1959-1962 - Govt of Abd al-Karim QasimPolitical Situation In Iraq1963 - Govts of Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Abd al-Salam Arif
Mosul Uprising and Kirkuk Massacre
Iraqi Withdrawal from Baghdad Pact
Qasim and the Communist Party of Iraq
Other Conspiracies and Loose Ends
Assassination Attempt on Prime Minister Qasim
US Policy Leading up to the Assassination Attempt
British Policy and Views on Qasim
Views of Neighboring States
Iraqi Government Investigation, and Various Theories
Feb. 1963 CoupFor Further Research
Baath Shatters Communist Party of Iraq
Communist Attempt Overthrow Govt
Other Baath Politics While in Power
Anti-Govt Plot, May, 1963
"Reactionary Plot and Spy Ring" Crushed, Oct. 1963
Nov. 1963 Coup
Other 1963
1959Assassination Attempt on Prime Minister Qasim
The assassination of Abd al-Karim Qasim, Prime Minister of Iraq, was attempted on Oct. 7, 1959.
Assassination Trials Qasim Assassination Sentences, Feb 29, 1960
Qasim Assassination Trials, Feb 13, 1960
Trial in Absentia, Feb 26, 1960
Emb Denies Contact w Rikabi, Jan 27, 1960
Tell Qasim Being Fed Disinfo, Jan 27, 1960
Farid Dhia Mahmud, Jan 26, 1960
Mahdawi Imperialist Plot, Jan 27, 1960
Jernegan denies Rikabi payment, Jan 30, 1960
Marsh 5 hour testimony, Jan 25, 1960
Trials in mid stride, Jan 16, 1960
Mahdawi Investigation, Nov 21, 1959
Implicated Govt Ministers, Jan 26, 1960
Protesting Mahdawi allegation, Jan 26, 1960
Mahdawi Emb Attack Threat, Jan 18, 1960
Trials Postponed, Dec 19, 1959
Assawi confesses UK agent, Feb 3, 1960
xr Nasser requests removal Mahdawi, Feb 9, 1960
Mahdawis accusation not believed, Jan 30, 1960
Political Situation In Iraq Editorial Note on Assassination Attempt in Foreign Relations of the United States
Special National Intelligence Estimate on Possible Developments in Iraq, dated Sept. 24, 1959
Qasim Newspaper Statement, Oct 28, 1959
Qasim statements re communism, May 31, 1960
Qasim relates attempt details, Oct 11, 1959
Police blaming communists, Oct 13, 1959
Qasim Hospital Testimony, Oct 13, 1959
Baath Responsibility, Oct 19, 1959
Personal Revenge, Oct 30, 1959
US urging UAR stop press attacks, Sept 18, 1959
Anti Communist Moves, Aug 11, 1959
Cab changes weaken communists, Aug 6, 1959
Congressman Kasem Meets Qasim, Nov. 27, 1959
Reporting on Qasim Speech, Dec. 7, 1959
Qasim not Believed to be Communist, Aug. 1, 1959
Qasim's Personality, Aug. 31, 1959
Iraq Will Never Join Eastern Bloc, July 1, 1959
Qasim Position on Communists, July 11, 1959
Trend to Dissociate from Communists, July 18, 1959
Assessing Political Situation, July 31, 1959
Prospects for Internal Stability, Sept. 28, 1959
No Communists in Cabinet Expansion, July 17, 1959
Qasim Taking Steps Curb Communists, July 10, 1959
Former Saudi Finance Mininister Warns of Iraqi Army Unrest, Feb. 27, 1959
Report Qasim Hostile to US, Dec 28, 1959
Missing study on political and juridical strategy, Sept 11, 1961
Smith Act Request, Jan 15, 1960
Qasims Version of Attack, Oct 15, 1959
Mosul Uprising and Kirkuk Massacre Mosul Executions, Sept. 25, 1959
Mosul Executions, Sept. 27, 1959
Prosecutions of Communists, Aug. 4, 1959
Arrests of Communists, Aug. 4, 1959
Qasim Eliminating Communist Influence Govt., Aug. 23, 1959
Arrest of 185 Communists, Aug. 29, 1959
Comments on Soviet Strategy, July 9, 1959
US Policy Leading up to the Assassination Attempt
The policy of the National Security Council with regard to Iraq was set out on October 1, just one week before the attempted assassination, at the 420th Meeting of the NSC. G. Lewis Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, presented a report of the NSC's Interdepartmental Working Group on Iraq, which concluded that the best way to encourage Qasim to resist Russian influence was through third parties, particularly Arab states, and that dramatic U.S. action was not desirable. Id. This was in accord with the views of the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, John D. Jernegan, who had sent a telegram advising that although the stability of Iraq was worsening, U.S. intervention would only make things worse. Id.
