IndexRevolution in the Llanos
Rojas Pinilla Coup and Amnesty
The War of Villarica
Dumar Aljure's FARC
Military Assistance Agreement with the U.S.
The Colombian Intelligence Service (SIC)
Terrorists organized into three groups, (1) to dynamite; (2) to burn and (3) as shock group. Army has seized 600 bombs in possession of terrorists and has arrested principal leaders.
Confirming foregoing, Consul Cali reports heavy troop movements toward Armenia. He reports also police raided Communist meeting Cali November 14th arresting 26 and confiscating shells and leaflets and police and army continuing search for arms.
Telegram from Ambassador Beaulac to Secretary of State, Nov. 16, 1949[Lleras Camargo said the] Government has concealed the real state of affairs in the provinces. As a matter of fact, there has been a great deal of violence, which the press has been forbidden to report, but some of the facts leak out from time to time.
He knows positively that in the Llanos armed bands of cavalry have been operating under the leadership of a man named Arbeláez, and the army has been unable to stop them.
Remarks by Lleras Camargo on the Colombian situation, January 4, 1950[José Camacho said that] Six hundred armed guards have been assigned to proect the person of Laureano Gómez. Neither Gómez nor Ospina appears in public except under the most unavoidable circumstances.
Ospina has ceased to be the head of the government in everything but name. He is in constant conference with Gómez, who dictates official policies.
Remarks of José Camacho on the Colombian situation, January 25, 1950The Ambassador said that the country is now completely tranquil and the rumors of internal disorders are false. The reports of armed conflict in the Llanos have to do with bands of robbers and marauders, not Liberals in rebellion. ... President Ospina told the Ambassador he wished it was really a revolutionary force instead of gangs of bandits, for then he was sure he could use the army to crush it.
Political Conditions in Colombia, March 14, 1950Buitrago told the news reporter that the Colombian guerrilla forces are in complete control of the Llanos of Casanare in Colombia. ... Eliseo Velásquez was said to be the Chief of Staff of the Army, and another guerrilla was stated to be Jorge Betancourt, who, Buitrago said, started the movement with the first uprising in Trinidad.
Buitrago said that the guerrilla forces occupy the entrances and exits to the llanos and some strategic mountain ranges. When asked by the reporter what towns they held, Buitrago replied that they did not wish to occupy towns as this would lead to massacres by the "falangist aviators". ... He added that the program of Eliseo Velásquez was the program of the Liberal Party.
Visit of Colombian Guerrilla to Venezuela, June 19, 1950At the time of the uprisings on the 9th of April, 1948, when Gaitán was assassinated, Eliseo Velásquez was in Puerto López. According to his mother, Eliseo headed up a revolt in that area and soon dominated the region. He then went to Bogotá, conferred with Darío Enchandía, and offered to take Bogotá with his men, submit to the regular army, and hand over power to the Liberal Party. Enchandía declined his offer, and Eliseo, disillusioned, returned to the Llanos. On a subsequent visit to Bogotá, Eliseo Velasquez was imprisoned for sixty-two hours by the "chulavita" police. Following the elections of last November, Eliseo Velásquez began his guerrilla warfare with the taking of Puerto López.
Family of Colombian Guerrilla Chief Arrives in Venezuela, July 12, 1950[O]rganized group entered ESPECTADOR bldg 7:30 p.m. Burned office equipment, damaged presses. Part of the group then took taxis to TIEMPO press shop set fire bldg damaged presses. By 8:30 p.m. army moved in with tanks armored cars took over town sector and rioters disbanded there. Firemen, police, army appeared wait until destruction accomplished specified bldgs then moved in and stopped spread damage to other bldgs. Civilian group attacked, pillaged burned home Alfonso Lopez between 8-10 p.m. Lopez and sons present but left when attack began. Home Pres Urdaneta two doors away guarded by soldiers. This guard and police inactive while civilians accomplished work. Urdaneta returned from country 7 p.m. Group proceeded next home Carlos Lleras Restrepo. Organized group 20-30 men first set fire hedge fronting Lleras house met gun fire from house, 5 attackers shot. Police car observed action from street nearby. Police assisted removal wounded, then about 20 poured rifle fire into house, claimed wounded 2 defenders. This action between 8:45-10 p.m. Exactly 10 p.m. 8 soldiers arrived, moved civilians and police back, surrounded house 3 sides, found defenders had excaped possibly over rear wall. House burned after soldiers took over and were observed to be destroying furniture. Four fire engines arrived with soldiers worked until 6 a.m. controlling fire preventing spread adjoining house. Emb witnesses believe fire started and controlled deliberately by soldiers. Army blocked all traffic area until noon Sunday.
