To augment the Intelligence/Counterinsurgency capability, 3 GIL's (Intelligence Hunter/Killer Teams) were trained for use in the Marquetalia and Santander areas, 3 more are being trained for operations in the VI Brigade area, namely the communist influenced areas as El Pato, Gualuro, and Marquetalia. These teams of 25 officers, NCO's and civilians, are hard hitting, heavily armed, entities composed of selected veterans. They operate as a unit or divided into three segments, and use any disguise or strategem to obtain their objective; they are trained to remain in the field for weeks and even months if required. They are capable not only of fighting, but of penetrating inimicable groups and working with informants. Colombia, US Assistance, USARMIS Intelligence Effort in Colombia (1961-1965), circa 1965
OPERATION "ABLE" (FORCE X): Objectives. Infiltrate enemy ranks and organization; Gain Order of Battle, "modus operandi", intelligence, penetrate security systems, disrupt supply lines, etc.; Create damage, dissension and demoralization in enemy ranks. Execution. Selection, training and preparation of selected personnel to adopt enemy dress, speech, manners, customs, etc. is the first step. Once this is accomplished, posing as "friendly", (i.e. anti- government), this undercover force can effect link-up with other enemy forces. Cover story for the contact will be that it is "liaison and contact" purposes, etc.; Intelligence is acquired during the "fraternization" phase,including the identities of sympathizers and government officials collaborating with the enemy; Combat is ordered when intelligence desired has already been acquired, or upon discovery of true identity of the undercover force. Advantages. Enemy intelligence is infiltrated. Modas operandi is disclosed and exploited. Enemy security and alarm systems disrupted; Identities of sympathizers or local officials actively aiding the enemy are discovered. Supply and intelligence systems are discovered. Supply and intelligence systems based on villagers are also disrupted; Creates dissension, mutual distrust in enemy ranks, which may result in fights, often in actual combat between different units of the enemy forces. Secret 1960 Survey Team Report, Recommendations for Colombian Action, Appendix I - Lanceros, Annex C, Anti-Guerrilla Methods & Techniques Applicable in Colombia, in The U.S. and its Responsibility for Counter-Insurgency Operations in Colombia, Michael Lopez, Colombia Bulletin, Summer 1998
Intelligence School Courses, 1963-1965
Military Training Teams, 1961-1965
Intelligence Training, Organization and Planning, 1961-1965
9th Psychological Warfare Company -- Program of Instruction
Lancero School -- Hunter Killer Program of Instruction
Interagency Defector Committee Operating Procedure 58/1
Continuance of Violence Problem, June 2, 1959
Governmental Measures to Combat Violence, June 24, 1959
Sumapaz Delegation Request for assistance to Counter Communist Activities, July 17, 1959
Colombian Delegates to the "26th of July" Celebreations in Cuba, July 29, 1960
Anti-U.S. Demonstrations, November 19, 1959
Operations Plan for Colombia, December 1, 1959
Pacification Campaign in Tolima, January 13, 1960
Are at present in Santa Rita 100 very well-armed men under control Mr. Bayer. Additional 100 supporters available but not armed. Described despatch to Santa Rita of small marine force, leaving of small 17-man detachment there, capture and disarming of these by guerrillas, and final rescue this detachment. He characterized this as bad operation. Fonmin said that had originally been throught guerrilla group was Castro motivated, but stated flatly that no evidence existed of Castro connection or Cuban presence. Movement appears instead to be indigenous communist movement probably directed from Bogota which has strategically sound plan develop movement from Llanos west. At present time however this group appears be isolated and no evidence coordination with other guerrilla groups. Fonmin said that government now in process of handling problem and had despatched troops to area. Region will be surrounded and since leaders known GOC expects be able eliminate this pocket. Confidential telegram from Ambassador Freeman, October 3, 1961
Violence Problem Increases, January 27, 1961
Increasing Banditry - Does it Threaten the Panama Canal?, February 17, 1961
Death of Leftist Agitator Antonio Larrota in Rural Violence
Area, May 17, 1961
The Colombian army has continued in recent months an intensified and considerably successful campaign
to eliminate leaders of the rural violence plaguing Colombia. The Army has seemed to accent the death, rather
than the often useless capture of violence leaders. By ensuring that the bandit is killed in the encounter with
soldiers, the possibility of his later escape, legal release, or bribery from jail is thereby removed.
...In conclusion, it must be said that whatever the long term effect these bandit deaths will have on the Colombian
violence situation, certainly these deaths have boosted the morale of the army, encouraging soldiers to new
effective anti-guerrilla action. Further, the Government has been able to show the local persecuted populace
of violence regions that although the guerrilla outlaws may operate for some time, the forces of public order are
able to catch up with them eventually.
