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OSS - The Psychology of War
SECRET INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
The Secret Intelligence Branch of the OSS, patterned after the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), collected information from underground organizations. The SI Branch was led by Paul Helliwell and then William Casey. After the war, another SI officer named Frank Wisner was put in charge of handling the Gehlen organization, a network of former Nazi spies. Wisner went on to become the CIA?s chief of the Office of Policy Coordination, the arm of the CIA engaged in political warfare, and committed suicide later in life.
Psychological warfare is the employment of all moral and physical means other than orthodox military operations which tend to: destroy the will and ability of the enemy to resist; deprive him of the support of his allies and neutrals; increase in our own troops and allies the will to victory. This must be consonant with national policy and coordinated with orthodox military operations. The implements of psychological warfare include open propaganda, black propaganda, subversion, and sabotage, special phases of economic and political pressure, and cultural contacts. Since psychological warfare can be waged successfully only when supplemented by adequate intelligence, it becomes necessary that a flow of information regarding the psychological state of mind of groups and populations in both enemy and neutral countries, and their reaction to psychological warfare conducted by our agencies and those of our allies, be available to this office. Therefore, supplementary to your present activities, it is desired by the Director that you secure and send reports regarding the vulnerabilities of enemy groups, both civil and military, and neutral populations which can be exploited for psychological warfare. Instructions to SI agents, Jan. 26, 1943
Relatively accurate facts can be secured as to the activities of the civil government, and the parties or political groups exercising power at the moment, and these reports should be in considerable detail. The more difficult task of securing accurate information as to minority political groups and subversive political organizations constitutes a very real challenge to the Director. He must develop contacts within such groups, or place loyal agents in such groups as members. Such opposition forces should be assisted in every possible way in their aim to interfere with the functioning of the government in power. Financial support should be offered and, if accepted, should be given in such a way that that future actions of the group can be controlled. This can best be accomplished by requiring that one of our agents be given a high position in the organization and that he exercise control over the finances. ... Efforts should be made to foment social unrest in the hostile nationa by agitating the current social problems and pitting one class against the other. A sub-Director who is thoroughly acquainted with the history of the hostile naiton and its peoples should be assigned to study this problem and direct a planned campaign. ... In studying his territory the Director will know the key points in the enemy installations but generally such points will be carefully protected and sabotage of such point must be the act of "desperate" men who have been especially selected and especially trained. ... Propaganda should be divided into two categories, one being the Propaganda Reconnaissance Agent and the other the Propaganda Distributing Agent. ...
The country should be divided into geographical areas and an Area Leader placed in charge of the activities in such areas. This Area Leader should be responsible only to the Director. Each Area Leader should be given no information additional to that which is necessary to carry on the work in his own area and he would not be acquainted with the personnel or activities of the other areas in the country. Conferences or meetings at which the various heads of areas, districts, zones or groups are assembled should never be held. Coordination must be secured through the control exercised by the next higher leader and not by a dangerous assemblage of subordinates. Within each area districts should be created and a District Leader made responsible to the Area Leader. These District Leaders should not be known to each other and as a general rule it should be unnecessary for such District Leaders to be known to the Director of the country. With the proper election of subordinates it should never be necessary for a superior to know anyone other than his immediate subordinate leaders, and those individuals are held responsible for results only and not required to subject their subordinates to contact with higher or adjacent echelons. Within each district zones should be organized and Zone Leaders appointed. These Zone Leaders will be particularly charged with the duty of organizing passive resistance and simple sabotage in their zones. They will also be specifically charged with the duty of acquiring detailed information on all phases of intelligence activities and submitting routine periodic reports on all of the various classes of intelligence referred to above in this memorandum. In the final analysis it is quite likely that the most important results achieved by an intelligence organization will come as a direct result of the routine operations of these Zone Leaders and the participating individuals in their organizations. These Zone Leaders must be carefully selected from among residents of the zone involved. They must have an intimate knowledge of the people in the zone, the industrial organizations in the vicinity and, in general, must KNOW their zone. Care should be taken that a zone is not too large for a single individual to exercise a close personal control of every activity therein. A zone might consist of only a single division of a large plant, a small factory, a single large apartment house, two or three residential blocks of houses, a small village or a sparely populated country or township. ... In addition to the geographical organization of the country, intelligence work must be organized along functional lines. The Director of the country should have on his staff Sub-Directors who are specialists in various lines of activity. ... The Director of the country should have a personal staff composed of special types of agents who will act as his personal "spies" on both of the above mentioned divisions of the organization. This should not be merely a few individuals sent out occasionally by the Director, but must be a definite organization within itself and must be designed to accomplish the mission of policing the organization. It should be highly secret from everyone in the two main operating divisions and should operate in the most ruthless manner. ...
