INDIA-PAKISTAN CONFLICTKashmir
1965 War
Alleged Pak Support of Naga and Mizo Rebels
Independence of Bangla Desh
Indian Support of Mukti Bahini Guerrillas
1971 War
Intelligence Division Office of Chief of Naval Operations Report No. 12-S-49, Nov. 14, 1949
NIE-41: Probable Developments in the Kashmir Dispute to the End of 1951, Aug. 28, 1951
A top-ranking police official permitted ConGen officer to see a highly classified intelligence report from sources supposedly in Indian-occupied Kashmir. The report detailed atrocities perpetrated by Indian troops on Kashmiri Muslims and participation of Indian troops in suppression of pro-Abdullah and pro-Pakistan demonstrations in Srinagar. The report also contained statements alleging an increase in communist infiltration from India into Kashmir and a growth of communist influence supposedly sponsored by the present Kashmir government. Weekly Summary of Political and Economic Events, Oct. 22-28, 1953, Oct. 29, 1953
New York Times correspondent Lukas returned from three day visit Kashmir Oct. 14. Lukas said Kashmir home Min D.P. Dhar told him that he estimated only about 30 infiltrators left in Kashmir Valley and about 300 in the rest of J and K state. On return to Delhi Lukas checked with Defense Ministry's spokesman for confirmation of Dhar's figures. After an interval spokesman called back said MOD estimated about 500-600 infiltrators left in J and K state and that probably Dhar's figures on the valley were "about right." Telegram from New Delhi Embassy, Oct. 15, 1965
Intensified guerrilla/infiltrator training. The GOI has what it consideres solid information that such training being conducted on priority basis in Pak-held Kashmir. ... The GOI has allegedly been informed by Eastern European diplomatic missions that the ChiComs are prodding the GOP to undertake some action against India with assurance ChiComs will undertake parallel action. Pak and ChiCom actions, more particularly in Kashmir area, over past several months, when looked at together, have been such as to convince the GOI that "collusion" no longer adequately describes the Pak-ChiCom relationship. The actions of the two governments appear to the GOI to have been very closely and effectively coordinated. Indo-Pak Relations, Aug. 5, 1967
Sheikh Mohammad ABDULLAH returned to New Delhi on April 27 after nearly two months in Jammu and Kashmir to renew what some have called the "dialogue of the deaf" with leaders of the Indian Government. ... Only with the new Pakistani Foreign Minister and Morarji Desai did Abdullah have a substantive conversation; he reportedly did not see the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, or the President in his calls at their residences. Sheikh Abdullah Returns to New Delhi, April 30, 1968
Bhutto is quoted in today's press as stating that he "absolutely unaware" of alleged secret protocol to Tashkent agreement reported in London Sunday Telegraph. Continuing, he said "... I was bypassed. President Ayub had long secret sessions with Mr. Shastri." Since Indians concluded his firm stand on Kashmir impeded progress, President Ayub had handled negotiations "directly and exclusively" with Shastri and Soviet Premier Kosygin. "... and what transpired in these talks is not known to me." Bhutto on Sunday Telegraph's Story on Tashkent, March 4, 1969
Pakistan government spokesmen and the Soviet news agency Tass have denied a story in the London Sunday Telegraph of March 2 ... alleging the existence of a secret protocol in the Tashkent Declaration of January 10, 1966. The alleged secret protocol was said to have provided for the eventual recognition of the de facto cease-fire line in Kashmir as an international boundary. ... Although of potential long-range significance, the Tashkent Declaration was essentially an expedient to enable Pakistan and India to restore a minimum degree of normalcy to their relations, which were totally disrupted by the brief war of September 1965. It represented a considerable success for Soviet diplomacy and an act of realism on the part of Ayub and Shastri. The Declaration was highly unpopular among West Pakistanis who were convinced, after months of exposure to the government's wartime propaganda, that they had won the war. They believed that this triumph, which should have brought Indian concessions on Kashmir, had been thrown away at Tashkent. Pakistan-India: Allegation of Secret Protocol to Tashkent Declaration, March 7, 1969
Khalid Sheikh, a former Palestinian student in Karachi, was appointed the head of al Fatah in West Pakistan. Representatives are chosen from Palestinians already located in Pakistan, because the organization does not have sufficient funds to assign individuals from abroad. Yusuf bin Abd-al-Aziz, a Palestinian student in King Edward's Medical College, Lahore, was appointed by Khalid Sheikh as the Lahore al Fatah representative. Yusuf represents al Fatah at social functions, at conferences, and with political leaders such as members of the National Awami Party/Left (NAP/L). Yusuf also directs the public relations efforts of other Palestinian students in Lahore. The General Union of Palestinian Students, Lahore Branch, under the presidency of Said Diab, works with Yusuf and solicits funds for al Fatah activities. Khalid Sheikh also has collected donations for al Fatah from Lahore. Yusuf meets with Anwar Medhi the Secretary General of the Ansar al Fatah (Friends of al Fatah) organization in Lahore. Medhi is a lawyer and active member of the NAP/L. In early November, 1969 Yusuf and Medhi accepted an invitation to attend a conference in Muzaffarabad led by Aman-ullah, the head of the Ansar al Fatah office and of the Kashmir Liberation Front. The leadership of the NAP/L has viewed al Fatah as a potential mechanism for creating guerrilla capabilities in Pakistan and views the Kashmir area as more suitable than the Punjab for training. There is no reliable information, however, to indicate that the NAP/L or al Fatah has selected or trained any commandos. Al Fatah in West Pakistan and Lahore, Jan. 9, 1970