Telegram from Bogotá embassy to Secretary of State, September 8, 1952Rojas had made several speeches recently in which he declared the Army apolitical and pledged fealty to Urdaneta and to democratic processes with limited regard for party lines. These declarations are presumed to have been too far off the party line to please the Gomez family and inner circle. The General's increasing public stature and failure of subserviency alarmed the group. While he talked of democracy, fair elections and equal rights, the Gomez-Andrade-Leyva nucleus was planning a new Constitution that proposed to define as treason all adverse criticism of the Government. The determination to get rid of him obviously arose out of the consciousness that control of the Army was essential to the continued existence of political power. ...
There is a bizarre footnote for the historical record. I refer to the arrest of Felipe ECHAVARRIA, charged with conspiracy to assassinate a strangely assorted list of Colombians. This man is wealthy and of good family. some months ago he moved his wife and small children to Greenwich, Connecticut, and placed the children in school there. He told me that he was unwilling for his children to grow up in the fear-ridden atmosphere of Colombia. Later, following a big birthday party he gave attended by diplomats, high officials and others, he himself went to the United States. Upon his return, he approached a soldier with the proposition to pay well for the assassination of certain specified men. He was led into a trap by the soldier and arrested. Echavarria only admitted his identity and confessed under some species of torture. Alvaro Gomez intervened, demanding that the officers who investigated the case be discharged. This was refused and Echavarria was consigned to a hospital as probably a mental case.
The list for assasination included General Rojas Pinilla, Gilberto AlzateAventaño, Juan Uribe Cualla,
Lucio Pabon Nuñez, Rafael Rocha, Liberal President of Jockey Club and several others. At the time the
list seemed politically meaningless. Echavarria had been a Liberal, converted to Conservatism, but the only
haracteristic that his list for assassination now seems to have in common is that they were politically
troublesome to the Gomez faction. It is noted that the young Enrique Gomez Saturday night gave the press
the explanation that his father wanted to dismiss Rojas because of the Army's barbaric treatment of Echavarria.
I report this as a footnote without further comment because I do not know whether these facts have any
special significance or not.
Military Coup in Colombia, June 17, 1953
Commencing September 9 with the surrender of Eduardo FONSECA Galan and his troop at Truramena the pacification has snowballed until by September 15 most of the principal Llanos leaders had delivered themselves, their men, and their arms to the Military.
9-14-53 Cantaclaro Guadalupe Salcedo Unda, Dumar Aljure 136 men.
As previously mentioned, much of the Government success in the Llanos probably may be laid at the door of General Duarte Blum who seems to have gained the guerrillas' trust. It now remains to be seen whether the Government will follow through in providing the guarantees promised by Duarte.
Llanos Guerrillas Surrender, September 16, 1953
In my opinion, the surrender of Guadalupe Salcedo, the most able guerrilla leader in the Llanos,
who has defeated the Colombian armed forces in a dozen or more engagements, signalizes the
end of the guerrilla warfare in Colombia.
This would seem to be General Rojas' biggest accomplishment thus far, and should bring back
normal times in Colombia more than anything else that has happened since he took over.
Recent steps taken by the Administration of General ROJAS Pinilla give rise to the suspicion that the
Administration is tending toward a Peronista type of totalitarianism.
In early November President Gustavo ROJAS Pinilla in an interview with a French news correspondent
stated that he was a sincere admirer of President PERON of Argentina. This statement received considerable
publicity in the Colombian press, but fear of censorship apparently prevented any editorial comment. As
though to illustrate the possible significance of his comment to the reporter from Le Monde, the President
and his Government have taken several steps which may only be interpreted as totalitarian.
The army is taking the situation seriously enough to saturate an area in southwest Huila five miles
square with 100 lb. fragmentation bombs and will probably use napalm if those do not work.
