Propaganda, Violence and Manipulative Persuasion
by Paul Blackstock, Quadrangle Books, 1964
Propaganda in the context of political warfare, has been termed "the planned dissemination of news, information, special arguments, and appeals designed to influence the beliefs, thoughts, and actions of a specific group." 1 The relationship of the rational use of force to persuasion is symbolized in the Latin motto which Louis XIV had inscribed on his canons ultima ratio regum (the last argument of kings). Curiously enough, Soviet theory and practice subscribe to the same principle "persuasion first, coercion afterward." 2 Persuasion may thus be likened to Santayana's characterization of love an ultraviolet angel at one end of the spectrum and a red devil at the other; it has been defined as "the act of influencing the mind by arguments and reasons."
Persuasion is a broader term than propaganda, since in practice the "reasons" may be an admixture of threats and appeals which include a large element of spiritual or physical coercion and violence. For this reason, in political warfare, the more specific term is "manipulative persuasion." It includes the use of bribery, blackmail, and the threat or application of such physical acts of violence as kidnaping, torture, and the use of "controls" over selected targets or agents. A single, clear-cut example will serve to clarify the concept.
A half-frozen, half-starved prisoner of war is persuaded to collaborate with the enemy by a combination of threats of violence to his family (which is living in enemy-occupied territory) and promises of warm food and preferential treatment. His continued collaboration is then assured and controlled by a judicious combination of threats and rewards. This form of manipulative persuasion has been widely practiced in wartime and is standard practice in many covert operations in time of peace. The simplest and most familiar form of manipulative persuasion is bribery, in a variety of disguises ranging from unsolicited Christmas gifts to anonymous bank deposits in Switzerland. But manipulative persuasion frequently does spiritual and physical violence to its object and may have lasting traumatic effects.
In contrast to manipulative persuasion, the relationship of violence to ordinary propaganda is more indirect and attenuated, and varies with the propaganda source and the political or social system in which it originates. For example, propaganda in a democracy stems from many different sources and is normally a form of fairly harmless persuasion; that is, it attempts to get people to do things -- to vote a party ticket or to buy a particular brand of soap chips or detergent of their own free will. Behind the propagandist there stands only a party campaign chest or a private advertising agency. In a totalitarian regime, such as Stalinist Russia, propaganda emanates from one source only, the state. Its predetermined end is to make the public believe that everything the state does is in the best interest of the "people" whether they like it or not, and, if they are "truly democratic," they will of course like it. The inference of violence in such a situation is always clear, for back of the propagandist stands not a private sponsor but the secret police, ready to persuade with more direct methods. The fact that in the U.S.S.R. under Khrushchev the secret police have been downgraded in no way alters this basic principle. Internally, under a totalitarian regime, propaganda is a substitute for violence.
As an instrument of intervention, totalitarian or any other propaganda aimed abroad is likewise a substitute for violence, and like its domestic counterpart it is taken seriously in proportion to the extent that it is supported by the implied threat of armed force. In his early beer hall days, few paid much attention to Hitler, but when his armies were poised for attack in 1939, he had to be taken seriously. Similarly, countries behind the Iron Curtain, or enclaves such as Berlin, pay close attention to everything emanating from Moscow. With the lessons of Poland and especially Hungary in mind, they seek to read in the daily outpouring of the Soviet propaganda machine some clue to their eventual fate.
In all stages of aggressive intervention, propaganda is used to inspire terror, and physical terror in turn is used for its propaganda effect. The use of assassination as a political weapon in the internal struggle for power, particularly in a revolutionary or counter-revolutionary context, is familiar. In Czarist Russia, the conspiratorial-terrorist organization Narodnaya Volya (The People's Will) after two years of intensive activity finally succeeded in assassinating Czar Alexander II in March, 1881, an act which was followed by the brutal organized counter-terror of the Security Police, which quickly reduced Revolution "to a cottage industry." 3 Sorel, the French apostle of "creative violence," laid the philosophic groundwork for the sporadic political terror and assassination, the so-called "propaganda of the deed," which characterized European revolutionary movements in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Political murder found its most devoted adherents prior to World War I in the Balkans, where the secret Macedonian terrorist society, IMRO, covered itself with infamy for years. Finally, a Serbian society achieved dubious immortality with the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, an incident which escalated into World War I.
