The Ford Foundation

By Eric Thomas Chester, 1995

Few organizations carry the aura of the Ford Foundation. It has come to symbolize the liberal establishment, the voice of the powerful but reasonable. In spite of the scathing criticisms of conservatives, the Foundation has continued to fund a variety of groups promoting social reform over a span of more than four decades. Yet the Ford Foundation also maintained a close and continuing relationship with the intelligence community throughout the most confrontational years of the Cold War.

In particular, the Foundation established in 1951 a subsidiary affiliate, the East European Fund, which disbursed its considerable resources to projects oriented toward political exiles from the Soviet Union. Over the next few years, the Foundation and its affiliated fund worked closely with other organizations within the covert network, including the International Rescue Committee. By 1956, the East European Fund had ceased to function, while the Ford Foundation had decided to lessen its involvement in the clandestine affairs of the intelligence community. Nevertheless, Foundation officials and the CIA's hierarchy remained in close contact, albeit at a lower level of intensity than before.

The Foundation had functioned as a small, regionally based fund from 1936 until 1951, when it began receiving tens of millions of dollars in dividends from the huge endowment of stock bequeathed to it by Henry and Edsel Ford. Almost overnight, the Ford Foundation became the largest and most influential philanthropy, with the entire globe as its concern.1

In January 1951, Paul Hoffman became the first president of the Foundation following its accession to much of the Ford family fortune. A liberal Republican and former corporate executive, Hoffman had been chosen by Truman to head the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the agency charged with implementing the Marshall Plan to revive the Western European economies. Hoffman was also a firm advocate of covert operations as an important component of Cold War strategy. During his tenure, the ECA had cooperated closely in the development of psycho- logical warfare programs aimed at selected targets. Open propaganda was seen "as part of the aggressive attack against Communist influence in Western Europe," while clandestine operations also constituted a significant component of be ECA agenda. For instance, a committee of influential Italian business executives sponsored local radio programs that were secretly funded and "cooperatively prepared" with ECA assistance. Clandestine funding was also provided for anti-communist trade unions in Italy and France, unions that had withdrawn from the dominant, but Communist-controlled, trade union federations in those countries.2

During "the heyday of ECA's covert activities" from 1949 through the first half of 1951, Frank Wisner had approved an arrangement under which the ECA could undertake certain clandestine projects in a "gray" area between open propaganda and the high-risk operations undertaken by the Office of Policy Coordination to destabilize the Soviet bloc countries. In the latter part of 195 1, after Hoffman had left the government for the Ford Foundation, the decision was made "to taper off ECA participation in covert activities," without entirely withdrawing from this arena.3

Beginning in April 1951, the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) had been charged with coordinating the entire array of intelligence operations, short of paramilitary intervention. The Economic Cooperation Administration functioned as an integral component of this coordinated approach, revising its strategic guidelines to conform to the policy objectives established by the PSB. In this context, the ECA reported to the PSB that it had engaged "in some gray and black propaganda. These programs are coordinated with CIA. A Black propaganda is distinguished by its attribution to a bogus source. To lend credibility to false or deliberately misleading information, intelligence agencies arrange to have the information appear as if it originated from an objective and authoritative source, or even from within the ranks of the targeted enemy.

Hoffman brought several key advisers with him from ECA to the Foundation, including Milton Katz, who advised Hoffman on "broad questions of war and peace." Katz had served as chief deputy to Averell Harriman, the director of all ECA program in Europe -- a powerful post in the postwar period; Katz briefly succeeded Harriman in this position before joining the Ford Foundation. During World War II, Katz had helped to supervise the European missions of the Secret Intelligence (SI) division of OSS from London, serving under William Casey, later CIA director in the Reagan administration. Katz thus had an extensive background in the intelligence community before his tenure with the ECA and the Ford Foundation.5

