Fabio Vásquez, Víctor Medina and Camilo Torres

Index

University Violence

Attacks on U.S. Offices and Personnel

Camilo Torres and the ELN

Anti- Subversive Measures

University Violence

Two sharp clashes downtown and Libre University. 17 police reported injured. Additional Molotov coctails thrown police headquarters in central Bogotá but no serious damage reported. ... Commie-dominated trade-union federation here (CST S) reportedly may try join students tomorrow. ...

In answer Dept's specific question, present demonstrations did have origin in DOMREP situation, later veered to question student impunity but recent indications are extremists now trying make anti-Americanism major issue once more.

Seems no doubt that Commies using demonstrations to discourage despatch GOC contingent to DOMREP and this could have effect ultimate Colombia decision. As department knows, GOC decision on sending unit DOMREP has already been affected by concern about local public order situation. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, May 21, 1965

Student disturbances throughout afternoon and night, which led to declaration state of seige (SS) early this morning, resulted in 67 police and more than 50 civilians injured. ... Students broke into four radio stations to broadcast propaganda, and also entered 13 movie theatres to harangue audiences. ... Police entered campuses in hot pursuit of rock throwers at America and Bogotá. EMB understands students have quantity low-powered bombs cached at National University, but were unable to get them off campus last night because of police blockade. Trouble also continued in Medellin with police dislodging sit-ins at University with tear gas. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, May 21, 1965

Firearms made first appearance in student disturbances late this afternoon with students sniping at police and army. . . . Molotov coctails also reportedly being used in various places. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, May 24, 1965

Report on Latin American Youth Requested by Special Group (CI), July 18, 1965

Comments Upon Assistant Secretary Vaugh's August 12 Presentation to Special Group (CI) on Communist Penetration and Influence in Latin American Universities, November 3, 1965

Universities including some 80 per cent of students in higher education system now paralyzed by administratively declared vacations, GOC closures or full or partial strikes. ... Street disorders diminished to scattered incidents by last night. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, April 23, 1971

Attacks on U.S. Offices and Personnel

Approximately 2030 hours 25 August bomb exploded under private car belonging to John Blydenstein, American citizen working with United Nations food and agriculture organization, car marked with special UN mission plates. Confidential telegram from COMUSMILGP to Secretary of State, August 26, 1963

Terrorist bombings continue with explosions Bogota August 25, 26 and 29. ... Over 35 suspects detained by GOC including FUAR leader Alfonso Romero Buj and Guillermo Caceres Lopez, administrator weekly "Vanguardia del MRL." Confidential telegram from Ambassador Freeman to Secretary of State, August 30, 1963

Bomb exploded against Centro-Colombo Americano Bogota tonight 10:05 PM. Bomb placed against one window of center, but concussion blew out other windows and shutters on street side and was powerful enough to crack stone facing of building and blast open iron balcony. Confidential telegram from Ambassador Freeman to Secretary of State, September 3, 1963

Local authorities report fourteen bombs exploded Cali last night between ten P.M. and two A.M. Targets included social clubs military and governmental offices two US firms newspaper office Centro Colombia Americano. Two bombs exploded 9:30 PM Manizales first outside government building second inside Centro Colombo Americano. Telegram from Cali Consulate to Secretary of State, September 23, 1963

Local authorities report fourteen bombs exploded Cali last night between ten P.M. and two A.M. Targets included social clubs military and government offices two US firms newspaper office Centro Colombo Americano. Two bombs exploded 9:30 PM Manizales first outside government building second inside Centro Colombia Americano. Other bombing Popayan near statue Maestro Valencia President's father. Damage slight in all cases as most bombs placed outside buildings. Obvious purpose harrassment no pattern in targets. Telegram from Cali Consulate to Secretary of State, September 25, 1963

Action Department unquestionably as result US participation military exercises involved operation, American terrorists set to work again night November 27. Sears Roebuck had three Smallish Incenciary bombs, one of which police disarmed. Merck and Home Products Laboratories had one fairly powerful dynamite bomb each. Telegram from Cali Consulate to Secretary of State, November 29, 1963

Darrell D Heick, USAF civilian employee attached to Colombian AF Palanquero air base fired upon opening December 28 while driving USAF mission vehicle from base to nearby residence. Confidential Telegram from Ambassador Freeman to Secretary of State, December 31, 1963

Current wave terrorism which began June 7 continued evening June 18 with placing some 19 bombs Bogota and three Cali. One unexploded bomb found below Amconsulate Cali. Four unexploded bombs found Bogota made of black powder, dynamite, potassium chlorate packed in traditional "FAB" soap powder boxes.