According to Mrs. Gandhi last week, the "accession of Kashmir is part of our history and history cannot be reversed or changed." According to her father's postion at the time, "the question of the State's (Kashmir's) accesion should be settled by a reference to the people." Since then, the Indian government's position has evolved through three phases: it first rejected a plebescite on the grounds that Pak forces had not been withdrawn, then on the grounds that Pak military alliances (with the US) had altered the balance of power, and finally on the grounds that the highly suspect elections in Kashmir had constituted a valid and sufficient test of the people's will. Until last week, therefore, the Indian Government has recognized its initial commitment to a plebescite but has maintained that developments first precluded and then obviated the need for one; now, it appears, the Indian Government no longer recognizes the original terms of accesion which have been and continue to be the very crux of the dispute. India: Rewriting the History of Kashmir?, July 27, 1970
Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan was inaugurated November 13 in Muzaffarabad as Azad Kashmir's first directly-elected President. He had received 47 percent of the vote in the four-way contest. Qayyum took a very hard line in his inaugural speech on the reunification of Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan. "The foremost duty" of his government, Qayyum said, would be the completion of Pakistan by making the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir a part of it. For this purpose, military training was "inevitable for every able-bodied person in Azad Kashmir. It was incumbent on every Muslim -- male as well as female -- to participate in "Jehad" as part of his religious duty. ... The only solution to the Kashmir problem "lay in the way which the Mujahideen indicated in 1947;" a massive revolutionary struggle was necessary. Azad Kashmir - Final Legislative Assembly Results - New "Militant" President Inaugurated, Dec. 4, 1970
On January 9, 1971 the Government of India served orders banning the entry of Sheikh Abdullah and Mr. G. M. Shah, the General Secretary of the Plebescite Front, into Jammu and Kashmir. A similar order externing Mirza Afzal Beg, the President of the Plebescite Front, was served earlier on January 8. This was followed by the arrest of over 500 political workers in Occupied Kashmir and, omn January 12, by an order banning the Plebescite Front. All these actions on he part of the Government of India have been deplored by the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Aide Memoire, Jan. 20, 1971
Pirzada stated that sympathy and support for Kashmiris opposing Indian rule was integral part of PPP policy of confrontation with India. DCM expressed understanding where PPP stood but said we nevertheless were disturbed that making heroes out of hijackers could have serious effects which would serve interests neither of Pakistan nor of world community. DCM said that favorable Pak reaction to recent hijacking might encourage other potential hijackers with result that lives of innocent passengers would be endangered. PPP Attitude on Hijacking, Feb. 3, 1971
While the tactics used by the hijackers were wrong, the Azad Kashmir President said that their goal -- the liberation of Kashmir -- was right. This was the cause for which he had pledged his political life. The Azad Kashmir President said that he hoped to achieve this goal peacefully, but was prepared to use force if necessary. The question, he said, was who would support the Kashmiri liberation movement? Sardar Qayyum then urged the U.S. to assist the Kashmiris. They needed help and would take assistance from any quarter, including China, although they preferred it from the West. Views of Azad Kashmir President, Feb. 5, 1971
The upshot of the Simla Summit was an agreement to delineate a "line of control"
in Kashmir according to troop positions held at the December 17 ceasefire and
withdraw troops to the international border from captured territory in India and
Pakistan. Agreement over the delineation of the "line of control" in Kashmir, which
was ready for approval on October 22, has been held up over the question of less
than two square miles of territory held by Pakistan in the Takho Chak area.
India-Pakistan: Simla Accords Aground in Kashmir, Nov 14, 1972
Ceasefire received originally with great relief because it meant end of bombing. Continuing propaganda re achievements of Pak forces seems to have convinced most that only Pak forbearance saved the Indians from disaster. Thus resumption hostilities not seriously feared by man-in-street. ... News photo of US ammunition repeatedly cited as proof diversion US AID from Pakistan to India, altho[ugh] some will admit US only misguided, deceived by wily Hindus. Kashmir settlement: man-in-street parrots commitment to fight for thousand years to win self determination for Kashmiri although unable articulate why Kashmir so vital to Pakistan, intelligent people recognize settlement cannot be on stated Pak terms, hope without much conviction that world statesmen can devise formular which Indians can accept. Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Oct. 20, 1965
It appears that an I.N. vessel was probably sunk and by rigorous security the fact has been successfully hidden to the point that there is as much confusion in the Pak camp as within the attache community as to what actually happened and exactly which ship is missing. If a ship was actually sunk the cover up by the I.N. has been most excellent. Both [n]avies and govts are presently at the end of a small limb on the subject. One is obviously lying. If it is Indian, the proof of one of its ships being sunk by an American supplied submarine will most likely cause some additional dark clouds in US/Indo relations after news of Patton tanks and Saber jets have left the front pages. Alleged Sinking of Indian Navy Frigate, Nov. 6, 1965
Finance Minister Shoaib told Ambassador Jan 5 that GOP had been greatly disturbed
by acts of Afghan govt during Indo-Pak hostilities last September. During early
stage those hostilities, Afghan govt had given GOP assurances it had no need for
concern regarding security Afghan-Pak border. On Sept 16, however, when Pak forces
under greatest Indian military pressure, Afghan govt without warning informed
Rawalpindi it had mobilized (or was mobilizing) its military forces on Pak border
in order ot come to assistance of Pakistan if Indians broke through. This news
received with great concern by GOP which took it to mean Afghans were preparing
to move unilaterally at moment of own choosing to occupy Pushtu areas.
