United States and Colombia Form 'Invincible' Military Alliance
"The drug crisis facing the United States is a top national security threat. The Department of Defense has been called upon to support counter-drug efforts of Federal law enforcement agencies that are carried out in source countries."
So begins the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act, passed by the U.S. Congress on October 19, 1998. The purpose of the bill is to create a "drug-free hemisphere" by attacking drugs at their source. Touted by one of its co-authors, Dennis Hastert (R-IL), as the largest anti-drug bill in U.S. history, the emphasis is on crop eradication in drug producing countries -- namely, Colombia.
One week after its passage, Presidents Clinton and Pastrana stood on the White House lawn, announcing the formation of a new military "Alliance Against Drugs," and agreeing to double the amount of military aid appropriated by the Congress. 1 In 1999, U.S. military aid to Colombia will be $289 million, more than three times the amount in 1998. 2 Colombia will become the third largest recipient of US military aid in the world, following Egypt and Israel. 3
The Colombian operation is code-named "Invincible." 4 In addition to Black Hawk helicopters and high caliber Gatling guns for Colombia’s older fleet of Hueys, the Colombian armed forces will receive training and access to satellite images of areas controlled by the largest guerrilla group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). The U.S. will also rebuild the Miraflores anti-drug base, which was overrun last summer, and beef up "base and force security" for other military installations in southern Colombia.
Draining the Sea to Kill the Fish
The story begins in 1946. Colombia’s liberal party ran two presidential candidates that year, and as a result lost the election to the conserva- tive minority party. Violence became the tool for the consolidation of political power, and Colombia and Bogota were never the same again. U.S. General George Marshall, attending the Pan- American Conference, rode back to the airport in a Sherman tank. Fifty years of sworn revenge have ensued, and the current guerrillas are still staking that claim, after wholesale betrayal by the liberal party.
The conflict has taken more 120,000 lives 3 and caused more than a million people to flee their homes. Unable to attack the guerrillas directly, the Colombian military has used paramilitary death squads to attack the civilian base of support of the guerrillas, often in gruesome, extralegal executions designed to frighten the population.
Paramilitary massacres accounted for 70% of the political murders in 1997, according to the U.S. State Department’s annual human rights report. There have been hundreds of civilian massacres, each defined as the killing of four or more people at once, in a policy called "draining the sea to kill the fish." Targets have included trade unionists, human rights workers, Catholic priests, and anyone supporting the guerrillas. The Geneva Convention does not permit attacking civilians, 5 and civilized society condemns this practice as terrorism.
Some of the paramilitary "self defense" militias are private armies created by wealthy landowners to protect their investments. Other groups, called convivirs, were organized by the Colombian government. This is an odd name for them, because the word convivir means to coexist, and recalls a popular phrase, "un pais donde el catolicismo convive con el marxismo" -- a country where Catholicism and Marxism coexist side by side. Both the FARC and Colombia’s other large guerrilla army, the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), are fighting for populist economic reforms and consider themselves Marxists.
The United States played a central role in organizing the counterinsurgency strategy. Of 247 Colombian military personnel linked to human rights violations by the Latin America Working Group, 124 are graduates of the School of the Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia. 6 According to U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), the Barrancabermeja intelligence network was set up with the assistance of the CIA in 1991. 7 It was recently revealed that Colombian General Ivan Ramirez Quintero served as a CIA asset for years while maintaining close ties to the paramilitaries. 8
Senator Leahy successfully introduced an amendment to the anti- drug bill requiring that Colombian military units be "vetted," meaning investigated, to determine whether they have committed gross human rights violations. If so, those units would not be eligible to receive U.S. aid. This was a masterful stroke on his part, but the bill is still lacking provisions to monitor the use of the aid, and provisions for the protection of human rights observers.
Operations Other Than War
In 1991 alone, U.S. aid to Colombia included 10,000 M14 rifles, 700 M16 rifles, 623 M79 grenade launchers, 325 M60 machine guns, 46,000 rifle grenades, 37,000 hand grenades, 3,000 Claymore mines, and about 15,000,000 rounds of ammunition. 7 Since then, the level of aid has remained relatively constant, until next year, when it will triple. 9,2
For example, in 1998, the Colombian National Police received three Black Hawk helicopters and 10 older Huey helicopters from the U.S. State Department. 4 Next year, we will provide six more Black Hawks and high caliber, multi-barrel Gatling guns for the balance of Colombia’s fleet of 50 Hueys. According to the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act, the helicopters and Gatling guns are to be used for coca crop eradication.
Particularly disturbing is a concurrent change in the Department of Defense policy called the Global Military Force Policy, 1 which establishes the priorities for the U.S. military in this order: (1) war; (2) military operations other than war; (3) exercises and training; and (4) operations not involving hostilities. Congress upgraded the military priority of drug eradication and interdiction from that of non-hostile operations (priority 4), to that of "operations other than war" (priority 2). This appears to signal that direct intervention by the U.S. armed forces is at least under consideration as an option.
