IV.

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

By Medardo T. Justiniano Major, AFP

Counter-Guerrilla Seminar Fort Bragg, 15 June 1961

In the Philippines we have mountains, swamps, and wilderness; we have treess so high and so thick that the sunshine never reaches the ground. in our jungles we have wild carabao, crocodiles, snakes thirty feet long, and Huks. These animals are killers, particularly the last ones.

Immediately after World War II, the leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines utilized the inherent confusion of the reconstruction period to strengthen-and enhance the military position of their armed forces. While the legitimate guerrilla forces were surrendering their arms, the members of the military branch of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the Huks did not do so. On the contrary, they sought to gather more, and secretly accumulated as many as possible. While the other guerrilla organizations were demobilizing, the Huks were busy recruiting more men for the hammer and sickle revolution.

In their recruiting, following accepted Communist strategy, the Huks exploited two courses of action for their expansion program. The first course of action was expansion by force, a course of action which was characterized by extremes of terrorism. Their actions were calculated to inject a psychology of terror into the minds of unpretentious citizens, government officials, and even the rank and file of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Murder, arson, robbery and torture meant nothing to them, and each method was employed as thought necessary in order to intimidate the people into forced submission.

Supplementing this military course of action was their second line of attack. This was expansion by indoctrination, a process which involved systematic brainwashing by trained Communist propagandists. I might mention at this point that, to enhance their capabilities in this regard, the top leaders of the Communist Party, those who later expected to overthrow the government of the Philippines by 1951, early established a Stalin University, complete with the ideological trimmings of its Kremlin predecessor. In this institution, promising converts to the Huk cause were given advanced training in subversive techniques.

In their program of expansion by indoctrination, the Huks took advantage of each item of contention to represent the facts on either side in whatever way they felt would best suit their sinister purposes. They demonstrated an extraordinary ability in attributing all imperfections, all injustices, all misfortunes, to the democratic process. They are masters at the exploitation of this particular line, at the propagation of deceitful catchwords such as "land for the landless," ''prosperity for the masses," and many others. These were carried far and wide and inculcated into the rural population.

This situation was challenging to an intelligence officer, and this situation was given to me for solution by Col Valeriano, my commanding officer. Here was a situation where the terrorized inhabitant would not even glance at soldiers for fear of reprisals by the Huk. Here was a predicament where the people were led to bind their hopes to the alluring doctrines of Communism, either because of their exposure to Huk degredation, or because of vicious propaganda expressed by the CPP stooges, exploiting trivial or even personal incidents to effect pernicious distrust of our governmental system. This situation, in which the rural and small town populations were militarily dominated by the Huk, and were ideologically captivated by Communist indoctrinators, was one which, as the intelligence officer of Colonel Valeriano, If found obviously required a major intelligence build-up. The expansion programs of the Communist Party made the success of intelligence operations seem rather problematical. Nevertheless, several methods were devised, applied and were found effective. Had they not been effective, our affairs this morning would have been necrological for the five of us, as well as two other people who are with you in the audience.

Gentlemen, I would like to discuss with you for a moment the physical background, the terrain in which we operated, for the different methods which we employed. Central Luzon, which I believe is shown on maps which have been furnished to you, might be considered roughly square. In the center is a single big mountain, called Mount Arayat.. Running south from it is a large grassy swamp, called the Candaba swamp. On the east and west sides of the square are mountain ranges, some grassy, some covered with the densest kind of rain forest. The area between the mountain ranges is partly rice land, partly grass land, with numerous streams and patches of forest Politically, the area is divided into many municipalities, and four provinces, whose common corner is on Mount Arayat. Notice on your maps how Mount Arayat is most strategically located in the center of these four different provinces. The Huks realized the importance of Mount Arayat, and took every advantage of the complications possibly ensuing from provincial boundaries and command boundaries of our armed forces. From this central mountain (which they never made the mistake of trying to defend against a major force), the Huks maintained courier routes to all parts of the area.

Now, let me discuss the different methods we used in gathering information in this hostile area. Our collection effort was based on the direct approach method and the indirect approach method, which we combined with other methods, the use or prisoners, infiltration, etc. The direct method was a simple interrogation method wherein we invited the Huks families and known sympathizers. The wife and oftentimes wives of Huks commanders could, if they would, tell us something of value. In this approach we would interrogate them, ask them to cooperate, give them some lectures and so on. Well, of course, I'd like to tell you that if we got any information along this line, it was not very useful. We have found these people hostile no matter what method of interrogation we adopted.

The indirect method is a system wherein we use friends of the Huks. Classmates of Huk children in school, cousins of a Huk commander, relatives of friends of associates of the Huk leaders were approached and induced to cooperate. By this system of making an indirect approach to the sources, we were able to get a lot of information.

