Admiral Hillenkoetter. Gaitan was killed by a man named Hose Sierra. [sic] Mr. Brown. May I ask who Sierra is? Admiral Hillenkoetter. Sierra was a nephew of an army officer who was killed in 1938. This army officer's name is Cortes. Mr. Brown. It was purely personal revenge? Admiral Hillenkoetter. Yes, it was an act of reprisal. Mr. Brown. The Committee will stand adjourned.
Functions of Central Intelligence Agency, Closed-door hearing of the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Expenditures, April 15, 1948
MR. WHITE: I have been asked a number of questions on the basis of these news stories from the Hill, concerning the testimony of Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter. All I want to say on that subject is that, as Mr. Lovett told you on Wednesday, we have had various reports from the Embassy in Bogota, dating back through mid-December, forecasting demonstrations of one kind or another ...
Memorandum of the Press and Radio News Conference, Thursday, April 15, 1948, 7 P.M.
Permitting what was perhaps the first authorized publication in United States
history of top-secret intelligence documents, Admiral Hillenkoetter gave to the
subcommittee excerpts from many other intelligence messages that had reached
the State Department directly.
Marshall Scoffed at Early Warnings on Reds in Bogota,
The New York Times, April 16, 1948
The intelligence director insisted that "we did know of unrest in
Colombia, that we did know there was a possibility of violence and
outbreaks aimed primarily at embarrassing the American delegation
and its leaders, and that the information was transmitted to
officials of the Department of State.
One message, on January 29, quoted "Mr. G., a leading Colombian
Columnist," as boasting that he could count on planes and artillery
when necessary to overthrow the government, and said the Communists
had stored arms, explosives and uniforms like those of the Colombia
Army. The "Mr. G." was reported to be the intermediary between the
Soviet Embassy the the liberal leader, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, "to
whom he furnished money supposedly for his liberal movement."
Another message, dated March 10, said "Mr. S., an official of a
Latin American country in Bogota, aided Gaitanistas in bringing
contraband arms into Colombia for a revolutionary coup," and had
urged Gaitan's followers "to stike the blow as soon as possible."
Hillenkoetter was emphatic, however, in saying Gaitan's assassination
was "purely personal reprisal."
Hillenkoetter leyó a los miembros de la subcomisión párrafos
de los despachos enviados por los agentes del Servicio de Inteligencia en Colombia
acerca de los planes comunistas para provocar perturbaciones durante las deliberaciones
de la conferencia, y dijo que con una sola excepción, todos esos despachos
habían sido enviados a los correspondientes funcionarios del Departament de Estado.
Press Service Dispatches Regarding Admiral Hillenkoetter's Testimony Concerning
Bogotá Situation, April 16, 1948
This article refers to statements made by Rear Admiral Roscoe H. HILLENKOETTER head of the Central
Intelligence Agency, and concludes from Hillenkoetter's remarks that Wall Street is directly to blame for
Gaitán's death.
The editorial focuses attention on the revelation of an American intelligence organization in Latin
America as illustrated by disclosures following the Bogotá disorders.
It seems reasonably certain, not only from the uprising in Colombia but
from the condition of the conference before it was interrupted, that the Administration,
though it had warning of trouble, had not made a successful diagnosis of the trouble.
It seems to have fixed its attention on the "Communist-inspired agitators," and not
on the deep and violent popular unrest which was boiling up just under the surface.
It is a mistake to expect, and foolish of Admiral Hillenkoetter to talk as if we had a right to expect,
the Central Intelligence Agency to appraise the situation in Colombia and South America. That
was the business of the President and Admiral Leahy, of Secretary Marshall, and Mr. Armour,
after they had studied Admiral Hillenkoetter's reports and the State Department's reports. To
suppose that an intelligence agency can make these final judgements is in effect to say that the
intelligence agency could be not only the eyes and the ears, but also the brains of the Government.
There never was, and there never will be, such an intelligence agency.
I am at a loss to understand approval of a public airing in open session of the accusations and
allegations in conection with intelligence reports on the recent disturbances here.
In addition to furnishing international Communists with the finest type of propaganda, it has
completely "blown the cover" of our CIA people here in Colombia and, I am
sure, to almost the same degree, generally in Latin America and perhaps throughout the world.
Hillenkoetter's public airing came as a distinct shock to us and we had no intimation
prior to the fact that such a move was contemplated. Subsequent investigation
indicates, however, that his public statement had the approval of Leahy and Forrestal.
Hearing scheduled for today has been postponed. Have not yet ascertained reason for
postponement but suspect that conversations that Mr. Lovett had with Congressmen
Andrews, Wadsworth and Taber contributed to it. All of the above-mentioned Congressmen
deplored the public airing. ... Mr. Lovett had already taken the initiative to have drafted
a Presidential directive which would "preserve the confidential character of foreign
intelligence activities."
[News] stories appearing during past year regarding US intelligence activities hold us up
to ridicule by our friends and enemies alike. Such publicity not only seriously damaging
security interests but undermines effectiveness all activities.
As dramatic an event as the bogotazo was in the first year of the
Agency's history, it is difficult, twenty years later, to point
with confidence to any specific impact on the course of affairs.
Admiral Hillenkoetter was convinced that the Agency's record of
warning was a good one, and a number of critics were disarmed by
his testimony. Yet some within the Agency appear to have reacted
as if the Bogota affair had indeed been an intelligence failure,
or at the least a warning of institutional vulnerability to charges
of not having adequately forecast one or another crisis. The
bogotazo thus appears to have been one event - perhaps a pivotal
early event - that led to a strong emphasis in reporting upon
"beating the newspapers" on any story of crisis involving
Communists. One veteran observer speaks of a "Bogota syndrome" -
that is, an extraordinary concern with early warning of crises and
emphasis on the Communist angle.
It is established now that one José Sierra killed Gaitan because he had successfully defended in court
that morning the murderer of Sierra's uncle.