a new phase of the Colombian counter-banditry campaign. The Colombian Government has stepped up its timetable and is preparing to expand its operations to include a campaign against well-established communist-led bandit groups in a new area of Colombia. ... It is of priority importance that the momentum of the Colombian campaign not falter. I believe that we should continue to provide them with every reasonable encouragement and assistance. In view of the facts of this case and the Presidential request, I feel that the fulfillment of our political objectives in Colombia requires the provision of these helicopters.

Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics:
US Counter-insurgency Efforts in Colombia 1959-1965 by Dennis Rempe

An integral part of Plan LAZO was the development of intelligence structures within the Colombian armed forces which would co-operate with the civilian DAS, F-2 of the National Police, and other government agencies. Attempts to start an intelligence establishment and training effort began, as described earlier, with the two-man MTT of 1961. It was followed by a second, three-man military training team which provided assistance from 18 May to 15 November 1962. A permanent Mission intelligence adviser also arrived that same year. The team gave several short-term (three week) 'crash' training programmes for interrogators, mobile intelligence groups (grupos moviles de inteligencia - GMI), and Localizadores teams (grupos inteligencia de localizadores - GILs or Intelligence Hunter/Killer teams). GILs were composed of 25 veteran officers, NCOs, and civilians, heavily armed, and trained to operate in the field for long periods. They were used both to fight and penetrate hostile groups as well as work with informants.

Perhaps the most notable military aspect of Plan LAZO, however, was the adoption of counterguerrilla warfare techniques that were highly dependent on sophisticated intelligence-gathering and analysis. ... Army tactical units acquired a 'comando localizador,' or unconventional warfare shock group, which clandestinely killed or captured guerrilla and bandit leaders. In addition, Mobile Intelligence Groups (grupos moviles de inteligencia) were attached to all major operating units. Their activities seem to have included counter-guerrilla work similar to the comando localizador, as well as information-gathering.

In April 1964 a Military Intelligence Battalion was created to undertake combat intelligence, counter-intelligence, and special operations, and to assist in coastal surveillance and internal security operations against infiltration of agents, 'provocateurs', arms, and propaganda. It was also utilised to find, destroy, or eliminate communist and extremist activities through a network of clandestine agents.

From May through October 1963, a joint US army, navy, and air force MTT was sent to Colombia to update Plan LAZO and develop a Command level counter-insurgency plan for the Colombian Armed Forces as a whole. ... The joint MTT found the directive 'overly ambitious', particularly in the Colombian ability to undertake combined arms actions. Still, fostering the development of a National Intelligence Agency - plans for which the US Mission Intelligence Advisor had helped to draft - was considered vital. The team also spent considerable time establishing the basic guidelines and organisational structure for the JOC.

Probing actions against the enclaves accelerated after Plan LAZO was developed. A long-term strategy was adopted and implemented in five phases:

(1) counter-guerrilla training was given to security forces, civic action programmes were initiated, security personnel were infiltrated into guerrilla groups, and informers were recruited;

(2) psychological operations were undertaken in order to establish control over the civilian population;

(3) operations were initiated to blockade specific areas and isolate guerrilla groups from their sources of support and intelligence;

(4) in-place informers and infiltrators were used to splinter the internal cohesion of the guerrilla groups and ongoing offensive counterinsurgency operations coupled with psychological warfare were undertaken to destroy guerrilla units and leadership;

(5) operational zones were reconstructed economically, socially, and politically under the auspices of US aid programmes.

The brief of General Yarborough's survey team was to prepare the way for the first of a series of Special Warfare Mobile Training Teams [MTT's] due to arrive in Colombia in early March 1962. ... Its paramilitary prescription, a virtual blueprint for the Colombian army "death squads" that are still active, was apparently implemented at once. ... The banditry of the early early 1960s, a heritage of La Violencia, the period of civil war that began in 1948, was transformed into organized revolutionary guerrilla warfare after 1965, which has continued to date. -- Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft

The Fall of Marquetalia by Richard Gott (La Caída de Marquetalia en español)

Clepsidra: Leyenda negra de Marquetalia por Alvaro Valencia Tovar

Interview with General Alvaro Valencia Tovar, March 23, 2002 Part 1 * Part 2 * Part 3 * Part 4
(requires Realplayer or other audio software)

Washington Planeó Intervenir en 1965 por Gerardo Reyes

1945-1950

La CIA debe saber sobre Gaitán -- hundreds of original documents from the US State Department and England's Scotland Yard, as well as a pending Freedom of Information Act lawsuit for the release of CIA and FBI documents. Original source materials for researchers of Colombia's greatest mystery -- who killed Jorge Eliécer Gaitán?