Our MA [Military Attache] reported in July that 50,000 rifles, 25,000 revolvers, and a great quantity of
ammunition had never been surrendered by Conservative civilians who were armed by the Laureano
Gómez administration. It seems impossible to doubt that much of the new guerrilla activity
can be traced back to this arsenal.
An analysis of the public order situation as of January 1955 in the Department of Tolima, the center of
the majority of guerrilla activity reported in recent months, has been made by the Public Order Brigade
of the Colombian Army stationed in Tolima. A controlled American source report of March 17 transmitted
a translation of this analysis.
The analysis reflects the desire of the military authorities to blame the outbreaks on Communist
provocateurs, and at the same time reveals their realization that the problems involved are much more
complex than the relatively facile explanation of Communist agitation would indicate.
The analysis states that "the Brigade command has reached the conclusion that the terrorist plan, in
its widest program, is completely of Communist origin". Later in the report, however, the conclusion is
reached "that all the rural inhabitants of the area are potential bandits".
Attached is a statement from the Pentagon, which shows that 14 fighters and 7 light bombers were
delivered to the Colombians as promised. It adds that they will receive 7 more bombers in Fiscal 1955.
I gave Mr. Spencer this morning a one-sentence statement for his memorandum, saying that the Embassy
has repeatedly insisted in its messages to the Department that the Government has presented no convincing
evidence of communist participation in the present guerrilla warfare.
So far as I am aware the Army and the Government have furnished only 2 pieces of "evidence" that foreign
communists have been active there: (1) that they killed a Colonel Lister, a famous communist leader in the
civil war in Spain; and (2) that they found a Chinese communist military manual in one of the houses they
searched.
In order that the Department may judge for itself how much weight is to be placed on the Lister story, I quote
herewith the press interview of May 8 with Colonel Forero Gomex, which gave rise to the story.
"What is this story about Lister?"
"Lister, according to information which we have, but which is unconfirmed, fell in a shooting affray which took
place a week ago, some distance beyond Villarica. There are strong indications that he is the man, but as I
have told you already we have not been able to confirm this fully, because the corpse of the man who was
supposedly Lister was carried off by the bandits."
"But was this indeed Lister, the famous communist who organized guerrilla groups in Spain and in other
countries?"
"Our information indicates this, but it also may be that the man is a native Colombian who bears the same
name."
As for the military manual, the reporter describes it as consisting of 215 pages in very bad condition,
"undoubtedly" (the reporter's adverb) a text of Mao Tse Tung. It is not stated where the book was
published or when, but it seems to me that I read of the confiscation of such a book back in 1952, when
there was very little made of the fact.
I note that in the interview that our Ambassador had with President Rojas the latter stated that his present
campaign policy is to exert greater pressure upon the guerrillas to force them to give up the large number
of hostages in their possession including women and children. It seems to me that it is ridiculous to allege
that napalm is necessary for a campaign intended to be so humanitarian in nature.
The station feels situation in Villarica developed due to Army's ineptness in trying to govern the area
and its intransigent Conservative Party bias in a department where for many years the majority of the
inhabitants have been of Liberal Party affiliation.
A source reported 23 May (B-3) that the Secretary General of the PCC Gilberto Vieira, told him on 22
May that the inhabitants in disturbed section are not Communists but that the PCC has sent them
literature on autodefense tactics and Frente Democratico, and also sent from Bogotá several
Party members to assist the farmers against attacks by Army. ... He told this source confidentially
that as far as he knows no international Communists are on the scene and government claims this effect
are absurd.
Another source reported 15 May (B-3) that Chief Personnel Section of Army told him Army now believes
area being brought under control and present situation giving the government opportunity to eliminate
Liberals there accusing them of being Communists.
It is felt that order could be restored by Army if it put aside traditional party bias and provide equal justice
for all inhabitants. However irresponsible, unfounded charges of Communism and biased attacks on
Liberals has weakened whatever popular support the government might have had. Unbiased government
action does not appear forthcoming ...
Captain Valencia followed the government line (as enunciated by Colonel NAVAS Pardo and others)
to the effect that the guerrillas are Communist-led and organized. He stated that he was originally
skeptical of this until he conducted a group of junior officers to the Villarica area in the latter
part of May to give them practical experience in interrogation. His own experience convinced
him of the Communist nature of the movement. Captain Valencia had no new evidence to add,
however, and mentioned the various items of Communist propaganda found in the area which have
already been brought to the Embassy's attention.