Following the Russian Revolution, terrorism was frowned upon and fell into disrepute among orthodox Leninist revolutionaries, since in What Is To Be Done the master had condemned it as part of the superannuated tactical baggage of the Economists, a Right deviationist faction. 4 In January, 1963, Soviet Premier Khrushchev strongly reaffirmed Lenin's condemnation of assassination as an instrument of policy. Although his speech was delivered to a congress of the East German Socialist United (Communist) party in Berlin, it was reportedly aimed as a warning to Cuban leader Fidel Castro and his followers not to employ terrorist tactics against Latin American politicians. Khrushchev recalled that in the struggle for liberation against the Czarist regime there were people who "believed that one must take the ax in one's hands, commit terrorist acts against representatives of the regime, so as to secure the success of the revolution." Noting that Lenin's brother, Alexander Ulyanov, had been executed for an attempt on the life of the Czar, Khrushchev quoted Lenin as saying on the day of his brother's execution, "We shall go another road. Only the road of the struggle of the masses under the leadership of the party of the working class can secure victory. Lonely heroes can die beautifully, but they are not in a position to change the social-political order, nor to achieve victory in revolution." 5
Ironically, since World War II, after having been formally abandoned by the political Left, terror and assassination have been adopted as a favorite instrument of right-wing extremist groups. For example, ultra-nationalists of the Secret Army Organization in Algeria and France have become foremost exponents of terrorist tactics. On an infinitesimally smaller scale, the occasional political bombings reported in the United States, in areas such as Los Angeles, have likewise been ascribed to right-wing extremists. 6 In contrast to the nineteenth century, this penchant for the "propaganda of the deed," a logical extension of purely vocal dissidence, has thus become a hallmark of the authoritarian syndrome, the tendency of the typically militant personality to move to right-wing extremes of thought and action. Individual acts of terror connected with the integration movement in the Southern states of the United States in the 1960's illustrate the authoritarian syndrome at work. The assassination of Negro integration leader Medgar Evers in Jackson, Mississippi, and the senseless bombing of a Negro church in Birmingham, Alabama, which resulted in the deaths of four children, are cases in point. 7 Although the evidence, as in most such incident, is necessarily incomplete, it points to the work of individual fanatics nursing real or imaginary grievances who translate vocal dissidence into direct action beyond the pale of law. The case of Lee Oswald, who shot President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963, in the most sensational assassination since Sarajevo in 1914, probably falls into this category.
In the context of political warfare, such as that which prevailed in Algeria for several years, physical terror, kidnapping, and assassination serve a double purpose. First, political opponents may be temporarily or permanently removed from the scene, and second, the violence itself is used to create fear and hatred and to discredit one political group in the eyes of another. Operationally, this is the essence of forced disintegration or atomization, by which the political and social structure of the state is split apart. The technique was effectively used by the Nazis in extending control and influence abroad and figured notably in their seizure of Czechoslovakia in 1938. More recently, such terror tactics have been incorporated into the doctrine of the dissident French officers and their Secret Army Organization, set forth in Colonel Lacheroy's "A Lesson in Revolutionary Warfare." This doctrine insists that in any seizure of power by a militant, determined faction, a decisive test must be avoided until the insurrectionists are ready to strike with maximum force. Thus the first or "pre-insurrectional" phase concen- trates on selective terrorism and the exploitation of terrorist acts for their propaganda effect. In practice, according to a reliable observer, this has meant "murdering opponents, intimidating with plastic bombs, and seeking to 'intoxicate' the non-Moslem masses of Algeria and the excitable and romantic elements among French university students." 8 A persistent campaign of bombings and assassinations resulted in over five hundred deaths and a thousand additional casualties in Algeria alone during 1961, and continued on a similar scale during the first quarter of 1962.