Bombings considered related Marquetalia campaign and to current student problems. Number bombs placed near National University or routes to it. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, June 19, 1964

PC [Peace Corps] headquarters Bogotá has complete info up to date on placement every PCV [Peace Corps Volunteer] Colombia. PC headquarters Washington is sent periodic lists PCV's indexed by name and location. In event ELN attack, PC Bogotá could say immediately if any PCV in vicinity.

CAS [CIA Covert Action Staff] and EMB have no info another attack by ELN imminent. Peace Corps Bogota in close contact EMB re ELN. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, January 16, 1965

Home-made time bomb containing 15 sticks dynamite discovered office building where EMB rents space approx 6 PM Jan 29 on sixth floor elevator landing. Bomb apparently set explode 6:30. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, January 30, 1965

The USIS and A.I.D. offices are located on this floor. With the explosives was found a manifesto directed against Assistant Secretary Mann's visit and the U.S. Bomb Found in the American Embassy, Bogotá, February 1, 1965

Small but noisy group identifying themselves as MRL Youth (JMRL) demonstrated briefly in front building where EMB located. Group carried signs saying "Yankee Get Out" and littered street with numerous handbills; demonstrators ran away upon almost immediate arrival of police detachment.

As Dept knows JMRL is left wing extremist group believed connected with ELN or National Liberation Army which attacked Simacota Jan 7. Handbills thrown around street indicate demonstration connected US military posture Vietnam. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, February 12, 1965

Crowd of some 200 gathered in street, shouting protests at USG actions in Vietnam and destroying facsimile of American flag. By time police arrived crowd had grown to 400, but dispersed swiftly at sight riot-control squads, which managed catch leaders of demonstration as they fled. They proved to be members communist youth organization "JUCO". Telegram from U.S. Consulate, Cali, to Secretary of State, February 12, 1965

PC jeep destroyed in Popayan by fire 0100 April 19 result match thrown in gas tank. Jeep assigned PC volunteer leader Paul Nobbe and parked in front his house in center city at time attack. No injuries reported, however neighboring houses damaged by explosion and blaze. Three students reportedly detained and authorities continuing investigation. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, April 17, 1965

Bomb, estimated by police to have been four sticks dynamite with timing device, exploded approximately 1315 hours est, today, corner house T/SGT William J. Dean, USAF Mission. No personnel or property damage. Bomb wrapped leaflets anti US presence Colombia and Dom. Rep. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, May 8, 1965

Group students stoned house Major Shields, Army Mission and knocked policeman who attempted intervene unconscious before being driven off by police reinforcements. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, May 19, 1965

Major David Wade attached US Army Mission with Civic Action MTT prematurely reported kidnapped by National University students 11:30 hours EST. Actually Wade was in jeep stoned by University students and later pushed away by them, but was neither injured or kidnapped. ... Does not know whether one of two army jeeps reportedly burned near National University this morning was one he occuppied since he "did not stay around to see." Wade said students agitated because "Army had killed one their colleagues" (ref to student who died last night).

Another report is that two Cubans captured Barranquilla confessed having been in contact Che Guevara in Colombia. AP correspondent had report Guevara was in Colombia in Guajira region recently. Canot evaluate now. As of 1230 hours EST appeared students getting heated up again, partly owing homenaje National University to left-wing (alleged communist) priest Camilo Torres who leaving country. Main reason appears be death student injured May 20. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, May 22, 1965

We shall attempt a new Country Team investigation and round-up of ambassadorial kidnapping reports. We get reports of such intentions as to me from time to time from various sources, for month now I have had a full-time bodyguard supplied at initiative of GOC on basis its intelligence as to student intentions. Confidential telegram from Ambassador Oliver to Secretary of State, June 2, 1965

