Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent
Republics: US Counter-insurgency Efforts in
by Dennis M. Rempe
From "Small Wars and Insurgencies" Vol. 6, No. 3 (Winter 1995), pp. 304-327
Published by Frank Cass, London
This article analyses the role played by the United States between 1959 and 1965 in developing counter-guerrilla training, civic action programmes, intelligence structures, and communications networks in Colombia, and in aiding the Colombians to undertake offensive counter-insurgency and psychological warfare operations in order to destroy bandit-guerrilla organisations within that nation. By specifically examining the development and impact of US counter-insurgency policy on low-intensity conflict in Colombia, and by utilising previously untapped US military and intelligence records, this work addresses a gap in the historiography of the period. 1 Indeed, it establishes the unique role played by the United States in facilitating the development of all aspects of Colombia's internal security infrastructure in order to contain 'one of the world's most extensive and complex internal wars of this century. 2
Relations between the United States and Colombia in the field of national security began to expand as a result of World War II and Colombia's geostrategic proximity to the Panama Canal. This relationship intensified as the US and USSR engaged in cold war. While Colombian policy-makers supported Washington's global strategy, they were consumed for almost two decades after the war by the internal crisis which came to be known as La Violencia.
Political, socio-cultural, economic, and military factors all contributed to the emergence of violence in Colombia. These included a widening gap between rich and poor, polarised political loyalties between the two traditional parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, which had filtered down through all levels of society, and a political system inadequately prepared to adapt to changing expectations, the spread of new ideas, and the uneven impact of modernisation. Since this was largely a peasant conflict, land distribution was a critical issue which fuelled social, political, and economic differences. Political mobilisation of the population after World War II eroded the structure of a society already burdened by regional differences, elite control over the institutions of power, and a certain cultural acceptance of violence. The situation was further aggravated by both an inefficient and partisan police force and an ineffective and politicised military which competed with one another and were distrusted by the public. 3
In an atmosphere of ongoing rural violence and sustained political agitation, the murder of populist Liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan on 9 April 1948 produced the Bogotazo: two days of riotous violence, mob control of the streets of Bogota, and some 1,400 people killed. 4 Although the Bogotazo was ultimately contained in the capital, it sparked a cycle of Liberal-Conservative guerrilla and counter-guerrilla actions influenced, in some instances, by communist elements. It was within the context of this violence - civil war followed by military dictatorship - that the US-Colombian national security relationship developed. The larger issues of hemisphere defence, development of conventional armed forces, the Korean War, trade and investment, military assistance, the persecution of Protestants, and the search for internal political stability dominated relations between the two countries until well into the second term of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. However, as US policy shifted towards internal defence after the Cuban Revolution of 1959, Liberal Alberto Lleras Camargo, first President of the newly-formed bipartisan National Front government, welcomed this new policy initiative and sought to implement it rapidly in Colombia. In September 1959 Eisenhower authorised the State Department to determine whether the Colombian government would receive a team of US counter-guerrilla experts to survey the situation and recommend courses of action. 5 This initiative 'was the first major effort of the US to influence the internal security problems of Colombia' .6
Special Survey Team in Colombia
A US Special Survey Team arrived in October 1959 to investigate Colombia's internal security conditions. 7 The team consisted of counterinsurgency experts with experience in the Philippines, Vietnam, Korea and other parts of Asia, as well as Latin America. Its report on the Colombian situation concluded that the new National Front administration of Alberto Lleras Camargo needed to focus on restoring honesty and efficiency in government and uniformed authority. Public confidence in the institutions of the state had been completely lost, and moral values had been 'outraged and even warped' as a result of the years of violence. Only Lleras Camargo commanded enough respect, the survey team believed, to re-establish law and order and make people believe that government was capable of working for the national interest. 8 Recognising the primarily criminal, rather than subversive, nature of Colombia's violence, the survey team suggested that both banditry and guerrilla warfare could be substantially reduced within a year by employing a special Lancero (Ranger) unit as a mobile counterguerrilla force. In the long term, the organisation and doctrine of Colombia's US developed conventional armed forces would have to change. Emphasis needed to be placed on developing a domestic military intelligence service and implementing psychological warfare, public information, and civic action programmes. In order to shield the interests of both Colombian and US authorities against 'interventionist' charges any special aid given for internal security was to be sterile and covert in nature. 9
For the Colombian armed forces, establishing the use of combined arms in counter-guerrilla operations would be a vital component in the successful prosecution of anti-violence measures. Formation of a joint staff, improved training methods, and personnel selection, as well as logistical reform, had to be undertaken. The Army, the survey team concluded, was essentially non-political, but the National Police were politicised and needed rehabilitation in order to become effective. US officials, conversely, would be primarily tasked with providing aid and advice, especially regarding the use of ranger troops and the establishment of effective military intelligence, psychological warfare, and civic action units. An expanded US Mission was needed to develop a national intelligence structure, and to re-orient the armed forces toward unconventional warfare rather than the conventional capabilities that the Americans had previously stressed. As well, economic and military assistance programmes had to be co-ordinated between the various US and Colombian agencies involved. 10
A variety of military and civilian advisers were needed with experience in political and psychological warfare, intelligence, human relations, and special operations in order to implement the new programmes and for long-term training, mobile teams, and community self-help groups. Others would work with the National Police while Colombian police observers would be sent to Canadian, Mexican, and Philippine constabularies for training assistance since immediate action on police issues was fundamental to the effective development of counter-violence measures. 11
Owing to the sensitive nature of Colombian internal security missions, the survey team further advised the use of third country nationals, covertly under US control, but apparently contracted by the host government. Military and civilian personnel used in this manner brought skills and experience acquired in their own country which might be difficult to find in the United States. Moreover, obviously non-US advisers had low 'interventionist propaganda-exploitation' value if discovered. However, policy guidance would be required from US officials regarding the use of third country nationals as field advisors to forces actively engaged in guerrilla-bandit suppression activities. 'Cover' arrangements for those not openly identified as US employees needed to be made, and they were to be placed under general supervision of the chief of the appropriate mission and a special officer for internal security matters. Finally, use of other than current US-military pattern material was also recommended: identification was to be removed and supply to be undertaken through other than regular US military aid channels. 12
In April 1960, one month after receiving the survey team's (edited) report, Lleras began to put into effect some of its recommendations. A broad policy of agrarian reform was undertaken in an attempt to provide land to peasants and to develop Colombia's agricultural sector. Long-range civic action programmes such as better roads, medical aid, and schools for rural areas were proposed. By 1961 the Colombian Institute of Land Reform (INCORA) began to operate, promoting rural cooperatives and irrigation projects to improve land use. 13 On an official visit to Washington that same April, however, Lleras commented to Eisenhower that the Colombian Army continued to receive US Mission training in conventional warfare. Diplomatically, he declared that the fault lay with Colombia's generals, who emulated the American army rather than preparing for guerrilla-type warfare. Eisenhower agreed that more emphasis needed to be placed on anti-guerrilla training, but also stressed that US Mission officials were bound by both the Morse Amendment and the policy directives of the Colombian government. 14 The special survey team report, however, was quite specific in regard to the origins of the actual problem.