Partial Index of G-2 Army Intelligence Files at the National Archives

50 Years of Violence by Garry M Leech

Many contemporary news accounts label the conflict a "thirty-five year-old civil war," basing its origin on the official formation of several guerrilla groups in the mid-1960's. However, the roots of Colombia's largest guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), date back to the peasant armed self-defense movements formed between 1948 and 1958 during the period known as La Violencia.

Road from San Vicente to Los Pozos, March 2002

The Evolution of the FARC by Alfredo Molano

In 1953, an anti-Communist military strongman, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, came to power by force, backed by elements within both traditional parties and - significantly - by Washington. Once securely in power, the General decreed an amnesty which was welcomed by the armed peasants of the eastern plains and by many Liberals and Conservatives as well.

In 1955, a military operation was launched against rural regions that remained strongholds of agrarian guerrillas who had fought in the name of Gaitán,  and where Communist guerrillas were also concentrated. Backed by Washington's National Security Doctrine and a $170 million U.S. loan, Rojas Pinilla began bombing guerrilla and opposition peasant positions. The guerrilla movement tried to dig in and hold out in the highlands, but was ultimately forced to retreat to the jungles of the Andean foothills. In those regions, Marulanda, joined by Jacobo Arenas, a charismatic Marxist ideologue who described himself a "professional revolutionary," organized a community based on economic self-management and military self-defense. This was the first of the guerrilla bases that later came to be known as "Independent Republics." (map from Guerrilla Movements in Latin America, by Richard Gott)

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Illicit Drug Trade by Ricardo Vargas Meza

Since the 1990s, Colombian coca plantations have covered an expanse that, according to residents of the affected areas, could be as large as 150,000 hectares. An estimated 300,000 people are directly dependent on the coca economy. These zones are, at the same time, controlled by guerrillas who derive significant revenues by levying taxes on medium- and large-scale farmers, intermediate coca products (base, further refined into cocaine), merchants, and, most importantly, processing laboratories and clandestine air strips for cocaine shipments. These funds are employed to strengthen the guerrillas' logistical and communications capacity for the war effort.

The army, therefore, perceives the settler-coca farmer as a direct guerrilla collaborator. The army's decision to engage in counternarcotics operations targeting illicit crop cultivation, justified by the "narcoguerrilla" theory, has led to the repression of peasants in those areas.

This region was particularly affected by decrees 0900 and 0717 establishing Special Zones in which the civilian authorities were stripped of their constitutional powers and control was transferred to government security forces. This set the stage for massive protests, beginning in 1996, of over 200,000 settlers and peasant farmers. These protests were organized in response to the mistreatment of rural workers and the lack of economically viable alternatives to coca.

In 1997, the Amazon region where the protests took place witnessed increases in massacres, violent deaths of agrarian leaders, and the formation of private paramilitary groups. As armed groups struggled for control, conflict escalated at a tremendous cost in terms of human life and the basic rights of the population.

Damaged bridge near Puerto Rico, Colombia, March 2002

Ana Carrigan: Dogs of War are Loose in Colombia * Colombia on the Brink * Colombia's Best Chance * Obstacles to Peace* Colombia's Best Hope

When Colombia's cities and landscape have been scorched and the 1.5 million internally displaced people have multiplied many times over; when Colombian refugees and their pursuers spill across the borders into neighboring countries, bringing violence and destabilization to the impoverished and fragile democracies of Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela and Panama; And when finally the war moves away, following the international drug trade as the traffickers shift their production centers south into Brazil or north into Panama, in eternal pursuit of the U.S. cocaine market: Who will calculate the cost of Colombia's destruction then?

Constanza Ardila Galvis: They Will Not Wipe Out the Seed * Both Sides at War Consider it a Job

The conflict took on dimensions we could never have imagined. Not one newspaper told the truth - they wrote about the Patriotic Union finishing off the peace process. I thought, of course, how could the comrades in the mountains think these city types were going to understand and protect a movement of the poor? They don't know rich people's greed and arrogance. Even when they apologise they're disdainful and even when they're in an uncomfortable situation they're arrogant. One way or another, they get what they want. They blamed all the problems on the poor, but they never saw the magnitude of the genocide and the newspapers hid it. They said there were guerrillas in the Patriotic Union, the labour movement was infiltrated with subversives and the Communist Party obeyed the armed organisation's command, but while these discussions were going on, three thousand five hundred leaders were killed and they still ignored it. The paramilitary groups carried out the dirty work the army couldn't do and no one saw or heard anything. Only now, ten years later, are people beginning to ask themselves what happened then.