Another very important source of our information are prisoners. I think we have been told about it in school and I know that most of you know how to use prisoners, but I would like to talk to you about how we use our prisoners. For the purpose of this discussion and for the purpose of our operation in the Philippines, we have, divided prisoners into four categories.

The first category includes, those prisoners who have been captured in combat. Everybody knows how to treat a prisoner captured in combat and how to take advantage of the psychological opportunity afforded by the confusion that this man's mind is involved in. One very striking example of this was when we captured Celia Pomeroy. Celia Pomeroy is the wife of an American GI who was in the Communist Party in the Philippines. He's one of these men whose picture you have seen displayed. This Celia Porneroy was a very intelligent Huk organizer, a graduate of our University of the Philippines. I had a chance to interrogate her ten minutes after she was captured, and I got as much information as I wanted from her during a short space of time, which compared favorably with the information secured during the one week interrogation which she was later subjected to.

The second classification of prisoners are the surrenderees. In the Huk organization when one surrendered, it meant that this fellow must have been feeling himself to be in some sort of a situation where he faced liquidation. Of course, we have given allowances for the possibility of planted surrenderees. However, I do not recall having any such prisoner during our five years of fighting with the Huks; not one surenderee that I know of was planted into our intelligence set up.

There are a number of situations where we have found surrenderees very useful. One of them is the technique that we call the "Magic Eye." You will agree with me that fighting a Filipino or fighting an American Communist, fighting Communists among your own countrymen, is extremely difficult for an intelligence officer to identify which man is an enemy and which one is not. That constant problem we often solved by the use of surrenderees, and in which we found the Magic Eye technique effective. This Magic Eye system allowed us to take advantage of psychological opportunities and at the same time protect the life of the families of the surrenderee. Take for instance a situation wherein we rounded up all the civilians of a town. We would construct a special tent for the prisoner, with a peephole. He would be concealed while the civilians were made to pass before this "Magic Eye," hidden in a tent. Naturally all these people would start feeling a sense of fright because they might be identified. This type of operation helped us a lot tactically and psychologically.

The third type of prisoners were those who were serving sentences in jail. I'd like to mention here that in the expansion program of the Huks they recruited all types of people, especially those who had police records, those who were known killers, and so on. Naturally when we started to operate in an area whose people and inhabitants were hostile to us, we were initially at a loss for contacts. We tried to find out from our national jails which prisoners actually hailed from that particular area. Once such a prisoner was identified, I would interrogate this fellow and try to win him over and get him to start talking. I might give him a pack of cigarettes, I might take him out for a free airing in a night club. In short, I would try to make him feel so happy and so grateful that he would give me some free information. The fourth category were what might be called "special'' prisoners. These usually were friends or close relatives either of Huks, or of people who were cooperating with us, and were made prisoners for their own protection.

In this connection, I would like to discuss with you, in continuation of Colonel Valeriano's discussion, the infiltration method, as illustrated by a particular project which we called the "Relatives Project." It is an example of the infiltration of individuals into the Huk ranks, a type of operation where maximum secrecy and security is necessary. It is a type of operation which demands a great deal from the individuals participating in it, the operative, his relatives, and his project officer alike.

"Relatives Project" dealt with the infiltration of the Huk organization in the Arayat area, in, Central Luzon. In the effort to find a suitable person for infiltration, we found it necessary to contact the relatives of several Huk commanders. We did this, without identifying ourselves, until we finally were successful in locating a cooperative individual who was the cousin of a Huk commander.

We found also that this Huk Commander had joined the Huks not specifically for ideological reasons but for personal reasons. The infiltrator was trained for about two months under my personal supervision. While this was being done, necessary arrangements for cover and protection were made. This took the burning of Ids house, the imprisonment of his brother, and eventually the evacuation of his mother and father to protect and give cover to this infiltrator into the Hukbalahap organization. We had to find the Huks, and the government naturally had to pay for this. His mother did not know that her son was an infiltrator. The brother did not know that he was being placed in jail because we were trying to put up some sort of a ruse. But the news of these activities made them very effective. Slowly, based on his obvious grievances against the government, our agent was able to reach certain categories in the Hukbalahap and the Communist Party organization witch has been explained to you by Colonel Lapus.

Our man was made a collector of the National Finance Committee. The National Finance Committee is the organization which supplied the Huks in the field with money, medicine, ammunition, weapons, and other equipment. For two months, our supplies were flowing into the Huk lines, through the National Finance Committee and as a matter of fact I think Colonel Lapus will back me up here because we could not tell anybody how we spend our confidential funds and I could not give any logical explanation at the time. For two months as I say, medicine was flowing into the Huks, ammunition was being given to the Huks, we were also giving weapons to the Huks, through this infiltrator. The purpose, of course, was to enable him to implant himself firmly into the organization and enable him to be promoted, He was eventually promoted, and and the promotion and the amount of money we have used I think paid off, because he was able to reach Taruc himself.