Although frowned upon as a matter of formal Leninist revolution- ary doctrine, in practice the most brutal forms of coercion and violence have been employed by Communists. Communist terror has been used both as a technique of internal governance under the Stalinist regime in the U.S.S.R., and as a means of extending power and influence abroad to a point where covert control has been achieved. According to a recent U.S. Department of State White Paper, A Threat to the Peace, North Viet-Nam's Effort to Conquer South Viet-Nam, 9 terror has been effectively used by the Communist faction, the Viet Cong, in extending covert control over areas legally within the jurisdiction of the government of South Viet-Nam. The report states in part "Assassination, often after the most brutal torture, is a favored Viet Cong tactic. Government officials, schoolteachers, even wives and children have been the victims. Literally hundreds of village chiefs have been murdered in order to assert Viet Cong power and to instill fear in the populace." The actual figures indicate a level of terrorist activity even higher than the ultra-nationalist record in Algeria "In 1960 the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam claimed that about 1,400 local Government officials and civilians were assassinated by the Viet Cong. Approximately 700 persons were kidnaped during the year. In the first six months of 1961, more than 500 murders of officials and civilians were reported and about 1,000 persons were kidnapped." 10
With these developments in such widely displaced theaters as Algeria and Viet Nam, the theory and practice of the "propaganda of the deed" has come full circle. At first it was a favorite playtoy of the bomb-throwing anarchists and revolutionaries of the nineteenth century. Later it was denounced by Lenin, only to be taken up again and systematized by the Nazis and other ultra-nationalists. Today it is practiced by the totalitarian extremes of both the Right and the Left. The New Assassins, with their doctrine of "revolutionary warfare" in Algeria, and the Communistled terrorists in the rice-paddies of Viet Nam are mounting the old brand of combined open and covert assault on organized societies and governments.
In setting political and social groups against each other, martyrs have great propaganda value as symbols, and are valuable aids in the creation of mythologies and an atmosphere of bitter-end militancy. Both the Nazis and the Communists have developed a hierarchy of political martyrs whose memory is kept alive on "anniversary" occasions. In the case of political strikes, such as those against the Marshall Plan in France in 1947, Communist agents have been known deliberately to provoke the police and gendarmerie into acts of repressive violence in order to exploit the resulting "martyrs to the cause" for propaganda purposes. More recently (July, 1961), in connection with disturbances in the Congo, the Katangese Minister of Interior, Godefroid Munungo, reportedly told one of his white mercenaries, "This week, I need some United Nations victims." Accordingly, the ambush of a United Nations unit near Kamina was ordered. The episode is indicative of how far the doctrine of "creative violence" has spread in the so-called under- developed areas of the world. 11
Once the martyr has been found, the propagandists keep his memory alive as an integral part of a political mythology. Anniversaries of deaths, and occasionally even of births, are celebrated with religious pomp and circumstance. The role of both Utopias and myths as genuine historical forces, particularly the myth of the general strike, has been analyzed by Sorel. 12 The Italian sociologist Gaetano Mosca observes that
Almost all political assassins lose their lives in the execution of their enterprises. Many of them become martyrs to an idea in consequence, and the veneration usually paid to them is one of the less honorable, but not least effective means of keeping revolutionary propaganda alive. 13
The role of persuasion (ranging from simple propaganda appeals to violence and coercion) in subversion is familiar, but it is more complex than in the case of forced disintegration. The massive use of propaganda plus the physical paraphernalia of a militant movement (flags, banners, marching societies, etc.) all create a persuasive moral atmosphere conducive to winning converts. Conversion and subversion are, of course, opposite sides of the same coin. But it should be emphasized that the experience itself is a moral one -- however evil may be the cause served -- and in the case of totalitarian movements, such as Nazism or Communism, frequently takes on a mystic, quasireligious quality.
The totalitarian concept of the state as a "community" or "peoples' community," in the old religious sense of a "communion of saints," is common to Nazism and Communism. Such a community is to the totalitarian zealot a holy thing which must be protected from contamination at all costs, and with the appropriate techniques, blessed in the history of the Western world by the Spanish Inquisition. It is significant that the Russian Nihilist, Nechayev, was fascinated by the Jesuit Order as have been many authoritarians since. Thomas Mann, as early as 1924, drew a picture of the type of authoritarian personality which was to emerge a decade later in Nazi Germany. This prototype, the Jesuit Naphta in The Magic Mountain, was fascinated by the totalitarian ideal expressed in the formula "An absolute Command! Iron discipline! Rape, obedience, terror ... the army regulations of the Prussian Frederick or the Spaniard Loyola, pious and stern to the death!" 14 With prophetic insight Thomas Mann criticized the semi-religious concept of "community" which underlies the totalitarian state and accounts in part for its undeniable hold over the loyalties -- including the will to self-sacrifice -- of its devotees "It gave nothing to the individual in his critical worth, but only to the [ ] and leveling Community, to the mystical submersion in it -- a submersion that was at the same time both dissolute and ascetic." 15 The subversion of the individual personality into the Nazi Gemeinschaft, a new, unholy "communion of saints," has been brilliantly dramatized in the following dialogue from the play, The Races, by the late Ferdinand Bruckner
TESSOW It has nothing to do with your five senses; it's entirely a question of having an idea you can give your life to at last. ... We had to descend into the depths to discover the one meaning in life -- the community. We were starving of a superfluity of brains and the self- seeking which it fostered. (Takes a long breath.) At last I'm no longer myself.