AMBASSADOR'S CLOSING STATEMENT (After a Marxist-Leninist tirade by the activist member of the delegation)

I am sure you know that there are other points of view and other answers to the deeds and doctrines you have asked about. We could disagree on the interpretation of deed and doctrine; but I say to you, with all sincerity, that if you have points of view based on economic theories of the past century and not relevant to modern times - neither Smith nor Marx are very relevant to our times, I believe - if you have Marxist ideas of imperialist wars, of greed for economic markets, etc., if you believe that this is why we act, I tell you you are completely wrong. ... We believe that the problems of the world of the future cannot be solved on the basis of antiquated ideas. We must all, ourselves and you too, dedicate ourselves with free minds to the horizons of the future, and abandon the ideas of the past which do not offer us solutions. English Translation of Ambassador Oliver's Opening and Closing Statements to the Representatives of the Students Who Invaded the Embassy on May 7, 1965, June 9, 1965

Bomb placed and exploded under private auto of Sgt. James S. Augeri. Car was parked on street in front of residence of Maj. Bendel W. MacDonald. Both USAFMISS members. No casualties. ... Car destroyed. Windows in front of house broken. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, June 20, 1965

A high power bomb exploded in the Ministry of War building killing one person and wounding eight. The bomb was placed in a second floor woman's lavatory adjacent to the offices of the United States Military Mission on one side and the offices of the Ministry Legal Section on the other. July 27 Bombing of War Ministry, August 8, 1965

Students demonstrating in front National University in connection Father Torres affair kicked and stoned car bearing US Naval Mission Chief as it passed by early afternoon August 10. . . . CT personnel are being instructed avoid National University and have been previously instructed not (rpt not) park cars on streets near buildings occupied by U.S. installations. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, August 10, 1965

Time bombs placed March 16 in plaza of Bucaramanga where V Brigade Commander Valencia Tovar and other dignitaries were scheduled to lead school-children in patriotic observance. . . . Bombs though to have been placed by ELN specifically to kill Valencia Tovar, commander of brigade which eliminated Camilo Torres February 15. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, March 17, 1966

American consulate near Parque de Santander attacked during lunch time April 21 by some 400 Bogotá university students ... Some embassy personnel in consulate offices at time. Rocks hurled by students broke three windows. One shot fired. Molotov coctails thrown but not into second-story consulate offices. One coctail started small fire first-floor store, but this extinguished. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, April 21, 1966

A CARE jeep assigned to CARE representative Ronald Burkehart was bombed while parked in front of a restaurant in Popayan, Cauca. Telegram from U.S. Consul, Cali, to Secretary of State, June 1, 1966

During past two months Consulate has been damaged by two bombs. Fortunately damage has been only broken glass. The latest bomb, however, could have had serious repercussions had an employeee or visitor been near or on Consulate's stairwell when it went off. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, July 22, 1966

A high-powered explosive device exploded in the ladies rest room on the first follor of the Centro Colombo-Americano. Investigation indicates the bomb was probably a fairly simple device, constructed of five or six sticks of dynamite and triggered with a lighted fuse. ... The bomb killed, almost immediately, three people, including one American, Robert Raymond Smetek. A fourth victim died eight hours later in the hospital. ... The U.S. Government partially supports this instutition ... through grants made by the U.S. Information Service and by providing highly trained staff members. General Information and Facts Known as of Now in the Case of the Terrorist Bombing of the Centro Colombo-Americano in Bogotá, August 28, 1966

President Lleras and John Rockefeller III were attacked yesterday afternoon by rock-throwing students at National University Bogotá. Were arriving at National U campus to unaugurate new veterinary science building constructed by Colombian agricultural institute (ICA) with Rockefeller Foundation subsidy. . . . Extremist students involved estimated at between 80 and 120. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, October 25, 1966

A bomb was exploded in a jeep belonging to the Peace Corps at 2:55 a.m. in the interior parking lot of a hotel in Buga, Valle. A time fuse was used, indicating that there was no intent to do bodily harm. Listing of Possible Insurgency Incidents in Colombia, October 11-18, October 25, 1968

Following the third demonstration in as many weeks two American flags were publicly burned on November 8 by a crowd of some seventy-five Communist students in front of the office building housing this Consulate.