According Shoaib, Afghan action this regard was additional factor in influencing
Pres Ayub to accept Indo-Pak cease-fire Sept 23. ...
Our assessment at time was, and still is, that RGA actions constituted precautionary
measures intended enhance security in border areas, possibly inhibiting large-scale
Afghan Pushtun tribal response to Pak call for jehad against India which
would have appeared inconsistent with traditional Afghan neutrality; and prepare to
secure and defend if necessary Pushtun border areas, including possible intervention
in "Pushtunistan," in case Pak resistance collapsed -- but not rpt not to exert
politico-military pressure on Pakistan while latter engaged in crucial deadlock
with India.
Reported Afghan Pak Border Mobilization During Recent
Hostilities, Jan. 8, 1966
Answering other questions on alleged Pak assistance to the Mizos and Nagas, Deputy Home Minister Shukla said, "Pakistan has helped and is helping" hostile Nagas and Mizos. A number of camps have been set up in East Pakistan in order to train the hostile in the use of small arms and explosives and in guerrilla tactics. According to Shukla, an armed group of 300 Naga and 200 Mizo hostiles entered Assam from East Pakistan on or about September 3, 1966. INDO-PAK: Parliamentary Discussion of Alleged Pakistani Infiltration into Assam, Jan. 6, 1967
Laldenga's presence in East Pakistan has been known for some time, but in general there has been no significant increase in the level of Pakistan's support for the Mizo movement. However, if Laldenga does in fact make his way to London with a view to pressing Mizo claims to independence, the Government of India is likely to take a serious view of the matter. The unusual efforts which India has recently made to prevent Naga leader Phizo from reaching the United States testify to the sensitivity with which the GOI regards attempts by tribal representatives to undercut the negotiations which are now going on with both Naga and Mizo leaders. Alleged Pak Help to Mizo Rebels, April 7, 1967
[T]he Government of India have been constrained, on a number of occasions in the past,
to protest, against the shelter and assistance given by the East Pakistan authorities
to insurgent elements from India including rebel Nagas and Mizos. ... Pakistani
authorities have permitted rebel elements form India to enter East Pakistan freely and
even given them arms aid, financial assistance and military training. Training camps
and other settlements have been set up for the rebels from India at a number of places
in East Pakistan, particularly in the Chittagong Hill Tracts district. At these camps
and centres military training including training in sabotage, jungle warfare and night
operation is imparted to the rebels. Some of these camps are utilized as bases for
launching raids and attacks into Indian territory.
Indian Protest that Pakistan is aiding Naga and Mizo rebels,
April 7, 1970
The Awami League's Ittefaq, in an editorial on October 13, seized upon the government's announcement of an Indian plan to invade East Pakistan to press for the formation of a Bengali division and rifle-training for all able bodied citizens. ... These suggestions and demands have been put forward before by East Wing political leaders, but have always been resisted by the GOP because of the increased potential for separatist or autonomist movements which would be an important side effect of such policies. Indian Plan to Invade East Pakistan - Ittefaq Uses Announcement to Press Demand for Bengali Division and Universal Rifle-Training, Oct. 14, 1965
The essence of Sayeed's presentation is that a new political party called the Muslim Brotherhood Party is being organized in East Pakistan with the avowed aim of overthrowing the Ayub Government's control in this province and establishing an independent state in East Pakistan. Sayeed maintained that the party had the support of several key Bengalis, a well-knit provincial leadership, and the beginnings of an organization down to subdivisional level. Dacca Author Requests US Support for Bengali Coup Plot, Nov. 28, 1967
Central Intelligence Bulletin, Feb. 20, 1969
Attached is a translation of an article which appeared in the Bengali language Dainik Sangram on March 10, 1970. The article, headlined "Conspiracy of the Naxalites in North Bengal, alleges that an extreme leftist group known as the Naxalite East Bengal Communist Party (NEBCP) recently met to make preparations to disrupt the forthcoming general elections and to split the two wings of Pakistan. According to the article, a "comrade" from outside the country (i.e., India) joined this meeting and donated Rs. 700,000 to the NEBCP. Part of this money is to be used to finance the anti-election propaganda and part of the "land capture campaign." By inference, the article indicates that most of the members of this NEBCP are "non-Muslim" (i.e., Hindu). The article concludes that the group will, as in the past, be unsuccessful in their attempt to mislead the people. Comment: Dainik Sangram is the mouth-piece of the Jamaat-i-Islami which is strongly anti-communist, anti-Hindu, and anti-Indian. Naxalites in North Bengal, March 18, 1970
The task of drafting a new constitution for Pakistan which the newly-elected Constituent Assembly will have to face is exceedingly difficult. In order to devise a viable constitution the Assembly will have to reconcile sharply divergent needs and aspirations of the country's two wings. By virtue of their election victories, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in East Pakistan and Z. A. Bhutto in West Pakistan have become key figures in the country's political development. At the same time, since their victories were wholly confined to the East or West Wing respectively, they have emerged as the primary spokesmen of the Wing they represent. Sheikh Mujib seeks a transfer of most important government powers to the provinces, with the powers of the central government sharply restricted. Mr. Bhutto would wish to preserve a much larger share of these powers for the central government which so far has been dominated by West Pakistanis. In the foreign affairs field the most important difference between the two men concerns the relatinship with India. Bhutto and his followers feel strongly about the Kashmir issue and would strenuously oppose any "normalization" of relations with India which Sheikh Mujib is likely to seek. Pakistan: In Search of Consensus, Feb. 5, 1971