Meetings of Pro-Communist Organization Movimiento Popular Revolucionario, September 21, 1961
Total 40 persons murdered by bandits North Valle January 21 in dramatic and bloody resurgence violence in that benighted area. Confidential Memorandum from Ambassador Freeman to Sec. of State, January 25, 1962
Reported Guerrilla Contacts with Colombian Korean War Veterans, Medellin Consulate, February 7, 1962
During the month of August, three significant episodes of violence occurred which are interesting because they
illustrate three different facets of the complex phenomenon known as the "violence problem"; 1) On August 15
bandits ambushed a bus near Saboyá in Boyacá killing 25 persons in an incident which has all the
earmarks of localized political motivation and the caudillo "war-lord" pattern. The reaction to this incident is also
suggestive of the local Liberal-Conservative rivalry that so complicates the violence situation. 2) On August 26,
bandits murdered 29 persons near Toro, Valle in an incident that seems to manifest criminal terrorism with
possible intimidation motives. 3) On August 27, an Army-police effort to capture a bandit leader resulted in a
skirmish near Guacarí, Valle which killed 12 persons and resulted in the capture of 56 other persons as
well as some subversive propaganda. The circumstances of this incident suggest that some relation existed
between leftist elements and the bandit leader in question.
Current Evaluation of Violence in the Department of Valle, April 19, 1963
In most serious violence attack in years cuadrilla believed led by "Desquite" cut road between
Marquetalia and Victoria, Caldas, Morning August 5, stopping cars and bus and killing over 40
passengers. Bandit leader reportedly justified massacre during harangue he delivered prior to
murders on grounds Valencia govt was "bad" and bandits would continue depredations until
govt changed.
In recent weeks, army has either killed or captured about 10 bandits associated with "Desquite"
who may have perpetrated August 5 atrocity 1) in reprisal; and 2) to warn "campesinos" they
should not cooperate in govt anti-violence campaign. 
Public Safety (Measures for Terrorist Control), September 11, 1963
According army communiques Battalion Colombia units killed important communist
guerrilla leader Roberto Gonzalez alias Pedro Brincos near Lerida, Tolima, and in another
action destroyed Castoist type guerrilla band near Puerto Boyaca, Boyaca, on September
16. Brincos active as guerrilla antioquia, Caldas, Tolima since 1950. Principal guerrilla-bandit
communist idealogue in region.
Confidential Telegram from Ambassador Freeman to Secretary of State, September 17, 1963
Interdepartmental review Colombian IDP Progress Report shows many similarities emerging terrorism to recent
Venezuelan situation. ... Major problem in Venezuela was convincing Betancourt necessity moving forcefully to
improve coordination, revise criminal procedures, take initiative against terrorists.
... exaggerated publicity terrorist activities serves purposes of terrorists. News coverage should focus on criminal
aspect and should include campaign to convince populace to cooperate with police. Press should also be induced to
emphasize role police as protector of public.
... terrorism should not be underrated. Its success as tactic to undermine government not directly related to amount of
physical destruction incurred, but rather to ability demonstrate defiance government with impunity.
28 peasants killed three kidnapped Friday September 20 municipial jurisdiction Santa Isabel, Department of Tolima. Massacre perpetrated by reported 30 bandits. Rumors reported by press that Sangrenegra, Desquite, Tarzan collaborated in assault. Troops from three battalions now in area. Telegram from Ambassador Freeman to Secretary of State, September 23, 1963
Hernando Garavito Munoz, prominent Communist lawyer and counsel for many extremists
including Castroist guerrilla leader Tulio Bayer, shot five times by unknown assailant early
evening October 15 in downtown Bogota. Latest medical reports indicate that he may survive.
Garavito accompanied at time by Cesar Gonzalez, departmental assembly alternate of
Sumapaz Communist leader Juan de la Cruz Varela, and some speculation that bullets meant for
latter as part of continuing Liberal-Communist feuding in Sumapaz.
Confidential Telegram from Bogota Embassy to Secretary of State, October 17, 1963
In Tolima, most of the violence news was created by the activities of José William ARANGUREN
(alias DESQUITE), Jacinto CRUZ Usma (alias SANGRENEGRA) and Noel Lombana (alias TARZAN), all of
whom were operating in the northern part of the department throughout the year. ... While a host of their
bandit chieftans fell in 1963, and while their own gangs were decimated to a great extent by military pressure,
these three and a number of their followers were very much at large at the end of the year.
... On the same day that the Armed Forces were battling the guerrillas in Boyacá, the Army in Tolima
killed the Communist bandit ideologue Roberto GONZALEZ Prieto (alias PEDRO BRINCOS). Emerging from
a middle-class background, Brincos had, since the early 1950's, led and formed guerrilla-bandit gangs and
distributed communist literature in three departments. ... Meanwhile, the subversive organizations MOEC
and FUAR which have had financial links with Cuba, were believed to have been giving some assistance
to bandit cuadrillas such as those of Telmo Abilio FERNANDEZ (alias TIJERAS) in northern Cauca,
Desquite, and to the remnants of the Chispas' gang in Caldas.