Taking into consideration the existing, substantial guerrilla potential and the contemporary history of Colombia, which includes heavy fighting against Communist guerrillas, present disregard of counter- guerrilla and unconventional warfare can only be attributed to traditionalism and the emphasis placed on US conventional warfare orientation and doctrine. 15
Immediately after the Lleras visit, the Defense Department, on Eisenhower's directive, began a comprehensive study of the Colombian Army's requirements to combat guerrilla warfare. In fact, the department reviewed the need for expanded counter-guerrilla training on a worldwide basis as part of the greater emphasis towards the new Overseas Internal Security Programs initiative. 16 Colombia would be one of the nations in the forefront of this new policy development.
Inception of the bipartisan National Front system in Colombia brought both co-operation between the two warring political parties and restoration of the Army's 'nonpolitical' image. Since the new system was based on an interparty consensus, those bandit and guerrilla groups which continued to operate after the October 1958 amnesty declaration became, by definition, either dangerous to public order or subversive. Consequently, the Army targeted these groups without the same political risk it had confronted before the National Front period. 17 Following the advice of both the Lleras government and the US survey team, American military assistance was reoriented in 1961 towards the violence problem. Earlier plans to develop a special counter-guerrilla team deployed from helicopters were rejuvenated. A 'special impact shipment' of approximately $1.5 million worth of military hardware was received by the Colombian armed forces in late 1961 and early 1962 to enable them to undertake Orden Publico (Public Order) missions. Three H-43B (medium) helicopters, as well as a variety of vehicles, communication equipment, and small arms were delivered in an effort to equip and mobilise the specialised ranger type unit, which would become a prototype for other units involved in the campaign against rural violence and uncontrolled banditry in the countryside. 18 It was also the first tangible effort by the US government to assist Colombian military forces in their struggle against internal violence, and led to a vastly expanded internal security effort under MAP support. By October 1962 the first operational Orden Publico mission was flown jointly by a Colombian pilot and a US Air Force instructor. 19
Another substantial change occurred in 1960 with the nomination of Brigadier General (promoted to Major General) Alberto Ruiz Novoa to Commanding General of the Colombian Army. Ruiz advocated that the armed forces be used 'as agents to mend the national social fabric and to develop the social infrastructure'. Destroying guerrillas was not enough; the Army also had to 'attack the social and economic causes as well as the historic political reasons for their existence'. 20 These strong views later brought Ruiz to the position of Minister of War in August 1962, but his frequent political attacks against the second National Front government of Conservative Guillermo Leon Valencia eventually led to his forced resignation early in 1965. Interest in developing an effective military intelligence programme also increased. As more Colombian officers recognised the need for intelligence in maintaining public order, they supported the US idea of establishing a broad intelligence course for Latin American military personnel in Panama. Beginning in 1960, the Colombian Army filled its quota in each class in an effort to expand its programme, although there was some difficulty in assigning personnel to duties on their return due to the lack of a proper intelligence infrastructure. 21 Attempts to alleviate this problem were made between February and August 1961, when the first intelligence Military Training Team (MTT) was sent to Colombia. Though not completely successful, it did establish a base from which follow-up MTTs were able to develop a nascent military intelligence structure. 22 In the same period operational planning began for a psychological warfare MTT to be sent to Colombia, and course spaces were made available for officers both at the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the Canal Zone in psychological operations and counter-resistance training. 23 In 1961 the Departamente Administrativo de Seguridad (Administrative Department of Security-DAS) was instituted in place of the deactivated Servicio de Inteligencia de Colombia (Colombian Intelligence Service-SIC). Performing both intelligence and counterintelligence functions, it co-ordinated counter-subversive actions amongst all security forces while the F-2 section of the National Police concentrated on anti-bandit (criminal) measures. Ostensibly, the agencies mandates were delineated by political versus criminal acts of violence, but the inter-related nature of violence within the Colombian context often made it difficult to differentiate between them. 24
The Yarborough Team
In February 1962 a US Army Special Warfare Center team headed by Brigadier General William P. Yarborough was dispatched to Colombia in a follow-up study to the 1959-60 survey team's overview of the internal security situation. Its primary objectives were to study the violence problem, evaluate the effectiveness of the Colombian counter-insurgency effort, and make recommendations which would allow the effective deployment of a US counter-insurgency MTT. 25 During a 12-day mission the team toured areas encompassing four of Colombia's eight brigades (see Map 1]. In its final evaluation, the Yarborough team concluded that lack of central planning and co-ordination was seriously effecting all levels of the counter-insurgency effort. Fragmentation of resources, lack of essential communications, transportation, and equipment, reliance on static outposts, and improper use of military personnel in civil capacities placed the Army on the defensive and allowed both subversive and bandit elements to acquire the initiative. Inadequate collation and dissemination of intelligence at both an army and national level further hampered the effort, as did the lack of counter-intelligence training. Civic action and psychological operations were sporadic, the relationship between the Army and National Police was not properly delineated, and broader social, political, and economic problems existed for which solutions appeared remote. 26
In general, the Yarborough team recommended that the US provide guidance and assistance in all aspects of counter-insurgency. MTTs for psychological warfare, civic action, air support, and intelligence were vital if proper anti-violence plans, requirements, and operations were to be established. As well, five Special Forces A-teams would be needed to work concurrently with the battalions of the four brigades which were most seriously engaged with guerrillas and bandits. As for the Colombians, the team concluded, corrective measures were needed if an effective counterinsurgency plan was to be undertaken. Collaboration between the DAS, National Police, and armed forces in the fields of intelligence and counterintelligence, co-ordination and standardisation of programmes structured to a national counter-insurgency plan, as well as improved transportation, equipment, and communication was needed. 27 At brigade level it was essential to garrison fixed outposts with state police in order to give the Army increased mobility; intensify anti-bandit propaganda; prioritise action areas; equip and maintain troops for rapid reaction and night operations; and conduct joint, inter-brigade operations. Armoured buses, filled with soldiers or police in civilian clothing were to be covertly introduced into the transportation system and operational zones isolated through curfews, civilian registration programmes, and other populace control measures. Finally, exhaustive interrogation of captured bandits and guerrillas using sodium pentathol and polygraph were to be undertaken in order to gather intelligence information on hostile groups. 28