Particularly since a number of windshields had been broken in the two earlier demonstrations, automobile drivers quickly found alternative routes and left the street to the noisy demonstrators. The latter ranted and raved and in general shouted themselves hoarse crying "Viva Ché Guevara," and "Yankees get out of Colombia," "Long Live the Communist Youth," etc., and handed out a variety of mimeographed leaflets calling for "an anti-imperialist, democratic and scientific university," stating that Colombian universities are under attack by "the CIA agents of U.S. imperialism" and calling for an end to U.S. Peace Corps participation in Colombian universities. Demonstrations and Flag Burning in Front of U.S. Consulate by Communist Youth Groups, November 14, 1968

High school demonstrators, protesting McNamara visit, stoned Cultural Center Barranquilla, breaking seven windows and smashing front windshield Willys utility truck. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, June 3, 1970

Barranquilla cultural center attacked once more early June 8. Reportedly 200 students from Barranquilla high school and Free University participated demonstrations center, Consulate, city business area. Students carried placards anti-American slogans pictures Che Guevara ... [A]lso carried facsimile US flag burned front Consulate. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, June 9, 1970

Personal vehicle Col. Jean McLaughlin DAO lightly damaged 2300 local time this evening by bomb placed or thrown at car parked in front of house of economic counselor Bruce Hemenway, where McLaughlin attending party. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, November 7, 1970

Robert EARLY, American Consular Agent in Buenaventura, has provided additional information on the January 21 demonstration during which the Agency's windows were broken, its shield damaged and a U.S. flag burned.

Although the Embassy has no solid intelligence on the demonstrators, it is probable that they were communist-inspired. Demonstration Against Consular Agency, Buenaventura, January 29, 1971

Embassy unexpectedly subject to hit and run attack at 12:30 P.M. May 10 by small group of students. Some windows broken. Five cars damaged. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, May 10, 1972

Camilo Torres and the ELN

Recently the Embassy was approached by a former member of the Executive Committee of the Juventud del Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal (Liberal Revolutionary Movement Youth-JMRL), who was able to offer hard information on the clandestine terrorist organization, the Army of National Liberation or Army of Liberation. (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN, or Ejército de Liberación, EL). As has been reported by the Embassy for the past two years, prior to most mass urban bombings, local newspapers received calls from persons identifying themselves as members of this organization. These persons would accurately predict that bombs would be placed that night and proclaim the reason as a protest against some Government action or other.

The ELN is the terrorist branch of the MRL Youth or JMRL, a Chinese-line extremist group having no connection at the present time with Alfonso LOPEZ Michelsen's MRL. Of the some 2,500 members of the JRML, about 500 of them also belong to the ELN. Of these 500, only about 100 have been actually involved in direct terrorist activities, with the remainder confining themselves to propaganda and courier activities.

ELN urban bombings have subsided in recent months because of a reshuffling of leadership and a reorientation of the group's activities from urban bombings to guerrilla activities.

The ELN is presently in the midst of organizing guerrilla bands in the Department of Santander. Two groups are being established: one of ten men operating in the mountains south of San Vicente, and the other of about twenty-five men located along the rail line north of Puerto Wilches. The ten men in San Vicente all studied academic subjects in Cuba, but while they were there they were also trained in guerrilla warfare. They returned to Colombia as a unit calling themselves the "José Antonio Galan Bridage" with the object of initiating guerrilla operations in Santander. However, they fused with the ELN upon their return, and disbursement of the Cuban funds which they were promised are now being handled through the ELN. Fabio Vásquez is the leader of the Santander ground and Víctor Medina is his lieutenant. Colombian "Army of National Liberation," November 20, 1964

He said quite frankly that to capture the ELN as a body in the mountains of Santander will be an extremely difficult proposition as the bandits are able to blend quite easily with the local scene of this relatively heavily populated area. Conversation with Colonel Jorge ROBLEDO Pulido, Chief, Colombian Army Intelligence, Re Papayal Attack and Other Subersive Activities, February 19, 1965

Father Camilo Torres Restrepo and National University Matters, Conversation with Dr. Orlando Fals Borda, September 5, 1965

At one point during riotous activities Torres and followers encountered CTC president Mercado in street and according latter Torres set his goons on him obliging Mercado and group with him pull pistols in self-defense. Mercado has announced he bringing legal charges against Torres for attempted murder.