KARLANNER (Slowly) Then what are you?
TESSOW Part of the great comradeship ... there is no life outside it. A materialist never really lives. Out of our innermost beings our sun has risen, the sun of youth. Don't torture yourself any longer. There is no sacrifice too great for us to make in this crisis. Because only our passion for heroic action will bring the sun back to Germany. 16
The moral basis, the depth of emotional and ideological commitment of converts to the secular faith of Communism, has been fully documented in The God That Failed, the "confessions" of such former Communists or fellow-travelers as Arthur Koestler, Ignazio Silone, Richard Wright, Andre Gide, Louis Fischer, and Stephen Spender. 17 Victor Serge's The Case of Comrade Tulayev 18 gives a comparable literary portrayal of the faith of the old Bolsheviks in the U.S.S.R. during the period of the Great Purges (1936-1938). The addictive quality of Communism is such that for many who renounce their faith, the withdrawal symptoms after a "lost weekend in Utopia" are both agonizing and permanently damaging. A significant percentage of both former Nazis or Communists have become attached to new cults of violence after their disillusionment with either lost cause. This behavior pattern has been described by Louis Fischer
Among the ex-Communists and among those Soviet supporters who, like myself, were never Communists, there is a type that might be called the authoritarian by inner compulsion. A changed outlook or bitter experience may wean him from Stalinism. But he still has the shortcomings which drove him into the Bolshevik camp in the first place. He abandons Communism intellectually, yet he needs an emotional substitute for it. Weak within himself, requiring security, a comforting dogma, and a big battalion, he gravitates to a new pole of infallibility, absolutism and doctrinal certainty. He clings to something outwardly united and strong. Often he deserts Communism because it is not secure enough, because it zigzags and flipflops and thus deprives him of the stability he craves. When he finds a new totalitarianism, he fights Communism with Communist- like violence and intolerance. He is an anti-Communist "Communist."
Doriot, a French Communist leader, member of the Third Inter- national's ruling executive committee, became a Fascist and crusaded fiercely against Communism. Laval, former Communist, former French Premier, was later pro-Nazi and reactionary. Similarly, since the war, many Italian, Rumanian, Hungarian and Polish Fascists and German Nazis, many thousands of them, have joined the nationalistic, totalitarian Communist Party of their countries. Totalitarians of all feathers understand one another. 19
In the case of subversion, persuasive appeals may be so intense that the subverted individual often experiences profound emotion akin to religious "conversion," in others he may be merely bought, like Judas, for the traditional thirty pieces of silver, or like many half-starved prisoners of war who have become enemy "collaborators," for a bowl of warm soup and the promise of privileged treatment.
Bribery has thus been used extensively as a form of manipul- ative persuasion in the wide range of political warfare. In the eighteenth century, funds for this purpose were publicly provided. The first appropriation act of the first U.S. Congress in 1789 contained a contingent fund for the "bribery" of foreign statesmen in the pursuit of American national interests. 20 In more recent times, such funds are usually discreetly camouflaged in national budgets or even in secret treaties. A secret pact proposed by the Soviet Union to Bulgaria in the months preceding the final Nazi-Soviet break in 1941 provided for delivery, by the Soviets, of very large sums of bar gold. Since interstate loans are made not on the basis of gold transfers but as extensions of credit, this provision could hardly have been included except as a thinly disguised bribe.