Reflecting the political instability surrounding the transfer of power from Lleras to Valencia, the Yarborough team presented this final report to the Special Group (Counter-insurgency) with a secret supplement. In view of the economic and political environment in Colombia, the team believed that 'positive measures' were needed should the internal security situation deteriorate further. Civilian and military personnel, clandestinely selected and trained in resistance operations, would be required in order to develop an underground civil and military structure. This organisation was to undertake 'clandestine execution of plans developed by the United States Government toward defined objectives in the political, economic, and military fields'. 29 While pressuring for reforms, it would also undertake 'counter-agent and counter-propaganda' functions as well as 'paramilitary, sabotage, and/or terrorist activities against known communist proponents'. Should such a structure already exist, the Yarborough team declared, it should be immediately employed against communist elements. Indeed, the team suspected that 'the Rurales operating in the Llanos are CAS (Covert Action Staff) directed through DAS in Colombia.' If this was the case they believed it was a 'step in the right direction' as long as CAS had 'positive leadership influence' over the security force. 30
Actions and objectives proposed by the Yarborough team strengthened those already recommended by the earlier survey. From this study a Colombian Internal Defense Plan evolved designed to integrate military efforts with the economic, social, and political aspects. The military portion of this overall plan was prepared and implemented by the Colombian Army in the summer of 1962 under the guidance of a US counter-insurgency MTT. Known as Plan LAZO, it called for military action which would target leading bandit elements and suppress and eliminate guerrilla forces; broad civic action programmes within the violence zones; and an improved anti-violence apparatus in order to maintain internal security. Although direct combat use of US Special Forces A-teams did not happen, maximum use of training MTTs was made instead. 31 With the inception of Plan LAZO, counter-violence measures became more determined as security force missions were increasingly aimed towards destroy and capture. 32
Resurgent political violence which, by 1962, had increased 30 per cent over 1960 incidence levels surrounded the transfer of power from Lleras to Valencia. Elections in 1960, 1962, and again in 1964, aggravated party factionalisation and fuelled partisan violence. 33 Former dictator Rojas Pinilla added to these problems by attempting to break the National Front political monopoly with the formation of the Alianza Nacional Popular (ANAPO) movement in 1960. Semi-revolutionary organisations sympathetic to Cuba also developed during this period. A 'Workers-Students-Peasants' Movement (MOEC) was formed in January 1960 - Colombia's first Fidelista political organisation - although its power faded after its leader, student Antonio Larrota, was killed in May 1961. As well, the United Front of Revolutionary Action (FUAR) led by Gloria Gaitan (daughter of the slain Liberal leader of 1948) and husband Luis Emiro Valencia organised intellectuals in an attempt to re-establish Gaitanism as a political force. Many splinter groups which coalesced during this time were often organised by students and intellectuals associated with these organisations, some of whom had gone to Cuba and been trained in guerrilla warfare techniques. 34
Although the Communist Party was legal in Colombia (intelligence estimates placed membership between 8,000 and 10,000 with an additional 28,000 sympathisers) it was excluded from the National Front political arrangement. Instead the Partido Communista Colombiano (Colombian Communist Party-PCC) attempted to infiltrate the hard-left elements of the Liberal party and support and control labour strikes, demonstrations, and propaganda distribution. Of greater concern to both US and Colombian security forces were its attempts both to organise and strengthen communist enclaves which had developed during the early Violencia period by establishing auto-defence militia units and to obtain direction and control of bandit and former Liberal guerrilla paramilitary capability. 35 Within these so-called 'independent republics', US intelligence estimated that 11 groups of communist guerrillas consisting of 1,600 to 2,000 men were active. Another 29 former (non-communist) guerrilla groups of approximately 4,500 men continued to exist, primarily in the southern and central departments of Colombia. Remnants of the fighting since the assassination of Gaitan, these groups continued to maintain arms and were unresponsive to government actions to improve social and economic conditions in their areas unless it was co-ordinated through former guerrilla leaders. Though largely inactive, they remained a potential threat to the government, particularly if the National Front system failed and partisan violence escalated in the countryside. Finally, somewhere between 90 and 150 bandit gangs totalling over 2,000 men were reported to be active primarily in the coffee-rich Cauca Valley region. Operating in a highly individualistic, though quasi-guerrilla fashion, these groups often maintained intelligence nets throughout rural communities. Organisation, US intelligence specialists concluded, had increased, and their operations were becoming more co-ordinated. However, inter-bandit rivalry continued to cause clashes and attempts by the communists to control these gangs had, at that point, achieved little success. 36
Targeting the communist enclaves and the bandit gangs became the primary aims of the Colombian Army under Plan LAZO. By late 1962, approximately 75 per cent of military forces were engaged in some form of antiviolence measures. 37 To facilitate internal security in Colombia and throughout the other American republics, the Latin American Special Action Force (1st Special Forces, 8th Special Forces Group) had been stationed in the Canal Zone in August 1962. It provided the majority (90 per cent) of mobile training teams used in support of internal defence. Numerous MTTs involved in a broad range of instruction went to Colombia in the decade after the Yarborough team report. Everything from supply, engineering, sanitation, and other civic action projects, to intelligence, counter-insurgency, psychological warfare, and special operations were taught. Indeed, more MTTs were sent to Colombia during this period than anywhere else in Latin America. 38
In 1962 several major initiatives were undertaken by US military training teams which had considerable long-range impact on the Colombian Army. The counter-insurgency MTT, as previously discussed, was instrumental in the development of Plan LAZO. Initial training in psychological warfare was also conducted by this team and then followed-up by an MTT which oriented the Colombian Army Staff and the War College class in psychological operations. In early November a civic action team was deployed to formulate plans, develop operational methodology, and improve Troop Information and Education (TI and E) programmes in conjunction with US Information Services and the Agency for International Development (AID). Under the auspices of this team a 'propaganda' (information) platoon was organised, trained, and field tested in Cundinamarca, the department around Bogota, in 1963. 39