At end deomonstration Torres reportedly barricaded self in store, refusing leave [sic] until Valencia resigned, later scaling down demand to release arrested demonstrators. Telegram from U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, to Secretary of State, October 2, 1965

According to reports received, major elements of the formerly deeply-divided Colombian extreme left have agreed to cooperate in a guerrilla enterprise under an accord entitled "Plan Aurora." These elements include the original Army of National Liberation (ELN), which is the armed wing of the Youth of Liberal Revolutionary Movement (JMRL); the Workers-Students-Peasants movement (MOEC); and the Chinese-line dissident Communist Party (PCC-ML). Also, the Soviet-line Communist Party (PCC), while not participating directly in this plan, has indicated that instead of condemning such guerrilla activity as in the past, it will lend the activists its "fraternal cooperation." ... It also appears that the consolidated apparatus will adopt the title "Army of National Liberation" in order to draw on the established "mistique" of the name. Although the JRML and MOEC had previously obtained financing from Cuba, there are indications that this source of money has dried up and that they now have turned to Red China for assistance.

The keystone in this subversive meeting of minds appears to be rebel priest Camilo TORRES Restrepo. Torres, who announced he had gone to the mountains to join the ELN in the first week of January, had previously brought the various leftist groups to the conference table through his abortive United Front political movement. Although Torres can hardly be considered the military mastermind of the "Aurora" terrorist plan, he will now likely become the leading figurehead in the movement, if it becomes operational. Progress Report on Colombian Internal Defense Plan, January 26, 1966

Elimination Camilo Torres as figure around whom various extremist groups could coalesce was a most significant development affecting Colombian internal security. Cohesion such extremists as ELN, MOEC, JMRL, PCC-ML and PCC was nascent before his removal from scene Feb. 15. ELN accusation that PCC "betrayed" Camilo to his death (EMBTEL 1131) along with other charges.

... Ultimately, Colombia should have some kind of Central Intelligence Service to eliminate competition between DAS and E-2 section of Army. While E-2 is now pre-eminent in field because of state of siege powers, its intelligence is not adequate. Telegram from Bogota Embassy to Secretary of State, March 4, 1966

[Jaime] Arenas told reporters that the ELN is presently divided into three groups -- one led by Fabio VASQUEZ Castano with 40 members; one led by his brother Manuel VASQUEZ Castano with 12 members; and a third led by Juan de Dios AGUILERA, with 20 members. The Aguilera group, according to Aernas, is at odds with the two led by the Vasquez brothers.

Asked if he had "counseled" former priest Camilo Torres to join the ELN, Arenas replied, "I accompanied him and was his collaborator. So, indirectly I may have influenced his decision to join the guerrillas. The guerrilla chiefs despised Camilo also." Defecting Guerrilla Reveals Weaknesses of ELN, March 6, 1969

Army Claims it has killed ELN Leaders Antonio and Manuel Vasquez, October 1973

Anti- Subversive Measures

The decrees were designed to inhibit assistance to the communist guerrillas, to destroy the leadership of extremist-controlled student institutions at National University, and to discourage the type of public order disturbances usually engaged in by students.

... While there had been vague rumors of a student protest to mark Lleras' presence on campus, as well as that of Rockefeller, the Colombian authorities were obviously unprepared for what actually transpired. Lleras' arrival by car at the ceremonies was the signal for about a hundred students to abandon their temporary hiding places in the extensive shrubbery surrounding the building and to begin throwing rocks and other missiles at the President of the Republic and his party.The attack was accompanied by both anti-Lleras and anti-US shourts. Lleras at first attempted to ignore the demonstrators and entered the building intent on carrying out the dedication as planned. However, when the students continued their rock-throwing at the soldiers, who were by this time reinforced by a detachment of Military Police rushed to the scene, the order was given to launch tear gas grenades to drive them off and then to pursue and to capture as many of the culprits as possible.