Captain Valencia said that it is believed that there are a number of disgruntled Korean veterans with
the guerrillas, serving principally as military instructors.
[Alberto CENDALES and Col. Hernando FORERO Gomez] may be plotting with Major Alvaro VALENCIA Tovar
on the inside ... who is rumored to be working with both Rojistas and Communists and to have aspirations to
succeed Lleras as President.
On January 29 [1956] when ex-President Alberto Lleras Camargo, one of the present Government's most
active oppontents, entered the Bogotá bull-ring he was given a tremendous ovation by the
crowd present there. ... The following Sunday the Government took steps to prevent a recurrence
of the incident, and government supporters tried to stage a counter-demonstration at the bull-ring.
Rioting broke out, and the consensus of opinion was that national police, hired thugs and soldiers in
civilian clothes were responsible. As many as 20 persons may have been killed and as many as
100 injured.
In general, political violence in Colombia may be divided into three categories: (1) The fighting,
now largely quiescent, carried on between organized guerrilla bands and Army and Police units;
(2) Depredations of the "pájaro" gunmen, partisans of Rojas armed under his regime or
previously by the Army; and (3) Outright banditry carried on under the pretense of political
motivation but actually dedicated to theft and murder for gain. The three types are of course
not always completely distinguishable.
During the 1949-53 period, when Liberal guerrilla bands held sway in many
parts of the country, various countermeasures were taken by the Conservative authorities and by
the Army. Among these was a hiring, and organizing into bands, of professional killers who were
used in a campaign of counter-terror, particularly through the assassination of important Liberals.
These bands became particularly active in the Department of Valle del Cauca where General Rojas,
as Commander of the Third Brigade during 1948-49, lent them support, and, many believe, financial
assistance. The Army G-2 at about this time began the practice of hiring assassins ... and using
them against political opponents. In 1951 the Conservative government undertook the organization
of the so-called "guerrilleros de paz" (peace guerrillas), Conservative campesinos armed by the
authorities to combat the Liberal guerrilla bands. It is believed that some elements of these groups
have gravitated to "pajaro" activity.
It is generally agreed that the gravity of the "pájaro" menace results largely from the
apparent impunity with which they carry out their depredations.
Since the death in June of the "Jefe Supremo", Guadelupe Salcedo, there has apparently been
considerable jockeying among those who hoped to succeed to their dead chief's position and
the situation threatened to get out of hand. CAS [CIA Covert Action Staff] has a report that the
"Congress" was attended by two local lawyers, Santiago PEŅA Rosa (sp?) (who was also director
of the party-line magazine Horizontes) and Hernando GARAVITO Muņoz, well-known for
their Communist sympathies, who hoped to install the Communist guerrilla leader Juan de la Cruz
VARELA in Salcedo's place. However, they were balked by Dumar ALJURE, chief of what is said
to be Colombia's largest existing organized band, who dominated the meeting. Aljure, an
anti-Communist, allowed Garavito, Peņa and Varela no voice in the proceedings and insisted on
the election of Lozano y Lozano.
Guerrilla Congress, October 2, 1957, hard to read document
The FLP has been in contact with a guerrilla group which calls itself the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) which is headed by Dumar ALJURE, a guerrilla leader
with an unsavory reputation, who has been active in the Llanos. The FARC has declared
"war" on the oligarchs, the SIC, and the two traditional political parties. Approximately February
10 Efrain TOVAR Medina, an assistant to ALJURE, met with FLP leaders in Bogotá and
apparently the two groups agreed to assist each other. The FLP hopes to use the organization
of FARC which asserts it has contacts with campesino groups in the Departments of Cundinamarca,
Tolima, Cauca, Valle, Antioquia, and Santander to extend its organization to these sections and
thereby probably obtain some representatives to local offices in the March 16 elections. The FLP
will in return act as a political and legal advisor for the FARC. This association with ALJURE might
however cause the FLP considerable problems since both LOZANO and DE LA CRUZ are known
to be in opposition to him. As of the present date the strength and importance of the FARC are not
known and it is not believed to presently represent more than a maximum of 15% of the guerrilla
bands in Colombia.