Civic action within the context of Plan LAZO was implemented as a means of improving internal security. By having military forces undertake projects on behalf of citizens, the government showed concern and interest in its people. Economic development often alleviated factors contributing to violence, opening areas to greater pacification efforts by security forces. Long-range programmes involving health centres and roads seemed to be the most successful: road construction fostered by the US Military Assistance Program (MAP) and MTT support began in June 1963 and over the next several years gravel surfaced routes were started in the violence-ridden departments of Huila, Cauca, Caldas, Valle, Cundinamarca, Santander, and Tolima. Providing access for both civil and military traffic, maintenance and construction of 'farm-to-market' and penetration roads had a direct effect on the suppression of violence in these areas. 40
Other proactive measures which the Colombian Army undertook with the aid of US MTTs in violence-affected or communist-influenced areas included the construction of water wells and potable water systems; literacy training programmes; development of youth camps; and construction of rural schools and dispensaries which provided dental treatment and medicine. In one instance, a dispensary established in an area of Caldas department was instrumental in turning the populace against one leader of a bandit gang. 41 While not directly under US military control through Plan LAZO, community action groups and public safety programmes were simultaneously begun under the Alliance for Progress. Assistance was provided to enhance community development at the local level, and both the National Police and DAS were given aid in order to improve training, administration, operations, communications, and public relations. A close working relationship also continued between US and Colombian labour through AID, the AFL-CIO, and ORIT (Inter-American Regional Labor Organization). Training, loans for low-cost workers' homes, scholarships for trade union studies, and factory tours in the United States were facilitated through the newly formed (spring 1962) American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD). 42
In November 1962 the US Army Mission prepared a plan for a civic action communications network in the Llanos - Amazonas regions. A civic action MTT extensively surveyed existing communication nets throughout Colombia, as well as identifying those still in the planning phase. During this survey a Colombian Ministry of Government project for the area was discovered which had been delayed due to funding problems. After some negotiation, a joint agreement was reached to combine the two plans, and a completion date set for December 1963. 43 The new system allowed military, police, and border elements to utilise the system for security purposes while, at the same time, the central government could also maintain closer communication links with its territorial areas (see Map 2). By 1965 plans were formulated to expand the communications net into isolated regions along the western (Pacific) coastline of Colombia. 44
Another communications project undertaken by the Mission, in conjunction with plans developed by a Colombian Air Force officer, was the development of a rural civil defence early-warning radio net. Established in violent areas with the support of the local community, it was utilised as a means of gathering intelligence and providing early warning against bandit or guerrilla attacks. Each net was considered a 'Federation' with subscribers contributing $200 for radio equipment which brought two-way communication down to individual farm level. Originally the system was intended to link together the battalions in I, III, VI, and VIII Brigade areas to the civilian populace and authorities, to local and national police, and to the air force. 45 By spring 1965, 11 separate networks had been established, supported by federations which had suffered considerable economic dislocation in the violence: coffee co-operatives along the Cauca River in Caldas, Valle, and Tolima departments; agricultural groups in the sugar growing region of Cauca department and cotton growers in Magdalena department; and other armed agricultural groups along the central Magdalena River Valley from Bolivar and the major oil extraction and refining area of Santander department to Huila. (see Map 3). Each net consisted of up to 100 citizen band radio sets distributed to farms, civilian defense centers (net control stations), and military civil defense monitor and repeater locations. Based on the success of the original nets, another 47 were scheduled for installation in the 1966-68 period. 46 Vehicles, radios, and other equipment were also provided for II Brigade (Guajira area) in order to establish a surveiIlance-intelligence net to control Colombia's northern coast against subversive agents and contraband'. 47
An integral part of Plan LAZO was the development of intelligence structures within the Colombian armed forces which would co-operate with the civilian DAS, F-2 of the National Police, and other government agencies. Attempts to start an intelligence establishment and training effort began, as described earlier, with the two-man MTT of 1961. It was followed by a second, three-man military training team which provided assistance from 18 May to 15 November 1962. A permanent Mission intelligence adviser also arrived that same year. The team gave several short-term (three week) 'crash' training programmes for interrogators, mobile intelligence groups (grupos moviles de inteligencia - GMI), and Localizadores teams (grupos inteligencia de localizadores - GILs or Intelligence Hunter/Killer teams). GILs were composed of 25 veteran officers, NCOs, and civilians, heavily armed, and trained to operate in the field for long periods. They were used both to fight and penetrate hostile groups as well as work with informants. 48
Perhaps the most notable military aspect of Plan LAZO, however, was the adoption of counterguerrilla warfare techniques that were highly dependent on sophisticated intelligence - gathering and analysis. ... Army tactical units acquired a 'comando localizador,' or unconventional warfare shock group, which clandestinely killed or captured guerrilla and bandit leaders. In addition, Mobile Intelligence Groups (grupos moviles de inteligencia) were attached to all major operating units. Their activities seem to have included counter-guerrilla work similar to the comando localizador, as well as information- gathering. 49
In April 1964 a Military Intelligence Battalion was created to undertake combat intelligence, counter-intelligence, and special operations, and to assist in coastal surveillance and internal security operations against infiltration of agents, 'provocateurs', arms, and propaganda. It was also utilised to find, destroy, or eliminate communist and extremist activities through a network of clandestine agents. 50
From May through October 1963, a joint US army, navy, and air force MTT was sent to Colombia to update Plan LAZO and develop a Command level counter-insurgency plan for the Colombian Armed Forces as a whole. Plan LAZO was reviewed and validated, though the team concluded that it lacked effectiveness as a joint operational plan, having been established strictly for the Colombian Army's anti-violence effort. Still, it was used as the basis upon which additional plans were formulated, including the Colombian Armed Forces (Joint) Counterinsurgency Plan (1964-66). 51 Prior to the arrival of the joint MTT, the Colombian Armed Forces developed and issued Internal Security Directive 001. Directed at all three military services, the National Police, and DAS, it called for co-operation through a Joint Operations Center (JOC) and for the establishment of an intelligence agency which would consider military and national intelligence requirements. 52 The joint MTT found the directive 'overly ambitious', particularly in the Colombian ability to undertake combined arms actions. Still, fostering the development of a National Intelligence Agency - plans for which the US Mission Intelligence Advisor had helped to draft - was considered vital. The team also spent considerable time establishing the basic guidelines and organisational structure for the JOC. This came into being in 1964 and was coupled with ongoing US army, navy, and air force coordination with their Colombian counterparts in order to ensure a realistic assignment of tasks and missions under Directive 001. 53