The use of bribery tends to be far less effective as a means of persuasion in practice than it would appear to the novice in political warfare. Throughout the eighteenth century, the major European powers made heavy outlays for this purpose from secret funds, frequently with disappointing results. To support their intervention in Swedish affairs in the 1740's, England, France, Russia, and even Denmark spent enormous sums on the bribery of political party leaders. But legislators did not feel themselves obligated by these bribes and acted as they or their party leaders felt justified. By contrast, in Poland, each member of the Diet (with a liberum veto power) behaved like a sovereign state, and having once sold his vote, held to the agreement, so that the Polish Diet could be literally purchased for a relatively small outlay of secret funds. 21 At the time of the Seven Years War (1756-1763), not only Frederick the Great but most other statesmen of the time were convinced that the bribes flowing into the pockets of Bestuzhev- Riumin, the Russian Foreign Minister, directly influenced his decisions -- an impression which Bestuzhev deliberately cultivated as he needed money desperately. Recent historical research, however, has shown that the huge sums paid out for this purpose by Austria, Saxony, and, above all, by England, had very little effect on the broad lines of Bestuzhev's policy. 22
The Czarist experience with Bulgarian politicians in the 1880's confirms the limitations of bribery as an instrument of political warfare. One official summarized the lessons learned as follows
As for the money which has been spent in order to win over some influential Bulgars -- I believe that money has been paid out at a complete loss. Sometimes much can be done with money, but not everything. I have often noticed that this money remains in the hands of intermediaries. It is a very delicate weapon and difficult to manage. We claim that the Bulgarians of the party at present in power are paid by the Austrians and English. I doubt that; they are paid otherwise, by the support given to their thirst for domination and other passions. 23
Contemporary experience points to the same conclusion. A responsible intelligence service operating in the Middle East estimated that by 1960 Saudi Arabia had already paid out over three million dollars in a vain attempt to arrange for the assassination of President Nasser of Egypt. 24
Manipulative persuasion, inoffensively called "control," is a standard element of covert operations. In the collection of secret intelligence, for example, the individual informant or source is frequently controlled or made dependent on his contact by means of payment in money, goods, or perquisites, and in some cases, narcotics, which of course represent the ultimate in control since for the addict they are physiolog- ically indispensable, and are both expensive and difficult to obtain in most societies. This type of manipulative persuasion also includes control of key individuals through their mistresses or physicians. The latter variant was probably a factor in the case of Benes and the Soviet seizure of Czechoslovakia. Such ordinary forms of control are frequently supplemented by blackmail (often effective with sexual deviates) and threats of physical violence or of betrayal to the police or secret police, as individual circumstances may indicate. Sanche de Gramont cites a number of case studies which illustrate graphically the use of manipulative persuasion. Indeed, the recruiting or subverting of agents and their subsequent control by the operational networks of the Great Powers is one of the most fascinating aspects of the intelligence industry, and contributes to the perennial popularity of both spy-thriller fiction and serious literature dealing with the craft of intelligence and espionage. 25
The ever-present threat of betrayal to the state (security) police is a reciprocal bond of control in most conspiratorial or underground organizations within a police state. Dostoyevsky's novel, The Possessed, reflects the plan -- attributed to the anarchist Nechayev -- according to which four members of a conspiratorial group together murdered the fifth on the excuse that he was an informer, thus providing an interlocking chain of shared guilt and reciprocal control against betrayal. In such underground groups or cells, treachery, i.e., betrayal of other members to the security police by infiltrated agents, is a frequent practice. Prior to World War II, in both Fascist Italy and the Balkans, the Communist parties accumulated a wide and deep experience in clandestine operations. The objective of an aggressive faction or party (such as the Bolsheviks in Czarist Russia or certain Communist parties abroad today) may be to eliminate rivals in anticipation of a future day when repressive controls will be lifted and the struggle for power will emerge into the open, as it must after any coup d'etat. Within such a context the conditions of underground operations are highly favorable to the penetration and ruthless elimination of rival groups through proven techniques of treachery. Because of the secret, usually cell-type organization of most underground groups, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to determine that a given member of a particular group is an agent who has penetrated the organization. After penetration, such agents have been known to organize sabotage missions and, at the last moment, deliberately to alert the "security police" and then disappear, leaving the unfortunate members of the rival party or faction to face a firing squad or to languish in the nearest concentration or "re-education" camp.