Bhutto, whose Pakistan People's Party controls more than half of the Assembly seats from West Pakistan, has asserted that he is the spokesman for the West, and has previously said that no constitution could be written without his approval. However, the Awami League is certain to take the position that the Constituent Assembly, with or without Bhutto's party, has the power to write a constitution, and will overwhelmingly endorse one based on the Six Points, after gaining as much West Wing support as it can from Bhutto's opponents. It will then be up to President Yahya to either accept the constitution or face an East Pakistani revolt which would split the country. Pakistan: Bhutto Says No to Constitution-Making, Feb. 16, 1971
Department commends ConGen Blood for skillful handling Awami League leader Alamgir's approach for U.S. support for independent East Pakistan. Confidential Telegram from Dept. of State, Feb. 11, 1971
The new government of East Pakistan, hereafter referred to as East Bengal, will be dominated by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League. This party's candidates won almost 99 percent of the provinces's seats in the December 1970 Constituent Assembly elections. The Awami League has so compelling a mandate for provincial autonomy that it will be extremely difficult for it to compromise on basic constitutional issues with the leader of the majority in West Pakistan, Z. A. Bhutto. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party, moreover, won by a narrower margin, carrying only 60 percent of the West Wing's seats. Once the split occurs, the new East Bengal government is likely to be socialist-reformist domestically and neutralist internationally, leaning toward the West, and favoring a rapprochement with India. Pakistan: Implications of Political Separation, Feb. 22, 1971
Since the military hard liners now appear to have gained ascendancy with Yahya, a resort to repressive efforts to thwart East Pakistani aspirations is a real possibility. Nevertheless, use of force is not likely to deter the Bengalis; it will only deepen their antipathy toward the West wing and make it more difficult for a moderate successor government to rule. The apparent shift away from attempts at concilliation suggests that Yahya's hopes for a relatively crisis-free transition to civilian government have been dashed. Unless the East Pakistanis can be brought to believe that the West wing intends to treat them equitably -- a prospect which has become increasingly unlikely -- secession appears inevitable. Pakistan: Crisis Deepens, March 2, 1971
As Pakistani political crisis deepens with possibility martial law administration may be prepared to use force to maintain unity, attitude of GOI takes on growing importance. GOI has capability to interdict air and sea communication between two wings of Pakistan and might under certain circumstances intervene militarily, possibly at request of Bengalis, in face West Pak attempt to put down secession by force. Pakistan Political Situation, March 3, 1971
Jonganeed asserted that he has been reliably informed that Yaqub has been transferred out of East Pakistan because he refused to be party to rfy [sic] military subjugation of East Pakistan and it is in preparation for this eventuality that Lt. General Tikka Khan was assigned to replace him. Report General Yaqub has Departed East Pakistan, March 11, 1971
It is difficult to be completely objective in Dacca in March 1971 when, out of discretion rather than valor, our cars and residences sport black flags and we echo smiling greetings of "Joi Bangla" as we move about the streets. Daily we lend ourselves to the out pouring of the Bengali dream, a touching admixture of bravado, wishful thinking, idealism, animal cunning, anger, and patriotic fervor. We hear on Radio Dacca and see on Dacca TV the impressive blossoming of Bengali nationalism and we watch the pitiful attempts of students and workers to play at soldiering. Chances of a Political Solution, March 11, 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin, March 15, 1971
[Pakistan Ambassador] Hilaly said India had permitted establishment provisional government on its territory and was providing financial support. In GOP view, such provisional government exists only in GOI's imagination, is designed to justify Indian intervention, and to aggravate already serious situation. Hilaly said GOP understands that several representatives of so-called Provisional Government already have gone abroad to seek support. One such representative, Zakaria Choudhury, has already arrived in London. According Reuters news report London, April 15, he has held press conference and has been interviewed on BBC, claiming that Bengali separatists control three fourths of East Pakistan. Same news report states that FCO has refused receive Choudhury. Provisional Government of Bangla Desh, April 17, 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin, Aug. 26, 1971
U.S. Agents Pressuring Bangla Desh, Sept. 8, 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin, Jan. 3, 1972
And This Is Intelligence?, Jan. 11, 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin, Jan. 13, 1972
CIA Supports Bengali Elite, Jan. 13, 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin, Feb. 1, 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin, Feb. 10, 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin, Nov. 3, 1973
Bangladesh: First Hundred Days of the "Second Revolution," May 9, 1975
Bangladesh: New District System, July 1, 1975
China-Pakistan-Bangladesh: Relations Established, Oct. 6, 1975
TASS Report: "The Situation in Bangladesh," May 8, 1976
Initially, the Indians are likely to confine their actions to expressions of sympathy for and perhaps support to East Bengalis. They will watch closely for signs as to the strength and prospects for success on the part of East Bengal dissidents. If the evidence indicates to the Indians that the East Bengal independence movement has reasonably good prospects for success, the GOI may do any of several things: tolerate privately provided cross-border assistance to the East Bengalis. This assistance could range from propaganda support to weapons and explosives; permit East Bengal dissidents to use India as a refuge and to conduct cross-border activities from within India; covertly provide supplies, including weapons, and perhaps some training, to East Bengal dissidents. Indian Reaction to Pakistan Events, Mar. 29, 1971