Reacting to the Violencia
Incidents in the early years of the Valencia administration added urgency to the anti-violence measures undertaken by the government. Riots by strikers in the petroleum industry in 1963, nightly bombings in Bogota and other cities in August that same year, as well as 'nuisance' bombings to protest joint US - Colombian naval exercises (Operation 'America') in November, raised the spectre of urban terrorism grafted on to the ongoing rural crisis. 54 On 3 November the Venezuelan government discovered an arms cache of Cuban origin intended for Colombian guerrillas. This fuelled fears of Cuban-backed subversion in the area, though in fact most of the arms held by bandit and guerrilla groups came from army stocks through theft or illicit purchase. Still, there were reports of arms smuggling, as in the earlier Violencia period, across the borders of Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador. 55 City bombings directed at property continued into 1964, with radical sections of ANAPO, the Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal (Liberal Revolutionary Movement-MRL, hardline), and communists being blamed for the actions. 56 That summer, a bomb factory outside of Bogota blew up and documents linking the factory owners to Venezuelan guerrillas and suspected Colombian terrorist groups were found. 57 Security forces, though, continued to have success both against urban terrorists (killing or capturing nearly two dozen people largely associated with the FUAR and MOEC), and rural bandits (killing 388 in 1962 alone). 58
A concentrated effort by Colombia's security forces to co-ordinate antiviolence measures continued through the Valencia presidency. Psychological warfare and public information campaigns were undertaken in conjunction with civic action and counter-insurgency operations. A psychological operations MTT in 1964 trained over 100 officers and NCOs at army and brigade level in tactics, planning and dissemination of propaganda, and coordinating psychological warfare with combat operations. 59 On 24 May 1963 the First Tactical Helicopter Squadron was established at Palenquero; it was used extensively to move troops, provide resupply and medical evacuation, and for reconnaissance missions. 60 Numerous other joint efforts were initiated including the creation of an Armed Forces Intelligence Committee which had DAS, National Police, and other governmental agencies representation; an intelligence school which trained personnel on an inter-service basis; and a Joint Air Coordination and Photo Interpretation Center to coordinate air photo mapping and surveillance responsibilities. All were formed under the supervision of US MTTs and civilian agencies. 61
Even prior to the inception of Plan LAZO, action against the communist-influenced independent republics was deemed essential to Colombian internal security. While most of these regions were relatively passive and caused little interference in government affairs, 62 they had gradually developed shadow governments, ruled by skilled Marxist guerrilla leaders, not subject to control from Bogota. 63 Early in the National Front period, Lleras Camargo attempted a two-track policy against the guerrilla zones. Peasants were encouraged to participate in rehabilitation programmes while guerrilla leadership which resisted government efforts to gain local support were eliminated. 64 This was the case in 1961, when the Republic of Marquetalia was declared by guerrilla leader Manuel Marulanda Velez (also known as 'Tiro Fijo' or Sure Shot). The Lleras government, fearing that a Cuban-style revolutionary situation might develop, launched a surprise attack against the area in early 1962. Although unsuccessful in driving the irregular forces from their stronghold, several army outposts were established in the area. 65 Ironically, Marulanda had begun his guerrilla career in the early (1949) Violencia period with other Liberal irregular forces from the area. His group later combined with communist fighters in the conflict prior to the formation of the National Front. 66
Probing actions against the enclaves accelerated after Plan LAZO was developed. A long-term strategy was adopted and implemented in five phases:
(1) counter-guerrilla training was given to security forces, civic action programmes were initiated, security personnel were infiltrated into guerrilla groups, and informers were recruited;
(2) psychological operations were undertaken in order to establish control over the civilian population;
(3) operations were initiated to blockade specific areas and isolate guerrilla groups from their sources of support and intelligence;
(4) in-place informers and infiltrators were used to splinter the internal cohesion of the guerrilla groups and ongoing offensive counterinsurgency operations coupled with psychological warfare were undertaken to destroy guerrilla units and leadership;
(5) operational zones were reconstructed economically, socially, and politically under the auspices of US aid programmes. 67
For Colombian security forces, 1964-65 were pivotal years in the struggle against the enclaves. On 18 May 1964 the Valencia government launched Operation 'Marquetalia' against Marulanda's guerrilla forces. A combined arms approach was used including heavy artillery, bombing by the air force, and infantry and police encirclement of suspected guerrilla villages. 68 Some 3,500 men swept through designated combat zones while 170 elite troops were airlifted into Marulanda's hacienda redoubt in an attempt to trap the guerrilla leader. 69 Paez Indians had been recruited and were used with notable success against the guerrillas as scouts and guides through difficult terrain. 70 Most of the guerrillas, including Marulanda, were driven out of the Marquetalia area, escaping the army cordon into the neighbouring 'republic' of Rio Chiquito. On 20 July 1964 Marulanda and other guerrilla leaders from the Tolima-Cauca-Huila border areas met in the First Southern Guerrilla Conference. Declaring themselves 'victims of the policy of fire and sword proclaimed and carried out by the oligarchic usurpers of power'. the new coalition called for 'armed revolutionary struggle to win power'. 71 Composed originally of both communist and non-communist bandit and irregular forces, this southern guerrilla bloc, with some financial and political aid from the PCC, consolidated its command into the unified group which became known as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces or FARC). 72 Still, by 1965, relentless anti-guerrilla campaigns by Colombia's security forces ended the existence of the so-called independent republics. Coupled with ongoing anti-bandit operations, significant progress was made in suppressing rural violence after the inception of Plan LAZO. In June 1965 Colombian Army Intelligence listed 30 guerrilla-bandit gangs with a combined strength of some 700-800 men as still active:
I Brigade - three bands totalling 25-30 men.
III Brigade - three bands totalling 170-225 men. (one band, headed by communist 'Mayor Ciro', 150-200 men)
IV Brigade - five bands totalling 50-60 men.
