MILITARYU.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group
Airplane Parts in the 1965 War
Embargo Exceptions
Pakistani Security Forces
Atoms for Peace
Soviets and Chinese
The Vice-President [Nixon] then proceeded to state that according to him a military aid arrangement would have the following two main uses: (i) Pakistan's defence forces could be adequately built up and (ii) Pakistan would then be able to face any Communist threat. Aide Memoire, June 12, 1953
We have not taken arms from other countries because we were depending on God and after that on the promises of American Government that he should arm our forces. But we have not recieved except some unfulfilled promises. Then if they really want to give us arms then previous treaties agreements etc are there. If they want to rearm our forces on the basis of previous treaties and agreements they can easily do so. But it seems that there are some hidden powers within the United States most likely the Jews which have got some hints from Britain to stop our rearmament. Therefore the United States Government is acting differently against his stand with Greece Turkey and even with Pakistan as we know. We will be more happy if Pakistan will be stronger no doubt Pakistan's strength is our strength and if the Jews have attacked on the holy land then Pakistan will be in the front of the defenders of the Haramain as it was promised. Letter from King Saud Ibn-e-Abdul Aziz to Ghulam Mohammed, June 2, 1954
U.S. military aid to Pakistan has resulted in successful USSR pressure on Afghanistan to accept Soviet technical aid. Top Secret Department of State Instruction, June 4, 1954
The figures given in this notes are entirely for military equipment. Defense Support Aid is NOT repeat NOT included in them. Top Secret Message from DCCS, Sept. 23, 1955
Then came our meeting in Washington in October '54. On it we were told that America
would be prepared to complete 1 1/2 Division of our Armour and four Divisions of Infantry,
and as we were spending the maximum we could on Armed Forces, apart from weapons etc required
our additional internal expense would also be covered for these Formations. The programme
was to take three years to complete. Thereafter our dealings began with the USMAAG.
Letter from Pakistani General Mohd Ayub Khan to Admiral
Arthur Radford, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Sept. 27, 1955
One area of doubt was question of supplying Gnat components to India and on this point U.S. views were specifically requested. Implicit in British presentation was hope U.S. would relax its current aid policies in both India and Pakistan. In their view both countries realize U.S. arms embargo had had profound effect on Indo-Pak conflict which had greatly benefited India. Telegram from Department of State, Nov. 23, 1965
We gather from reftels and from talks here with UK [ ] James that UK, under heavy Indian and domestic pressures, is now considering some licensing, in compliance with standing commercial contracts, or parts and components for Indian gnat aircraft assembled under British license at a plant in India. In discussions with UK on this matter, assume dept will have [in mind] that any UK action contributing to Indian fighter strength would be significant divergence from US policy of total suspension of military assistance or sales to both India and Pakistan. Such UK replenishment action would add measureably to our problems here by intensifying Pak resentment at continued US total embargo on F-86 spares, with its [unequal] practical effect against Pakistan. In broader context, input into India of militarily significant items could serve to stiffen Indian position on whole range of issues relating to cease fire, withdrawal, and Kashmir settlement, and would increase desperation pressures on GOP decision-making during critical period for future Pak policy orientation. Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Nov. 9, 1965
Pak C-in-C Nur Khan estimate reported reftel and generally supported by independent MAAG and military attache judgements is that PAF under present conditions has approximately one more month full operational effectiveness. About middle Nov. marked deterioration aircraft commission rate all types is expected owing increasing spare parts shortages anticipated from current necessary routine readiness operations. ... Principal consequences for GOP are: (A) early strategic and tactical vulnerability of Pak air and related air-ground capabilities to Indian attack followed by foreseeable total or near helplessness these regards, and (B) weakening bargaining position vis-a-vis India in current preliminary moves and any later actual negotiations Indo-Pak differences. Also, PAF inability maintain air supply lifeline during long winter seasonal cut-off by road to isolated Gilgit-Skardu areas, while militarily marginal, could have political, psychological and humanitarian implications. Indo-Pak Crisis: Imminent Pak Air Vulnerability, Oct. 19, 1965
Most important, perhaps, is fact Soviets have not suspended or delayed arms deliveries and in fact have been sympathetic to Indian requests for accelerated aid and in some cases additional deliveries of items such as MIG-21 aircraft, P 30 M Radar, medium tanks, 130 mm guns, and large amounts of ammunition, in addition to submarines. Although details kept quiet, this general forthcomingness has also been communicated to press in obviously "leaked" stories. At same time Soviets attempting portray West as responsible for roots Pak-India conflict and still interested in manipulating dispute for own purposes. Telegram from New Delhi Embassy, Oct. 13, 1965
... While we would prefer sit out Pak air vulnerability question for time being, the potential consequences of decision facing GOP are sufficiently fateful that we feel obliged refer Malcer to Washington for urgent consideration. ... Any such discussion must make clear to GOP the obstacles which substantial Pak military involvement with Chicoms would pose for current UN and US efforts to assist in movement toward settlement Indo-Pak differences, particularly Kashmir, as well as for future US-Pak relations. Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Oct. 19, 1965
Air Marshall Nur Khan has asserted to me that Indian Air Force is still receiving parts for its British-built planes by commercial procurement from the UK. Similar report also received other sources including Pickard in CRO. NAME, October 18, 1965
Said his best estimate was that with zero replacement of worn parts and normal rate of
PAF routine activity, PAF would remain effective fighting force only four weeks longer.
