The assassination of Abd al-Karim Qasim, Prime Minister of Iraq, was attempted on Oct. 7, 1959.
Govt of Abd al-Karim Qasim
ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTAssassination Attempt and InvestigationINTERNAL POLITICS
Assassination Trials
Mosul Uprising and Kirkuk MassacreINTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Communist Party of Iraq
Other Internal Iraqi Politics
Iraq-US
Iraq-UK
Iraq-USSR
Neighboring States
Withdrawal from Baghdad Pact
Assassination Attempt and InvestigationEditorial Note on Assassination Attempt in Foreign Relations of the United States
Qasim relates attempt details, Oct 11, 1959
Qasim Hospital Testimony, Oct 13, 1959
Police blaming communists, Oct 13, 1959
Report on Attempted Assassination, Oct. 14, 1959
Qasims Version of Attack, Oct 15, 1959
Baath Responsibility, Oct 19, 1959
Qasim Newspaper Statement, Oct 28, 1959
Newspaper Reports US Planes, Oct. 28, 1959
Personal Revenge, Oct 30, 1959
Investigating Committee
Qasim Attempt Investigating Committee Findings Unknown, Oct. 14, 1959
Investigation of Attempt, Oct. 25, 1959
Palestinians Suspected
Rumor of Palestinian Assassins, Sept. 24, 1959
Embassy Source re Anti Communist Palestinians, Oct. 20, 1959
Palestinian Communists Suspected in Qasim Attempt, Oct. 14, 1959
CIA SuspectedAn April 10, 2003, UPI story by Richard Sale, citing anonymous U.S. intelligence sources, claimed that Saddam Hussein, while working as an agent of the CIA, took part in the failed assassination attempt of October 7, 1959. The article cites only anonymous sources, yet its claims have been repeated in dozens of news articles, by The BBC, The Telegraph, CBS, The Boston Globe, The San Francisco Chronicle, The Asia Times, Counterpunch, Z Magazine, Democracy Now, and many others.
Assassination TrialsQasim Assassination Sentences, Feb 29, 1960
Qasim Assassination Trials, Feb 13, 1960
Trial in Absentia, Feb 26, 1960
Emb Denies Contact w Rikabi, Jan 27, 1960
Tell Qasim Being Fed Disinfo, Jan 27, 1960
Farid Dhia Mahmud, Jan 26, 1960
Mahdawi Imperialist Plot, Jan 27, 1960
Jernegan denies Rikabi payment, Jan 30, 1960
Marsh 5 hour testimony, Jan 25, 1960
Trials in mid stride, Jan 16, 1960
Mahdawi Investigation, Nov 21, 1959
Implicated Govt Ministers, Jan 26, 1960
Protesting Mahdawi allegation, Jan 26, 1960
Mahdawi Emb Attack Threat, Jan 18, 1960
Trials Postponed, Dec 19, 1959
Assawi confesses UK agent, Feb 3, 1960
xr Nasser requests removal Mahdawi, Feb 9, 1960
Mahdawis accusation not believed, Jan 30, 1960
Marsh, Jan 12, 1960
Mosul Uprising and Kirkuk MassacreMosul Executions, Sept. 25, 1959
Mosul Executions, Sept. 27, 1959
Prosecutions of Communists, Aug. 4, 1959
Arrests of Communists, Aug. 4, 1959
Qasim Eliminating Communist Influence Govt., Aug. 23, 1959
Arrest of 185 Communists, Aug. 29, 1959
Communist Party of IraqMarch 8, 1961 CIA report on The Iraq Communist Party and the Question of Legalization
On January 1, 1960, the Law of Associations No. 1 was promulgated, allowing the formation of political parties by "loyal citizens" for the first time in the eighteen months since the revolution.
Rumors of Communist Plot, July 6, 1959
Warning CPI May Assassinate Qasim, July 7, 1959
Comments on Soviet Strategy, July 9, 1959
Qasim Taking Steps Curb Communists, July 10, 1959
Qasim Position on Communists, July 11, 1959
No Communists in Cabinet Expansion, July 17, 1959
Trend to Dissociate from Communists, July 18, 1959
Cab changes weaken communists, Aug 6, 1959
Communist Roundup, Aug 7, 1959
Anti Communist Moves, Aug 11, 1959
License granted to splinter group of Communist Party of Iraq (CPI) in order to cause split in group.