V Brigade - four bands totalling 65 men. (40 in the Ejercito de Liberacion National (National Liberation Army- ELN)]
VI Brigade - twelve active bands totaling 375-400 men. (six of the bands were communist containing 250-300 men)
VIII Brigade - three bands totaling 25 men. 73
In the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, US policy initiatives during the early National Front period in Colombia resonated positively, particularly in the military field. Yet while there was a close alignment in the US-Colombian security relationship during this time, strategic needs and perceptions of those needs often differed. For the United States, counterinsurgency, paramilitary operations, and internal defence became integral parts of US national security policy in the Cold War arena. Colombian officials, both Liberal and Conservative, undertook these policies as organic to the survival of the nation - although they were concerned by the implications of the revolution in Cuba and were prepared to act in concert with the United States in order to best protect their own perceptions of the national interest.
While the National Front system initially provided stability, restricting dangerous political antagonisms, it also restricted normal political competition. This contributed to voter apathy, infighting within the parties, and the formation of more extreme political elements. Disillusionment with the Valencia government increased as economic, political, juridical, and social problems underwent only marginal reforms, and political opportunism continued. 74 Still, this early period offered the armed forces the opportunity to depoliticise their image and concentrate on those groups considered dangerous or subversive by the new inter-party government. Through the Colombian Internal Defense Plan, the US played a substantial role in facilitating the development of all aspects of Colombia's internal security infrastructure.
Plan LAZO proved to be an ambitious anti-violence effort for the Colombian Armed Forces, given the previous lack of counter-insurgency training or intelligence support available. Although not wholly successful, many bandit and guerrilla forces were eliminated and zones which might have been used effectively as base areas ('focos') for staging guerrilla operations were placed under government control. Civic action contributed to both social development and economic growth, but it also 'increased the public's expectation of, and created bureaucratic mechanisms for, the military's presence to be felt in time of national political tension'. Indeed, the political advocacy and forced resignation of General Ruiz Novoa caused the government to better co-ordinate civic action into its future counterinsurgency programmes while re-emphasising 'the physical repression of guerrillas as the primary task of the armed forces'. 75 By 1966 the Violencia period had effectively been brought to an end. However, new internal security problems related to this earlier violence did arise. Mobile FARC forces developed in VI Brigade area and early in 1965, unrelated to the campaign against the enclaves, an attack on the village of Simacota (V Brigade - Santander Department) was undertaken by the ELN (formed in 1963--64). This was considered to be 'the first prominent incident of Castro backed insurgency during the National Front tenure'. 76 Another radical group, the PCC-ML (Marxist-Leninist) was also founded in 1964 in reaction to the pro-Soviet line of the 'mainstream' PCC. Pro-Maoist, its action arm the Ejercito Popular de Liberacion (Popular Army of Liberation - EPL) was formed several years later. 77 With this new potential threat of organised rural insurgency coupled to urban kidnappings and other acts of terrorism, Colombia remained 'one of the stickiest areas' for internal security problems in Latin America. 78 Nonetheless, the security structures established by Colombians in collaboration with the United States during this period - psychological operations capability, inter-regional communications networks, and an intelligence and counter-insurgency apparatus - have proved to be essential to a nation which appears to be plagued by 'permanent and endemic warfare'. 79
1. I am particularly indebted to Ms Hannah Zeidlik, Ms Gerri Harcarik, and Dr Don Carter of the US Amy Center of Military History. Mr John Taylor, Mr Edward Reese, and Mr Will Mahoney of the US National Archives, Ms Kate Doyle and the staff of the US National Security Archives, and Dr Richard Stewart of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center US Army Special Operations Command Archives for facilitating my research.
2. Russell W. Ramsey, 'Critical Bibliography on La Violencia in Colombia'. Latin American Research Review 9/1 (Spring 1973), p.3.
3. 'Army Roles. Missions, and Doctrine in Low-intensity Conflict (ARMLIC): Preconflict Case Study 2 - Colombia.' File HRC 319. 1. US Army Center of Military History Archives, Washington, DC (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Operations Research, Inc. under contract No. DAAG 25-67-0702 for US Army Combat Developments Command, 15 Dec. 1969), pp.xii, 1,9-10.
4. 'National Intelligence Estimate: NEE 88-65 - Prospects for Colombia, 9 July 1965'. Declassified Document Quarterly Series, Vol. 14 (1988), Microform 003075 (Washington. DC: Carrollton Press, 1989), p.3. (Hereafter referred to as DDQS)).
5. 'Staff Summary Supplement #247 - Colombia Seeks Aid in Suppressing Bandit Groups, July 1959'; 'Staff Summary Supplement #315 - US May Survey Colombian Guerrilla Problem. 23 Sept. 1959'; DDQS. Vol. 10 (1984), Microforms 002410, 000249, 1 page supplements.
6. 'Summary and Conclusions', File 228-01 Permanent: HRC Geog G Colombia 400.318 (Washington. DC: US Army Center of Military History-Colombia File, 1965). p.33. (Hereafter referred to as Colombia Document). Clearly, US advisory and training efforts and the Military Assistance Program had also been used to influence military efforts in Colombia for several decades, although the primary focus had previously been directed towards conventional warfare and hemisphere defence.
7. 'State Visit by Colombian President Lleras. 5-16 April 1960: Position Paper - US Assistance to Colombia in Combatting Guerrillas'. DDQS Vol.8 (1982). Microform 002466(A). p.2.
8. 'Summary and Conclusions', Colombia Document. p.53.
9. 'Colombia Survey Team Recommendations for US Action'. ibid., Annex A to Tab E. pp. 1-2.
10. 'Planning and Objectives'. ibid., Tab E p. 1.
11. As note 9. pp.3- 10.
13. 'Central Intelligence Agency Office of Central Reference Biographic Register: Alberto Lleras Camargo, December 1961', in CIA Research Reports, Latin America, 1946-1976, Reel 2. Document No. 0506, p.2; 'Agency for International Development - Spring Review: Agrarian Reform in Colombia, June 1970'. in AID Spring Review of Land Reform, June 1970, 2nd Edition, Vol. V - Land Review in Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela (Washington, DC: Dept of State, 1970). Summary; Jorge P. Osterling, Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. 1989), p.97.
14. 'Memorandum From E.P. Airand to General A. J. Goodpaster (Staff Secretary to the President), 7 April 1960'; Memorandum From Maj. John S.D. Eisenhower (Assistant Staff Secretary) to Douglas Dillon (Under Secretary of State). 14 April 1960'; 'Memorandum From Maj. John S.D Eisenhower to John N. Irwin 11 (Assistant Secretary of Defense). 14 April 1960', DDQS Vol. 10 (1984), Microform 001306, 1 page supplements.
15. 'Colombia Survey Team Recommendations for US Action'. Colombia Document, Annex A to Tab E. p.2.