The U.S. has also put pressure on Colombia to switch from spraying coca crops with glyphosate (marketed as Round-Up by Monsanto) to using the more powerful defoliant tebuthiuron (marketed as Spike by Dow Agrosciences). So far, Colombia has not agreed to make the change, fearing environmental devastation.
CIA satellite imagery shows that in 1998, 130,000 acres of coca were grown in Peru, 97,000 acres in Bolivia, and 200,000 acres in Colombia. 10 Compare the $289 million in military aid destined for Colombia in 1999 with $17 million for Bolivia, and one million dollars in alternative development aid for Peru. 1 The level of anti-drug funding for each country is not related to the amount of drugs produced.
Ronald Reagan first coined the term "narco-guerrilla" to justify U.S. support for the Contras in Nicaragua. Later, in what became known as the Iran-Contra Affair, we learned that the United States was supplying weapons to the Contras in exchange for cocaine.
The same label is now used in Colombia. Marine General Charles Wilhelm, commanding officer of the U.S. Southern Command, says the guerrillas are a self-sustaining "narco-insurgency." 11 U.S. Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) and the Colombian National Police both refer to the guerrillas as "narco-terrorists." 2
There is little question that the guerrillas are funding their campaign through taxing drug producing areas, in addition to kidnapping people for ransom and extorting money from oil companies by threatening to blow up their pipelines. However, there seems to be little concern that Carlos Castańo, leader of the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia, an alliance of paramilitary militias, is described by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration as a kingpin in the infamous Cali cocaine cartel. 12 The selective enforcement of drug trafficking is certainly a corrupt and immoral key to power in Colombia, and was the reason for U.S. enmity towards Colombia’s previous president, Ernesto Samper.
The Road to Peace?
President Andres Pastrana Arango was elected last summer by a narrow margin, on a platform of making peace with the guerrillas. But the road to peace will be a long one. According to Luis Alberto Moreno, the Ambassador of Colombia to the U.S., "An integral part of President Pastrana’s efforts to negotiate an end to our internal conflict is to modernize the Colombian armed forces. The peace process has only just begun." 13
For his part, Pastrana has denounced the paramilitary tactics. "Even if the enemies of the state and society torture, massacre, and use arms and methods prohibited by civilization, the men society and the state has charged with defending them cannot respond with the same methods." 14 Yet no one expects him to punish any of his military officers, or to take action against the paramilitary militias.
An amendment to the bill withholds the military aid if the Government of Colombia permits the establishment of any demilitarized zone in which eradication by Colombian security forces is prohibited. This appears to be a signal that Washington is not happy with Pastrana’s negotiations with the FARC and his withdrawal of troops from the Caqueta region.
Peace talks with the FARC are now underway. Pastrana is in a difficult position, but he has the first chance in decades to end the war. It will be a great test for him, and could set Colombia’s course for years to come.
What can we say about U.S. foreign policy in Colombia? It’s a hoax to call it a war on drugs. Furthermore, our support for the Colombian military, and consequently their paramilitary allies, does not strengthen democracy or respect human rights. We cannot allow our government to hide behind the smokescreen of the war on drugs any longer. The stakes are much too high, and the horror has gone on far too long.
Paul Wolf January 11th, 1999 Notes (1) The Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (2) New York Times, "Congress Steps Up Aid to Colombians," 12/1/98 Note: In a 12/27/98 article by the Washington Post, it is reported that U.S. aid was $289 million in 1998, and $180 million in 1997. The NYT numbers are used here. (3) "Colombian Government and Rebels Brace for Tough Talks Ahead," Agence France Press, 1/8/99 (4) "U.S. General Says Drug Fight Gaining Ground," Periscope, 11/10/98 (5) Geneva Convention, 1977 Protocol Additional, Part IV, Art. 13.2 (6) Colombian Human Rights Abuses Tied to School of Americas Graduates, Press Release 07/23/98 from U.S. Rep. Joseph P. Kennedy II (D-Mass.) http://www.house.gov/josephkennedy/soa7-23.htm (7) "Colombia’s Killer Networks: The Military-Paramilitary Partnership and the United States," Human Rights Watch Publications, 1996 ISBN 1-564-32-203-3 (8) Washington Post, 8/11/98 (9) Foreign Military Sales Facts, 1996, published by the U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency (DoD), www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/colombia_armstable.htm (10) Washington Post 1/7/99 (11) Reuters, 12/3/98 (12) Washington Post, 12/30/98 (13) US News and World Report, 12/21/98 (14) Associated Press, 12/15/98