Our man was made a bodyguard of Taruc, the leader of the Huk field forces, but this duty was done off and on for security purposes. Nevertheless this fellow was able to reach Taruc and we were able to get secret pictures our man took of the entire membership of the Huk organization in Candaba swamp. I think that General Lansdale, Colonel Lapus, Major Bohannan, Colonel Valeriano and General Hobbs were the only ones who knew about this.

The infiltration program went on, and the securing of reports was the most difficult thing that I had to encounter. How could the reports reach me, and how would I get instructions to the man, that was my problem. I discussed it with my commanding officer, with two officers from JUSMAAG, with Major Bohannon, and I got very important points which helped me. I'd like to tell you of some of the very interesting methods we devised which might help you also.

In order to let our man know that he must pick up our instructions to him, we devised a technique of using kites of an ordinary type. At certain prearranged points in the area where he operated, we would fly kites simultaneously in three different places. This was done at certain hours of the day exactly on the hour. The kites were not flown continuously, or at random times, to keep him from having to watch for them always, which military operations could have made very difficult. Further, if he were always to be seen scanning the horizon, suspicion would certainly be aroused. So that we did things on the hour. We would fly the kite at 7:00 in the morning, 8:00 in the morning, 9:00 in the morning, 10:00 in the morning, until we were sure that this signal had been received. The moment when he would see this kite, he would know a pre-arranged contact within the swamp was to be effected.

The troops of course couldn't be told anything about this operation, As a matter of fact, I lost two men when the area commander in this area attacked my men and I nearly lost my life too, but I couldn't tell him. Very often there would be no one to meet him, but he would find his messages concealed, perhaps in a messkit, or in an American first aid kit, carelessly abandoned. We would put the instructions into this kit and leave it at certain places along the designated place.

Using this sytem, how could we make an emergency contact at night? What do we do to make our message reach him when night infiltration is usually being conducted in this area? This is another problem that we faced because, of course, he could not see the kite at night. We devised two things.

We would fly the same kite, with a battery operated light. Then he gets his message. That's one. The other one is by the use of flares. In other, words, if we believe that he may not be able to see this small light from the kite, we supplement this with flares, fired on the hour at the same designated spots.

The moment that our man would see this signal, he would know it means that he's got to be very careful because the troops are going in fast. We tell him now to find a way to save himself. It was my biggest concern, to be sure that this fellow was safe because, it is so difficult. to find one who could fit into the suit, train him, break all the rules necessary, burn houses, imprison somebody, and send supplies to the Huk organization.

But as I say it was very effective. As a matter of fact, I remember that before I presented the first picture taken by our infiltrator to Secretary Magsaysay, there was much skepticism about this project, of mine. In fact, I suppose the late Magsaysay gave me the chance because of the confidence he had in me. He was worried about the success of this operation, but when I gave him the pictures taken by this infiltrator, he was in a conference with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Right then and there he left the General Staff conference and immediately went to General Hobbs, the Chief of JUSMAG (Joint US Military Advisory Group) and spread out all the pictures on the table of General Hobbs.

Let me tell you another thing which was done by this infiltrator. If you recall my mentioning the National Finance Committee, as I said we supplied the Huks through it, a matter which went on for two months. In the third month, Colonel Valeriano and Secretary Magsaysay decided it was time for us to hit. It was very easy for me, to get out the files of what this fellow had submitted and, based on them, we were able right then and there to apprehend 1,175 members of the National Finance Committee. That destroyed the supply line of the Huk.

I have discussed with you the means by which I contacted one of our infiltrators. Now I would like to take up with you, his means for the trans mission of reports to me. As Colonel Lapus has told you, the Huk organization disseminated propaganda material. On regularly issued was a magazine called Titis, or "Spark." Their propaganda was mimeographed or printed and scatttered to all the rural inhabitants. It was also the medium by which I was able to get reports which were submitted to me as an intelligence officer. The way this was done was very simple. My infiltrator would take a propaganda sheet which was being given to all the inhabitants. He would simply take a pencil, start reading and the first word he came to that he wanted to use he would indicate by a small pencil dot under the first letter, just a small dot. And then he goes on down the line to the next word he needs, and puts a little dot under it. When the leaflet gets down to me, I take a magnifying glass, somebody starts writing down the words I call out, and I get my report.

Gentlemen, these are simple things that I want to bring up here. You may find situations where you need to do a lot of things and I hope some of these examples, plus your own ingenuity, will help you with them.

