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    OSS - The Psychology of War

Morale Operations Branch



Italy



I. WAR OF NERVES CAMPAIGN

Carry out a "war of nerves" against Italy, keeping her constantly worried over invasion threats and confused as to our plans. To do this, we must manipulate all signs and sources that might be used by the Axis to infer our future actions. If successful, we can destroy the validity of these signs as bases of inference, so that the Axis will no longer have faith in them when real action is impending.

II. TERROR CAMPAIGN

Wage a campaign of terror against the Fascist leaders and the Nazis in Italy.

III. AIR RAID DEMORALIZATION

Use all possible means to maximize the demoralizing psychological effects of air raids over Italy.

IV. INFLATION CAMPAIGN

Wage an intensive campaign through all relevant channels with aims of (1) aggravating the present conditions of inflation in Italy, (2) increasing the fear of inflation, and (3) bringing these effects into a paralyzing climax during the month or two prior to direct military action.

V. PEACE FEELERS CAMPAIGN

Spread peace feelers and rumors about peace to create false hopes and expectations among both Italian leaders and people.

VI. PRAY FOR PEACE CAMPAIGN

Initiate a "Pray for Peace" campaign to increase popular sentiment against the war.

VII. MESSAGES-HOME-FROM-ITALIAN-SOLDIERS CAMPAIGN Operation Plans for Italy, Jan. 1943 (17 pages detailing the above plans)

The material exposes a great many sore-spots in the Italian social structure into which we might rub salt and arouse frictions and antagonisms. These are extremely valuable but from a psychological point of view they are not enough -- at least so it seems to me. Before constructing a finished plan of attack we must evaluate very carefully the various possibilities open to us and the kind of psychological frame of mind it is desirable to induce in our adversary in order that the achievement of our goal may be facilitated. In the present instance we can predict with considerable certainty that if we are successful in throwing salt into these various sore spots the resulting state of mind in the Italians will be one of confusion in which every Italian will tend to grapple with his neighbor and no concerted action would be possible. ... I think it is safe to assume that during the year and a half of participation in the war the internal frictions in Italy have diminished rather than increased and that there is an underlying tendency to feel that they will all have to pull more or less together in order to make the best out of a bad mess. If this is true we could expect to find among the Italians an unconscious resistance to fall prey to our technique of incidint confusion and frictions among them which would defeat our aim. ... Instead of attempting to split the Italian naiton into a number of sub-groups we should, therefore, strive to unite them more firmly while redirecting their energies to a new goal which serves our own purposes better. Considerations in connection with the Italian Plan, by Walter Langer, Jan. 14, 1943

To promote passive resistance against the occupying German forces and the Fascist regime. [rumors, mails and chain letters, supersititions and black magic, popular religious movements, counterfeit documents, anti-Italian jokes, and exploiting and spreading spontaneous techniques]; To make preparations for and promote active resistance when authorized by competant authority. [rumors, symbolic acts by Italians, subversive groups, sabotage instructions, inciting riots]; To discredit the Fascist regime. [rumors, discrediting Axis propaganda]; To create confusion and disaffection in the civil population and in the armed services. [superstitions and black magic, mails and chain letters, rumors, counterfeit documents and papers, raising false hopes, and exhibition of cripples] Suggestions for Subversive Activities in Italy, March 13, 1943

Suggestions for Activities of Special Communications Detachments Against Italian Civilian Populations, March 13, 1943

Suggestions for Special Communications Detachments Activities Against Italian Troops, March 13, 1943


I Carbonari

Herewith a leaflet in both Italian and English for distribution by airplane over Italy. It is hoped you can arrange to have a dozen or so printed in Italian in the style of an underground leaflet to be dropped over some Italian city such as Naples. The idea of course is to spread the fear among the Caribinieri that their organization is to be dissolved and absorbed by their old rivals the Militia. It is expected that one or two of the dozen dropped will come into the hands of the Caribinieri. A secondary but important purpose is [to] cause the Italian authorities to believe the hold underground movement called "I Carbonari" is revived and active again, and to send police on a wild-goose chase running down its members. Carabinieri Reali Pamphlet, July 3, 1943


Evil Eye Campaign


It is recommended that steps be taken immediately to institute a campaign designed for spreading the following rumors ... That in the town of "X" an illegitimate child was born to an Italian mother of a German father. On examining the child it was discovered that in the center of each eye there was a clear image of the Swastika - the crooked cross. Upon further inquiry it was found that the German father had been a personal bodyguard of Hitler and had fallen under the influence of Hitler's evil eye. ... In the execution of this plan it is most important that some degree of subtlety be used to convey the charge that Hitler has an evil eye. It would not do, obviously, to distribute pamphlets carrying the burden of this allegation. The entire campaign must be done in such a wahy that it is largely suggestive and mysterious, not open and direct. Further, it must be so carried out as to appear to arise spontaneously among the Italian people and not to be the result of foreign machinations. Proposal for Psychological Warfare in Italy, May 18, 1943