Such brutal treachery has been a standard practice in underground or resistance operations for years. During the twoyear period before Hitler launched his attack on the U.S.S.R., in a Secret Protocol of September 28, 1939 Nazi and Soviet authorities in Poland agreed to cooperate wholeheartedly to suppress "Polish agitation which affects the territories of the other party." 26 In December, 1939, at Zakopane, Poland, at a joint meeting of Nazi and Soviet security officers, NKVD representatives proposed to set up in the Nazi-occupied area a secret Communist organization of agents provocateurs to penetrate the real Polish underground and submit reports to both the Gestapo and the NKVD alike. The proposal was accepted, and after successful penetration numerous Polish resistance leaders were liquidated. This organization of traitors later transformed itself into the PPR, the Polish Workers' Party, as the present Communist party in Poland is called. In the later stages of the war, one of the principal objectives of the PPR was to incite the real underground into a premature uprising which would have been ruthlessly crushed, thus leaving the field open after the war to the bogus "resistance" which had been secretly but systematically denouncing the genuine resistance groups. 27
Manipulative persuasion is of greatest concern when it takes the form of carefully planned and propagandized quasi-military moves, such as the staging of "bandit raids," the massing of troops and tanks, or the brandishing of airpower, missiles, and thermonuclear "super-bombs." Such actions as purely political moves are by no means new. On the contrary, they are among the more familiar and time-honored tricks of international power politics. Marx himself, writing an article on "The Russian Humbug" in the New York Tribune of June 22, 1853, discounted widespread European press reports of Russian troop movements toward the Balkans as "nothing but so many ridiculous attempts on the part of Russian agents to strike a wholesome terror into the Western World. 28
New in international relations, however, is the deliberate peacetime planning and execution of quasi-military measures and their exploitation through the mass media of persuasion on a world-wide scale. Beginning with the Nazi "psychological warfare annexes" to plans for operations against Czechoslovakian the major powers have devoted increasing attention to overall "psychological strategy" and to the use of "the psychological instrument of statecraft." In the early 1950's, the United States established and for some time utilized a Psychological Strategy Board on the highest governmental level, directly responsible to the President. 29 In the months preceding the invasion of Poland in September, 1939, the Nazi regime ordered a number of provocations which were skillfully exploited primarily for their psychological effects on the target population, the Polish people. Moreover, there is evidence in Polish and other state papers of the period that the Poles themselves were well aware of the psychological purpose of such provocations and were not intimidated. As a concrete illustration of the latter case, Poland refused to be provoked by an influx of Nazi "tourists" in mid-summer of 1939 "The Polish Government was determined not to be scared by any psychological terrorism into imprudent action ... a war was not won by a few thousand 'tourists.' The Germans knew that quite well, and were mainly hoping to provoke and intimidate Poland." 30
The late Professor Edward Mead Earle described how "fear of a knockout blow delivered by Germany from the air provided the political climate in which Nazism flourished. ... For physical apprehension -- 'something approaching naked fear' in the opinion of one British military critic -- of aerial bombing played a large part in causing people to make the worse appear the better reason and to misjudge the true character of their interests. This is not to say that the people of France and Britain were craven; it is merely to suggest that because of the threat from the air it was easier to persuade them than it otherwise would have been that there was merit to Hitler's claims, and that discretion was the better part of valor.... The subsequent defeat of the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain should not blind us to the fact that its bloodless victory of 1938 came periously close to deciding the fate of the world." 31
In a like manner, in the period immediately following World War II, a moral atmosphere or political climate favorable to Soviet intervention has been created by the presence of Soviet troops stationed either within or along the borders of most Central European countries. In this respect, Ivo Duchacek writes, "The effect of the display of Soviet power is more responsible for Communist successes both in infiltration drives and final seizures of power, than the attractions of Marxist-Leninist doctrine." 32
The primary role of such ready force in Soviet intervention in the East European satellites was first explained in an off-the-record speech (later suppressed) to Hungarian Communist party leaders by Jozsef Revai, Minister of People's Culture in March, 1949 "We were a minority in Parliament and in the Government, but at the time we represented the leading force. We had decisive control over the police forces. Our force, the force of our Party and the working class, was multiplied by the fact that the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Army, were always there to support us with their assistance." 33
Excerpt from The Strategy of Subversion, by Paul Blackstock, Quadrangle Books, 1964, pp. 78-94.
Footnotes:1. W. E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore, 1956), p. 2.