Lewis Jones also reported that he'd received reports of rumors from Cairo and Baghdad that attempts would be made on the life of Qasim, in response to his anticipated execution of nationalist prisoners. Id..
On October 13, the State Dept advised U.S. diplomats to communicate to the British and Canadian governments that U.S. policy was one of non-intervention. Iraq was to be left alone to work out its own problems without outside interference.
An April 10, 2003, UPI story by Richard Sale, citing anonymous U.S. intelligence sources, claimed that Saddam Hussein, while working as an agent of the CIA, took part in a failed assassination attempt against the Prime Minister of Iraq on October 7, 1959. The article cites only anonymous sources, yet its claims have been repeated in dozens of news articles, by The BBC, The Telegraph, CBS, The Boston Globe, The San Francisco Chronicle, The Asia Times, Counterpunch, Z Magazine, Democracy Now, and many others.
It seems improbable that the CIA would attempt to assassinate a foreign leader when the National Securiy Council had just met and , and when all U.S. diplomatic efforts were in the direction of working with Qasim and encouraging other countries to do so.
US Encouraging Neutral Position, Dec. 13, 1959
Implies US Policy is not to Oppose Qasim, Oct. 15, 1959
US Arms Sales Intended Demonstrate Qasim Support, Aug. 22, 1959
No One Else in Sight Take Qasims Place, Aug. 28, 1959
US Handling Contacts with Iraqi Nationalists, Oct. 5, 1959
US Regret Over Attempt, Oct. 8, 1959
U.S. Urging Cairo Cease Qasim Attacks, June 17, 1959
U.S. Diplomat Sees Qasim as Possible Counterbalance to Communists, Mar. 17, 1959
US Concern Over UAR Attacks on Qasim, Sept. 6, 1959
Prediction Qasim Demise Would Benefit Communists, Nov. 17, 1959
No Evidence Moscow Pact, April 20, 1959
Evidence Moscow Influence, April 18, 1959
Fearing attacks on Qasim would aid Communists, Aug. 27, 1959
British Policy and Views on Qasim British Position re Qasim, Sept. 29, 1959
British Position re Qasim, Oct. 1, 1959
Mtg with Iraqi Officials and Dentist, Dec. 4, 1959
Iraq Buying British Weapons, Aug. 12, 1959
Views of Neighboring States Syrians Blame Baathists, Oct. 22, 1959
Egypt Comm Take Adv Qasim Demise, Sept. 27, 1959
Damascus Campaign Against Qasim, Sept. 23, 1959
Baghdad Pact Views of Iraq Communism, April 16, 1959
Iranian Concerns over Iraqi Communists, April 29, 1959
Egypt Fears UK Communist Collusion, Oct. 8, 1959
Syrian Demo Against Qasim, Sept. 24, 1959
Turks Concerned Communist Influence, Jan. 9, 1960
Libyan Views on BP, March 31, 1959
UAR optimistic about Qasim resisting communists, June 25, 1959
Egyptian Official on Qasim Communism, Feb. 16, 1959
Iran Believed UAR Soviet Tool, Feb. 10, 1961
Iraqi Withdrawal from Baghdad PactOn March 24, 1959, Iraq advised the other members of the Baghdad Pact that it was withdrawing from the agreement, then notifying the U.K. and U.S.. The Conversation between Iraqi Foreign Minister Jawad and U.S. Ambassador Jernegan was apparently an amicable one. Jawad was advised by Prime Minister Qasim to explain to Jernegan and other interested ambassadors that the withdrawal was a recognition of reality rather than an unfriendly act. Jernegan replied that he did not think the U.S. State Department would be upset, although he was concerned that a public announcement could be perceived as meeting one of the "eight demands" being made on Qasim by Iraqi leftist parties. Jawad assured him that the decision had neither been made in response to leftist demands, or in response to pressure from Gamel Abdel Nasser, then President of the United Arab Republic, as British Ambassador Sir Hugh Trevelyan had suggested. Id.