For your information, there have been accounts in the American press recently to the effect that Mussolini has an evil eye. It was our intention, as you will recall, to pin the evil eye upon Hitler adn not upon Mussolini; rather to make Mussolini the hapless victim of Hitler's spell. However, since the rumors have taken this turn, you might find it desireable to revise our plan to center upon Mussolini instead of Hitler. As a matter of fact, I do not see any objection to the dissemination of both types of reports, since consistency is no great merit in whispering campaigns. It is suggested that in addition to the rumors already indicated in the Evil Eye Campaign, which are included in the outline of the campaign enclosed herein, the following may also be used: (1) In Southern Italy, pictures of Mussolini are being removed from Italian homes and destroyed due to fear of his evil eye, (2) Italian army officers now always reach for a key or other piece of iron when Mussolini's name is mentioned (This is a means of countering the evil eye) (3) In the past year, three of Mussolini's secretaries have died lingering deaths from unknown causes. It is claimed that they suffered under the spell of his evil eye. ... Evil Eye Campaign, May 1943


Rumor Campaign Supporting Allied Invasion

Italian Crisis Rumors, July 31, 1943

Psychological Warfare Proposal - Aspects of Rumor Spreading During Actual Invasion, June 26, 1943


Vatican Rumors

NAME, June 5, 1943

NAME, June 28, 1944

NAME, July 14, 1944


Rumors Related to the Food Crisis

Diseased Meat for Distribution in Italy, May 27, 1943

Suggestions for Rumor, May 24, 1943

Suggestion for Rumor, May 22, 1943

NAME, June 4, 1943

NAME

Suggestion for M.O. Project, May 13, 1943

Suggestion for Rumor Campaign, May 20, 1943


Unsorted


Complete Report on "Ravioli" Operation No. 1, April 20, 1945

[Bari Station] Report for Period 15 Sept to 30 Sept, circa Oct. 1944

Semi Monthly Report, MO Branch [Bari Station], April 29, 1944

Report on Italian Operations, circa 1944

Plan for Sicily, March 18, 1943

Air Raid Demoralization Campaign

Suggestion for Rumor (Grosseto Incident), July 2, 1943

Inflation Campaign

Secret Memorandum from V. Taylor to MOPO Committee, June 23, 1943

Distribute by plane attractive comic leaflets which show a hero, like Mickey Mouse or Donald Duck, carrying out various acts that would annoy and insult the Nazis and Fascist leaders. By this means children could learn indirectly how to make fun of the Nazi salute and of goosestepping, how to called names and     , how to carry out petty acts of resistance and sabotage, [sic] Many adults might also be influenced by seeing their favorite comic charactiers enlisted on in the struggle. OWI: Comic Books

Stress the idea that the Germans have only contempt and hatred for the non-Nordic Italians. Present this in such a way as to make plausible the view that some sabotage in Italy is really German-inspired. OWI: German Contempt and Hatred

OWI Leaflets, circa 1943

Secret Memorandum from Eugene P. Warner to MOPO Committee, June 23, 1943

NAME

Messages Home From Italian Soldiers Campaign, circa 1943

Pray for Peace Campaign

Pre Invasion Inflation Campaign

Incite riots by exploiting real grievances, particularly grievances about food. For example, we should obtain information as to where foods are being stored or where they are being transported. This verifiable information should be let out in the areas concerned, with the additional charge that the food is intended for Germans. It should be rumored that a number of people are gathering to demonstrate at the spot. Other riots might be provoked by des[cribing?] the buildings where Nazi officials and agents live, with the suggestion that the windows of these buildings be smashed. Riots

The most effective sabotage, from a psychological point of view, is that which disrupts the normal reliances of daily life -- food, water, tobacco, heat, transportation, law and order. The following are some more specific suggestions: use cartridges of dynamite, looking like pieces of coal, to insert in loads or piles of real coal that comes to Italy from Germany; if at all, use toxins to create diarrhea only in food publicly known to come from Germany or from the Balkans; get foul-tasting material inserted in tobacco coming from the Balkans; destroy railroad tickets, streetcar tickets, films, coupons of various kinds; set fire to buildings that contain legal and political records. If such instances of sabotage are to achieve their greatest effect, the Italian public must be apprised of them -- by rumor clandestine radio, or other means. In fact, the mere rumor that coal from Germany contains explosives, or food from the Balkans toxins, should in itself be demoralizing, even if the act is not carried out. Sabotage Operations

Superstition and Black Magic, circa 1943

Terror Campaign, circa 1943

War of Nerves Campaign, circa 1943

War of Nerves Campaign, circa 1943

Black Radio Project, August 18, 1943

Material for Gustov Siegfried Eins, Aug. 13, 1943

Proposed Newspaper plant, Aug. 11, 1943

Poison Pen Letter to Compromise Farinacci, June 29, 1943 (page from another document appearing elsewhere in this study)

Newspaper Plant in Furtherance of Etna Campaign, June 29, 1943

Accompanying Rumors, June 26, 1943

NAME, June 24, 1943

NAME, May 15, 1943

Rumor Campaign for Italy, July 12, 1943

Poison pen letter, Aug. 3, 1944



Copyright Paul Wolf, 2004. For educational use only. No copyright to original government works.