Another influential adviser to Hoffman with close ties to the intelligence community was Richard Bissell. As with Katz, Bissell came to the Ford Foundation from the ECA, where he sometimes served as its representative to the Psychological Strategy Board, as the PSB coordinated covert operations and developed common policy guidelines for the entire foreign policy ipparatus. Bissell joined Hoffman at the Foundation in early 1952, where much of his work concerned economic development. (Bissell was an economist by training.) In the fall of 1952, Bissell was temporarily transferred back into the government to serve on a select committee reviewing national security policy for the incoming Eisenhower administration. While working on this project, Bissell remained on the Ford Foundation staff, on loan to the government. Hoffman had enthusiastically supported Eisenhower's presidential campaign, and he was anxious to help the new administration, even by using the Foundation's resources.6

Bissell returned to the Foundation once the select committee had submitted its secret report, but he soon became dissatisfied with his situation. In January 1954, Bissell left the Ford Foundation to become special assistant to Allen Dulles, then CIA director. When Frank Wisner was pressured into leaving his post as deputy director of plans in late 1958, Dulles chose Bissell to replace him. As the Agency official overseeing all covert operations, Bissell had overall responsibility for the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, and, with Dulles, he accepted the responsibility for its failure by resigning from the CIA in February 1962. Thereafter, Bissell pursued a Iucrative career in the private sector.7

Hoffman directed the Foundation from his home in Pasadena, California, setting general policy guidelines in consultation with his circle of close advisers, including Milton Katz. Everyday authority was delegated to a New York office, which actually screened the incoming grant proposals and implemented the policy directives. The New York office was headed by Bernard Gladieux, who had filled a top post in the War Production Board during World War II, and who had then become executive assistant to the secretary of commerce, a position he occupied from 1945 to 1950. While in this post, he acted as the "official representative and liaison of the Department of Commerce with the Central Intelligence Agency." After shifting to the Ford Foundation in 1950, Gladieux remained a committed proponent of psychological warfare programs targeted at the Soviet bloc countries. He continued to maintain contacts with high officials in the Agency; while an officer of the Foundation, he also "served in a consultant and liaison capacity with the Central Intelligence Agency involving certain highly sensitive matters." Soon after being appointed director of central intelligence in February 1953, Allen Dulles reassured Gladieux that he had been kept "fully advised of recent developments" and that he wanted "to work closely with" Gladieux in the future.8

Within the New York office, John Howard had primary responsibility for screening overseas grant proposals. This meant that Howard was a key liaison between the Foundation and the CIA. Howard had spent much of his career within the State Department, rising at one point to a post as special assistant to Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Although Howard did not join the Foundation staff until 1952, he remained on staff well after Hoffman's term of office as president had ended the following year.9

The East European Fund

Although the New York office made many of the decisions on specific grant requests, Hoffman decided to decentralize the process. Large block grants would be disbursed to the boards of affiliated funds, which would then determine specific grants within their areas of concern. Several of these subsidiary funds were created by the Ford Foundation soon after Hoffman became president, but one in particular handled Soviet exile affairs. Officially launched in March 1951 under the name of the Free Russia Fund, the name was changed to the East European Fund in September 1951 to avoid further confusion with the more provocative operations of the CIA proprietary handling the same arena, the American Committee for Liberation. During its first three years, the Fund received $3.8 million from the Ford Foundation, its sole source of income.10 George Kennan was entrusted by the Ford Foundation trustees with full authority to oversee and direct the new fund. Kennan's ties to the intelligence community were intimate and longstanding, but he later insisted that, although key CIA officials "were well aware of what we were doing" at the East European Fund and "were pleased about it," nevertheless "they did not interfere."11 In fact, the hidden links between the Fund and the Agency went far beyond the limits suggested by Kennan's protestations.

Kennan had left the State Department in June 1950 to become a research scholar at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, already famous for having provided sanctuary for Albert Einstein. While at the institute, Kennan initiated his scholarly investigations into Soviet foreign relations during the first years after the Bolshevik Revolution. Yet he also remained an influential consultant to the government throughout the last years of Truman's term in office.12

Kennan had left his post as counselor to the secretary of state in order to be able to take a longer view of the tense relations between the superpowers. In this context, Kennan commissioned a "historical analysis of civil resistance, political warfare and para-military activities" as a means of blocking hostile Soviet actions. His choice for this project was James Cross, an OSS veteran who later became a CIA operative working under Frank Wisner within the clandestine services division.13