The move was not entirely unexpected. Two months before, David A. Fritzlan, a Counselor of the U.S. embassy in Iraq, asked the State Department to advise the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff that all "operating Pact sections" had been moved to Ankara, Turkey.
SYG Position on Iraqi Withdrawal, March 26, 1959
Soviet Press on Leaked Docs, Aug. 20, 1961
Keys to the CENTO Safe
Qasim and the Communist Party of IraqMarch 8, 1961 CIA report on The Iraq Communist Party and the Question of Legalization
On January 1, 1960, the Law of Associations No. 1 was promulgated, allowing the formation of political parties by "loyal citizens" for the first time in the eighteen months since the revolution.
License granted to splinter group of Communist Party of Iraq (CPI) in order to cause split in group.
Communist Prosecutions, Aug 5, 1960
Communist Roundup, Aug 7, 1959
Official Actions Against Communists, May 9, 1961
Iraqi Government Investigation, and Various Theories Rumor of Palestinian Assassins, Sept. 24, 1959
Report on Attempted Assassination, Oct. 14, 1959
Qasim Attempt Investigating Committee Findings Unknown, Oct. 14, 1959
Investigation of Attempt, Oct. 25, 1959
Embassy Source re Anti Communist Palestinians, Oct. 20, 1959
Palestinian Communists Suspected in Qasim Attempt, Oct. 14, 1959
Newspaper Reports US Planes, Oct. 28, 1959
Other Conspiracies and Loose Ends Allegations of US Involvement in Rashid Ali Plot, Dec. 14, 1959
Rumors of Communist Plot, July 6, 1959
Warning CPI May Assassinate Qasim, July 7, 1959
Hardan's Plan to Overthrow Qasim, July 27, 1959
Message to Iraqi Fugitives in Syria, Oct. 13, 1959
Odd Reference to Provocation, Dec. 5, 1959
Soviets Blame US for Northern Uprising, Mar. 10, 1959
Qasim Bodyguards, June 1, 1959
Assawi Qasim Advised of Plots, Jan 29, 1960
1963Feb. 1963 Coup Qasim Attacks US - American Plots Feb 9 1963
Qasim nightmare over - press reporting Feb 12 1963
Film of Qasim Execution Feb 12 1963
Implications of 2d Iraqi Revolution Feb 14 1963
Mobiloil Meeting Feb 14 1963 2
Communists Blame CIA Feb 15 1963
Communists Opposing Revolt Feb 15 1963
Sequestration List Feb 19 1963
Communists Criticize Coup Feb 19 1963
Chase Bank Briefing Feb 25 1963
Qasim accused of being Western agent Mar 5 1963
Jewish Observer allegation March 14 1963
State Dept Re Jewish Observer art Mar 15 1963
Soviet Allegations of US Infl in Coup April 23 1963
Iraq Embassy Loyalty July 18 1963
Baath Shatters Communist Party of Iraq Communist Attrocity Investigation Mar 4 1963
Baath Shatters Communist Party, June 11, 1963
Communist Confession, June 11, 1963
Communist Attempt Overthrow Govt July 3 Communist Plot to overthrow govt July 9 1963
Events following revolt, July 10, 1963
Communist Massacres Aug 9 1963
Communist Executions Aug 13 1963
Coup Plotters Executed Aug 1 1963
Other Baath Politics While in Power Rumors in Baathi Iraq May 21 1963
Director of Police Request, July 9, 1963
Hardan Tikriti requests visit U.S. May 31 1963
Anti-Govt Plot, May, 1963 Anti-Baath plot exposed May 31 1963
Nationalist Plotters May 26 1963
[recheck they were nationalists, what was this about?]