Then it would "grind to a halt." This applies to fighters, bombers and C-130 transports.
The grounding of the C-130's, with no substitute transports available, would mean the
complete failure of supply during then winter season fo the isolated northern areas of
Pakistan, with starvation the prospect for Gilgit. There was no rpt no alternative
source to which Pakistan could turn for maintenance of the US-supplied planes.
Indo-Pak Crisis: Conversation with
Air Marshall Nur Khan re Pak Air Force Problems, Oct. 16, 1965
I agree with your statement that the less we tell the Indians now about what we have in mind, the more likely the private Indian reaction will include an element of relief that we did not go as far as they may have anticipated. We, of course, will not bring up the subject here ourselves but when they bring it up, as they have been doing, we believe that any comments we make should be carefully phrased with a view to what we eventually will have to tell them. Accordingly, I have phrased my comments in such a way as to suggest to the Indians that we here assume that we are talking about a possible tank sale. Presumably, armored personnel carriers and bombers will not, in any event, be as objectionable to the Indians as tanks, although, with all due respect to Chris Van Hollen's view, it simply will not be possible to justify APCs and B-57s to the Indians as defensive, and I will not attempt to do so. New Delhi Embassy to State Dept Country Director for India, July 28, 1970
Arms package was on one-time exception basis, limited in quantity and largely of defensive or replacement character. It was designed to avoid arms buildup or excessive diversion of resources from economic development to military purposes. South Asia Military Supply, Aug. 20, 1970
I told Banerji it was, in fact, one-time exception. In Indian view, I believed, third country sales had been particularly related to question of procurement of tanks. This was no longer in the picture. However, TZR 1967 policy had provided that third country sales would be considered on case-by-case basis and this policy stood. Banerji rejoined that this left possibility for third country supply of lethal arms to Pakistan and said it detracted from the force of the one-time sale argument. Military Supply: Arms to Pakistan, Oct. 7, 1970 page 1 only
Department officer explained USG continues hope limited sale to Pakistan can be kept confidential and does not intend issue statement as suggested by Embassy. USG recognizes Indians have problem in responding to press queries, however. Department officer therefore proposed we agree on general line of responses in paper. Secret Telegram from State Dept to New Delhi Embassy, Oct. 7, 1970
He expressed "our distress and disappointment" at the way story broke in Washington despite all the talk between two governments in both Washington and New Delhi. He insisted Indian sources have not rpt not been responsible for the leak. Arms for Pakistan, Oct. 9, 1970
Specifically, Gupta alleges that: despite the US Government's embargo on arms shipments, the US Air Force sent to Karachi on November 29, 1971, a C-147 loaded with spares; US and other foreign aircraft were spotted unloading military supplies at Karachi airport during the December 10-11 cessation of air activity agreed to by India to permit third countries to evacuate their nationals from Karachi; President Nixon "authorized" Jordan and Saudi Arabia to transfer to Pakistan US-supplied jet aircraft; the Pakistani cargo ship "Padma" unloaded $1.3 million worth of US arms during the December war; and the US sent the Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal to "blackmail" India, an action which nearly resulted in a nuclear showdown with the Soviet Union. Gupta also insinuates that the US might have been responsible for the sinking of the Indian ship "Khukri." ... In formally releasing "Anderson Papers" to the public, GOI Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram remarked that India will continue its search for a peaceful settlement of outstanding problems with Pakistan, despite sometimes provocative Pak and American postures toward India. He asked "certain major powers" to cease creating trouble in Asia. Tenditious Recounting of US "Support" for Pakistan in 1971 Subcontinent Crisis, June 30, 1972
July 24 Stateman leads with Jack Anderson column headlined "Pakistan to buy torture devices from USA." Column alleges GOP "shopping in US for torture devices for breaking down suspects and brainwashing prisoners." Third paragraph says, "It is suspected -- but can't be stated positively -- that money for torture and tapping devices will come out of US aid funds." Story goes on to quote alleged letter from Pak Army Attache Washington seeking technical information and price quotations, noncommittal comment by Pak Army Attache in response to Anderson query, and comment by head of one of firms which received inquiry. I expect this story will be raised during my farewell calls in next few days, unless advised to contrary, I plan categorically to deny any USG involvement actual or prospective. Jack Anderson Allegation Pakistan Seeking Qte Torture Unqte Devices from US, July 24, 1972
Sultan Khan has asserted that the U.S. arms embargo has significantly diminished Pakistan's military capability by rendering impossible acquisition of spares for aircraft and tanks. In an effort to evaluate Ambassador Khan's assertion, we are seeking from intelligence community its assessment of embargo's impact. In particular, we have asked (a) how important are American-supplied tanks and aircraft to Pakistani capabilities, (b) to what extent has Pakistan been able to overcome the U.S. embargo and thus obtain spares for American-supplied tanks and aircraft, and (c) what is net effect? Secret Exdis Telegram from Department of State, Dec. 8, 1972
Indian concerns about Iranian arms transfers to Pakistan do not square with facts. We recommend
that instead of bringing their problems to us Indians concentrate on reassuring Shah that they are
fully committed to Pakistan's territorial integrity.