Shahi displayed concern over evolution of events in East Pakistan and thought competing communist elements from India could set off armed struggle between left and right forces in East Bengal which could overshadow current hostilities between separatists and army. Pakistan PERMREP Protests Indian Interference, Apr. 9, 1971
Pakistan High Commissioner told Ambassador today that Pakistan and India on verge of war. ... He claimed 3,000 Indians armed with regulation Indian Army equipment either kiled or captured by Pakistani troops in East Pakistan. Conversation with Pakistan High Commissioner, April 30, 1971
In addition to its concern about the refugee problem, the GOI has been taking steps to support the Bengali struggle for independence in the face of the military successes of the Pakistan Army. The BSF has established camps at which 10,000 Bengalis are reportedly receiving training in guerrilla and sabotage tactics. Limited quantities of arms and ammunition continue to be provided to the Bengali separatists and some Indian forces have infiltrated into East Bengal to provide assistance and training to the separatists. ... [W]e have learned from intelligence sources that China may have given a conditional promise to assist Pakistan in the event hostilities break out with India. The Chinese may have also given assurances that they will initiate military action "along the Tibetan border" if Indian troops deliberately cross the Pakistani border in force. Should the Chinese become directly involved,it is likely that the Soviet Union will openly support India and will presumably provide such military assistance as required. Contingency Study for Indo-Pakistan Hostilities, May 25, 1971
For some time now India has been systematically interfering in internal affairs of Pakistan with clear aim of jeopardizing Pakistan's territorial integrity. India has sent armed infiltrators into East Pakistan to create disturbances and to help anti-state elements. She has circulated false and highly distorted and tendentious accounts of events in East Pakistan through government-controlled radio and press. She has not only provided shelter to anti-state elements on her soil but has also persistently allowed so-called members of "Bangla Desh Government" to use her radio and other mass media to stir up rebellion against legitimate government of country. Pakistan Protest Note to India, May 26, 1971
We have pursued three courses with regard to the Indians. First, since the refugee burden seems to be India's major problem now, we have taken a number of steps to encourage India to manage this problem by getting international assistance rather than by taking direct action against East Pakistan as some Indians are urging. Partly because of our actions U Thant is getting an effective international assistance program underway. We are already helping and will be stepping up our assistance. Second, we have taken up with the Indians their cross-border support to guerrillas and have privately cautioned them against direct action. Third, in order to persuade the Indians that a solution to the East Pakistan problem can be achieved without their direct military intervention, we have confidentially briefed them on the positions we are taking privately with Pakistan. Possible India-Pakistan War, May 26, 1971
Following based on Corr's personal observations and discussions with M.A.K. Chaudhry, Inspector General Police (IGP), East Pakistan, formerly IGP North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Joint Embassy-USAID Message, June 25, 1971
Choudhury admitted that attacks by Mukti Bahini forces against police stations in rural areas seemed to be continuing at a high level but asserted that at least now police were fighting back rather than dropping their rifles and running. ... Referring to Dacca, he said bombings and sabotage were a major headache for his forces. Recalling press item three days ago announcing capture of young Bengali carrying explosives, IG said man was part of three man team designated to disrupt SSC (matriculation) examinations. He said young man was found with impressive supply of grenades adn other explosive devices, all with Indian markings. Man admitted to membership BM and to having been trained at Argatala before undertaking mission. Status of East Pak Police, July 23, 1971
Two successive batches of insurgents have now completed training in India and have boosted
number and quality of infiltrators. Number of Mukti Bahini have received training at Dehra Dun
and been commissioned as officers. Additional numbers are now in training at various Indian
centers. Meanwhile extremist elements including Naxalites have taken advantage of opportunity
to step up their own activity, on the other hand, Hamid said, Mukti Bahini are not so successful
as they would like to have people believe.
Conversation with Pak Army Chief of Staff: East Pak Situation,
Aug. 11, 1971
Acting Secretary Johnson called in Indian Ambassador Jha August 23 to discuss USG concerns about reports of GOI intention to step up its support to Mukti Bahini and to express USG hope that GOI could use its influence with Mukti Bahini to discourage and prevent attacks on relief facilities and personnel in East Pakistan. Jha in response indicated historical tradition of anarchic violence in Bengal and physical and poltiical difficulties which GOI would face if it tried disarm guerrillas. Jha stressed dangers of radicalization of Mukti Bahini. Indian Support to Mukti Bahini, Aug. 12, 1971
During Hilaly's call on Cisco August 13, Hilaly raised question of role Senator Church and his office playing on behalf of Bangla Desh Movement. Hilaly's Call on Sisco, Aug. 14, 1971
Primary problem is not cross-border activity by Paks but rather by Indians, including vital support they are giving to Mukti Bahini. We believe problem of potential serious cross-border action by Paks would be easily eliminated if India halted its own support for military operation within East Pakistan. Indo-Pak Escalation, August 20, 1971