Qasim statements re Communism, May 31, 1960
Communist Prosecutions, Aug 5, 1960
Official Actions Against Communists, May 9, 1961
Other Internal Iraqi PoliticsFormer Saudi Finance Mininister Warns of Iraqi Army Unrest, Feb. 27, 1959
Qasim Bodyguards, June 1, 1959
Hardan's Plan to Overthrow Qasim, July 27, 1959
Assessing Political Situation, July 31, 1959
Qasim not Believed to be Communist, Aug. 1, 1959
Qasim's Personality, Aug. 31, 1959
Special National Intelligence Estimate on Possible Developments in Iraq, dated Sept. 24, 1959
Prospects for Internal Stability, Sept. 28, 1959
Message to Iraqi Fugitives in Syria, Oct. 13, 1959
Odd Reference to Provocation, Dec. 5, 1959
Reporting on Qasim Speech, Dec. 7, 1959
Report Qasim Hostile to US, Dec 28, 1959
Smith Act Request, Jan 15, 1960
Assawi Qasim Advised of Plots, Jan 29, 1960
Iraq-US
U.S. Diplomat Sees Qasim as Possible Counterbalance to Communists, Mar. 17, 1959
U.S. Urging Cairo Cease Qasim Attacks, June 17, 1959
US Arms Sales Intended Demonstrate Qasim Support, Aug. 22, 1959
Fearing attacks on Qasim would aid Communists, Aug. 27, 1959
No One Else in Sight Take Qasims Place, Aug. 28, 1959
US Concern Over UAR Attacks on Qasim, Sept. 6, 1959
US urging UAR stop press attacks, Sept 18, 1959
US Handling Contacts with Iraqi Nationalists, Oct. 5, 1959
US Regret Over Attempt, Oct. 8, 1959
The policy of the National Security Council with regard to Iraq was set out on October 1, just one week before the attempted assassination, at the 420th Meeting of the NSC. G. Lewis Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, presented a report of the NSC's Interdepartmental Working Group on Iraq, which concluded that the best way to encourage Qasim to resist Russian influence was through third parties, particularly Arab states, and that dramatic U.S. action was not desirable. Id. This was in accord with the views of the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, John D. Jernegan, who had sent a telegram advising that although the stability of Iraq was worsening, U.S. intervention would only make things worse. Id.
Lewis Jones also reported that he'd received reports of rumors from Cairo and Baghdad that attempts would be made on the life of Qasim, in response to his anticipated execution of nationalist prisoners. Id..
On October 13, the State Dept advised U.S. diplomats to communicate to the British and Canadian governments that U.S. policy was one of non-intervention. Iraq was to be left alone to work out its own problems without outside interference.
It seems improbable that the CIA would have attempted to assassinate a foreign leader when the National Securiy Council had just met and recommended working through third countries to encourage Qasim to oppose the Iraqi communists, and while U.S. diplomats were doing so.
Implies US Policy is not to Oppose Qasim, Oct. 15, 1959
Prediction Qasim Demise Would Benefit Communists, Nov. 17, 1959
Congressman Kasem Meets Qasim, Nov. 27, 1959
US Encouraging Neutral Position, Dec. 13, 1959
Allegations of US Involvement in Rashid Ali Plot, Dec. 14, 1959
Reference to AID study on political and juridical strategy, Sept 11, 1961
Iraq-UKBritish Position re Qasim, Sept. 29, 1959
British Position re Qasim, Oct. 1, 1959
Mtg with Iraqi Officials and Dentist, Dec. 4, 1959
Iraq Buying British Weapons, Aug. 12, 1959
Iraq-USSRSoviets Blame US for Northern Uprising, Mar. 10, 1959
Evidence Moscow Influence, April 18, 1959
No Evidence Moscow Pact, April 20, 1959
Iraq Will Never Join Eastern Bloc, July 1, 1959
Neighboring StatesSyrians Blame Baathists, Oct. 22, 1959
Egypt Comm Take Adv Qasim Demise, Sept. 27, 1959
Damascus Campaign Against Qasim, Sept. 23, 1959
Baghdad Pact Views of Iraq Communism, April 16, 1959
Iranian Concerns over Iraqi Communists, April 29, 1959
Egypt Fears UK Communist Collusion, Oct. 8, 1959
Syrian Demo Against Qasim, Sept. 24, 1959
Turks Concerned Communist Influence, Jan. 9, 1960
Libyan Views on BP, March 31, 1959
UAR optimistic about Qasim resisting communists, June 25, 1959
Egyptian Official on Qasim Communism, Feb. 16, 1959
Iran Believed UAR Soviet Tool, Feb. 10, 1961
Withdrawal from Baghdad PactOn March 24, 1959, Iraq advised the other members of the Baghdad Pact that it was withdrawing from the agreement. Iraq then notified the U.K. and U.S. The Conversation between Iraqi Foreign Minister Jawad and U.S. Ambassador Jernegan was apparently an amicable one. Jawad was advised by Qasim to explain to Jernegan and other interested ambassadors that the withdrawal was a recognition of reality rather than an unfriendly act. Jernegan answered that he didn't think the State Department would be upset, although he was concerned that a public announcement could be perceived as meeting one of the "eight demands" of the Iraqi leftist parties. Jawad assured him that the decision had neither been made in response to leftist demands, nor in response to pressure from Gamel Abdel Nasser, then President of the United Arab Republic, as British Ambassador Sir Hugh Trevelyan had suggested. Id.
The move was not entirely unexpected. Two months before, David A. Fritzlan, a Counselor of the U.S. embassy in Iraq, asked the State Department to advise the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff that all "operating Pact sections" had been moved to Ankara, Turkey.
SYG Position on Iraqi Withdrawal, March 26, 1959
Soviet Press on Leaked Docs, Aug. 20, 1961
The stolen Baghdad Pact documents apparently contained locations to be attacked with nuclear weapons in the event of problems with the USSR.
At least some of the leaked CENTO documents were genuine, because they were recorded in the indexes of Top Secret documents, although the documents themselves were apparently missing.
Copyright Paul Wolf, 2005.