The mobile Agents are utilized by the Leader to travel throughout the geographical subdivisions and may be charged with various types of duties and the accomplishment of various missions. These mobile Agents should have a cover that permits their movement throughout the geographical subdivision. The fixed Agent may be charged with such dutues as constantly observing an installation, or activity and rendering periodic reports thereon, as, for instance, the following types of work: working or residing near a railroad and reporting on the number of troops and supply trains passing, their direction of movement, the identification of the passing units and descriptions of the equipment; working or residing near highway junctions an submitting reports of a similar type; working in a factory and reporting output; working in a hotel and reporting on activities of hostile travelers. A fixed Agent may also be a small merchant or shopkeeper or a householder who will serve as a letter-box or as an addressee for mail communications. ...
Orders to employeees must always be verbal, definite and understandable. It is best to repeat orders, and to have the employee repeat the order, until it is positive that it is clearly understood. Orders should never be given in writing. ... The disposition to be made of an employee who proves to be unsatisfactory or disloyal should be a part of the Director's plan. If the employee proves to be disloyal and is in possession of dangerous information, he should probably be killed. ...
Informers should be made available to known hostile agents and false or misleading information furnished. These informers may be either unwitting individuals or agents engaged [in a] deliberately planned campaign. The activities of known enemy organizations or agents might be embarrassed by rendering anonymous reports to police authorities and thus subjecting them to embarrassing inquiries. When possible their activities might be made the subject of reports to newspapers and thuse secure them unfavorable publicity. The wives and relatives of known hostile agents should be given scandalous information, and embarrassing information of this type should be disseminated so that it reaches the ears of the superiors of a hostile agent.
Instructional Memorandum on Intelligence Operations, circa 1943 (39 pages)Espionage is by its very nature not to be considered as 'honorable' or 'clean' or 'fair' or 'decent.' It consists in obtaining information by stealth, in encouraging and executing sabotage, in wrecking the civilian and military morale, and in combatting equally subversive activities directed against itself. The objectives are accomplished in large part by two appeals: to patriotism and to the lowest nature of individuals -- greed, lust for power, revenge, etc. By far the largest number of AGENTS or EMPLOYEES are taken from the petty criminal class, mal-contents, revolutionaries, refugees or psychopaths. Subject: Special Intelligence Section [of ONI], March 11, 1942
I gave the opinion that the Government of India would probably not agree to any other Government setting up a covert organization within India employing Indian nationals. ... As an alternative we would suggest that the American authorities should indicate on a map the airports and any other areas in which they think cover is necesary. We shall then arrange for them to be put in direct touch with the Service and Police Security authorities on the spot. It would be essential for the Americans to have an officer in each major area with Security experience to effect and maintain liaison. We would also welcome any measures which could be taken to strengthen the American C.I.C. representation in India, and would gladly assist by offering training facilities either for officers or men at out Karachi schools. Most Secret British Document of Maj. Gen. DMI, Feb. 7, 1944
Near East Agents Secret Near East Project No. 10
Secret Near East Project No. 16
Secret Near East Project No. 14(a)
Secret Near East Project No. 21, Nov. 10, 1942
Near East Project No. 23, Jan. 13, 1943
Secret Near East Project No. 23, Jan. 14, 1943
Secret Near East Project No. 25
Secret Near East Project No. 29
Counterfeiting unsorted SEAC X-2 Org. Chart, March 11, 1944
Exploitation of White Russians in the Far East for Espionage Activities, Jan. 1, 1944
Use of White Russians in the Far East, Jan. 6, 1944
Document Flow Chart, Africa Division, SI, circa 1943
Medusa Activities, June 2, 1944
Criteria for Categorical Division of SI Field Personnel, Feb. 14, 1946
Special Plan for Future SI Activities in Albania, Sept. 18, 1944
Capt. Andrews -- SI Possibilities, Nov. 23, 1943
SCE Field Units, Jov. 30, 1943
Notes for the History of SI, Istanbul, Jan. 5, 1945
Memorandum of Chas W. Edwards, June 27, 1944
Monograph on Lock-Picking, March 4, 1944
Copyright Paul Wolf, 2004. For educational use only. No copyright to original government works.