2. Julian Towster, Political Power in the USSR, 1917-1947 (New York, 1948), p. 20. On propaganda and violence as interrelated forms of persuasion, see Ernst Kris and Hans Speier, German Radio Propaganda (New York, 1944), pp. 322. On propaganda as "physical violence," see Serge Chakoutine, Le viole des foules (Paris, 1939), Chapter 14, "Symbolism and Political Propaganda." On the functional relationship of propaganda and terror, see E. K. Bramstedt, Dictatorship and Political Police (London, 1945), pp. 137-159. For a recent comparative analysis, see Hideya Kumata and Wilbur Schramm, Four Working Papers on Propaganda Theory (Urbana, 1955).
3. John Maynard, Russia in Flux (New York, 1948), p. 90.
4. V. Lenin, Selected Works (Moscow, 1952), pp 282-286. For a typical orthodox discussion of political assassination, see the chapter, "Tirannicidio e terrorismo," in Emilio Lusso, Teoria dell 'Insurrezione (Rome, 1950), pp. 145-155.
5. Pravda, January 17, 1963; Washington Post, November 29, 1963.
6. Washington Post, February 3, 1962.
7. New York Times, June 13 and September 16, 1963, respectively.
8. C. L. Sulzberger in the New York Times, March 4, 1962.
9. U.S. Dept. of State Publication 7308, Far Eastern Series 110, Parts I and 11, December, 1961.
10. Ibid., Part 1, p. 13.
11. Report of former U.N. Intelligence Chief in the Congo, Col Bjorn Egge, in We New York Times, November 16, 1961.
12. Sorel, op. cit., especially pp. 32-33, 45-47, and 50.
13. Mosca, op. cit., pp. 193-194, 203-204.
14. Der Zauberberg (Stockholm, 1939), 11, 186. On the character of Naptha as an authoritarian prototype, see also Robert Payne, Zero, The Story of Terrorism (New York, 1950), pp. 53-54.
15. Thomas Mann, op. cit., 11, 187.
16. New York, 1934, pp. 14-15.
17. New York, 1950.
18. New York, 1950.
19. The God That Failed, pp. 202-203.
20. Harry Howe Ransom, Can American Democracy Survive Cold War? (New York, 1963), p. 176, n. 9.
21. Walther Mediger, Moskaus Weg Nach Europa (Braunschweig, 1952), pp. 304-305.
22. Ibid., pp. 582-597.
23. M. K. lonou to Giers, NKG, September 10/22, 1887, cited by Jelavich, op. cit., p. 283.
24. The estimate was given by a former high-ranking Israeli intelligence officer and confirmed by Allen Dulles during a public visit, as a guest lecturer, to the University of South Carolina, April 2, 1963.
25. De Gramont, The Secret War, passim. For a case involving alcoholism, physical intimidation, and "the twin scourges of the lower middle class -- stupidity and cupidity" (Harry Haughton), see Chapter 10, pp. 299-345. On the problem of homosexuality, see the case of the two American defectors, William H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell, Chapter 12, pp. 404-419. For a comparable English case involving blackmail, that of William Vassall, see the Washington Post accounts of September 14 and October 10, 1962, and April 26, 1963. The sensational trial of IvanAsen Khristov, a Bulgarian spy who allegedly received $200,000 from the CIA, was used by the regime as the pretext for stoning the U.S. legation in Bulgaria. Khristov alleged that the CIA had flown each of his three mistresses three times to New York to see him, which, if true, would certainly establish a record in the use of sex in agent control. See the New York Times, September 27, 28, and 29, 1963.
26. U.S. Dept. of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941, p. 107.
27. According to the account of Dr. Branislaw Kusnierz, the Polish Resistance leader, in Stalin and the Poles (London, 1949), pp. 168-177. As Minister of Justice in the government of General Bor Komorowski, Dr. Kusnierz no doubt had access to highly classified documents concerning such operations.
28. See especially the "Case Green" (Munich) documents, N.C.A., 522-523 ff
29. See Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde, Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy (Chicago, 1960), especially Chapters I and 2, pp. 1-54.
30. Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents Concerning German- Polish Relations, Miscellaneous No. 9 (London, 1939), p. 96. On the Nazi-staged border incidents which were used as a pretext for the invasion, see Chapter 9 below.
31. "The Influence of Air Power Upon History," Yale Review, Summer, 1946, pp. 586-587.
32. The Strategy of Communist Infiltration The Case of Czechoslovakia (New Haven, 1949).
33. See his "On the Character of Our People's Democracy; in Foreign Affairs, XXVIII, No. I (October 1949), pp. 143153.