Arms Sales - Third Country Assurances, June 16, 1973
Colonel MUZAFFAR Khan assumed charge as Deputy Director of Intelligence for the Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan Divisions. He replaces Salahuddin Qureshi (aka S.D. Qureshi) who on August 20 took charge of his new post as Deputy Inspector General of Police of Dera Ismail Khan Division. Colonel Musaffar Khan Takes Charge as Deputy Director of Intelligence, Aug. 30, 1962
Speculation is increasing as to the intended role and function of the Mujahid Force. Is it, as the name would imply (coming from jehad), intended to train "holy warriors" against India, or guerrilla fighters for use in local defense or elsewhere? Or is it intended to be a sort of Home Guard, designed to release the regular armed forces for combat duty in time of need, and possibly for domestic political purposes? Educated local guessing runs in the direction of the latter. However, because of the distinct anti-Indian and religious coloration being placed on the scheme by high officials, the Mujahid Scheme deserves careful watching in the time ahead. ... It seems significant that the GOP has thus far confined its recruitment in this region to the settled districts, studiously avoiding the volatile tribal areas -- which have built-in Mujahideen forces of their own anyway. Peshawar Area Leads the Nation in Recruiting "Mujahideen" Force: "Holy Warriors," Guerrillas or Mere Home Guard? Dec. 5, 1963
On 8 October Pak army permitted detachment 327 unit at Lahore to be opened and entered by unit personnel. Pak officer in charge granted permission for unit commander to determine that certain items had been destroyed. Under the pretext of destroying documents the unit commander also destroyed classified equipment. He is of the opinion that there is no equipment remaining that could be of use to unauthorized personnel. The unit was re-sealed by Paks upon departure of USAF personnel after two hours access. Entry to detachment 332 at Karachi still had not been authorized on 9 October despite understanding with ISID earlier that day that it would be granted. Secret LIMDIS telegram from CIA, Oct. 12, 1965
By order of the Governor of the NWFP, five Pakistani criminal laws were made applicable to the three former states of Swat, Dir and Chitral as well as the protected tribal territory of Malakand which constitute Malakand Division of the NWFP. ... Henceforth, tribal customs and procedure will no longer apply to the population of the Division which was fully integrated with the settled areas of the Pakistan State in July 1969. Political Notes, Jan. 22, 1971
Creation of a Federal Security Force (FSF) of 13,000 men has been approved by the
National Assembly. Its ostensible purpose is to assist the civil administration
and provincial police with law and order problems and, apparently, to give President
Bhutto an alternative to calling on the Army should a serious internal security
situation arise. Opposition leaders have expressed the fear that the FSF may also
be used against them. The Force is to be headed by a former police official of
somewhat sinister reputation.
Federal Security Force Establishment, June 27, 1973
The Minerals Attache said that while he does not believe it is necessarily contemplated to make
the export of thorium nitrate from the United States to India contingent upon the availability of
supplies of monasite, the raw material, from India, he, nevertheless, felt obliged to point out that
the stoppage of export of monasite from India has inevitably resulted in the shortage of thorium
nitrate which, in turn, must cause serious inconvience in India and other countries where thorium
nitrate is needed.