Three months ago East Bengali leftist parties sought the formation of a United Front Government. They were then rebuffed by the Awami League, which asserted that its sweeping victory in East Bengal in the December 1970 general elections conferred on it a mandate as exclusive representative of the people of East Bengal. The creation of the council is thus a major shift in the Awami League's stance. Some sources believe that the council was formed as a result of pressure from leftists within the Mukhti Bahini; since the "liberation force" appears to have drawn heavily on students, it is very likely that it has a higher than average complement of leftists. Moreover, the Mukhti Bahini runs the day-to-day risks in the struggle against the Pakistan Government and now has more immediate contact with the people of East Bengal than the BDG, whose members are in India. Thus, the Mukhti Bahini might have been able to convince the Awami League of the need to broaden the BDG's base. Bangla Desh: A "National Liberation Front" Emerging? Sept. 21, 1971
Serious concern over Indian military deployments, strengths, and intentions was expressed during Sep 30 briefing of Congressman Frelinghuysen by Major General Jilani, Director General, Inter Services Intelligence, and his staff. ... They also portrayed 69 Indian-sponsored insurgent training camps bordering East Pakistan, with an estimated total of 30 - 50 thousand rebels in training. Pak Military Intelligence Briefing for Congressman Frelinghuysen, Oct. 1, 1971
Although India had not started the crisis, it was, for reasons of its own, supporting guerrilla activity in East Pakistan, even though this was denied. Memorandum of Conversation with Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home (Great Britain), Oct. 3, 1971
Sir Terence asked about US representations to India on latter's aid to Mukti Bahini. I replied that GOI position is that it gives sympathy and support, as demanded by Pariament, to members of Mukti Bahini who enter India and then go back with or without arms. GOI makes clear it will not stop this support. However, GOI will not admit that it is supporting training camps for Mukti Bahini on Indian soil, despite ample evidence to contrary. I expressed doubt regular Indian Army units or personnel are participating in military activity in EAst Pakistan, though some Indian Bengalis might be involved. Sir Terence noted incidence of shooting, including artillery, across the border. I speculated that if Paks retaliate it will probably be in Kashmir in order to seize territory for bargaining purposes. War or Peace in South Asia, October 7, 1971
We now have specific report (Calcutta 2605 - protect source) to effect that Mukti Bahini plans to inject as many as 40,000 armed men across border by October 15, with additional 20,000 to follow by end October. This action reportedly would be accomplished with support diversionary actions by Indian Army to keep Pak Armed Forces off balance while infiltration took place. We are not convinced that intensified guerrilla activity will achieve results compatible with India's interests. Risks of War in Indo-Pak Confrontation, Oct. 7, 1971
Oct 8 press reported 79 Indian agents eliminated the previous day in two separate actions in Rangpur District. First action in which 44 were claimed killed occurred mile and a half outside Pakistan territory near Daikhata. In second action, north of Lalmanirhat, 35 infiltrators were reportedly killed. In both cases, large quantities of ammunition, including machine guns, grenades and explosives claimed captured. Comment: Press reports of Indian agents and/or infiltrators killed this week now totals 136. More Indian Agents, Oct. 8, 1971
Status of insurgency: In Dacca 2733 we suggested two chief unknowns this situation were: (1) whether population of province had will continue support [sic] MB in face of difficulties and reprisals and (2) whether MB would be able organize itself for long guerrilla struggle. In past two months we have gathered some evidence on both points: (A) On question of popular support our impression is that urban bourgoisie showing some signs weariness. People in this clas hate West Pakistan as much as in April and May but some beginning wish things would settle down. However, peasants who must actually feed and shelter guerrillas appear be on side of MB as much as ever. This true despite fact that there are now more guerrillas than in July, placing correspondingly heavier burden on rural people. Army's reprisals against villagers for MB actions appear counterproductive in sense of increasing their hatred of the army and support of MB. In sum, MB's popular support appears to be holding up. (B) Question of organization somewhat more obscure. As reported in Dacca 4066, MB in Gopalganj claims existence permanent chain of command from Colonel Usmani down to Thana-level guerrillas. MB sources informed Australian Deputy High Commissioner (protect) that MB has about 28,000 EBRS, EPRS, police, locally-recruited militia (Ansars) and veterans; 40,000 men in camps being trained for conventional war; and 35,000 men who have completed guerrilla training and are already active; latter reportedly supposedly scattered among 69 base camps and 100 sub-bases throughout province. According this source, MB intends establish 90 base camps eventually. Best judgment we can make at this point is that while MB has not yet developed its organization to degree necessary to overcome Pak Army, it has made considerable progress. First evidence of parallel BD shadow government appeared during month: as reported Dacca 4066, Time Correspondent Dan Coggin met individuals in Gopalganj Subdivision claiming to be governing area in name Bangla Desh Government. Pakistan Internal Situation, Oct. 9, 1971
Former East Pakistan Governor Abdul Monem Khan shot to death night October 13 at his home in Dacca. As Monem Khan had been conferring with conservative polticians for past several months with view toward ending his retirement, strong likelihood is that assassination carried out by Mukti Bahini. Assassination of Monem Khan, Oct. 14, 1971
The Pakistan Army in East Pakistan has achieved nearly autonomous control of the province, in many respects independent of the policies and direction of President Yahya Khan in Islamabad. Only foreign affairs affecting East Pakistan is firmly in the hands of Islamabad. The relative isolation of President Yahya Khan is probably the result of many factors. Indications of this isolation are that Army commandersi in the East pursue independent military operations, the Army governs the province behind the facade of the puppet civilian Governor Malik and his cabinet -- who are completely dependent on the Army for their personal security -- with limited reference to Islamabad, little but Pakistani successes and India's perfidy is reported from Dacca to Islamabad, and President Yahya Khan lacks independent means of observation, reporting and verification of events in the East. ... The myth of growing political stability in East Pakistan is almost certainly fed to Yahya Khan by reports from his civilian Governor and his Army commanders. The reality is that Army policies and operations -- behind the facade of a civilian government -- are progressively and seriously alienating the Bengali population in East Pakistan, and that the seeds of rebellion are not only those sown by India. President Yahya Khan's Control in East Pakistan is Increasingly Limited, Nov. 5, 1971