CAS [CIA Covert Action Staff] here reported the formation of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia (FARC) a guerrilla organization with Communist ties which
includes some important bands such as those of "Capitan Franco" (Juan
de J. FRANCO Yepes) in the Magdelena Valley and Dumar ALJURE (the FARC
leader) in the Llanos. It is obvious that the Communists hope to gain
control of the organized guerrilla movement and have penetrated some
units. However, CAS does not believe that their influence is predominant
throughout the eastern Tolima-Huila area (as it certainly is with the Juan de
la Cruz Varela organization in Sumapaz), though there are undoubtedly
Communist elements present in the region.
Troops of the VII Brigade, in an encounter at Puerto Limon, Meta, killed 14 members of the old bandit gang of
Dumar Aljure, which just recently became active again after a long period of quiescence. Aljure himself was
one of those killed. ... Although there is no indicaton that Aljure's gang was in contact with any of the Communist
guerrilla groups, he had according to the reports established an "autonomous" region and was defying government
security forces.
Colombians state they are unable conclude an agreement which would permit utilization for different
purposes of funds appropriated by Colombian Congress for one specific purpose.
It seems evident however that Pres. Urdaneta insistent removal every doubt re COL
ability utilize military aid units maintain order within country or repel aggression its
neighbors.
View present political tension (EMBTEL 522 MArch 27) possible GOVT may fear increased
Army strength and therefore willing break off Treaty negotiations while placing onus US GOVT
in order avoid further antagonizing Army elements but EMB not convinced this is true.
US Congress in Sec. 401 of Mutual Security Act provided Pres with authority to furnish Mil Asst to
Colombia for a single specific purpose and US accordingly cannot agree to change in description
Colom Mission which broadens purposes stated in law.
US concern is that Colom accept stated mission and that when occasion arises for performance
of mission, as envisaged in Para 3 of Mil Plan, equipped Colom units are available to perform mission.
Our refusal agree alteration of plan based equally strongly on additional related consideration
that Colom revision of "mission" might appear associate US with Colom in mission involving joint
maintenance Colom security.
1. The bilateral agreement states that Colombia will not, without the prior agreement of the U.S., devote
MDAP or reimbursable assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished. Defense
believes that the primary purpose of furnishing assistance is to provide assistance for the performance
of collective hemisphere defense missions, but that our assistance has a secondary purpose, namely,
the maintenance of Colombia's internal security, if the need should arise. In support of this position,
Defense points to the secret bilateral plan with Colombia, in which Colombia is assigned the task of
discharging responsibilities assigned to Colombia in the Inter-American Defense Board general military
plan for the defense of the hemisphere. One of the responsibilities assigned to Colombia in the general
plan is the maintenance of its own security. ...
3. With regard to the Colombian request to our Air Mission chief that he provide assistance in preparing
napalm, Defense indicates that standing Defense instructions preclude Air Mission personnel becoming
directly involved in hostile activities. However, Defense considers that the provision of the type of
technical assistance requested by Colombia would not constitute direct involvement.
Following the UN and OAS Resolutions on collective measures, the United States proposed and offered
to sign bilateral military assistance agreements with a number of Latin American governments, and to
provide grant military assistance thereto. Such a bilateral agrement was entered into with Colombia on
April 17, 1952. The secret United States - Colombian military plans call for United States assistance for
one anti-aircraft battalion, one infantry battalion, one fighter squadron, one squadron of light bombers and
a naval modernization program.
"With respect to equipment and materials furnished under terms requiring reimbursement, the
utilization thereof for purposes different from those mentioned in this paragraph will require the
prior agreement of both Governments."
This has been interpreted as restricting the use for internal security purposes of equipment and
of troops provided therewith where such equipment was designed primarily for hemispheric
defense.
It is ironic that this particular sentence was inserted in the Military Assistance Agreement at the
request of Colombia. So far as the Embassy knows, it appears in no other Military Assistance
Agreement signed with any of the other American Republics. The reason for its insertion was said
to have been that the Colombian Armed Forces, then subject to the Laureano GOMEZ - Roberto
Urdaneta Conservative Government, were desirous of placing a check upon the Government's use
of equipment, which check is seemingly now to their present disadvantage.