16. 'Memorandum From John N. Irwin to Maj. John Eisenhower, 16 April 1960', in DDQS Vol. 10 (1984), Microform 000834, 1 page.
17. Richard Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1973), pp.66-7. Violence in Colombia had transformed itself from primarily politically-motivated guerrilla warfare to agrarian extortion practiced by bandits. There were exceptions, most notably in the so-called 'independent republics' - Agriari, Viota, Tequendama, Sumapaz, El Pato, Guayabero, Suroeste del Tolima. Rio Chiquito, 26 de Septiembre, and Marquetalia - which formed in southern Cundinamarca and eastern Tolima. Most were controlled by (Liberal) irregular peasant groups, though several were influenced by communists. Coffee plantations were primarily affected by bandit groups, although owners of sugar, cotton, and cacao were also subject to extortion by these gangs who would sell the crops through the black market. Both guerrilla and bandit groups often maintained 'subrosa political relationships with major figures of the legitimate government and opposition involving the trade of votes, hatchet jobs, and influence'. (Maullin, p.8) These links with local and central power structures made anti-violence measures particularly difficult to undertake in the pre-National Front period. (See Norman A. Bailey, 'La Violencia in Colombia.' Jnl of Inter-American Studies 9 (Oct. 1967). pp. 561-75.)
18. 'Helicopter Operations in Colombia'. Tab L. p. 1. 'Military Sales and Military Assistance Part I - 1943 to 1960'. Tab 1. p.6; 'Planning and Objectives'. Tab E. p. 2, Colombia Document.
19. Ibid. except 'Planning and Objectives'
20. Alberto Ruiz Novoa. El Gran Desafio (Bogota: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1965). pp.53 and 95-88, as cited in Maullin (note 17), p.68.
21. 'Mission History - US Army Mission to Colombia, 1959 and 1960,' Colombia Document, Tab C. pp.93-4. 98.
22. 'USARMIS Intelligence Effort in Colombia. 1961-1965'. ibid.. Tab F. p. 1.
23. 'Public Relations, Public Information, Troop Information and Education (TI and E). and Psychological Warfare', ibid., Tab M, p.2.
24. Russell W. Ramsey, 'The Modern Violence in Colombia, 1946-1965', PhD Thesis (Gainesville, FL: Univ. of Florida. 1970). pp.405-6.
25. 'Planning and Objectives', ibid.. Tab E, pp. 1-2.
26. 'Visit to Colombia, South America, by a Team from Special Warfare Center. 26 February 1962 - Major Conclusions', pp.3-4, Low Intensity Conflict document collection, National Security Archives, Washington, DC (Hereafter referred to as LIC doc. coil.).
27. 'Visit to Colombia, South America by a Team from Special Warfare Center, 26 February 1962 - Recommendations'. pp.5-8. LIC doc. coll.
28. 'Visit to Colombia, South America by a Team from Special Warfare Center, 26 February 1962 - Narrative Report: Survey Team Activities Colombia, Observations,: pp. 1-8. LIC doc. coil.
29. All quotes from' Colombia Survey Report - Secret Supplement. 26 February 1962'. 1 page, LIC doc. coll.
30. Ibid. The acronym 'CAS' given within the context of the secret supplement seems intimately related to what Philip Agee describes as the merging of CIA's former International Organizations Division and the Psychological and Paramilitary Staff into Covert Action Staff. (Philip Agee. Inside The Company- CIA Diary (Baltimore: Penguin Books. 1975). p.319.]. However, Agee places this name change in the Plans Directorate early in 1964. (See also Loch Johnson. America's Secret Power. The CIA in a Democratic Society (NY. OUP, 1989) and Alfred H. Paddock, Jr.. US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Washington, DC: National Defense UP, 1982) for further information on CAS and its origins.) CAS - Panama was also consulted by the Yarborough team before they left for Colombia. With regards to the Rurales, they consisted of about 120 horse-mounted, non-uniformed, government paid police (the report compares them to the Texas Rangers) which patrolled sections of the Llanos. Their inception appears to stem from the early period or the military dictatorship of Gen. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (June 1953-May 1957) - see Ramsey (note 24), p.315.
31. 'Planning and Objectives', Tab E. pp.1-3; 'Summary and Conclusions', pp. 1, 26, 33, Colombia Document.
32. 'Summary and Conclusions', ibid., pp.5. 18.
33. Maullin (note 17), pp.28-9.
34. Richard Gott, Rural Guerrillas in Latin America (Middlesex: Penguin Books. 1973). pp.291-2: Maullin (note 17). p.29. Colombia had broken diplomatic relations with Cuba in Dec. 1961 and supported Kennedy's action through the Cuban Missile Crisis in Oct. 1962.
35. Capt. Charles L. Daschle, AI(CE) Assistant G2, US Army Special Warfare Center, 'The Background to Potential Insurgency in Colombia, 9 Sept., 1962'. pp.3-6. John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center - United States Army Special Operations Command Archives. Fort Bragg. North Carolina. (Hereafter referred to as JFKSWC - USASOC Achives).
36. Ibid.. pp.7-16; 'Summary and Conclusion'. Colombia Document. p. 18.
37. 'Minutes, of Meeting of Special Group (CI). 12 April 1962'. p.3, in LIC doc. coll.
38. Capt. Roy Benson, Jr, 'The Latin American Special Action Force of the US Army as a Counterinsurgency Force. December 1965'. p.2; 'Classified US Army Special Forces MTT Missions, Latin America 1962-1973, Enclosure 2 - Colombia,' pp.2-7, both in Jack Taylor Donation Box 2 - Vietnam: Files - Latin America - MTTs, Colombia - MTTs, NSA. See also 'Training', Annex B to Tab K (Mobile Training Teams 1960-1968) Colombia Document for MTT information not declassified in Jack Taylor collection.
39. 'Public Relations, Public Information. TI and E, and Psychological Warfare'. Colombia Document, Tab M. p. 1.
40. 'The US Army and Civic Action in Latin America, Vol. 3 (I July 1963 to June 1967)', prepared by Staff Historian, Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 HQ-USARSO, Oct. 1968. File USARSO-1. 1963-67 cy. 1, pp.32-4. Center for Military History Archives; 'Civic Action Projects,' Colombia Document, Tab H, pp. 1-2.