General Farman Ali Khan described the loevel of Mukti guerrilla insurgency as somewhat intensifed but manageable because the newly trained Bengali guerrillas entering from India feared to take action. Over 1,400 guerrillas had entered Dacca district in the last 30 days but only a few had chosen to fight. He acknowledged, off-the-record, that this was due to the terroristic reprisal policy. He also acknowledged that terror and reprisal had an "unfortunate effect on Bengali attitudes." But he said, "all Army commanders had concluded that insurgency was more of a problem in areas where the Army had been too lenient and had not demonstrated clean-up operations." ... General Farman Ali Khan said the Army sought to leave the fighting of the Mukti guerrillas to the newly armed Bengali "Rasikars," who now numbered 60,000. He acknowledged that "Rasikars" -- raised as village levies for guard duty with only ten days training, and without NCOs or officers -- did not constitute a disciplined force. However, the "Rasikars" are a destabilizing element -- living off the land, able to make life and death decisions by denouncing collaborators and openly pillaging and terrorizing villages without apparent restraint from the Army. With villagers caught between the Rasikars and Mukti guerrillas, law and order is breaking down rapidly in rural East Pakistan. Hence, the rural population is moving either to the cities which are now overpopulated or going to India. ... General Farman Ali Khan accepted the estimate that at least 80 percent of the Hindus had left East Pakistan. He, off-the-record, spoke of about six million refugees who had gone to India and he anticipated that a further 1,500,000 refugees would probably go to India "before the situation settles down." President Yahya Khan's Control in East Pakistan is Increasingly Limited, Nov. 5, 1971
[I]nitially, insurgence was weak. Indians needed several months to train Mukhti Bahini. Mukhti Bahini have conducted border crossings, and we are satisfied there is active Indian involvement in Pakistan fighting. This is mixed operations, with about four times more Indians than Mukhti Bahini. Indians have publicly acknowledged their direct involvement during last 48 hours. Minister of Defense has said Indian troops are permitted to cross border and go far enough into East Pakistan to quell artillery. India-Pakistan Briefing for Yugoslav, Nov. 30, 1971
Primin Indira Gandhi announced to packed Lok Sabha ... that one hour earlier General Niazi, Pak commander in East Bengal, had surrendered unconditionally in Dacca to General Arora, Indian General commanding joint Indian Army / Mukti Bahini operations. Telegram from New Delhi Embassy to Secretary of State, Dec. 16, 1971
Reports continue to pour in of wanton killings of civilians by Indian armed forces personnel and Mukti Bahini in East Pakistan. In fact, American TV networks have shown pictures of huge crowds of people witnessing the torture and execution of people without any trial. ... The Government of Pakistan would be grateful if the Government of the United States would impress upon the Government of India that the Indian occupation forces would be held responsible for the arson, loot, murder and rape by Mukti Bahini and other elements in East Pakistan. Aide Memoire, Dec. 20, 1971
Citizens of largely Bihari areas of Mohammedpur and Mirpur, on the outskirts
of Dacca, are living in state of terror. Areas are cut off from communications
and food. Lawlessness reigns.
The Bihari Question, Dec. 23, 1971
Reliable sources report that the Pakistan Army has been placed on a low-level alert; less reliable sources indicate that Indian units may have also been put on alert. Substantial numbers of Indian troops have been deployed along the border with East Bengal, and there have been indications of possible Indian deployments in the West. Exchanges of artillery and mortar fire across the eastern Indo-Pakistani border have grown in number and volume over the past few weeks. A variety of sources indicate that India is preparing for major military operations in September. The order of July 28 banning foreign relief workers in India from border areas could signal the start of accelerated military preparations. India-Pakistan: The Guns of August, July 30, 1971
As a result of indications of a military build-up on both sides of the Indo-Pakistan border and of an early massive increase in cross-border infiltration, we instructed Ambassador Keating to see Mrs. Gandhi and Charge' Sober to see President Yahya (a) to propose a pullback of military forces, (b) to point out to the Indians and the Pakistanis the grave damage to our bilateral relations which would result if either provoked a conflict, (c) to indicate the importance which we attached to a political settlement with the elected leaders of East Pakistan, and (d) to ask the Indians to prevent a massive cross-border infiltration of guerrillas. ... Foreign Minister Swaran Singh (Mrs. Gandhi was unavailable) said the U.S. was "distorting" the sequence of events leading up to the present crisis and emphasized the need for genuine reconciliation in East Pakistan. He nevertheless categorically stated that (1) the Mukti Bahini was not present on the Indian border in such numbers ready to march openly into India; (2) the Indian Army would not undertake diversions to cover a Mukti Bahini attack, and (3) India would not attack or make any incursion against Pakistan. He also said India would consider withdrawal of Indian forces if Pakistani forces withdrew. Foreign Secretary Kaul subsequently reaffirmed a willingness to "reconsider" the situation if Pak forces withdrew from the "threatening" positions they now occupy. Proposal for Mutual Withdrawal from Indo-Pak Borders, Oct. 20, 1971
He stressed that any Indian attack on Lahore would invite Pakistani retaliation on Indian cities such as Amritsar and Ferozepore. He noted Pakistani artillery of considerably longer range and higher fire power than any Indians believed to possess. He further stated Pak reconnaissance aircraft have penetrated India as far as Srinigar and returned safely despite Indian pursuit. Pakistan Military Tactics in Lahore Area, Oct. 20, 1971