[President Alberto Lleras Camargo] said that guerrilla forces were recently becoming more difficult to suppress, and
that he had definite knowledge that in many sections of the country, these units were being infiltrated
by Communist party members. He went to some length to explain how the Communist Party was successful
in defeating a well-equipped Army in Cuba, and that he was somewhat worried that such might also be the
case with other Latin American countries in the future.
The suppression of guerrilla activities in Colombia has been in the past, as it is now, a very serious and
difficult problem for the government. According to Colombian military sources, there is increasing evidence
that much of the bandit activity is led by and participated in by Communists.
President Lleras has made a strong plea to our Ambassador in Bogota for the granting of four helicopters
which he considers vital to Colombian plans for suppression of Communist-infiltrated bandit groups.
I believe, therefore, that we should develop a program of positive assistance with the Colombian Government,
short of providing grant military assistance at this time, which program, pending further study, could include the
following:
b) An offer to send to Colombia a team of experts on guerrilla warfare problems, to survey the situation and make
recommendations to President Lleras with respect to an overall program to eliminate the problem. Such a team,
comprised of experts from CIA and the military would also serve to fill in our own knowledge of the nature and
scope of the problem, particularly the Communist aspect, which information might later justify a change in the
present recommendation against providing grant military assistance.
c) An offer to assign to our military mission in Colombia, two or three additional officers with proper qualifications
to give anti-guerrilla Ranger-type training, on the spot and with cooperation of Canal Zone and continental U.S.
schools as required. The Special Forces School at Ft. Bragg, N.C., might not only be a source of suitable officers,
but might interest itself in the Colombian case as a model for the development of their special type of operations.
The United States should seek to encourage President Lleras in his desire to liquidate the guerrilla problem. ...
Since 1948, some 250,000 people have been killed and 1,500,000 displaced in Colombia by guerrilla warfare
which started as part of the traditional conflict between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Since politically
motivated guerrilla activities ended a situation has developed characterized more by lawlessness, murder
and banditry than politically-motivated guerrilla warfare. Five of Colombia's richest provinces are affected.
Although the remaining guerrilla bands cannot be said as a whole to be Communist-controlled, the Communists
do have a few guerrilla bands of their own and have infiltrated others, while the general situation is dangerously
exploitable by the Communists should they decide to revert to tactics of violence.
During the conversation at Camp David, President Lleras made the remark that our mission was not training
the Colombian Army in what they really needed. This was not said in a complaining voice but in fact he stressed
that they were getting what the Colombian Army Generals thought they needed. He stated that there was little
prospect of war between the Latin American States or of any deployment of the Colombian Army overseas. He
said that what they should be ready for is guerrilla-type warfare since he believed that if the President and Mr.
Khrushchev are able to maintain peace, the Communists will use third parties to stir up trouble, including
guerrilla activity in all the weak areas of the world.
President Lleras also remarked that it would be very difficult for him to persuade the very powerful Army group
in his country to do anything but emulate the American Army, but that he had hopes that if, as President
Alessandri of Chile had suggested, the Latin American nations have a disarmament conference, then at this
time not only the Colombian Army but perhaps others can be convinced that what they need is anti-guerrilla
forces.
During the conversations at Camp David, President Lleras made the remark that the Colombian army is stressing the
wrong type of tactics in their training. By this, of course, he meant that they are putting undue emphasis on conventional
tactics rather than anti-guerrilla warfare. ... The President agreed with President Lleras that the stress of military activity
in South America should be placed in anti-guerrilla operations, but he pointed out that our missions should not attempt to
influence basic governmental policy, but rather should teach what the Colombians want.
This is to serve as a followup to our telephone conversation several days ago in which I told you of a conversation
of the President with President Lleras of Colombia. President Lleras stated the need for more anti-guerrilla training
in the Colombian army.
After the meeting, the President directed that you be requested to furnish a report as to what kind of army Colombia
needs, to include such matters as equipment, training, organization, force levels, and budget.
By separate memorandum, a copy of which is enclosed, I have notified Secretary Dillon of the State Department that
the President has requested you to do this.