"Reactionary Plot and Spy Ring" Crushed, Oct. 1963 Sequestration List Oct 26 1963
Espionage Network, Oct 22, 1963
Old Regime Plotters Nov 2 1963
Oct 17 Reactionary Plot Oct 22 1963
Nov. 1963 Coup Reports of Imminent Power Move Sept 5 1963
Failure to use Amile Daat I Nov 19 1963
Startling Reversal Nov 14 1963
New Baath Leadership Nov 13 1963
Brit views on Baath Nov 13 1963
Baath Party Split, Abd al-Salam Arif takes over Dec 4 1963
Removal of Baathis from Iraqi Government Dec 10 1963
National Guard Dec 14 1963
Other 1963Spy Ring Discovered July 23 1963
For Further ResearchMost of the documents used in this study are from the U.S. State Department Central Files and the files of the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. They were scanned at the National Archives in College Park, MD, where they've been sitting, declassified, for many years. The National Intelligence Estimate and the National Security Council documents are from the Foreign Relations of the United States series. I do not have the originals, just the transcriptions. Several papers, including "The Iraq Communist Party and the Question of Legalization" are CIA records from the CREST computer at the Archives. These are marked CIA RDP" at the top and bottom of each page.
Here is a Personality list of U.S. and foreign officials mentioned in the Foreign Relations of the United States volume for the Mid-East, 1958-1960.
Here are the "pull slips" used to access the General and Classified Records of the Baghdad Embassy, 1959-1960, found in Record Group 84. Here is the pull slip for the files on the Qasim assassination trials. Several records related to revolutions and coups are still classified, including: Sept 14, 1959; Dec 10, 1959; June 30, 1959; and Oct 29, 1959.
The following records have been withdrawn from the records of the State Dept. (RG 59) for the year 1963, related to revolutions and coups: Feb 11, 1963; Feb 11, 1963 (2); Feb 12, 1963; Feb 13, 1963; Feb 13, 1963 2; Feb 13, 1963 3; Feb 14, 1963; Feb 14, 1963 (2); Feb 14, 1963 (3); Feb 16, 1963; Feb 17, 1963; Feb 18, 1963; Feb 26, 1963; Feb 28, 1963; March 9, 1963; Mar 23, 1963; April 1, 1963; April 11, 1963; April 27, 1963; May 6, 1963; May 6, 1963 (2); May 11, 1963; May 11, 1963 (2); May 13, 1963; May 13, 1963 (2); May 14, 1963; May 24, 1963; May 31, 1963; June 3, 1963; June 7, 1963; June 27, 1963; July 3, 1963; July 13, 1963; July 15, 1963; July 16, 1963; July 17, 1963; July 18, 1963; July 24, 1963; July 26, 1963; Aug 1, 1963; Aug 13, 1963; Aug 15, 1963; Aug 27, 1963; Sept 13, 1963; Sept 17, 1963; Sept 20, 1963; Oct 1, 1963; Oct 24, 1963; Oct 31, 1963; Nov 9, 1963; Nov 14, 1963; Nov 16, 1963; Nov 20, 1963; Nov 21, 1963; Nov 21, 1963 (2); Nov 21, 1963 (3); Nov 26, 1963; Nov 29, 1963; Nov 30, 1963; Dec 5, 1963; Dec 9, 1963; Dec 12, 1963; and Dec 21, 1963.
An audio tape of Radio Baghdad's broadcasts during the first hours of the Feb. 12, 1963 coup was also permanently withdrawn from State Dept files.
Copyright Paul Wolf, 2005.