Government of India considers resumption of monasite shipments, May 6, 1948
In the course of a conversation with an Embassy officer, Bogra said that the Russians have displayed great interest since 1944 in the pressence of uranium in Sinkiang Province. ... Bogra said that uranium mines in the Altai mountains have been worked by the Russians for several years in a more or less surreptitious fashion, and that about 3000 mine workers were employed there. Now that the Chinese communists have obtained control of Sinkiang, he estimates that about 10,000 workers are being employed in the uranium mines. He believes that the Russians may have found deposits in the Altyn mountains in addition to the known deposits in the Altai range. The question was put to Bogra: "If such information were of interest to the American Government, would you be able to obtain precise information concerning the location and nature of the uranium mines in Sinkiang which are now beign worked by the Russians?" He replied that such an undertaking would be "very difficult" and would require considerable effort, but that he would be glad to set about trying to obtain this information if he were informed that it would be of real value to the United States in combatting communism. Bogra was also asked whether he would be interested in helping the United States in the event of a full scale conflict with the Chinese communist regime. He indicated that he would be very much interested in such work. He admitted that it would be difficult for him to undertake any extensive operations within Sinkiang without the support of the Pakistan and Indian authorities. ... He pointed out that such work would not be new to him, as he had been a guerrilla leader against the Russians in this area in 1934 and 1935. Mohamed Amin Bogra, Former Governor of Singiang, Dec. 28, 1950
The Department's attention is invited to page 3 of reference which states that "at the end of June 1963 Moscow offered Pakistan (and two months later delivered) a nuclear research reactor." Recent Soviet Pakistani Relations, Feb. 29, 1964 [Research Memorandum RSB-3 not found attached. - Paul]
Subsequent check by SCI and in Department's files indicated that the reactor described by the broadcast as a five megawatt research unit received by the National Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology in Islamabad was apparently of Western origin. Reported Soviet Nuclear Reactor in Pakistan, April 14, 1964
Desai said that the GOI was under pressure from various sources, including some members of the Cabinet, to develop nuclear weapons. Desai Visit to Washington, Sept. 16, 1967
Abdul Matin Chaudhury, Member for Research of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, has informed the reporting officer that he will go to Islamabad/Rawalpindi as "Chief Scientist and Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of Defense." Chaudhury is extremely fond of his wife and children and is reluctant to be separated from them even for short periods. Despite his apparently excellent qualifications, he gives the impression of a man with a king-sized interiority complex. He is sometimes difficult in discussions, becoming emotional, shouting and pounding desks at times. He occasionally bullies his subordinates. He quarrels in the office with Dr. Usmani, but once a decision is firm he follows orders and apparently delivers the goods. New Science Chief for Defense Ministry, Feb. 20, 1970
Usmani felt confident that Bhutto would ultimately reconsider the matter and come to the
inevitable conclusion that Pakistan could not play the game of trying to be a threshold
nuclear weapon power. Nonetheless, Usmani more than hinted that one of the principal
reasons he wanted to leave Pakistan was his disagreement with any policy decision which
might divert some of the resources of the Pakistani atomic energy program away from
peaceful applications.
Discussion with I.H. USMANI, Former Chairman Pakistan Atomic
Energy Commission, June 8, 1972
During the period under review responsible officials in South Asian governments seemed increasingly aware of the danger of Chinese Communist aggression. Consolidation of Chinese Communist power in Tibet; reported Communist participation in [the] abortive rebellion in Nepal in January; activities of Communist forces in Burma; reported Communist infiltration in Bhutan; and accelerated activity of Communists or pro-Communists in Indian-occupied Kashmir made the Communist threat to South Asia increasingly apparent. South Asian governments, in their endeavor to avoid a struggle with the Communist bloc, continued to maintain correct attitudes toward Peking, Moscow, and satellite governments, but generally speaking they continued to give clear indications that basically they were oriented toward the non-Communist world. The Position of the United States with Respect to South Asia, May 20, 1952
Soviet arms agreement with Pakistan of July, 1968 provided for delivery of variety non-lethal equipment including trucks, radars, helicopters, etc. Major lethal items were two hundred T-54/55 tanks and one hundred twelve 130 mm artillery pieces. Believe only deliveries made between February and June, 1969 and total sixty tanks and sixty cannon leaving deliveries less than half completed. Soviet Arms for Pakistan, Nov. 3, 1970
Basic Pak goal in this initiative is to induce Chinese to reaffirm closeness of Sino/Pak relations despite shifts in Chinese policy and recent events in subcontinent, in order enhance credibility of Peking/Islamabad tie as deterrant to India. Secret Telegram from Islamabad Embassy to State Dept., Nov. 8, 1971
Soviets told his majesty in Moscow they interested in survival West Pakistan and
believe further hostilities would result in deeper Chinese involvement. They would
eventually recognize Bangla Desh, and they working for early end hostilities. RGA
concerned by possible separation Bengal from Islamic family and urges US take all
possible steps to prevent this separation and curb Indian appetite in interest long-term
peaceful settlement sub-continent. RGA says it has resisted strong Indian pressures take
action against Pakistan.
Indo-Pakistan Conflict: King's Moscow Visit and RGA's Views,
Dec. 15, 1971