Attached for your files are the signed original and yellow copy of Presidential Determination
No. 61-14 regarding use of funds available for furnishing of military assistance to Colombia.
I understand the above report regarding the situation in Colombia calls for the use of some of our people to help
and assist the government in controlling violence and Communist activities.
I would appreciate knowing if the recommendations of our study group have been put into effect and the present
status of the recommendations.
In June 1959 President Lleras formally requested U.S. equipment under the MAP program for the purpose of
combatting and reducing guerrilla and bandit activities in the interior of Colombia. President Lleras did this
in the full realization that compliance with his request would necessitate an exception to current restrictions
on the use of MAP assistance for internal security purposes. In response to his request, a team of guerrilla
warfare experts was dispatched to Colombia to make an on-the-spot survey of the violence situation. This
team concluded its field survey in December 1959 and submitted its report in June 1960. This report was an
exhaustive undertaking and filled 3 large volumes and recommended rather grandiose proposals, including
the establishment of a covert network of advisers and engagement in broad fields of internal activities.
... At the Department of State's request, on January 5, 1961, the President made the required Determination
permitting the furnishing of this assistance for internal security purposes without regard to Western
Hemisphere defense missions. Our two Governments exchanged notes for the enabling Agreement on April 3,
1961 and the program is now in the process of implementation.
It is my painful duty to report, despite personal belief to contrary, that ex-president Alberto Lleras
Camargo, one of Latin America's most distinguished statesmen and a potent journalist, made it
plain at lunch yesterday that he believes that House resolution in favor of unilateral intervention
was inspired by White House in response to Senator Fulbright's criticism of DR operation.
OBLIGACIONES Y DERECHOS DE COLOMBIA
a) MILITARES.
Colombia se compromete a utilizar las armas suministradas por los Estados Unidos solo en
misiones especiales y que sean juzgadas convenientes para la defensa del hemisferio y del
mundo libre, por planes estratégicos.
Colombia se obliga a no usar las armas suministradas por los Estados Unidos para defender
su seguridad interna o para defenderse contra la agresión de un pais vecino, sin previa
anuencia de los Estados Unidos.
Colombia se obliga a devolver a Estados Unidos las armas que esta Nación le suministre,
cuando haya desaparecido su necesidad.
Colombia se obliga a participar en misiones militares conjuntas con los Estados Unidos.
Colombia se obliga a permitir que oficiales norteamericanos obrando bajo la supervisión y
control directo del Departamento de Defensa de los Estados Unidos, observen el uso de las armas
suministradas a titulo de préstamo.
El Tratado Secreto Militar con los EE. UU., La Gaceta, November 19, 1959
El profesor Gerardo Molina, ex-director de la Universidad Nacional y de la Universidad Libre, nos
expresó: "Me parece sumamente grave porque afecta la soberanía nacional. En
los momentos en que la guerra fría disminuye, aquí se agudiza en la forma de una
persecución contra las corrientes democráticas valiéndose de la
colaboración de la policia norteamericana".
Silenciosamente, como corresponde a un agente secreto, el coronel Hans Tofte, danés de
nacionalidad pero en misión especial entre los americanos, entró en su
automóvil y se dirigió hacia el Hotel Tequendama.
URDANETA called on the Ambassador unannounced in connection with the La Gaceta
headlined story of an alleged secret military pact between Colombia and the United States and
the presence of an alleged FBI mission -- both of which were echoed in La Calle and the
Communist news organ Voz de la Democracia. The La Gaceta article accused Urdaneta
of signing the said "secret" military pact and carried a contemporary picture of him with Rojas
PINILLA and Pabón NUÑEZ (then Minister of Government).
In a further conversation November 24 with Col. Parker and Mr. Hans Tofte of the US team, General
Rueda stated that the Minister of War had held a conference with a reporter from the "international
press" (the General could not identify the newsman) and had stated that the team was not an FBI
mission but was here in regard to technical matters pertaining to the MDA Agreement.
None of the articles featured in La Calle or La Voz de la Democracia was repeated in the
responsible press, and hence no repetitive circulation was given to these stories. These papers themselves
did not return to the attack the following week. Considering these facts together with the small circulation
of the weeklies in question and the sensationalist reputation which is usually attached to them by the
reading public, the Embassy believes that the President's decision was a good one. To have issued an
official statement would have only forced the responsible press to take cognizance of the charges.