Another topic that I'd like to mention briefly, as being of much assistance in our campaign, was the reward system. The reward system is basically a money matter. In other words, for the head of a Huk, or for his capture or surrender, a reward would be given, ranging from 200 pesos to about a hundred thousand pesos. If any of you would want to earn $50,000, that price is still offered in the Philippines for the capture of one top Communist leader, Jesus Lava. The fellow is still at large. This reward system brought up a lot of opportunities, and a lot of problems. Through it, we were able to get a number of Huk commanders and key personnel.

Next I would like to discuss psychological operations, especially in supporting intelligence operations. It is a very interesting subject and I suppose I will be criticized about some of the things I will discuss with you. You will remember that I said in the beginning of my briefing that the Huks used the psychology of fear to incite and enforce non-cooperation with the Armed Forces by the civilian masses. Naturally when we go into an area where Huks are active, the civilians, even if they are not ideologically indoctrinated, would not want to give us information because of fear, because the Huks have a practice of slicing the tongue of an informant, if they do no worse. These civilians and their families are living in very remote places; what else can they do but cooperate with the Huks. The Philippine Army cannot provide enough guards, not even one soldier for each of these families. In such areas we practiced several different techniques for gaining cooperation.

In the early days, we practiced what I might call counter-terrorism, if we may put a coined word to work. To cite one particular case, there was our operation at San Luis, the home of Taruc. All the people there, as far as I was concerned, were all Huks, were all sympathizers of the Huk organization. The Mayor, the Chief of Police, all were Huks or sympathizers. As a matter of fact, when we went there, we asked for some water because we were so thirsty - and Colonel Valeriano got poisoned. They talked to us nicely, but when we turned our backs, what happened? Four of my men got killed there. They used a bayonet, opened up the intestines and then chopped them into pieces, and scattered the pieces for several kilometers along the roads. I know it was quite an ugly sight, but their idea was to inject some sort of terror into the civilian minds.

So, here is what we did to counteract the terror inspired by the Huk. We gathered together the civilians of the region, including the Mayor and the policemen, and took them to the bank of the river which runs by the village. On the other side, 100 to 200, yards away, were my troops in uniform. In the presence of the townspeople these troops, in full uniform, began to kill about a dozen "captured Huks." We just used our bayonets and killed them. But there was a procedure in killing them. While the civilians were gathered across the river, our troops brought out the "Huks" blindfolded, still with their equipment, and began to bayonet them one by one. While we were killing them, some were shouting out the name of the Mayor, the names of the policemen, and shouting out the names of their principal suppliers. Seeing the Huks killed before their eyes, hearing themselves named as the supporters of those we had just massacred, these civilians naturally expected to be next on the death lists.

Our psychological officers now started talking to the people. What they said was, in effect: "Now we know everything about everyone in this town, from the Mayor to the Chief of Police to all of you. Now we realize that if you came to us to give us information and everybody knows that you came to us, you might be beheaded the next day. We are going to give you ten places tonight where you can report and there we shall accept your confessions. If you confess, we will not treat you like we have these Huks." Almost all of the people reported to these spots, practically one after the other. We learned a lot of things, the Mayor was put in jail. We effectively broke the Huk support in this town.

But don't criticize me for these atrocities, gentlemen. They were not true. The people that the civilians thought we killed were our own soldiers. But, we really didn't harm them. It was a show. We used chicken blood, pigs blood and so on, to make it look real, because we cannot commit any atrocities like those committed by the Huks. We have our Constitution, our laws. But when that pretended atrocity was followed up by psychological operations, it really paid off.

Another way by which we have counteracted the psychological terror that was injected into the minds of the masses by the Huks, by instilling greater fear of us, was by the use of dead bodies. For examples, in one particular operation discussed by Colonel Valeriano, we killed a large number of Huks. We piled these dead Huks into a truck with the hands and feet dangling outside, a whole truck load of dead bodies, and we drove this truck clear around town, and through the area.

I have discussed some of the difficult phases of intelligence activities in counter-guerrilla operations during our antiCommunist campaign in the Philippines. Training, ingenuity, a stoutheart, a practical knowledge of human psychology, that is of knowing people and how to treat them, are the vital ingredients necessary in accomplishing this hazardous mission. But, above all the transcendent element in our fighting for the free world, is our undying Philippine love for liberty and an ever increasing determination to survive Communist bondage and oppression.

In the Philippines, 13,000 miles from here, we are 27 million strong. As many and as big as the combined population in the area of New York, Rhode Island, Delaware, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut and New Jersey. We have contributed a humble share to our brother nations in the free world by crushing a rebellion of the Communist Party. We will continue to do our level best as the Vanguard of the free nations. Coming from all corners of the globe, let us all act in concert to fortify the framework of international solidarity. Against a wicked enemy, let us therefore break from the shackles of complacency and finally with freedom as our battle Rag let us stand united as one race and one nation and bury those who seek to trample our priceless legacy of liberty and justice.