Reports of extensive and presumably Indian-supported Mukti Bahini penetrations along East Pakistan border could represent serious escalation in Indian/Mukti Bahini pressure tactics against Pakistan. On behalf of President Amb. Keating is conveying to GOI our deep concern over this development. We are also instructing Amb. Beam in Moscow to convey to Soviets our concern over these developments and our hope that USSR will use its influence for restraint by GOI. You should seek immediate appointment with President Yahya to inform him of actions we are taking with Indians and Soviets. You should take not of Yahya letter to President (septel), expressing President's strong appreciation for Yahya's determination continue exercise greatest possible degree of military restraint and "avoid senseless and destructive war with India." Secret Telegram from State Dept to Islamabad Embassy, Nov. 23, 1971
On November 21 an Indian Army Brigade group supported by armed helicopters ingressed into Chittagong Hill Tracts over-running our border out-posts and ingressing approximately 10 miles in our territory. On the same day, another brigade group of 23rd Indian Division launched an attack in the Belonia Salient of Noakhali District pushing 8 miles deep into Pakistan territory, supported by the rest of the Division. In the Brahmambaria subdivision also on November 21 attacks were launched by a battalion group each from 57th Division against two of our border posts at Mukandpur and Saldandi which were over-run. In Sylhet District Maulvi Bazar subdivision, two battalion groups attacked and over-ran our border out-posts at Dhalai, Atheram and Zakigauj. The battalion groups included two companies of Gurkhas. On November 21, another attack was launched in Rangpur District in the Burangamari Salient where an Indian Brigade Group penetrated 15 miles into Pakistan territory up to Nageshwari. On the same day in Jessore District, a major offensive was launched by a brigade group of 9th Indian Division supported by armor and air cover. The attack was launched opposite Chaugacha and Indian tanks penetrated about 8 miles into Pakistan territory. ... As many as 12 Indian Divisions have been deployed around East Pakistan. In additon there are 38 battalions of the Indian border security force. 2nd and 5th Indian mountain divisions which were previously deploted on the borders with China have also been moved towards East Pakistan. The 8th Mountain Division (of 6 brigades) has also been moved to East Pakistan borders towards Sylhet from Nagaland where only one brigade is now left. ... Mr. President, as you are aware Indian armed forces in the last few months have maintained pressure all along our Eastern borders. Apart from training, equipping and launching rebels supported by Indian Border Security force personnel into Pakistan territory, Indian artillery units have been constantly shelling areas in East Pakistan. But as I have pointed out above, in the last 3 or 4 days the Indian Armed Forces have turned from localized attacks to open and large scale warfare on so many fronts. Letter from President Yahya to President Nixon, Nov. 23, 1971
Lest there be any possible misunderstanding on subject of Niazi's intentions in making his approach to me, I should like to emphasize that Niazi is appealing for our most speedy assistance in bringing his proposal to attention of Indian army authorities as quickly as humanly possible in order to reduce liklihood that beginning of assault in Dacca (which could occur beginning with daylight tomorrow) may unleash bloodbath. Today's heavy bombing and strafing of targets in Dacca and elsewhere lend point to Niazi's urgency. I strongly recommend that New Delhi or Calcutta or both be immediately authorized convey Niazi's message directly to Indian army authorities asap. Niazi Cease Fire Proposal, Dec. 14, 1971
"Pakistan Government is putting out false allegations against Indian in and outside UN. They have alleged that India has launched massive attack with tanks and troops in East Pakistan. This allegation is false and baseless and is designed to cover up massing of Pakistani infantry, artillery and armor right up to our borders in an attempt to crush freedom movement in East Bengal and push more refugees into India. To exacerbate the situation further, President Yahya has declared a stae of emergency throughout Pakistan on November 22. This has been done following Pak offensive of November 21 supported by tanks and artillery against freedom fighters who were holding liberated area around Boyra in East Bengal five miles from Indian border. Pakistani armor under heavy artillery cover advanced to our border threatening our defensive position. Their shells fell into our territory wounding a number of our men. The local Indian military commander took appropriate action to break up Pakistani attack. In doing so he destroyed thirteen Chafee tanks whereupon the Pak troops fell back. On November 22 Pakistani forces called up an air strike of four Sabre jets on our positions. These were intercepted within Indian territory by our Gnats who destroyed three Sabre jets." South Asia Crisis, Nov. 24, 1971
Current GOI attitudes toward West Pakistan are necessarily tentative pending Indo-Pak peace settlement and unfolding of President Bhutto's declared policy and actual practice over next months. ... Should Bhutto opt for postures of revanchism and revision, for military buildup, for anti-Indian alliance strategy, GOI might respond by abetting the weakening of West Pakistan from within. Indian Intentions Re Baluchistan and Pashtunistan, Jan. 17. 1972
NY Times and Washington Post Wednesday editions carried Schanberg/Lescaze stories
attributed to Indian sources suggesting USG deliberately delayed transmission of
surrender proposal from Niazi to Indian authorities. ... Spokesman has emphasized
that nothing like 20-odd hours lost; that only even potentially avoidable delay
fell within period 1620-2300 December 14 when we unable to establish contact with
Pakistanis or Indians; that delay was completely unintended and stories suggesting
contrary are unfounded and inaccurate.
Alleged Delay in Transmission of Surrender Proposal, Jan. 26, 1972
See also
The Report of the Commission of Inquiry - 1971 War declassified by the government of Pakistan.