41. 'History of Counterinsurgency Training in Latin America (Oct. 1962 to 31 Dec. 1965), 3D Civil Affairs Detachment.' prepared by 3D Civil Affairs Detachment, Fort Clayton, Canal Zone Headquarters, United States Army Forces Southern Command. File 8-2.9A DA cy. 1. p. 1. US Army Center of Military History Archives: 'Civic Action Projects'. Colombia Document Tab H. pp.2-4. 7-8.
42. 'Alliance for Progress - The Progress of Colombia -Third Year: 17 August 1961-17 August 1964.' Tab D. pp.19-21; 'US Assistance Strategy'. Part III to Tab D. pp. 3-4. Colombia Document.
43. 'After Action Report, Civic Action Mobile Training Team No.48-MTT-01-63. Colombia, South America, 10 May 1963,' pp.6-7. JFKSWC-USASOC Archives.
44. 'Civic Action Projects: Llanos - Amazonas National Territories Net'. Columbia Document. Tab H. pp.5-7.
45. As note 43, pp.7-8.
46. 'Civic Action Projects: Rural Civil Defense Early Warning Radio Nets'. Colombia Document. Tab H. pp.4-5.
47. 'Training'. ibid., Tab K, p. 6.
48. 'USARMIS Intelligence Effort in Colombia (1961-1965)', ibid.. Tab F. pp. 1-4.
49. Maullin (note 17). p.75.
50. 'USARMIS Intelligence Effort in Colombia (1961-1965)', Colombia Document. Tab F p.5.
51. 'Report of Joint Mobile Training Team to Colombia (RCS CSGPO-125). No. 48-MTT-104-63. 19 November 1963'. pp. 1,5. JFKSWC-USASOC Archives. As late as 1965, however. some did not consider the overall Colombian Country Team Internal Defense Plan (IDP) 'a true Internal Defense Plan as envisaged in the Washington Special Group Guidance dated September 1962. It merely treats the problem from a military viewpoint and does not include all the elements necessary to insure a well integrated and overall planning guidance for all agencies of the US CT.' (See 'Summary and Conclusions'. ibid., p.34.).
52. 'Planning and Objectives', ibid., Tab E, p.3.
53. 'Report of Joint Mobile Training Team to Colombia (RCS CSGOP - 125). No 48-MTT-104-63. 18 Nov. 1963'. pp.3-6: 'Planning and Objectives'. Colombia Document. Tab E. p.3.
54. 'Central Intelligence Agency - Survey of Latin America, OCI No. 1063/64. 1 April 1964,' p.65, CIA Research Reports, Latin America. 1946-1976.
55. 'Clandestine Arms Traffic in Latin America and the Insurgency Problem' Research Memorandum RAR-49, 29 November 1963. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, DDQS Vol.14 (1988). Microform 003336. p.2; 'Memorandum for the President from Dean Rusk - Venezuelan Announcement of Cuban Origin of Discovered Arm Cache, 27 November 1963', DDQS Vol. 15 (1989). Microform 002137, p. 1.
56. 'Summary and Conclusions'. Colombia Document. p.16.
57. 'Guerrilla and Terrorist Activity in Latin America: A Brief Review', Research Memorandum RAR - 38. 18 November 1964, Department of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, DDQS Vol.2 (1976), Microform 283(C). p.2.
58. 'Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum - Cuban Training of Latin American Subversives, OCI No. 0515/63, 27 March 1963', pp. 15-56. CIA Research Reports. Latin America, 1946-1976. There is some discrepancy in the figures estimated earlier by the Special Forces intelligence officer (150 bandit groups, approx. 2,000 men) and the sanitised source for the CIA. Figures from the latter for 1962 alone estimated 2.582 bandits captured, 1,020 detained on suspicion of banditry, and 388 bandits killed. The CIA estimate does acknowledge that only about two per cent of all those arrested and detained were actually convicted and sentenced.
59. 'Public Relations. Public Information, TI and E, and Psychological Warfare'. Colombia Document. Tab M. p.3.
60. 'Helicopter Operations in Colombia'. ibid., Tab 1, pp.3-5.
61. 'USARMIS Intelligence Effort in Colombia (1961-1965),' ibid.. Tab F. pp.2-7. For the full extent of US training see Tab F - Inclusion 1, 'Intelligence School Courses' and Tab F Inclusion 2. 'Military Training Teams' of the ibid. Some instructional delays did occur. A Special Operations MTT scheduled for July 1964 was cancelled because it was not US policy to give that type of instruction to Latin American countries at that time. Under strong Mission pressure, the course did go ahead the following year, though clearly the intent of US military training teams was not to teach these kinds of courses in order to circumvent regular juridicial proceedings against hostile elements. As well, a Polygraph MTT scheduled for the same year was also cancelled due to CAS objections over the possible compromise of sources.
62. 'Summary and Conclusions', ibid.. p. 11.
63. Osterling (note 13), p.280.
64. Alberto Gomez. 'The Revolutionary Armed Forces in Colombia', as quoted in Gott (note 34). p.298.
65. James D. Henderson. When Colombia Bled: A History of the Violencia in Tolima (Tuscaloosa, AL: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1985). pp. 221-2.
66. Osterling (note 13). p.295. Marulanda was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party as were several others within the guerrilla leadership (see Gott note 34, pp.279-89).
67. Gilberto Vieira, 'La Colombie a I'heure du Marquetalia'. Democratie Nouvelle, July-Aug. 1965, as quoted in Gott (note 34). pp.299-300.
68. Henderson (note 65). p.222.
69. 'The Backlands Violence is Almost Ended', Time, 26 June 1964, p.31.
70. Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1992). p. 146.
71. All quotes from Manuel Marulanda Velez, 'The Republic of Marquetalia - Manifesto issued 20 July 1964 by the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC)', in J. Gerassi (ed.) The Coming of the New International (NY: World Publishing Co., 197 1), pp.502-3.
72. Maullin (note 17), pp. 14, 30, 40.
73. Ibid., pp. 18- 19.
74. 'Summary and Conclusions'. Colombia Document, pp.9, 28.
75. All quotes Maullin (note 17), pp.78-9.
76. 'Summary and Conclusions', Colombia Document, p.6.
77. Osterling (note 13). p.314.
78. 'Memorandum for the President from McGeorge Bundy: Colombia, 20 June 1965,' DDQS Vol. 10 (1984), Microform 002770, p. 1.
79. Gonzalo Sanchez, 'La Violencia in Colombia: New Research, New Question.' (trans. Peter Bakewell), Hispanic American Historical Review 65 (April 1985). p.789.