Cross went "on leave from the CIA" to join Kennan at the institute. He had initially resisted this posting out of fear that "he would jeopardize his status with the Agency," but CIA officials agreed to count the time spent at the institute in determining promotions within the CIA, as long as Cross continued to work directly under Kennan's supervision. To further muddy the lines of authority, "Cross said he would ask Wisner what the possibilities were for the Agency's paying all or part of his salary, but that he [Cross] thought that it was quite unlikely that they would be willing."14

Thus Cross worked for Kennan at the Institute for Advanced Study (which relied on funding from the Ford Foundation), while on leave, with credit, from the CIA. In October 1951 Cross presented an interim report on his investigation into possible countermeasures against potential Soviet attacks. One contingency covered in the report was a Soviet military invasion of Western Europe, considered a genuine possibility by some high government officials in the aftermath of the Korean War. Kennan and Cross had previously discussed "the advisability of scorching an industrial area," should the Western allies have to retreat in the face of Soviet troop movements. In his interim report, Cross suggested that following such a course of action would only cause the Soviets to have all skilled workers and technicians "scooped up and trundled off to the east." He proposed an alternative policy of partial destruction that would "assure reduced production, but which will place at a minimum the inducements to the Russians to deport lock, stock, and barrel."15

Obviously Cross's research into the topic of civil resistance was far from scholarly in purpose and tone. After November 1951, when Kennan agreed to become U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Cross continued to work under Richard Bissell's "supervision." This enabled the Ford Foundation to extend its Ending for this national security related research, even after Kennon's departure. Of course, Bissell must have had the implicit trust of the Agency for such an arrangement to be sanctioned. With Kennan gone, Cross soon decided to shift jobs, moving on to Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Center for International Studies, a recipient of covert funding from the CIA for sensitive studies on international affairs.16

Kennan's research projects, on his own and in conjunction with others, were a secondary element in his work for the Ford Foundation. It was in his role as president and chief policymaker of the East European Fund that Kennan exercised his authority. To actually direct the fund, Kennan chose George Fischer as its director and principal staffer. Fischer was the son of Louis Fischer, a famous journalist who had covered the Soviet Union for fifteen years for The Nation, and Bertha Makoosha, who worked with Soviet bloc refugees in Munich for be International Rescue Committee Wing the 1950s. The younger Fischer had established a reputation as an expert on the political divisions among Soviet emigres, having studied this topic as a postgraduate fellow at the Harvard University Russian Research Center. He had also participated in a Harvard project to interview Soviet exiles in Germany immediately prior to his appointment by Kerman to the East European Fund post.17

In me spring of 1951, when George Fischer took over as the director of the new fund, he confronted a difficult personal dilemma. In the midst of the Korean War, he was about to be drafted into the Air Force, with an assignment to a code-breaking project directed at Soviet military operations. Fischer was unwilling to fight the conscription notice, while Kerman was reluctant to take advantage of his clout with the administration to block Fischer's induction into the Air Force. Instead, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., progressive ideologue, OSS veteran, and IRC board member, wrote to Averell Harriman, then President Truman's special assistant for Cold War coordination. Schlesinger informed Harriman that the Ford Foundation's program for Soviet exiles would "play an indispensable part in our political warfare against the Stalinist regime" and that Fischer possessed "unique qualifications" for the director's post.18 Schlesinger also approached Frank Wisner, "in case CIA feels sufficiently interested in the Free Russia project to help rescue it." Harriman quickly responded by getting "in touch with Frank Wisner about George Fischer," thereby enabling Fischer to assume his position within the covert network.19

From its formation, the East European Fund sought to establish good relations with the intelligence community. At the first meeting of the board in March 1951, the trustees authorized Kennan, as the Fund's president, to send identical letters to Bedell Smith, director of central intelligence; J. Edgar Hoover, FBI director; and Dean Acheson, secretary of state, informing each of them of the new fund and its goals. Kennan's letter conceded that projects "affecting the morale and well-being" of Soviet exiles were bound to "have some political significance." The Fund's trustees were certain that they were "serving purposes which are in deepest accord with the feelings of our people, and the policies of our Government." Accordingly, the trustees pledged joint consultations, should any of the three top officials feel that the Fund was about to "assume a character" that would "be undesirable from the standpoint of Government policy."20

