CIA Survey Teams
A US Colombia Survey Team arrived in 1959 to conduct a comprehensive study of Colombian internal conditions. The team's conclusions and recommendations were published in early 1960. The conclusions stated that the violence problem was one of criminality and that active violence could be eliminated in a year with potential violence being a long-term commitment; that the Army was non-political and had great potential; the National Police were politically prone but could become a capable force; that there was a definite intelligence requirement; and that finally there was a fertile field for psychological warfare and public information programs. Prior to 1960 the Mutual Security Act of 1954 did not permit use of Grant Aid equipment in the violence problem. MAP was reoriented in 1961 toward the violence problem and all Army MAP planning was directed towards this effort. The US Overseas Internal Defense Policy was published in 1962. This document provided responsible executive agencies of the US Government with policy guidance for the employment of US resources to prevent or defeat subversive insurgency and assist in the development of balanced capabilities for total defense of free world societies against the threat of internal attack. From this document evolved the Internal Defense Plan (Colombia) which was published in 1962. The Mission contributed the military portion to the overall plan based on courses of action from the Colombian Army counterinsurgency Plan "LAZO". The Colombian Army with the aid of a USA Counterinsurgency MTT prepared, published, and implemented its counterinsurgency plan, Plan "LAZO", in 1962.
Colombia, US Assistance, Planning and Objectives, circa 1965Further information regarding outstanding para-military line-up of highly qualified members proposed survey team should be of interest to [the US Ambassador to Colombia] and appropriate Colombian government officials as follows.
Hans V. Tofte: Team leader. Excellent service records WWII and Korean War, former British commando officer later US Army specialist guerrilla warfare in Orient, Middle East and Europe, accomplished linguist with some Latin American knowledge, naturalized citizen with interesting background international business, world travel, US private enterprise;
Col. Berkeley Lewis: Retired US Army Ordnance Colonel after thirty years service, professional engineer with fluent Spanish including technical language qualifications and extensive area knowledge, former military attache Argentina, specialist small arms and unotrhodox weapons, exceptionally compatible with Latin Americans all levels;
Lt. Col. Joseph J. Koontz: experienced staff officer with fine combat record, formerly served with MAAG Bogota 1952-56 consequently fluent Spanish and nominated for feam by Defense Department due local area knowledge and connections;
Major Charles T. R. Bohannan: (Defense Department nominee) professional Army officer with impressive behind-the-lines combat experience in Orient where fought alongside Philippine guerrillas during WWII and later participated actively in anti-guerrilla campaigns against communist Huks same area, fluent Spanish and specialist in supporting (indigenous) local unorthodox forces;
Col. Napoleon Valeriano: Philippine Army Colonel rated most successful officer in anti-guerrilla fighting, personal aide late President Magsaysay, former Chief Police Manila and Philippine constabulary, diplomatic background as Military Attache in Thailand, operated in Indo-China war, former Representative United Nations Security Council and nephew present Philippine Ambassador to Washington; fluent Spanish;
Bruce Walker: promising young special services officer, former USMC Lieutenant specializing air-ground support, Korea, fluent Spanish and Latin American area knowledge after tours duty Ecuador and Honduras.
Team for Colombia, Sept. 29, 1959Memorandum of converation with Hans Tofte and Charles Bohannan, November 17, 1959
It was reported in the meeting that Colonel Valeriano, the Filipino consultant with the Survey Team, was to return to Colombia on 22 Feb. to report for the U.S. Team to President Lleras Camargo.
A notable lack in the report is the absence of a plan or a substantial idea for a political basis of the actions to be suggested to the Colombians. Without such plan or idea, corrective acitons can only hope to be of a contingency nature. Surely the United States requires a sounder concept than emergency actions. During the expected two years remaining in the Presidency of Lleras Camarago, there is a real opportunity for the U.S. to undertake assistance to Colombia to correct the situation of political insurrection which reportedly has caused a quarter-million deaths and displaced over a million and a half people since 1948 in this area neighboring a place so vital to our own national security as the Canal Zone.
It is essential that the U.S. Survey Team focus Colombian attention on developing a set of Colombian political principles which can be used as a basis for rallying the Colombian people, with Lleras Camargo as the dynamic exponent of these principles.
To illustrate this point: is the Colombian Army to kill bandits for Lleras Camargo just because he is a nice guy? Are we to help Colombia supress this violence or help correct the causes of violence? Isn't there somthing which would make the Colombians, whether military or civilian, lift their heads to look towards a better future and take the first steps now towards it? Having the military act as friends of the population won't do this. Creating an elite military organization won't do this. Undertaking land settlement won't do this. Perhaps all of these would help the Colombians reach their objective, once this was spelled out clearly enough for them to make them willingly risk their lives to attain it.