A two hour chase through the campus followed, punctuated by tear gas explosions and the crashing of broken windows. Finally, with about 300 troops occupying the campus, the area was pacified and Lleras left. Government Decrees Anti-Subversive Measures, November 9, 1966

Acting under state of siege authority, President Lleras decreed on October 27 the most severe anti-subversive control measures of the past 10 years. This action followed the stoning of cars carrying the President, U.S. officials, and other dignitaries within the National University grounds for the dedication of the National University Laboratory. Lleras immediately called in army troops to stop the disturbances. Colombian Decrees Against Subversion Extend to Universities, November 16, 1966

The Embassy has received the reference instruction and has undertaken a review of its estimate of GOC intelligence collection and utilization capability. Its summary conclusion is that this capability, while improving, remains far short of the optimum goal.

Neither civilian nor military intelligence operations are very effective, and both suffer from lack of trained manpower, inter-agency rivalries, unavailability of funds, poor organization and overlapping jurisdictions. However, the GOC continues with its efforts to improve this capability, and progress can be noted; for example, the GOC recently established the National Intelligence Board (JIN) and the Regional Intelligence Boards (JIS), both designed to help coordinate and increase the efficiency of the intelligence services.

The U.S. military are providing assistance, training, and advice. The local intelligence school relies heavily on U.S. equipment and training aids, and several Colombian officers have had training at Ft. Holabird, with excellent results. ... Given the limited absorptive capacity of the Colombian intelligence gathering organizations, it is probably fair to say assistance should not be increased at this time. Internal Security: Alertness to Potential Insurgency, August 18, 1967

The Counter-Guerrilla (CG) Companies are specially trained units composed of a mix of military personnel and police Carabineros. After intensive ranger and counter-guerrilla training at the Lancero Training Center in Melgar, the CG Companies are detailed to Brigade areas where they infiltrate (usually in civilian clothes) into areas in which guerrilla bands are believed to be operating. Once in position, they gather intelligence, usually through paid informants (each unit has a small sum at its disposal for the recruitment and payment of local infomants and guides), on the guerrillas operating in the areas. If they successfully locate guerrilla units, the CG Company (or the smaller squads in which they usually operate) will either engage the guerrillas or call for assistance from the nearest Army Battalion. According to military intelligence sources, these CG Companies have been responsible for most of the the successes enjoyed against guerrillas over the past several months. The Embassy is so impressed by these units that it is currently studying a proposal to lend further United States' assistance to increase their activities. Half-Year of Guerrilla Activity, January 3, 1968

Colonel Prieto states that he has been fairly successful in his efforts to stem the "vast amounts" of communist literature which arrive here through the postal system. He has several plainclothesmen stationed in the main Post Office who intercept the great bulk of this material as it arrives. The material so garnered is burned every week or so. ... Col. Prieto's assistant in charge of these matters, Captain Salamón Rojas, also conducts periodic raids on a number of known communist establishments where "harmful" communist propaganda is distributed. Police Measures Currently Used to Restrain Circulation of Subversive Communist Literature in Medellin, January 5, 1968

While there appeared to be a reduction in the number of guerrilla incidents during April, there was a major attack on three fincas in the Department of Huila by "Oscar Reyes" gang (FARC) during which one citizen was killed and 19 kidnapped, 9 of them being found hacked to death with machetes. This may indicate a change in tactics on the part of the FARC from those of wooing the campesino to those of sowing terror and securing support and collaboration through intimidation but most likely it was reprisal for having given information on guerrilla activities to the Government. Public Safety Monthly Report, May 17, 1968

The Colombian Administrative Department of Security (DAS) has enjoyed two important successes against the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) and its guerrilla arm, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Acting upon information from an informant well-placed within the PCC, security officials in Bogotá intercepted and arrested two FARC couriers returning on April 20, 1968, from Mexico with $100,000. The informant initiatially stated that the funds were from Cuba, but after the couriers were intercepted he reversed his story and claimed that the Soviets had provided these funds as well as $200,000 in June 1967. Information found at the time of the arrest indicates that the couriers might have had contact with a Soviet KGB officer in Mexico.