The November 19 issue of the leftist Liberal weekly paper La Gaceta features an article charging
that a secret military pact exists between the United States and Colombia. The article states that the
agreement signed in 1952 by President Roberto URDANETA was never submitted to Congress for
ratification and contains secret provisions. The article also relates this alleged secret treaty to the
paper's previous story concerning an FBI mission in Colombia, stating that the latter is a direct result of
the secret treaty.
This story, highlighted "Urdaneta Confirms the Existence of an Arms Agreement with the US," states
that the letter from the former President confirmed the existence of an agreement that violates Colombia's
sovereignty. It charges that the procedure of exchanging notes was illegal, and that the agreement by
Representative Alvaro GARCIA Herrera last year when he charged that it violated Colombia's sovereignty,
and called upon Congress to ask the Government to submit the agreement to it for ratification.
It is said that agents within this special intelligence unit are unknown to each other and that very few of
the high Colombian officials know the existence of the organization. ... It is said that in addition to being
under the direct supervision of the Colombian Army Chief of Staff, this intelligence unit is also subject to
the personal interest of the President of Colombia.
Several members of the Colombian Intelligence Service have been identified. One of them is Hernando
Reyes Posada ... It is known that during the abortive revolutionary movement of March, 1945, Hernando
Reyes Posada was able to penetrate the ranks of the conspirators and served as a double agent for the
Colombian Army Chief of Staff Intelligence Unit. It was through the information secured by Reyes Posada
that the Colombian Government was able to successfully combat the revolution.
Dr. Chaves said the Colombian Government would like to contract the services of three U.S. experts
who would go to Colombia and set up the machinery for an intelligence service there. ... He said Colombia
would be glad to contract these men either as private individuals or as representatives of a U.S.
government agency, and Colombia would pay their salaries. He asked whether it would be improper to
go direct to Mr. Allan Dulles or Mr. J. Edgar Hoover with this request, and was told it would be advisable
to keep it within Department channels.
The new Intelligence Service is essentially designed to make the Rojas Regime more secure. Placing
it directly under the Presidency presumably eliminates the possibility of its serving the personal
ambitions of subordinates; combining the two existing groups ought to make for efficiency, and the
importation of modern (FBI) methods tends toward this same end.
Last year the Colombian Government engaged the services of Mr. Hobart Spalding, a former officer
of the Department, to go to Colombia and make a survey ultimately intended to lead to the setting up
of a National Intelligence Service modeled along the lines of our CIA. The local Embassy complained
that he did not submit any report on the results of his work in Colombia, and also asked that OSA
endeavor to learn if he furnished any report to the CIA. It is understood that the Embassy later was
furnished a copy of Mr. Spalding's report, but is still not satisfied as to the amount of assistance it
has received from us.
It has not been considered sound policy for the U.S. Government to loan the services of experts to
help organize intelligence systems. The Governments wishing such help are naturally interested in
methods of ferreting out information concerning activities of opposition politicians...
However, it is currently planned in CIA to make arrangements for training a certain
number of chosen individuals from Colombia in intelligence and security methods in this country,
and perhaps to send one or more technicians to Colombia in an advisory capacity to assist the
National Intelligence Service.
If this subject is raised, you can state that Mr. Spalding was hired by the Colombians in a purely
private capacity and his services were not made available on loan by the U.S. Government.
The Department's involvement in the whole matter was only the use of its good offices in
bringing Colombian Embassy officials in touch with the CIA to discuss the subject. Nevertheless,
we are trying to work out some arrangement with the CIA that will be mutually beneficial to
ourselves and Colombia.
It is difficult to distill the essence of this violent epoch in Colombian history, but
something of the unbridled hate and savagery should be set forth in this study, for the
wounds went too deep, were too basic, to be forgotten; they are still there, demanding
the healing of some government or another. They may break and reopen under social
friction at some unforeseen day in the future, and for this reason, they are important.
Capt. Alvaro Valencia Tovar and Lt. Gen. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla visit
the Tokyo Army Hospital during the Korean war, October 2, 1951.
President Lleras' appeal for aid in suppressing Colombian guerrilla warfare
activities, July 21, 1959