The East European Fund also worked closely with the leading CIA proprietary utilizing Soviet bloc refugees. In a June 1951 prospectus initially outlining the basis for the Fund, George Fischer reported on preliminary discussions with two high officials of the National Committee for a Free Europe Spencer Phenix and William Griffith. Once in operation, the Fund continued to work "in close association with the NCFE."21

On the other hand, the Fund sought to establish its own distinctive role in its relations with exiles from the Soviet Union, one different in tone from that of the American Committee for Liberation, the other CIA proprietary in this field. Toward this end, the East European Fund concentrated on cultural projects with psychological warfare implications, while AMCOMLIB initially emphasized the creation of a unified directorate of Soviet exiles capable of projecting a public presence, and, when that failed, it redirected its efforts to launching Radio Liberation, its shortwave radio service to the Soviet Union. This difference in agendas provided a certain distinction in outlook, although the interests of the two organizations still tended to overlap.

Providing relief aid to new immigrants from the Soviet Union became a major focus of concern for the Fund from its inception. Fischer sought to finance several organizations operating within the Russian exile community as relief centers. In allocating this money, the Fund sought to "balance its grants to organizations of all leanings." Yet it also proposed to exclude "the authoritarian extremes," including both Communist sympathizers and "extreme Tsarist-type monarchist and other clearly authoritarian groups on the 'right.'" Despite its official policy limiting support to moderate groups, the East European Fund contributed generously to organizations linked to the authoritarian Right. The Tolstoy Foundation, controlled by leading monarchist exiles and also covertly funded by the CIA, received more than two hundred thousand dollars from the Fund for a grant to help Soviet exiles adjust to life in the United States. Although the Fund's staff knew that the Tolstoy Foundation was "viewed with some suspicion and distrust by some of the recent emigres,'' who were repulsed by its nostalgia for czarist rule, the Fund continued to authorize additional grants.22

George Fischer readily justified his pragmatic acceptance of this distasteful choice of allies. He was even prepared to cooperate with the most influential of the right-wing Soviet exile organizations, the neofascist Solidarists, or NTS. According to Fischer, the NTS, "with a proud belief in a profoundly authoritarian philosophy, strategy and tactics," had been able to gain considerable influence, "at least on this side of the Iron Curtain." Although he was dismayed by the success of this conspiratorial organization, Fischer still insisted on "using NTS just as much -- and just as regretfully -- as I would Tito or Franco."23

Within months after this policy had been implemented, top officials in the Ford Foundation acted to reverse it. In September 1951, the Ford Foundation informally notified the East European Fund that future aid to refugees from the Soviet Union would be channeled directly from the Foundation to well-established relief agencies headed by Americans, agencies such as the International Rescue Committee. (That summer the Foundation had approved a half-milliondollar grant to the Committee's Resettlement Campaign.) Kennan agreed with this decision, noting the "many difficult problems" encountered by the Fund in providing financial assistance to relief agencies controlled by Russian emigres, in particular an implicit involvement in the "fierce mutual jealousies" that so characterized this community.24

In the aftermath of this decision, the East European Fund concentrated on projects utilizing the literary and research skills of Soviet refugee intellectuals. When exiles in contact with the Fund had resettlement difficulties, they were directed to the International Rescue Committee. After a "very friendly discussion," the Fund and the IRC agreed that the Fund would "refer cases of Soviet exiled professionals to us [IRC] for help," with "certain special cases" being sent directly to David Martin, then the Committee's executive director.25

Resettlement aid to Soviet exiles was not the only program area undertaken by the East European Fund. The Fund undertook two major projects aimed at more effectively utilizing the talent of Soviet exile intellectuals. One project involved the creation of a research institute to establish an academic setting for intensive studies of the Soviet system by refugee scholars. Several organizations with overlapping interests, including the Committee, were involved in a series of efforts to create such an institute. The result provides an insightful case study in the interrelated functioning of the different components of the covert network, and is further examined in chapter 8.