Public relations in the park in San Vicente, March 2002

Plan Colombia (2000)

Congresswoman McKinney's Statement on Colombia Sept. 2000 So now, the US is about to implement a plan to spray chemicals on third world subsistence farmers and attack them with helicopter gunships while the Colombian government allows paramilitary groups to massacre them. ... One thing is for sure in this plan, it isn't about drug abuse control and won't help my friends who are strung out on dope. Strategies for Peace in Colombia Community Church of Chapel Hill, Dec. 2000 One very basic agreement would be for the guerrillas to stop kidnapping, and for the government to dismantle the paramilitary groups. This proposal puts two of the most serious issues on the table for discussion. Human Rights Conditions in Plan Colombia Presidential Determination on Waiver of Certification August 22, 2000 NGO's review the human rights record of the Colombian military. August 28, 2000 Colombia Human Rights Certification II January 2001

Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (1998)

America's Dirty War in Colombia Aug. 1998 US anti-drug aid to Colombia was estimated to be $100 million in 1997, up from $28 million in 1996. According to the Government Accounting Office, only one-third of the counter-drug aid since 1990 has gone directly to anti-narcotics assistance, while the remaining two-thirds went for military-related expenditures. The U.S. support for the "war on drugs" in Colombia does not strengthen democracy or respect human rights, nor does it stem the flow of drugs into the United States. Our support of the Colombian military, with their drug-trafficking paramilitary allies, is a tragic mistake. United States and Colombia Form 'Invincible' Military Alliance Z Magazine Jan. 1999 Ronald Reagan first coined the term "narco-guerrilla" to justify U.S. support for the Contras in Nicaragua. Later, in what became known as the Iran-Contra Affair, we learned that the United States was supplying weapons to the Contras in exchange for cocaine. No Peace with Colombia's Paramilitary Strategy Washington Times April 4, 1999 Democracy and negotiation are key to relieving the pressure. Colombia must find a way to manage strikes, demonstrations, and even terrorist attacks without resorting to acts of terror itself. Until Colombia abandons its paramilitary strategy, there is no hope for peace. Drugs replace communism as the point of entry for U.S. policy on Latin America Council on Hemispheric Affairs 8/24/99 General McCaffrey seems to be the policymaker most obsessed with the notion of the guerrillas as ravenous drug barons, but Congressmen Dan Burton (R-IN) and Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) are not far behind. In an official statement, the representatives made no mention of the paramilitaries' intense involvement in drugs, while emphasizing that the FARC "narco-terrorists" reel in "an estimated $100 million per month in revenues from facilitating narco-trafficking." Boinas verdes en la Amazonía Ignacio Gómez G. Aug. 1999 Mucho antes de que el Pentágono comenzara a movilizar su más avanzada tecnología en inteligencia de guerra a la Amazonia colombiana y de los países vecinos, las Fuerzas Especiales de Estados Unidos habían desplazado entrenadores y técnicos especializados en la instalación de los equipos de tierra necesarios y el entrenamiento de las fuerzas locales que deberían actuar con base en la información capturada, especialmente a la guerrilla de las Farc. US Planes and Helicopters Said to Bomb Civilians in Puerto Lleras 7/10/99 Several blocks away from the scene of [a FARC attack on a police station], however, there is widespread physical evidence that the military's airborne assault was directed at civilian-occupied areas of Puerto Lleras. The evidence backs up consistent witness accounts provided by local government officials, residents and rescue workers that aircraft opened fire on residential areas. Farther down the street, aircraft strafed houses and stores. Inside one, baker Jose Alberto Moreno and three family members were hiding in a bathroom, taking advantage of a 5-inch-thick concrete ceiling to shield them from the bullets raining from the sky, family members said. The thin corrugated roofing that covered the rest of their bakery already had been riddled with bullets fired from passing aircraft, they said. As the Morenos huddled in the bathroom, an aircraft fired down again, hitting a gas canister near the bathroom. The gas ignited, burning the clothes off the occupants and sending the Morenos running naked into the street, screaming for help. Three of the four died a few days later. The survivor, Angelica Ladino, 19, is recuperating in Bogota. She declined to comment. The U.S. and its Responsibility for Counter-Insurgency Operations in Colombia Summer 1998 Latin American politicians helped to invent the specter of the drug-financed "narco-guerrilla," a myth discounted by careful and dispassionate researchers like Rensselaer Lee. U.S. military officers were equally cynical. Col. John D Waghelstein, writing in the Military Review, argued that the way to counter "those church and academic groups that have slavishly supported the insurgency in Latin America" was to put them "on the wrong side of the moral issue", by creating "a melding in the American public's mind and in congress" of the alleged narco-guerrilla connection.

Links to other Colombia websites (under construction)


Copyright Paul Wolf, 2002

Paul Wolf in San Vicente del Caguan, March 2002