In Recommendation No. 1., Annex I, the concept of the "Lanceros" as an elite, single force to combat guerrilas is set forth. It is believed that this needs further study. At least two on the Survey Team know from personal experience in the Philippines that there is merit to the concept of assigning small teams, with capabilities envisaged for the "Lanceros", to regular Army units. In further study, consideration should be given to sharpening the counter-guerrilla proficiency of all Colombian combat units; assigning small "Lancero" teams to these combat units might prove to be a preferable method.
Preliminary Report, Colombia Survey Team, Colonel Lansdale, February 23, 1960Secret Memorandum to Colonel Napoleon Valeriano, March 22, 1960
Country Statement of U.S. Objectives and Programs for Colombia, August 31, 1960
Country Statement of US Objectives and Programs for Colombia, October 4, 1960
... Ambassador McIntosh sets forth his views on the proposed program to combat the banditry and violence problem which has so long plagued Colombia. I quite agree that early action is incumbent upon us, and I shall attempt to insure that it is taken. As a matter of fact, the Colombia program -- while unusually meritorious -- should be only a first step in what he hope to develop as a comprehensive response to some of the problems newly facing us throughout Latin America. Letter from Thomas Mann, State Dept. to Bogota Embassy, October 6, 1960
It is suggested that there would be many advantages to be gained from promulgating and widely publicizing the thesis that probable Communist strategy in any land efforts against American states would be to support largely indigenous guerrilla or partisan forces.
This would provide a defensible and understandable basis for denying requests for "luxury" items such as tanks, or other heavy hardware so dear to indigenous military commanders. More important, from the standpoint of present problems, it would justify to Latin American leaders reorienting US advice and assistance to their countries toward the development, training, and equipping of armed forces tailored for limited war and counter-guerrilla operations.
The implementation of this policy need not be announced; in fact, where there exists a situation of actual violence, as in Colombia, implementation might well be at least semi-covert.
Maintain this policy at a classification of SECRET.
Establish policy guidance that, insofar as possible, third country nationals be used to advise forces actively engaged in guerrilla (or bandit) suppression activities.
Establish the policy guidance that, insofar as possible, materiel supplied for use against present bandits, (and potential guerrillas) be other than of current US military pattern, have any US identification removed, and be supplied through other than regular US military aid channels.
"Civic Action" and "Attraction" Program: One military advisor, for one-and-a-half years, appears required. Advisor should be experienced in the planning and implementation of programs of this nature, and in securing from them maximum utility for intelligence production, and psychological warfare; and aware of their inherent political warfare possibilities and perils.
An advisor is needed in planning an appropriate national intelligence structure, delimiting the areas of responsibility of participating agencies and assisting in the organization of a national intelligence coordination office.
Should it be determined by the Colombian Government that it is desired to retain SIC interest in the intelligence field, the same individual may be the senior advisor to the SIC, and in any case should assist in planning the reduction of Communist infiltration in this organization.
Advisors not identified as US employees could, by terms of their "cover" arrangements with the Colombian Government, be placed under the general supervision of the chief of the appropriate US mission.
Colombia, US Assistance, Colombia Survey Team Recommendations for U.S. Action, early 1960It is the considered opinion of the survey team that a concerted country team effort should be made now to select civilian and military personnel for clandestine training in resistance operations in case they are needed later. This should be done with a view toward development of a civil and military structure for exploitation in the event the Colombian internal security system deteriorates further. This structure should be used to pressure toward reforms known to be needed, perform counter-agent and counter-propaganda functions and as necessary execute paramilitary, sabotage, and/or terrorist activities against known communist proponents. It should be backed by the United States.
Visit to Colombia, South America, by a Team from Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, February 26, 196233. (S) It is generally conclued that by itself the Communist Party in Colombia does not, at present, have the capability to overthrow the existing constitutional order. If, however, it should succeed in gaining control and direction over the ex-guerrilla and dissident bandit groups, then the possibility of a government overthrowal and a Communist directed takeover would exist. The Background to Potential Insurgency in Colombia, September 9, 1962
In May1962 ... Ambassador [Fulton] Freeman established the Country Team Task Force to consider recommendations for an antiviolence program. The recommendations of this task force were handcarried by the Ambassador to Washington in June, 1962, where they were presented to Special Group (CI). The Special Group shortly thereafter approved the recommendations as the Colombia Internal Defense Plan. In August, 1962, the recommendations and the implied offer of U.S. assistance to implement them were presented to President Valencia and the Minister of War. Upon their concurrence, the way was cleared for close cooperation between the United States Country Team and the Colombian Government on an antiviolence campaign. The Past as Prologue?: A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 1958-66, by Dennis M. Rempe, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2002
By direction of the President, General Maxwell D. Taylor is conducting a survey of counterinsurgency activities and capabilities of the USG both at home and abroad. ... Secret Telegram from State Department to Chief of Mission, October 22, 1962
Copyright Paul Wolf, 2002-2004