The Chekhov Publishing House

The other major project originated from within the East European Fund, with the full backing of the Ford Foundation. In September 1951, the Fund created the Chekhov Publishing House, a firm dedicated exclusively to the publication of Russian-language literature, and virtually the only one outside of the Soviet Union. A 1953 Ford Foundation review committee justified its support for renewed funding for the project by explicitly affirming that the "ultimate purpose" was "to help win the battle for men's minds" within the Soviet emigre community. In the review committee's opinion, Chekhov Publishing represented an effective response to "the Soviet Union's intensive use of Russian book publication in political warfare." Should Chekhov founder, the committee argued, Russian-speaking exiles would have no alternative but to read literature coming from the Soviet Union and would, therefore, be continually exposed to the Soviet line.26

During its first three years, Chekhov published more than one hundred titles, including books smuggled out of the Soviet Union -- classics that had been banned or censored, as well as new works by emigre authors. This output included many works of genuine literary merit, as well as a great deal of tendentious propaganda. The publishing firm depended almost entirely on its grants from the East European Fund, so that in 1954 only $50,000 out of a total $250,000 budget came from sales receipts. Indeed, Chekhov received nearly $800,000 from the Ford Foundation over a five- year span. The need for such a large subsidy is not surprising, given the generous pricing policy followed by this unusual publishing venture. To make Chekhov's books easily available to the Russian exile community, each volume was priced between $1.25 and $3.00, with one-fourth of the output distributed at no cost through cultural associations and charitable organizations.27

Chekhov Publishing constituted a conscious venture into psychological warfare by the Ford Foundation through its subsidiary, the East European Fund, but it was only one of several projects with national security implications funded by the Foundation during the first turbulent years of the Cold War. After 1956, the Foundation became more circumspect in its ties wit me intelligence community. In part, this reflected the departure of Paul Hoffman from the post of president. Further evidence of Hoffman's commitment to clandestine activities is provided by his continued involvement with covert operations in the years following his departure from the Foundation. Hoffman became chair of the finance committee for the Asia Foundation, a CIA proprietary conduit for the Far East, similar in its scope to the National Committee for a Free Europe. Only in 1958, upon assuming a post as adviser to the United Nations on economic development, did Hoffman reluctantly resign from the Asia Foundation board.28

Residual Links with the CIA

Hoffman's successors sought to reduce the Ford Foundation's visibility and its potential exposure to attack. Still, the Foundation continued to maintain cordial relations with the CIA well after Hoffman's departure in February 1953. Bernard Gladieux, head of the New York office from 1950 to 1954, was worried at first that Rowan Gaither, the new president of the Foundation, might enforce a hands-off policy. Nonetheless, soon after this transition, Gladieux reported to C. D. Jackson, then Eisenhower's special assistant on psychological warfare and a vital link between the White House and the intelligence community, that the Ford Foundation "may be able to do something in [the] Cold War."29

Five years later, top officials at the Foundation were still regularly consulting with the CIA hierarchy on a range of possible cooperative efforts. Don Price, brought in by Gaither as an associate director of the Foundation, wrote Matthew Baird of the CIA to set up a discussion on "potential ideas for future action." Joining Price would be John Howard, still a central figure in the oversight of overseas programs. Baird responded by inviting Price and Howard to a meeting at CIA head- quarters with "40 or 50 Agency representatives" from the Clandestine Services Division. The agenda would feature a presentation by Price and Howard in which they would "discuss informally those programs of the Foundation" that they felt would "be of general interest to the Agency." Afterward, the Ford Foundation officials would meet with smaller groups of CIA staff to discuss specific projects.30

The CIA and the Ford Foundation maintained close relations throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s. The Foundation's continuing interest in psychological warfare projects is demonstrated by its generous support for the Congress for Cultural Freedom. The Foundation allocated more than two million dollars in grants to the Congress from 1957 to 1966, a period during which it was also receiving covert funding from the CIA. With these funds, the Congress for Cultural Freedom organized international conferences for anticommunist intellectuals, while also sponsoring an array of literary journals, including Encounter.