Although impressed by the evidence of Russian involvement with local subversives, Lleras will not move to terminate diplomatic relations. His government would be extremely embarrassed if the public learns of Soviet subversive activities, particularly since much of the press had criticized Colombian acceptance of a Soviet ambassador who had previously been declared persona non grata in Argentina. Colombian Security Agency Disrupts PCC Subversive Efforts and Implicates the USSR, May 24, 1968

Fact No. 1. Colombian rural violence had its roots in differences between the two major political parties and later evolved into pure criminality in most cases. This is not to say that Communism has had no part to play in the violence, but rather that it has represented, and continues to represent, only a portion of a larger picture.

Fact No. 2. Despite laudable progress by the Government of Colombia in national economic development, there still exist large areas of rural unemployment.

Fact No. 3. The differing ideologies of the three major guerrilla forces follow the conventional ideological divisions within the world communist movement. (Moscow, China, Cuba). [FARC, EPL, ELN]

Fact No. 4. The Colombian Military Forces, National Police and DAS have generally neutralized established insurgent and bandit groups and denied them areas of influence in other than the most remote and inaccessable areas. ... The net result of these counter-guerrilla activities has been to disperse those guerrillas who were not captured or who did not surrender to government forces. This forced dispersal, coupled with the voluntary dispersal due to ideological differences, significantly reduces the effectiveness of guerrilla operations but at the same time creates a new set of problems including among others an increasing difficulty in obtaining accurate and timely intelligence information.

Even in view of their greatly reduced effectiveness, the guerrillas continue to maintain their numbers and their capability to carry out insurgency actions. Notes on the Current Internal Security Situation in Colombia, October 29, 1968

On October 5, between the Municipalities of Páez and San Eduardo, Department of Boyaca, army troops killed Ciro Trujillo Castaño, alias Major Ciro, second in command of the FARC. ... Through an informer it was learned that Trujillo was using a certain finca as his headquarters. The informer led an army patrol to the finca in the early morning hours. As Trujillo came from the house to meet the informer, he was cut down by the troops. Public Safety Monthly Report, November 3, 1968

There has been a high jump in kidnappings, especially in the Cali area, in the last several months, resulting in a government declaration in a state of siege in the Department of Valle del Cauca. There has also been an increase in guerrilla attacks during that period, especially in the ELN (Ejercito de Liberación Nacional) and the EPL (Ejercito Popular de Revolución).

The FARC continues to follow the policy imposed upon it about two years ago by the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC) of not provoking response from the armed forces. The PCC provides the urban base for the FARC and, in spite of some differences over the PCC policy of suspension of revolutionary efforts, the FARC takes direction from and follows the political line of the PCC. Assessment of the Internal Security Situation, October 24, 1969

Press estimates of the total number of those detained reached as high as two hundred and included high government officials, prominent citizens, university professors, foreign and Colombian journalists, doctors, priests, monks, university students, peasants, and a grab bag of other professionals and foreigners including the expelled Swedish journalist and alleged KGB agent Karl Staf, a Belgian priest, a Panamanian university professor and a Panamanian journalist.

Army operations received scathing criticism from the opposition press. Many of those detained joined the opposition press in charging military intelligence forces with witchhunting, arbitrary arrests, McCarthyism, torture, and blatant disregard for judicial procedure. In a daily series which appeared in El Periodico, prisoners reported on long periods of confinement incommunicado, lack of food, toilet facilities and adequate lodging, and physical torture. A Congressional commission appointed to investigate these charges visited military detention facilities and criticized the "inhuman conditions" there and reported prisoners' charges of torture. The commission issued summonses to the Ministers of Defense and Justice, as well as other high government officials...

General Herrera's revelations weem clearly intended to underline the severity of the ELN threat, to emphasize the efficiency of military intelligence operations, and to stem the rising tide of public and private skepticism, incredulity, and criticism. To some extent, these aims have been achieved, but it is not clear that many arbitrary detentions did not occur, nor that extra legal interrogation procedures were not widely used. Roundup of ELN Urban Guerrilla Net, August 31, 1972

Termination Phase Out Study, Public Safety Project, Colombia, April 1974