When the New York Times exposed the Agency's links to the Congress, the Ford Foundation, and its president McGeorge Bundy, who had only recently retired from his position as national security adviser to President Lyndon Johnson, agreed to provide a $1.5 million grant for 1967, with a guarantee of four more years of generous, albeit decreasing, levels of support. Renamed the International Association for Cultural Freedom, the organization remained solvent until 1974 with funding from the Ford Foundation, and then finally dissolved in 1979. The Foundation thus stepped in to become the principal source of funding for the Congress for Cultural Freedom, just as the CIA was compelled to terminate its secret funding of the organization.31

Although the full extent of the Ford Foundation's cooperation with the CIA over the last three decades cannot be determined as long as the relevant files remain closed or unavailable, it is clear that the Foundation worked closely with the intelligence community on several sensitive operations during the 1950s, the heyday of the Cold War and the period when the government most energetically pursued psychological warfare operations against the Soviet Union and its dependent allies.

As the International Rescue Committee experienced the transition from World War II to the Cold War, it became enmeshed in an intricate web of organizations, with overlapping, and sometimes conflicting, jurisdictionsall of them functioning within the same sector of the covert network. If the IRC was to survive in this new milieu, it had to create its own special place as a refugee relief agency, while at the same time maintaining cordial relations with competing organizations, each with its own intimate contacts to the rich and powerful. Ultimately, the Committee succeeded in this tricky maneuvering, but not before confronting a series of pitfalls and crises.

Chapter 6 (pp 43-53) of Covert Network Progressives, the International Rescue Committee, and the CIA (M.E. Sharpe, 1995)


Footnotes:

1. William Greenleaf, "The Ford Foundation The Formative Years," 1958, chap. 1, pp. 12-13, accession 1189, Research Center, Henry Ford Museum, Greenfield Village, Dearborn, Mich.; Ford Foundation, Annual Report (1951).

2. E. A Lilly, Memorandum, "A Short History of the PSB," December 21, 1951, pp. 68-73. OCB Secretariat Series, NSC Staff Papers, 1948-61, White House Office Files, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kans.

3. Lilly, "Short History," December 21, 1951, OCB Secretariat Series, Eisenhower Presidential Library, pp, 68-73.

4. John Sherman, Memorandum of Record, October 8, 1951, box 2, Papers of the Psychological Strategy Board, Truman Presidential Library.

5. Robert Bendiner, "Report on the Ford Foundation," NYT Magazine, February 1, 1953; William Donovan to Bedell Smith, Memorandum, box 1A, folder 7, Donovan Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute; Alan R. Raucher, Paul G. Hoffman Architect of Foreign Aid, pp. 66, 88-89.

6. Richard Bissell, interview, June 5, 1967, Eisenhower Presidential Library; Raucher, Hoffman, pp. 66, 97; Ranelagh, Agency, pp. 160-62.

7. Ranelagh, Agency, pp. 312-13; Powers, Helms, pp. 93-118, Who's Who in America, 1981-82, s.v. "Bissell, Richard"; National Cyclopedia of American Biography, J174, s.v. "Bissell, Richard."

8. Who's Who in America, 1988, s.v. "Gladieux, Bernard"; Bernard Gladieux, Statement, July 8, 1954, House Select Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations, Hearings on Tax-Exempt Organizations 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954, p. 1198; Allen Dulles to Bernard Gladieux, February 16, 1953, box 56, Allen Dulles Papers, Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.

9. State Department Biographic Register (Washington, D.C. GPO, 1951). 10. George Fischer, Memorandum, Trustee Supplement to Monthly Report #3 Confidential, September 4, 1951 folder Free Russia, June 1951 - December 1951, Organization Files, Frank Altschul Papers, Herbert H. Lehman Suite, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University; Minutes of the Board of Trustees of the Free Russia Fund, September 21, 1951, Organizational Files, Lehman Suite, Columbia University; Richard Magat, The Ford Foundation at Work Philanthropic Choices, Methods, and Styles, p. 165.

11. "George Kennan Oral History Transcript," p. 24, Ford Foundation Archives.

12. Isaacson and Thomas, Wise Men, p. 507; Kerman, Memoirs, pp. 3-4.

13. Richard Bissell, Draft Memorandum for the Officers of the Ford Foundation Concerning the Completions of the Activities of the George F. Kerman Project at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J. [February-March 1951], p. 3, appendix to "Kennan Oral History," Ford Foundation Archives; Who's Who in America, 1976, s.v. "Cross, James Eliot."

14. Bissell, Draft Memorandum [1952], appendix to "Kennan Oral History," Ford Foundation Archives; Robert Strunsky to George Kennan [1951], appendix to "Kerman Oral History."

15. James Cross to George Kennan, Memorandum October 11, 1951, appendix to "Kennan Oral History," Ford Foundation Archives.

16. Bissell, Draft Memorandum [1952], appendix to "Kerman Oral History," Ford Foundation Archives; NYT, April 27,1966.

17. George Kerman to Paul Hoffman, January 9, 1951, appendix to "Kerman Oral History," Ford Foundation Archives.

18. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. to Averell Harriman, May 30, 1951, box 289, Averell Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.

19. Schlesinger to Harriman, May 30, 1951, Harriman Papers, Library of Congress; Averell Harriman to Arthur Schlesinger Jr., June 5, 1951, box 289, Harriman Papers.

20. Attachment to the Minutes of the Board of Trustees of the Free Russia Fund, March 23, 1951, folder Free Russia Fund, January 1951 - May 1951, Organization Files, Altschul Papers, Lehman Suite, Columbia University.

21. George Fischer, Memorandum, Project Aid to Russian Fugitives from Soviet Russia and to Russian Cultural Activities in the United States, January 4, 1951, folder Free Russia Fund, June 195I - December 1951, Altschul Papers, Lehman Suite, Columbia University; Elizabeth Meredith to Joseph St. Clair, February 7, 1952, box 12, Papers of Eastern European Fund, Ford Foundation Archives.

22. George Fischer, Memorandum, "Monthly Report #1," July 1, 1951, box 6, Joseph Alsop Papers, Library of Congress; Donovan to Bedell Smith, Memorandum, December 16, 1950, box 1A, folder 7, Donovan Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute; Stanley Gordon and George Parker to Bernard Gladieux, Memorandum "Free Russia Fund, Inc.," July 25, 1951, appendix to the "Kennan Oral History," Ford Foundation Archives.

23. George Fischer to Melvin Lasky, September 29, 1951, box 12, file Der Monat, Papers of the Eastern European Fund, Ford Foundation Archives.

24. Fischer, Memorandum, Trustee Supplement to Monthly Report #3 Confidential, Altschul Papers, Lehman Suite, Columbia University; George Kerman to Paul Hoffman, November 29, 1951, folder East European Fund, 1951-61, Altschul Papers.

25. George Fischer to Senior Staff, Memorandum, August 17, 1951, box 13, Papers of the East European Fund, Ford Foundation Archives; Richard Salzmann to David Martin et al., August 17, 1951, Papers of the East European Fund.

26. Memorandum, "Report on the Chekhov Publishing House," Merle Fainsod Papers, Harvard University Archives, Harvard University.

27. Nicholas Wreden, "Books in Russia," p. 531; Greenleaf, "Ford Foundation," chapter 3, pp. 22-23, Henry Ford Museum.

28. Asia Foundation, Program Bulletin, March 1958; Paul Hoffman to Brayton Wilbur, box 70, Hoffman Papers, Truman Presidential Library.

29. C. D. Jackson, Log, April 24, 1953, box 34, C. D. Jackson Papers, Eisenhower Presidential Library.

30. Don Price to Matthew Baird, March 5, 1958, GEN 58 "Campbell to Chicago University," Ford Foundation Archives; Matthew Baird to Don Price, April 9, 1958, GEN 58 "Campbell to Chicago University," Ford Foundation Archives.

31. NYT, May 14, 1967; Peer Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy The Congress for Cultural Freedom and Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe, pp. 233, 240, 246-47.